Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Venezuela as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The consolidation of power in the hands of President Nicolás Maduro and his ruling party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), was preceded by the progressive erosion of the country’s democratic institutions under former president Hugo Chávez, as well as a period of significant political instability at the turn of the 20th century, which led to Chávez’s rise. In 1992, Chávez gained political prominence after he led a failed coup against then-President Carlos Andrés Pérez. The following year, Pérez was impeached on corruption charges, and in 1994, his successor pardoned Chávez. This cleared the way for Chávez’s successful 1998 presidential campaign. After taking office in 1999, Chávez displayed increasingly authoritarian tendencies, a trend that intensified after 2002, following a coup attempt led by segments of the military, with the support of some of the civilian opposition. The coup attempt failed, and Chávez hardened his stance towards all critics and dissidents; he went on to rule the country until his death in 2013. Following Chávez’s death, former Vice President Nicolás Maduro rose to power, under whom Venezuela’s democratic backsliding accelerated, and serious, systematic human rights abuses intensified. During the 2024 general elections, the regime overtly falsified elections to unfairly maintain Maduro in power. Additionally, under Chávez and Maduro, non-state actors allied with the regime have contributed significantly to authoritarian consolidation in Venezuela. Armed groups—such as guerrillas, urban militias, and gangs—have been known to engage in electoral violence and repress dissent on behalf of the regime in exchange for resources, such as weapons, and control of illicit economies.
In Venezuela, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. President Nicolás Maduro and the PSUV have engaged in widespread electoral fraud so as to unfairly remain in power. Non-state actors with ties to the regime regularly intimidate and coerce individuals into voting for Maduro and the PSUV. Regime officials have also unfairly barred prominent opposition candidates and political parties from competing in elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime of Nicolás Maduro and the PSUV. Dissidents regularly face arbitrary detentions, physical aggression, and judicial harassment from regime officials—in the most extreme cases, officials have forcibly disappeared and killed dissidents. The regime in Venezuela has also unfairly persecuted independent dissenting organizations, leading many to shut down or leave the country. Dissidents who are forced into exile due to the regime’s persecution continue to face risks abroad due to transnational repression. Armed non-state actors with ties to the Maduro regime have also been implicated in the kidnapping and assassination of dissidents abroad.
Institutions in Venezuela largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The judiciary, as well as regulatory bodies and oversight institutions, are subservient to Nicolás Maduro and the ruling PSUV party. Venezuela’s institutions largely fail to uphold electoral integrity and do not protect the rights of dissidents. In effect, judges regularly facilitate regime action that undermines the political opposition and silences critical voices. At the same time that critics and political leaders are unfairly criminalized, regime officials are able to commit serious crimes with impunity.
In Venezuela, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime of Nicolás Maduro has overtly falsified electoral results to unfairly remain in power, in addition to engaging in widespread vote buying and voter intimidation. Regime-allied non-state actors have also employed violent intimidation and coercion to unfairly boost Maduro and the PSUV in the polls. Moreover, the regime has criminalized and barred prominent opposition candidates and political parties from competing in elections. In response to widespread electoral fraud and systematic persecution of opposition members, the majority of the real, mainstream opposition boycotted the 2020 and 2025 legislative elections.
Throughout Maduro’s presidency, the regime has engaged in systematic, significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, and electoral fraud. These fraudulent practices include the overt falsification of results, widespread vote buying, and voter intimidation. In 2024, President Nicolás Maduro claimed that he had been reelected to a third presidential term with 51.95% of the vote. However, these results were proven to be fraudulent—data collected directly from poll stations and validated by international electoral observers from the civil society organization (CSO), the Carter Center, proved Maduro’s real vote share to be approximately 30%. The main opposition candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, is believed to have obtained approximately 67% of the vote. The Maduro regime was able to leverage its control over the National Electoral Council (CNE) to overtly falsify the results and unfairly remain in power. Moreover, the regime in Venezuela has systematically abused state resources to engage in large-scale vote buying and coerce state employees as well as beneficiaries of state services into casting votes for Maduro and the PSUV.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, have systematically contributed to orchestrating electoral irregularities or fraud. Armed non-state actors, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla and the pro-regime urban militias known as “colectivos,” have coerced and intimidated voters on behalf of the regime during electoral cycles. For example, during the 2024 presidential elections, the ELN deployed armed patrols on pickup trucks in the border regions of Táchira and Apure. According to eye-witnesses, armed ELN members monitored and threatened voters against voting for the opposition before and during election day.
