Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Zambia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Zambia is a presidential democratic republic. The Head of State, President Hakainde Hichilema, was democratically elected as an opposition challenger in the August 2021 elections, but has continued the authoritarian practices of his late predecessor, Edgar Lungu. After gaining independence from Britain in 1964, Zambia experienced 27 years of one-party rule before transitioning to multi-party democracy in 1991. Since then, the country has experienced nine consecutive election cycles, six presidents, and two democratic power transfers between a governing and opposition party.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the governing authority, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) dominated the first two decades of multi-party democracy before being unseated by the Patriotic Front (PF), which then reigned over the next decade. In 2021, the United Party for National Development (UPND) won the presidency and secured a majority in the national assembly for the first time after two decades of contesting for power. However, since taking office, the UPND regime has unfairly skewed the electoral playing field in its favor by systematically blocking opposition rallies, using the judiciary to attempt to disqualify opposition leaders from the next presidential vote, and undermining independent electoral oversight.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Zambian regime intimidates political opposition leaders and independent journalists through a pattern of arrests. Non-state actors with ties to the ruling party contribute to this intimidation and unfairly repress dissenting protests through disruptions, intimidation, and violence. Despite taking steps to repeal or partially amend some repressive and vague legislation, the regime continues to wield them against critics.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The regime has undermined the independence of institutions, constitutional checks and balances, and the separation of powers in a manner that enables it to repress criticism and undermine electoral competition. President Hichilema has abused the powers granted to the president by the constitution in the appointment and dismissal of judges, altering the composition of the bench to secure favorable court decisions on electoral matters.
In Zambia, electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the governing authority, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely although realistic chance to win. In the 2021 presidential elections, Hichilema of the UPND defeated incumbent Edgar Lungu’s PF with the third-largest margin of victory and the second-highest voter turnout (70%) in the era of multi-party democracy. However, since taking office, the UPND regime has unfairly skewed the electoral playing field in its favor by systematically blocking opposition rallies, undermining independent electoral oversight, enjoying incumbency advantages, and destabilizing the opposition.
The regime barred a mainstream opposition candidate from competing in elections. The UPND regime interfered with the composition of the Constitutional Court by stacking it with allies to disqualify Hichilema’s most serious political opponent and predecessor, Edward Lungu, from the 2026 presidential elections. In December 2024, the reconstituted bench unanimously ruled that Lungu was ineligible because of the constitutional two-term limit. This ruling overturned the Court’s previous position, affirming that Lungu’s 20-month presidency in 2015-16 after the death of President Michael Sata did not count towards the constitutional two-term limit.
Moreover, the regime has unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party’s electoral campaign. The police strictly enforce the 1955, colonial-era Public Order Act to systematically block opposition political party rallies, both outside of electoral periods and during pre-elections. For example, in August 2023, police blocked a planned rally of the main opposition PF party, citing ‘security concerns.’ On June 8, 2024, heavily armed police forcibly shut down an opposition Socialist Party rally in Kitwe, Copperbelt Province. The same month, Zambia’s police chief disclosed that police do not permit the opposition to hold rallies because the ruling party “is always ready to attack them.”
Non-state actors, with ties to the governing authority, contribute to the unfair barring of a real, mainstream opposition party from competing in elections. Ruling party thugs known as UPND cadres frequently attack opposition figures and gatherings in total impunity, creating an atmosphere of fear for the opposition. For example, in March 2025, UPND cadres violently assaulted youths of the main PF opposition party during Youth Day celebrations, injuring 45. In September 2021, a group of 50 UPND cadres surrounded the PF secretariat and disrupted a press briefing there.
The regime has undermined independent electoral oversight through the appointment of loyalist cadres. The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ZEC) has long faced accusations of partisan bias, but in 2022, Hichilema took this to another level by controversially appointing his personal lawyer and UPND member, Mwangali Zaloumis, as chair of the Commission. She became the first non-judge to occupy the position. He also appointed another commissioner, McDonald Chipenzi, with known ties to the UPND.
Independent journalists, political leaders, civil society leaders, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Despite some steps toward reform, the regime continues to suppress opposition voices through arrests, protest restrictions, and vague speech laws that criminalize criticism.
