Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Zimbabwe as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Zimbabwe is a unitary state, and the Head of State, Emmerson Mnangagwa, seized power in November 2017 through a military coup that forced his longtime companion and political mentor, Robert Mugabe, who had ruled the country since independence in 1980, to resign. Electoral competition in Zimbabwe has faced significant constraints since independence, marked by severe repression, electoral violence, and the politicization of state institutions. For years, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party has deliberately fractured the opposition by engineering splits using courts and state institutions to legitimise rival factions. ZANU-PF party remains the central political actor, supported by security forces, state-aligned non-state actors, and a dominant parliamentary majority, while opposition movements and civil society organisations continue to face systematic obstruction.
National elections in Zimbabwe are a sham, to the point where the mainstream political opposition party has no realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. ZANU-PF emerged as a liberation movement fighting against white minority rule and transformed into a governing party after claiming victory in the historic 1980 elections that led to Zimbabwe’s independence. In every national election since 1980, ZANU-PF has significantly and unfairly hindered the real, mainstream opposition party and its supporters from campaigning and securing votes. ZANU-PF has exerted partisan control of electoral oversight, unfairly skewed the electoral process in its favor, intimidated its main opposition challengers, and staged unfair and untransparent polls, all of which have been tainted with allegations of fraud.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime systematically eliminates opposition members and activists through targeted killings and enforced disappearances, and intimidates them through torture, abductions, threats, and arbitrary detention. It files politically motivated cases under vague, draconian laws and keeps prominent critics in prolonged pretrial detention to silence them. At the same time, it selectively enforces restrictive assembly laws, deploys pre-emptive security operations to block mobilization, and violently disperses protests, often arresting organizers to deter collective action.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. Courts have enabled the regime to validate disputed election results, disqualify opposition candidates, uphold restrictions on opposition rallies, sustain politically motivated prosecutions, and prolong detentions. The regime has retaliated against dissenting judges, weakened judicial institutions by exerting control over judicial appointments, and systematically dismantled accountability mechanisms.
National elections in Zimbabwe are a sham, to the point that the mainstream political opposition party has no realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Despite regular elections, the ZANU-PF government has systematically undermined the electoral process through judicial prosecutions that exclude opposition candidates, violence and intimidation that disrupt campaigns, the denial of rally permits, the appointment of party loyalists to the electoral body, and the detention of local independent election observers prompting the mainstream opposition to threaten to boycott elections, as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition.
The regime has unfairly barred candidates of a mainstream opposition party from competing in elections. It has used pre-election judicial prosecutions and post-election parliamentary recalls to disqualify the mainstream opposition party’s candidates. For example, in the last quarter of 2023, twenty-two mainstream opposition candidates from the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) were barred from recontesting parliamentary by-elections after they were controversially recalled from parliament by an imposter who claimed party authority despite lacking authority from the party – a process endorsed by the Speaker of Parliament and upheld by the courts.
Since Zimbabwe’s independence, the ruling ZANU-PF has significantly and unfairly hindered the mainstream opposition party and its supporters from campaigning and securing votes through violence from state and non-state actors, intimidation, and blocking and disrupting opposition campaign activities. ZANU-PF has systematically orchestrated deadly and violent intimidation against its main opposition challengers and supporters ahead, during, and after election cycles. The 2023 election cycle followed this pattern, with CCC members and supporters suffering extrajudicial killings, abductions, assaults, and torture orchestrated by the regime and its affiliated non-state actors. Also, leading up to the 2023 elections, authorities banned 92 CCC campaign rallies, citing questionable reasons such as unsuitable roads or insufficient police personnel to secure the events. Alongside these restrictions, the regime, through its security services and captured courts, has deliberately worked to weaken the opposition by facilitating its splits on several instances.
ZANU-PF exerts partisan control of electoral oversight through the presidential power of appointment of commissioners of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), which retains the authority to control voter registration, polling station locations and rules, the printing of ballot papers, and the publication of the results of national elections. ZANU-PF, through its control of the ZEC, unfairly skews the electoral process and campaigning in its favor in violation of election laws. Since its establishment in 2004, the ZEC has consistently faced credible accusations of manipulation and rigging in favor of ZANU-PF in collusion with the military and the security agencies. Ahead of the 2023 elections, Mnangagwa appointed six new ZEC members, including three children of senior ZANU-PF leaders. ZEC enforced a 20-fold hike on ballot registration fees for presidential candidates and denied accreditation to a significant number of international observers. It also allowed “Forever Associates of Zimbabwe,” a well-funded group that openly supports ZANU-PF and is suspected of being linked to intelligence and security services, to set up illegal “exit poll survey” desks outside polling stations and take and record the ID numbers of voters before they voted. ZEC was also responsible for significant delays in voting in largely opposition strongholds because of ballot paper shortages.