The regime has also systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. Members of the real mainstream opposition, including both campaign managers and political leaders, are regularly subjected to politically motivated charges of corruption, terrorism, treason, and criminal association, among others. The regime has systematically leveraged its control over the Attorney General’s office and the judiciary to unfairly bar opposition candidates from participating in elections. In 2024, the opposition’s most popular presidential candidate, María Corina Machado, was arbitrarily barred from contesting the race by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ). Between 2010 and 2023, the regime barred approximately 1,441 individuals from holding office in Venezuela. Moreover, due to the risk of politically motivated imprisonment and other human rights abuses, prominent opposition members have been forced to seek political asylum in embassies and abroad, such as Edmundo González Urrutia, who is living in exile in Spain after the 2024 election, which independent observers broadly agree he won by a wide margin. As of 2025, the majority of real mainstream opposition parties in Venezuela have either been barred from participating in elections or taken over by regime loyalists.
Venezuela’s mainstream opposition parties have boycotted several elections in recent years as a way of protesting the lack of free and fair electoral competition. In response to widespread electoral fraud and the systematic persecution of opposition members, the majority of the real, mainstream opposition boycotted the 2020 and 2025 legislative elections. In 2025, the ruling Simón Bolívar Great Patriotic Pole (GPPSB) political coalition, which consists primarily of the PSUV as well as other smaller regime-controlled parties, increased its dominance over the National Assembly, claiming 253 of 285 available seats. The majority of the remaining seats in the legislature were distributed to sham opposition parties.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime of Nicolás Maduro and the PSUV. Dissidents regularly face arbitrary detentions, physical aggression, and judicial harassment, while independent organizations are intimidated, fined, prosecuted, and often forced into exile. Officials have been implicated in systematic enforced disappearances as well as some extrajudicial killings of dissidents. Protesters have regularly faced excessive use of force, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and torture. The regime also harasses, threatens, and kidnaps individuals with close relationships with exiled dissidents, while loyalist armed non-state actors kidnap and assassinate dissidents abroad.
To suppress dissent, the regime in Venezuela has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Dissidents regularly face arbitrary detentions and physical aggression from regime officials and unfounded legal action based on the regime’s gag laws. Throughout 2024 and 2025, Operation Tun Tun (also known as Operation Knock Knock) has represented an escalation in the prosecution and jailing of journalists, civil society leaders, activists, volunteers, and their families. In 2024, the Institute for the Press and Society (IPYS Venezuela) documented a rise in physical and verbal aggressions perpetuated by the regime and its non-state allies against journalists and media workers. Journalists reported suffering physical injuries inflicted by both security forces and non-state allies. They have also been subject to arbitrary detentions and the seizure of their equipment by regime security forces. Similarly, civil society leaders have increasingly faced serious obstruction and intimidation from the regime. Security forces have arbitrarily detained, and in some cases forcibly disappeared, civil society leaders at the head of prominent Venezuelan CSOs, including the director of the CSO Control Ciudadano, human rights attorney Rocío San Miguel, in February 2024; the director of CSO Espacio Público, press freedom advocate Carlos Correa, in January 2025; and a leading member of the CSO Súmate, Nélida Sánchez, in August 2024. While Correa was ultimately released nine days after he was detained, San Miguel and Sánchez remained imprisoned throughout 2025.
In addition to obstructing the work of dissidents, the regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations in Venezuela. It has also forced organizations to cease operating through a pattern of intimidation consisting of verbal threats, judicial harassment, financial penalties, and the arbitrary detention of staff members. In 2019, the National Commission of Telecommunications (Conatel) unfairly revoked Radio Caracas Radio’s (RCR) license to be on air due to its critical coverage of the regime. The removal of RCR from the air followed years of judicial, administrative, and financial harassment targeting the station. RCR shut down all its operations in 2023, after unsuccessfully attempting to keep running online; it was the oldest operating radio station in Venezuela. Other leading dissenting organizations have been forced to move their operations abroad due to the impending threat of effectively being shut down. For instance, major news outlets, such as El Nacional newspaper, and prominent civil society organizations, such as Transparencia Venezuela, have been forced into exile and must operate digitally. Prior to shutting down its Caracas-based print edition in 2018, El Nacional faced multiple attacks from the regime, including politically motivated judicial action and fines in retaliation for publishing criticism of government officials.
The Maduro regime has also systematically killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. Regime officials have played a direct role in the systematic enforced disappearance of dissidents. They have also been implicated in the extrajudicial killings of dissidents; however, assassinations are rarely investigated in Venezuela, which allows perpetrators to act with impunity and evade identification. Between May 1, 2024, and April 30, 2025, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was able to document 84 cases of enforced disappearances, some of which were of short duration, but others that lasted up to 159 days. According to the OHCHR, the main perpetrators of these crimes were state officials, such as intelligence officers from the Directorate for Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) and the Bolivarian National Service for Intelligence (SEBIN). Police and military members were also implicated in the disappearances. In 2019, the United Nations (UN) published a report that also directly linked regime officials with the assassination of dissidents. For instance, the report noted that agents of the Special Action Forces (FAES) were implicated in the 2019 killings of six men who had previously participated in anti-government protests.