The regime systematically arrests, prosecutes, and convicts high-profile political opponents–particularly but not exclusively pro-Lungu lawmakers and leaders of the main opposition PF party. For example, in July 2025, former Lungu presidential advisor Chris Zimba was detained and charged with cyber harassment and libel over a social media post critical of Nevers Mumba, a Hichilema ally. In May 2025, PF lawmaker Munir Zulu was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment with hard labor over a 2023 social media statement accusing Hichilema of planning to dissolve Parliament and call for early elections. Mumbi Phiri, the 56-year-old former Deputy Secretary-General of the PF party, was detained for two weeks in January 2025 on false charges of aggravated robbery that were dropped for confronting Cabinet Minister Mike Mposha during the Kawambwa by-election. In February 2022, she was also a co-accused in the 2019 murder of UPND supporter Lawrence Banda, spending 412 days in pretrial detention, much of it without trial, before the charges were dropped.
The regime systematically stops the leading faces of opposition from meeting with the public. For example, in May 2024, police dispersed a private meeting between former President Edgar Lungu and a Catholic bishop, branding it an “unlawful assembly.” In November 2023, PF Deputy Chair and chief mobilizer Bowman Lusambo was charged with unlawful assembly for greeting supporters in the city of Kabwe after he got off a bus. In May 2025, police blocked Patrick Chisala, the PF mayor of the city of Kabwe, from holding a meeting with a local community and further ordered him to seek police approval for any community engagement. In November 2023, police arrested opposition politician Sean Tembo on a charge of unlawful assembly after he held a press conference at his residence to present his 2024 alternative budget.
Furthermore, the regime and its associated non-state actors have unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Through a pattern of selective enforcement, authorities systematically block anti-regime demonstrations, political meetings, and public gatherings or violently disperse them. In July 2024, police preemptively blocked a protest over electricity blackouts, arresting four organizers on vague charges of “idle and disorderly conduct,” while in March 2025, suspected UPND cadres violently attacked PF youth during Youth Day celebrations in Lusaka, injuring 45. In May 2025, police violently dispersed a protest by opposition leaders, members of civil society, and private citizens outside the Lusaka Magistrate Court to stage a peaceful protest against crackdown on dissent after the sentencing of opposition MP Maureen Mabonga to eight months in prison on politically-motivated sedition charges in relation for remarks she made in a public press conference to demand the release of former independent MP Emmanuel Jay Jay Banda after the latter’s abduction. In March 2025, police denied the Lungu-led opposition coalition Tonse Alliance’s formal request to hold country-wide protests against Hichilema’s proposed constitutional amendments, citing security and public order risks.
In addition, the regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. In Hichilema’s first year in office, the regime arrested, convicted, and jailed at least a dozen critics under Section 69 of the Penal Code (Criminal Defamation of the President Law)–more people than during Lungu’s entire six-year tenure. Although Hichilema repeated the Defamation of President Law in December 2022, the regime pivoted to enforcing the penal code offense of insulting language towards the president. For example, in September 2024, Suzgo Mbale was arrested for allegedly insulting President Hichilema in a TikTok video. The following month, Jonathan Tembo was sentenced to three months of hard labor for the same offense.
The regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media. Although President Hichilema enacted the long-awaited Access to Information legislation in December 2023, the regime continues to frequently enforce repressive laws that criminalize critical reporting and persecute journalists. They include penal code provisions on sedition, libel, the 2021 law on cybersecurity and cybercrime, or the Defamation Act. For example, investigative journalist Thomas Zgambo has faced repeated arrests on charges of criminal libel and sedition for reporting and commentary critical of Hichilema’s policies. In April 2024, police detained two television journalists and forced them to delete footage of their coverage of a rally by the newly formed opposition alliance, United Kwacha Alliance. Non-state actors affiliated with the governing authority, namely UPDN cadres, also frequently attack the press, such as in April 2023 when they attacked two radio stations, Radio Explore and Serenje Station, and in December 2022, when they raided Kokoliko FM radio station, attacking opposition politician Chilufya Tayali during his interview on air. The next day, cadres blocked Tayali from accessing another station.
Institutions in Zambia are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The regime has undermined the independence of institutions, constitutional checks and balances, and the separation of powers.
The regime has weakened the independence of the courts. The Constitution gives the President the power of appointment and dismissal of judges, based on the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), and with the approval of the National Assembly. But with virtually all JSC members presidential appointees, and with the ruling UPND holding a majority in the National Assembly, Hichilema has stacked the bench with judges favorable to his policies. Since taking office, Hichilema appointed a total of more than 36 judges to the nation’s top courts, significantly altering the composition of the bench.