During the elections, police detained 41 local independent observers working with accredited poll monitoring organizations. International observers and the CCC opposition party contested the integrity of the electoral process and the results of the elections published by ZEC, which awarded Mnangagwa a victory.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The ZANU-PF government has relied on intimidation and arbitrary detention, state-linked violence, including abductions and targeted killings, repression of protests and public gatherings, the criminalization of dissent through selective prosecution under vague and draconian laws, and the systematic capture and manipulation of the media environment to suppress dissent.
Authorities have seriously and systematically intimidated independent media, opposition and civil society leaders, opposition supporters, and regular people with threats, violence, arbitrary detention, and politically motivated prosecutions. For example, in May 2022, Blessing Mhlanga, a prominent journalist, and Chengeto Chidi were assaulted, detained, and charged for recording the arrest of opposition legislator Job Sikhala, who was subsequently held in pre-trial detention by authorities for 595 days on politically motivated charges.
Through state-sponsored violence, the ZANU-PF government and its aligned non-state actors have killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents by carrying out abductions, torture, enforced disappearances, and targeted killings of opposition supporters and activists. In addition to the well-known case of Itai Dzamara’s enforced disappearance (suspected to be done by the regime) in March 2015, clergyman Tapfumaneyi Masaya was abducted by authorities in November 2023 while campaigning, tortured, and later found dead, his body dumped on the outskirts of Harare. Earlier, Tinashe Chitsunge, a CCC activist, was ambushed and stoned to death while trying to flee from a ZANU-PF mob that was assailing opposition activists who had gathered to hold a rally.
Moreso, the regime seriously and unfairly represses protests and gatherings through bans, violent dispersal by security forces, mass arrests of organisers and participants, pre-emptive security deployments to deter assembly, and the selective enforcement of the draconian Maintenance of Peace and Order Act. For example, authorities killed six people during a post-election protest in August 2018 and at least 17 during the nationwide stay-away in January 2019. It systematically banned an opposition gathering ahead of the 2023 elections, and raided a peaceful gathering of more than 100 opposition supporters in June 2024 and remanded 78 of them to prison on charges of unlawful assembly. The regime also arbitrarily arrested and tortured over 160 activists and opposition members in mid-2024 to pre-empt planned demonstrations ahead of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit in Harare.
Regime officials attempted to shut down major independent dissenting organizations through administrative suspension orders issued without due process. In mid-2021 state officials issued directives—later blocked by the court—targeting prominent dissenting organizations including the Zimbabwean Human Rights NGO Forum (a coalition of 20 human rights organizations), the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (a coalition of more than 75 civic society organizations), the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, and the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union, demanding compliance with arbitrary administrative requirements such as submiting work plans and activities for prior clearance. Also, in April 2025, Mnangagwa signed the Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Amendment Act into law, granting the regime broad authority over NGOs, including the power to replace leadership, seize assets, and shut down organizations accused of vaguely defined “political activities,” with penalties of up to ten years in prison.
State authorities have seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech through arbitrary arrests, selective prosecution of prominent critics, and criminalization of dissent under vague and draconian laws. Authorities frequently use baseless charges of “incitement to commit public violence” to curtail freedom of expression. Prominent opposition leaders, activists, and journalists, including Tendai Biti (former Finance Minister), Job Sikhala (opposition leader), Hopewell Chin’ono (journalist), and Pastor Evan Mawarire, have been charged under sections 36 and 37 of the Criminal Law (Codification Reform) Act.