Courts frequently fail to check, or enable, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. For example, in September 2024, as the Constitutional Court prepared to hear a legal petition challenging former President Lungu’s eligibility to contest the 2026 elections, Hichilema controversially dismissed three justices who had previously ruled in favor of Lungu. He appointed four new judges, and in December 2024, the reconstituted Court declared Lungu ineligible. Notwithstanding, in a few, exceptional instances, judges have ruled against the regime. For example, in November 2024, a High Court judge nullified the National Assembly’s Second Deputy Speaker’s controversial decision to vacate nine parliamentary seats belonging to the opposition PF.
Moreover, courts frequently fail to check, or enable, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism. In Zambia, judges systematically convict high-profile political opponents and critics of the regime on politically motivated and non-bailable charges. For example, although Hichilema repealed the Defamation of the President Law in December 2022, in May 2024, a court convicted opposition PF Secretary General Raphael Nakacinda on the basis of the now-defunct law, sentencing him to 18 months of hard labor for statements made in December 2021, where he accused Hichilema of political interference with the judiciary. The court ruled that Nakacinda was judged based on the law in force at the time the offense was committed.
Judges who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime sometimes face regime retaliation. Dissenting judges face reprisals in the form of disciplinary proceedings, suspension, accusations of breaches of judicial conduct, and firing. For example, in October 2024, in a move that the Law Association of Zambia condemned as an assault on judicial independence, President Hichilema controversially fired three Constitutional Court judges 48 hours before they were scheduled to hear a regime-backed petition seeking to overturn previous rulings of the court affirming former President Edgar Lungu’s eligibility to contest in the 2026 elections. The trio had previously dismissed President Hichilema’s legal challenge to the 2016 presidential election and ruled in favor of Lungu’s eligibility to contest the 2026 elections. Since 2022, the regime has systematically used the Judicial Complaints Commission (JCC) to suspend and ultimately remove seven judges from office: four High Court judges—Joshua Banda, Sunday Nkonde, Wilfred Muma, and Timothy Katanekwa—alongside Anne Sitali, Mungeni Mulenga, and Palan Mulonda, the three Constitutional Court judges.
The regime has directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts. Under the guise of the fight against corruption, Hichilema-appointed Chief Justice created in 2022 the Economic and Financial Crimes Court, but the Attorney-General and the Anti-Corruption Commission have exclusively charged or prosecuted former officials of Lungu’s regime, pro-Lungu PF lawmakers, associates, and family members of the former president. A criminal conviction renders one ineligible to run for political office.
HRF classifies Zambia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Zambia is a presidential democratic republic. The Head of State, President Hakainde Hichilema, was democratically elected as an opposition challenger in the August 2021 elections, but has continued the authoritarian practices of his late predecessor, Edgar Lungu. After gaining independence from Britain in 1964, Zambia experienced 27 years of one-party rule before transitioning to multi-party democracy in 1991. Since then, the country has experienced nine consecutive election cycles, six presidents, and two democratic power transfers between a governing and opposition party.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the governing authority, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) dominated the first two decades of multi-party democracy before being unseated by the Patriotic Front (PF), which then reigned over the next decade. In 2021, the United Party for National Development (UPND) won the presidency and secured a majority in the national assembly for the first time after two decades of contesting for power. However, since taking office, the UPND regime has unfairly skewed the electoral playing field in its favor by systematically blocking opposition rallies, using the judiciary to attempt to disqualify opposition leaders from the next presidential vote, and undermining independent electoral oversight.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Zambian regime intimidates political opposition leaders and independent journalists through a pattern of arrests. Non-state actors with ties to the ruling party contribute to this intimidation and unfairly repress dissenting protests through disruptions, intimidation, and violence. Despite taking steps to repeal or partially amend some repressive and vague legislation, the regime continues to wield them against critics.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The regime has undermined the independence of institutions, constitutional checks and balances, and the separation of powers in a manner that enables it to repress criticism and undermine electoral competition. President Hichilema has abused the powers granted to the president by the constitution in the appointment and dismissal of judges, altering the composition of the bench to secure favorable court decisions on electoral matters.
In Zambia, electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the governing authority, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely although realistic chance to win. In the 2021 presidential elections, Hichilema of the UPND defeated incumbent Edgar Lungu’s PF with the third-largest margin of victory and the second-highest voter turnout (70%) in the era of multi-party democracy. However, since taking office, the UPND regime has unfairly skewed the electoral playing field in its favor by systematically blocking opposition rallies, undermining independent electoral oversight, enjoying incumbency advantages, and destabilizing the opposition.