The regime heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor through its monopoly over national airwaves and control of the largest national papers and regulatory boards, which it staffs with party loyalists. For example, in 2024, Mnangagwa’s niece was appointed chairperson of the national public broadcaster ZBC, and Charles Munganasa, a youth leader of ZANU-PF, was appointed acting CEO of ZBC. The regime also restricts media coverage and content by limiting the flow of information through episodic, event-driven social media and internet blackouts, most notably a three-day nationwide internet shutdown in January 2019 and intermittent internet connectivity disruptions in August 2018 after the election violence, in July 2016 ahead of planned nationwide protest, and in July 2015 during a stayaway protest.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority, allowing it to repress criticism, significantly undermine electoral competition, and consolidate the systematic dismantling of accountability mechanisms. In Zimbabwe, courts operate less as an independent check on power than as an enabling arena for the regime by validating disputed election results, disqualifying opposition candidates, upholding restrictions on opposition rallies, sustaining politically motivated prosecutions and prolonged detentions, tolerating selective accountability for officials, and functioning within an institutional framework shaped by executive control.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process skewed in its favor by upholding police bans on opposition rallies, validating disputed polls, disqualifying or excluding key opposition candidates, and dismissing pre- and post-election challenges. The Constitutional Court has consistently dismissed legal challenges filed by the main opposition party against presidential election results, as it did in the 2018 presidential election. The opposition chose not to file legal challenges in the 2008 and 2023 polls because of the perception of partisanship of the courts. The Supreme Court and High Court upheld ZANU-PF’s politically motivated legal challenge in 2023, which sought the disqualification of former minister and ZANU-PF member Savior Kasukuwere as a presidential candidate. In December 2023, the High Court barred 22 CCC legislators from by-elections crucial for ZANU-PF in its bid to secure a supermajority in parliament.
The courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Courts systematically entertain prosecutions against independent media, political and civil society leaders, and regular people on the basis of politically motivated or baseless charges–including legally defective provisions–while keeping regime opponents in lengthy pretrial detentions. For example, opposition figure Job Sikhala spent 20 months in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges of inciting violence after peacefully protesting the abduction and murder of opposition supporter Moreblessing Ali. In 2024, the High Court kept 78 opposition members and supporters for five months in pre-trial detention —including a mother and her one-year-old child—on trumped-up charges for participating in a peaceful gathering of the CCC. Also, prominent opposition members such as Fadzayi Mahere and Job Sikhala were charged and sentenced by lower magistrate courts, in April 2023 and January 2024, respectively, under a nonexistent law of “falsehoods prejudicial to the State.”
In rare, exceptional cases, the courts have ruled against the regime. Examples include a 2018 High Court ruling ordering the state to pay civil damages to pro-democracy activist Jestina Mukoko, a 2019 High Court ruling against a 10 day nationwide internet shutdown, a 2020 Constitutional Court ruling striking out a constitutional amendment giving the president direct, discretionary power of appointment of top judges, and a 2023 High Court ruling in favor of opposition presidential candidate Elisabeth Valerio’s legal challenge against her disqualification from the ballot.
Judges who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime systematically face regime retaliation through public attacks, disciplinary action, suspensions, and dismissals. Mnangagwa has dismissed four top dissenting judges. Examples include Justice Edith Mushore for her ruling against the presidential extension of Chief Justice Luke Malaba’s term, and High Court Judge Erica Ndewere for her ruling granting bail to Job Sikhala. Fearing victimization, several judges have recused themselves from sensitive cases. In May 2024, Judge Esther Muremba recused herself from Neville Mutsvangwa’s bail hearing (son of Minister Monica Mutsvangwa and ZANU-PF spokesperson Christopher Mutsvangwa) after she was invited to the State House for a meeting with the President and Justice Minister.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. Authorities routinely shield senior officials from investigation or prosecution, subject a few politically expendable officials to brief “catch and release” episodes, and pursue politically timed prosecutions to project an image of reform and legitimacy. For example, former ministers Ignatius Chombo, Prisca Mupfumira, and Obadiah Moyo were arrested on well-founded corruption charges. However, the National Prosecuting Authority withdrew the remaining charges against Chombo in August 2023, Moyo was cleared after the High Court quashed his corruption charges in October 2021, and Mupfumira’s proceedings stalled after the Harare Magistrates’ Court accepted submissions that she was unfit to stand trial in December 2019, with the prosecution ultimately collapsing in August 2024 without a full trial.
The regime has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence by reasserting executive control over judicial appointments, removing transparent and competitive selection procedures, and weakening the Judicial Service Commission’s (JSC) gatekeeping role. For example, in 2017, Mugabe’s regime enacted a constitutional amendment that gave the president the discretionary power to directly appoint the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, and the Judge President of the High Court. This change rolled back democratic safeguards in the 2013 constitution, which constrained presidential powers of appointment and promotion through an independent JSC and a public, transparent vetting process. In practice, the JSC remains subservient to the president. In 2021, Mnangagwa abused his power to controversially extend the term of openly pro-ZANU-PF Chief Justice Luke Malaba beyond the constitutional limit. While the High Court ruled that the term extension was invalid, the country’s highest court, the Constitutional Court, ruled in favor of the regime.
HRF classifies Zimbabwe as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Zimbabwe is a unitary state, and the Head of State, Emmerson Mnangagwa, seized power in November 2017 through a military coup that forced his longtime companion and political mentor, Robert Mugabe, who had ruled the country since independence in 1980, to resign. Electoral competition in Zimbabwe has faced significant constraints since independence, marked by severe repression, electoral violence, and the politicization of state institutions. For years, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party has deliberately fractured the opposition by engineering splits using courts and state institutions to legitimise rival factions. ZANU-PF party remains the central political actor, supported by security forces, state-aligned non-state actors, and a dominant parliamentary majority, while opposition movements and civil society organisations continue to face systematic obstruction.
National elections in Zimbabwe are a sham, to the point where the mainstream political opposition party has no realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. ZANU-PF emerged as a liberation movement fighting against white minority rule and transformed into a governing party after claiming victory in the historic 1980 elections that led to Zimbabwe’s independence. In every national election since 1980, ZANU-PF has significantly and unfairly hindered the real, mainstream opposition party and its supporters from campaigning and securing votes. ZANU-PF has exerted partisan control of electoral oversight, unfairly skewed the electoral process in its favor, intimidated its main opposition challengers, and staged unfair and untransparent polls, all of which have been tainted with allegations of fraud.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime systematically eliminates opposition members and activists through targeted killings and enforced disappearances, and intimidates them through torture, abductions, threats, and arbitrary detention. It files politically motivated cases under vague, draconian laws and keeps prominent critics in prolonged pretrial detention to silence them. At the same time, it selectively enforces restrictive assembly laws, deploys pre-emptive security operations to block mobilization, and violently disperses protests, often arresting organizers to deter collective action.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. Courts have enabled the regime to validate disputed election results, disqualify opposition candidates, uphold restrictions on opposition rallies, sustain politically motivated prosecutions, and prolong detentions. The regime has retaliated against dissenting judges, weakened judicial institutions by exerting control over judicial appointments, and systematically dismantled accountability mechanisms.
National elections in Zimbabwe are a sham, to the point that the mainstream political opposition party has no realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Despite regular elections, the ZANU-PF government has systematically undermined the electoral process through judicial prosecutions that exclude opposition candidates, violence and intimidation that disrupt campaigns, the denial of rally permits, the appointment of party loyalists to the electoral body, and the detention of local independent election observers prompting the mainstream opposition to threaten to boycott elections, as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition.
The regime has unfairly barred candidates of a mainstream opposition party from competing in elections. It has used pre-election judicial prosecutions and post-election parliamentary recalls to disqualify the mainstream opposition party’s candidates. For example, in the last quarter of 2023, twenty-two mainstream opposition candidates from the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) were barred from recontesting parliamentary by-elections after they were controversially recalled from parliament by an imposter who claimed party authority despite lacking authority from the party – a process endorsed by the Speaker of Parliament and upheld by the courts.
Since Zimbabwe’s independence, the ruling ZANU-PF has significantly and unfairly hindered the mainstream opposition party and its supporters from campaigning and securing votes through violence from state and non-state actors, intimidation, and blocking and disrupting opposition campaign activities. ZANU-PF has systematically orchestrated deadly and violent intimidation against its main opposition challengers and supporters ahead, during, and after election cycles. The 2023 election cycle followed this pattern, with CCC members and supporters suffering extrajudicial killings, abductions, assaults, and torture orchestrated by the regime and its affiliated non-state actors. Also, leading up to the 2023 elections, authorities banned 92 CCC campaign rallies, citing questionable reasons such as unsuitable roads or insufficient police personnel to secure the events. Alongside these restrictions, the regime, through its security services and captured courts, has deliberately worked to weaken the opposition by facilitating its splits on several instances.
ZANU-PF exerts partisan control of electoral oversight through the presidential power of appointment of commissioners of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), which retains the authority to control voter registration, polling station locations and rules, the printing of ballot papers, and the publication of the results of national elections. ZANU-PF, through its control of the ZEC, unfairly skews the electoral process and campaigning in its favor in violation of election laws. Since its establishment in 2004, the ZEC has consistently faced credible accusations of manipulation and rigging in favor of ZANU-PF in collusion with the military and the security agencies. Ahead of the 2023 elections, Mnangagwa appointed six new ZEC members, including three children of senior ZANU-PF leaders. ZEC enforced a 20-fold hike on ballot registration fees for presidential candidates and denied accreditation to a significant number of international observers. It also allowed “Forever Associates of Zimbabwe,” a well-funded group that openly supports ZANU-PF and is suspected of being linked to intelligence and security services, to set up illegal “exit poll survey” desks outside polling stations and take and record the ID numbers of voters before they voted. ZEC was also responsible for significant delays in voting in largely opposition strongholds because of ballot paper shortages.