The regime barred a mainstream opposition candidate from competing in elections. The UPND regime interfered with the composition of the Constitutional Court by stacking it with allies to disqualify Hichilema’s most serious political opponent and predecessor, Edward Lungu, from the 2026 presidential elections. In December 2024, the reconstituted bench unanimously ruled that Lungu was ineligible because of the constitutional two-term limit. This ruling overturned the Court’s previous position, affirming that Lungu’s 20-month presidency in 2015-16 after the death of President Michael Sata did not count towards the constitutional two-term limit.
Moreover, the regime has unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party’s electoral campaign. The police strictly enforce the 1955, colonial-era Public Order Act to systematically block opposition political party rallies, both outside of electoral periods and during pre-elections. For example, in August 2023, police blocked a planned rally of the main opposition PF party, citing ‘security concerns.’ On June 8, 2024, heavily armed police forcibly shut down an opposition Socialist Party rally in Kitwe, Copperbelt Province. The same month, Zambia’s police chief disclosed that police do not permit the opposition to hold rallies because the ruling party “is always ready to attack them.”
Non-state actors, with ties to the governing authority, contribute to the unfair barring of a real, mainstream opposition party from competing in elections. Ruling party thugs known as UPND cadres frequently attack opposition figures and gatherings in total impunity, creating an atmosphere of fear for the opposition. For example, in March 2025, UPND cadres violently assaulted youths of the main PF opposition party during Youth Day celebrations, injuring 45. In September 2021, a group of 50 UPND cadres surrounded the PF secretariat and disrupted a press briefing there.
The regime has undermined independent electoral oversight through the appointment of loyalist cadres. The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ZEC) has long faced accusations of partisan bias, but in 2022, Hichilema took this to another level by controversially appointing his personal lawyer and UPND member, Mwangali Zaloumis, as chair of the Commission. She became the first non-judge to occupy the position. He also appointed another commissioner, McDonald Chipenzi, with known ties to the UPND.
Independent journalists, political leaders, civil society leaders, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Despite some steps toward reform, the regime continues to suppress opposition voices through arrests, protest restrictions, and vague speech laws that criminalize criticism.
The regime systematically arrests, prosecutes, and convicts high-profile political opponents–particularly but not exclusively pro-Lungu lawmakers and leaders of the main opposition PF party. For example, in July 2025, former Lungu presidential advisor Chris Zimba was detained and charged with cyber harassment and libel over a social media post critical of Nevers Mumba, a Hichilema ally. In May 2025, PF lawmaker Munir Zulu was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment with hard labor over a 2023 social media statement accusing Hichilema of planning to dissolve Parliament and call for early elections. Mumbi Phiri, the 56-year-old former Deputy Secretary-General of the PF party, was detained for two weeks in January 2025 on false charges of aggravated robbery that were dropped for confronting Cabinet Minister Mike Mposha during the Kawambwa by-election. In February 2022, she was also a co-accused in the 2019 murder of UPND supporter Lawrence Banda, spending 412 days in pretrial detention, much of it without trial, before the charges were dropped.
The regime systematically stops the leading faces of opposition from meeting with the public. For example, in May 2024, police dispersed a private meeting between former President Edgar Lungu and a Catholic bishop, branding it an “unlawful assembly.” In November 2023, PF Deputy Chair and chief mobilizer Bowman Lusambo was charged with unlawful assembly for greeting supporters in the city of Kabwe after he got off a bus. In May 2025, police blocked Patrick Chisala, the PF mayor of the city of Kabwe, from holding a meeting with a local community and further ordered him to seek police approval for any community engagement. In November 2023, police arrested opposition politician Sean Tembo on a charge of unlawful assembly after he held a press conference at his residence to present his 2024 alternative budget.
Furthermore, the regime and its associated non-state actors have unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Through a pattern of selective enforcement, authorities systematically block anti-regime demonstrations, political meetings, and public gatherings or violently disperse them. In July 2024, police preemptively blocked a protest over electricity blackouts, arresting four organizers on vague charges of “idle and disorderly conduct,” while in March 2025, suspected UPND cadres violently attacked PF youth during Youth Day celebrations in Lusaka, injuring 45. In May 2025, police violently dispersed a protest by opposition leaders, members of civil society, and private citizens outside the Lusaka Magistrate Court to stage a peaceful protest against crackdown on dissent after the sentencing of opposition MP Maureen Mabonga to eight months in prison on politically-motivated sedition charges in relation for remarks she made in a public press conference to demand the release of former independent MP Emmanuel Jay Jay Banda after the latter’s abduction. In March 2025, police denied the Lungu-led opposition coalition Tonse Alliance’s formal request to hold country-wide protests against Hichilema’s proposed constitutional amendments, citing security and public order risks.