During the elections, police detained 41 local independent observers working with accredited poll monitoring organizations. International observers and the CCC opposition party contested the integrity of the electoral process and the results of the elections published by ZEC, which awarded Mnangagwa a victory.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The ZANU-PF government has relied on intimidation and arbitrary detention, state-linked violence, including abductions and targeted killings, repression of protests and public gatherings, the criminalization of dissent through selective prosecution under vague and draconian laws, and the systematic capture and manipulation of the media environment to suppress dissent.
Authorities have seriously and systematically intimidated independent media, opposition and civil society leaders, opposition supporters, and regular people with threats, violence, arbitrary detention, and politically motivated prosecutions. For example, in May 2022, Blessing Mhlanga, a prominent journalist, and Chengeto Chidi were assaulted, detained, and charged for recording the arrest of opposition legislator Job Sikhala, who was subsequently held in pre-trial detention by authorities for 595 days on politically motivated charges.
Through state-sponsored violence, the ZANU-PF government and its aligned non-state actors have killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents by carrying out abductions, torture, enforced disappearances, and targeted killings of opposition supporters and activists. In addition to the well-known case of Itai Dzamara’s enforced disappearance (suspected to be done by the regime) in March 2015, clergyman Tapfumaneyi Masaya was abducted by authorities in November 2023 while campaigning, tortured, and later found dead, his body dumped on the outskirts of Harare. Earlier, Tinashe Chitsunge, a CCC activist, was ambushed and stoned to death while trying to flee from a ZANU-PF mob that was assailing opposition activists who had gathered to hold a rally.
Moreso, the regime seriously and unfairly represses protests and gatherings through bans, violent dispersal by security forces, mass arrests of organisers and participants, pre-emptive security deployments to deter assembly, and the selective enforcement of the draconian Maintenance of Peace and Order Act. For example, authorities killed six people during a post-election protest in August 2018 and at least 17 during the nationwide stay-away in January 2019. It systematically banned an opposition gathering ahead of the 2023 elections, and raided a peaceful gathering of more than 100 opposition supporters in June 2024 and remanded 78 of them to prison on charges of unlawful assembly. The regime also arbitrarily arrested and tortured over 160 activists and opposition members in mid-2024 to pre-empt planned demonstrations ahead of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit in Harare.
Regime officials attempted to shut down major independent dissenting organizations through administrative suspension orders issued without due process. In mid-2021 state officials issued directives—later blocked by the court—targeting prominent dissenting organizations including the Zimbabwean Human Rights NGO Forum (a coalition of 20 human rights organizations), the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (a coalition of more than 75 civic society organizations), the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, and the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union, demanding compliance with arbitrary administrative requirements such as submiting work plans and activities for prior clearance. Also, in April 2025, Mnangagwa signed the Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Amendment Act into law, granting the regime broad authority over NGOs, including the power to replace leadership, seize assets, and shut down organizations accused of vaguely defined “political activities,” with penalties of up to ten years in prison.
State authorities have seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech through arbitrary arrests, selective prosecution of prominent critics, and criminalization of dissent under vague and draconian laws. Authorities frequently use baseless charges of “incitement to commit public violence” to curtail freedom of expression. Prominent opposition leaders, activists, and journalists, including Tendai Biti (former Finance Minister), Job Sikhala (opposition leader), Hopewell Chin’ono (journalist), and Pastor Evan Mawarire, have been charged under sections 36 and 37 of the Criminal Law (Codification Reform) Act.