In addition, the regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. In Hichilema’s first year in office, the regime arrested, convicted, and jailed at least a dozen critics under Section 69 of the Penal Code (Criminal Defamation of the President Law)–more people than during Lungu’s entire six-year tenure. Although Hichilema repeated the Defamation of President Law in December 2022, the regime pivoted to enforcing the penal code offense of insulting language towards the president. For example, in September 2024, Suzgo Mbale was arrested for allegedly insulting President Hichilema in a TikTok video. The following month, Jonathan Tembo was sentenced to three months of hard labor for the same offense.
The regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media. Although President Hichilema enacted the long-awaited Access to Information legislation in December 2023, the regime continues to frequently enforce repressive laws that criminalize critical reporting and persecute journalists. They include penal code provisions on sedition, libel, the 2021 law on cybersecurity and cybercrime, or the Defamation Act. For example, investigative journalist Thomas Zgambo has faced repeated arrests on charges of criminal libel and sedition for reporting and commentary critical of Hichilema’s policies. In April 2024, police detained two television journalists and forced them to delete footage of their coverage of a rally by the newly formed opposition alliance, United Kwacha Alliance. Non-state actors affiliated with the governing authority, namely UPDN cadres, also frequently attack the press, such as in April 2023 when they attacked two radio stations, Radio Explore and Serenje Station, and in December 2022, when they raided Kokoliko FM radio station, attacking opposition politician Chilufya Tayali during his interview on air. The next day, cadres blocked Tayali from accessing another station.
Institutions in Zambia are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The regime has undermined the independence of institutions, constitutional checks and balances, and the separation of powers.
The regime has weakened the independence of the courts. The Constitution gives the President the power of appointment and dismissal of judges, based on the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), and with the approval of the National Assembly. But with virtually all JSC members presidential appointees, and with the ruling UPND holding a majority in the National Assembly, Hichilema has stacked the bench with judges favorable to his policies. Since taking office, Hichilema appointed a total of more than 36 judges to the nation’s top courts, significantly altering the composition of the bench.
Courts frequently fail to check, or enable, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. For example, in September 2024, as the Constitutional Court prepared to hear a legal petition challenging former President Lungu’s eligibility to contest the 2026 elections, Hichilema controversially dismissed three justices who had previously ruled in favor of Lungu. He appointed four new judges, and in December 2024, the reconstituted Court declared Lungu ineligible. Notwithstanding, in a few, exceptional instances, judges have ruled against the regime. For example, in November 2024, a High Court judge nullified the National Assembly’s Second Deputy Speaker’s controversial decision to vacate nine parliamentary seats belonging to the opposition PF.
Moreover, courts frequently fail to check, or enable, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism. In Zambia, judges systematically convict high-profile political opponents and critics of the regime on politically motivated and non-bailable charges. For example, although Hichilema repealed the Defamation of the President Law in December 2022, in May 2024, a court convicted opposition PF Secretary General Raphael Nakacinda on the basis of the now-defunct law, sentencing him to 18 months of hard labor for statements made in December 2021, where he accused Hichilema of political interference with the judiciary. The court ruled that Nakacinda was judged based on the law in force at the time the offense was committed.
Judges who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime sometimes face regime retaliation. Dissenting judges face reprisals in the form of disciplinary proceedings, suspension, accusations of breaches of judicial conduct, and firing. For example, in October 2024, in a move that the Law Association of Zambia condemned as an assault on judicial independence, President Hichilema controversially fired three Constitutional Court judges 48 hours before they were scheduled to hear a regime-backed petition seeking to overturn previous rulings of the court affirming former President Edgar Lungu’s eligibility to contest in the 2026 elections. The trio had previously dismissed President Hichilema’s legal challenge to the 2016 presidential election and ruled in favor of Lungu’s eligibility to contest the 2026 elections. Since 2022, the regime has systematically used the Judicial Complaints Commission (JCC) to suspend and ultimately remove seven judges from office: four High Court judges—Joshua Banda, Sunday Nkonde, Wilfred Muma, and Timothy Katanekwa—alongside Anne Sitali, Mungeni Mulenga, and Palan Mulonda, the three Constitutional Court judges.
The regime has directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts. Under the guise of the fight against corruption, Hichilema-appointed Chief Justice created in 2022 the Economic and Financial Crimes Court, but the Attorney-General and the Anti-Corruption Commission have exclusively charged or prosecuted former officials of Lungu’s regime, pro-Lungu PF lawmakers, associates, and family members of the former president. A criminal conviction renders one ineligible to run for political office.