The regime heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor through its monopoly over national airwaves and control of the largest national papers and regulatory boards, which it staffs with party loyalists. For example, in 2024, Mnangagwa’s niece was appointed chairperson of the national public broadcaster ZBC, and Charles Munganasa, a youth leader of ZANU-PF, was appointed acting CEO of ZBC. The regime also restricts media coverage and content by limiting the flow of information through episodic, event-driven social media and internet blackouts, most notably a three-day nationwide internet shutdown in January 2019 and intermittent internet connectivity disruptions in August 2018 after the election violence, in July 2016 ahead of planned nationwide protest, and in July 2015 during a stayaway protest.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority, allowing it to repress criticism, significantly undermine electoral competition, and consolidate the systematic dismantling of accountability mechanisms. In Zimbabwe, courts operate less as an independent check on power than as an enabling arena for the regime by validating disputed election results, disqualifying opposition candidates, upholding restrictions on opposition rallies, sustaining politically motivated prosecutions and prolonged detentions, tolerating selective accountability for officials, and functioning within an institutional framework shaped by executive control.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process skewed in its favor by upholding police bans on opposition rallies, validating disputed polls, disqualifying or excluding key opposition candidates, and dismissing pre- and post-election challenges. The Constitutional Court has consistently dismissed legal challenges filed by the main opposition party against presidential election results, as it did in the 2018 presidential election. The opposition chose not to file legal challenges in the 2008 and 2023 polls because of the perception of partisanship of the courts. The Supreme Court and High Court upheld ZANU-PF’s politically motivated legal challenge in 2023, which sought the disqualification of former minister and ZANU-PF member Savior Kasukuwere as a presidential candidate. In December 2023, the High Court barred 22 CCC legislators from by-elections crucial for ZANU-PF in its bid to secure a supermajority in parliament.
The courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Courts systematically entertain prosecutions against independent media, political and civil society leaders, and regular people on the basis of politically motivated or baseless charges–including legally defective provisions–while keeping regime opponents in lengthy pretrial detentions. For example, opposition figure Job Sikhala spent 20 months in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges of inciting violence after peacefully protesting the abduction and murder of opposition supporter Moreblessing Ali. In 2024, the High Court kept 78 opposition members and supporters for five months in pre-trial detention —including a mother and her one-year-old child—on trumped-up charges for participating in a peaceful gathering of the CCC. Also, prominent opposition members such as Fadzayi Mahere and Job Sikhala were charged and sentenced by lower magistrate courts, in April 2023 and January 2024, respectively, under a nonexistent law of “falsehoods prejudicial to the State.”
In rare, exceptional cases, the courts have ruled against the regime. Examples include a 2018 High Court ruling ordering the state to pay civil damages to pro-democracy activist Jestina Mukoko, a 2019 High Court ruling against a 10 day nationwide internet shutdown, a 2020 Constitutional Court ruling striking out a constitutional amendment giving the president direct, discretionary power of appointment of top judges, and a 2023 High Court ruling in favor of opposition presidential candidate Elisabeth Valerio’s legal challenge against her disqualification from the ballot.
Judges who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime systematically face regime retaliation through public attacks, disciplinary action, suspensions, and dismissals. Mnangagwa has dismissed four top dissenting judges. Examples include Justice Edith Mushore for her ruling against the presidential extension of Chief Justice Luke Malaba’s term, and High Court Judge Erica Ndewere for her ruling granting bail to Job Sikhala. Fearing victimization, several judges have recused themselves from sensitive cases. In May 2024, Judge Esther Muremba recused herself from Neville Mutsvangwa’s bail hearing (son of Minister Monica Mutsvangwa and ZANU-PF spokesperson Christopher Mutsvangwa) after she was invited to the State House for a meeting with the President and Justice Minister.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. Authorities routinely shield senior officials from investigation or prosecution, subject a few politically expendable officials to brief “catch and release” episodes, and pursue politically timed prosecutions to project an image of reform and legitimacy. For example, former ministers Ignatius Chombo, Prisca Mupfumira, and Obadiah Moyo were arrested on well-founded corruption charges. However, the National Prosecuting Authority withdrew the remaining charges against Chombo in August 2023, Moyo was cleared after the High Court quashed his corruption charges in October 2021, and Mupfumira’s proceedings stalled after the Harare Magistrates’ Court accepted submissions that she was unfit to stand trial in December 2019, with the prosecution ultimately collapsing in August 2024 without a full trial.
The regime has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence by reasserting executive control over judicial appointments, removing transparent and competitive selection procedures, and weakening the Judicial Service Commission’s (JSC) gatekeeping role. For example, in 2017, Mugabe’s regime enacted a constitutional amendment that gave the president the discretionary power to directly appoint the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, and the Judge President of the High Court. This change rolled back democratic safeguards in the 2013 constitution, which constrained presidential powers of appointment and promotion through an independent JSC and a public, transparent vetting process. In practice, the JSC remains subservient to the president. In 2021, Mnangagwa abused his power to controversially extend the term of openly pro-ZANU-PF Chief Justice Luke Malaba beyond the constitutional limit. While the High Court ruled that the term extension was invalid, the country’s highest court, the Constitutional Court, ruled in favor of the regime.