The regime in Venezuela has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In addition to a disproportionate use of force against protesters by state security forces, which has resulted in multiple deaths and serious injuries, the regime has systematically repressed protests through arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, and abuse of detainees. During the 2024 and 2025 protests against the fraudulent reelection of Nicolás Maduro, hundreds of protesters suffered serious injuries, and several protesters were killed. According to the CSOs Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Foro Penal, at least 25 protesters were killed during the first few days of protests in late July 2024, and over 2,000 individuals were arbitrarily detained throughout the protests. While the majority of those detained in the aftermath of the 2024 elections were ultimately released, they continue to face politically motivated charges for terrorism and inciting hate, among others.
Furthermore, in response to dissidence abroad, the regime has also systematically engaged in, or enabled, transnational repression against critics in exile. The regime of Nicolás Maduro engages in coercion by proxy as a form of transnational repression. Regime officials regularly harass, threaten, and kidnap individuals with close relationships to exiled dissidents. For example, in January 2025, the regime forcibly disappeared Rafael Tudares, the son-in-law of exiled opposition leader and former presidential candidate Edmundo González Urrutia. On December 1, 2025, Tudares was sentenced in highly irregular and opaque proceedings to 30 years in prison on politically motivated charges of treason.
Non-state actors tied to the regime have systematically contributed to the governing authority’s transnational repression, with criminal groups implicated in the kidnapping and assassination of dissidents abroad. For example, in 2024, Ronald Ojeda, a former Venezuelan military official and dissident exiled in Chile, was kidnapped and murdered by individuals disguised as local police officers. Investigations led by Chilean authorities implicated members of the Tren de Aragua criminal gang in the murder, as well as top officials of the Maduro regime. Furthermore, Venezuelan dissidents exiled in Colombia face significant risks due to the widespread presence of multiple armed groups with ties to the regime of Nicolás Maduro within the country. In October 2025, two prominent regime critics, Yendri Velásquez and Luis Peche Arteaga, were violently attacked in Bogotá by two unknown assailants. Velásquez and Peche Arteaga suffered serious injuries as a result of gunfire. While police investigations in Colombia are still ongoing, Velásquez had previously been detained by regime officials in Venezuela, and his passport has been arbitrarily annulled by the regime. According to the CSO, Coalición por los Derechos Humanos, members of the Tren de Aragua gang and the ELN guerrilla regularly surveil, coerce, attack, and kidnap Venezuelan dissidents in Colombia, sometimes in order to hand them over to regime officials at the border.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime in Venezuela. The regime-controlled judiciary has been instrumental in legitimizing Maduro’s fraudulent electoral victories and criminalizing the political opposition. Judges also regularly facilitate regime action that silences critical voices and dissidents. As part of the 2024 and 2025 post-election crackdown, loyalist judges have issued multiple arrest warrants against opposition leaders and dissidents who denounced Maduro’s fraudulent reelection. At the same time that critics are unfairly criminalized, regime officials are able to commit serious crimes with impunity.
Courts in Venezuela have systematically and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition and make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The regime-controlled judiciary has been instrumental in legitimizing fraudulent electoral results and criminalizing the political opposition so as to perpetuate President Nicolás Maduro and the PSUV’s hold on power. In August 2024, the president of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), Caryslia Rodríguez, dismissed well-founded evidence that the regime had committed large-scale electoral fraud and certified Maduro’s reelection. The TSJ’s validation of the results was done at the request of Nicolás Maduro, who appointed Rodríguez to lead the TSJ in January 2024. Prior to her appointment, Rodríguez held political office as a PSUV member. In addition to enabling Maduro’s fraudulent reelection, the TSJ also contributed to the unfair persecution of the opposition’s 2024 presidential candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, and other prominent opposition leaders. The TSJ provided its decision validating the fraudulent results to the Attorney General’s office so that it could be used to prosecute opposition members who denounced electoral fraud. The TSJ also held González Urrutia in contempt after he rejected the regime-orchestrated results verification process and refused to hand over the opposition’s material evidence of widespread electoral fraud. In September 2024, another judge presiding over a special anti-terrorism court, Edward Briceño Cisneros, issued an arrest warrant for González Urrutia, who ultimately had to flee the country.
The regime’s systematic abuse of the judiciary to criminally prosecute political leaders predates the 2024 and 2025 post-election crackdown. Courts have repeatedly upheld unfair electoral bans imposed on prominent opposition candidates by regime officials. In 2015, María Corina Machado was barred from holding office for 12 months on politically motivated charges of corruption. In 2023, the original sentence was arbitrarily extended to 15 years after Machado emerged as the popular frontrunner in the opposition’s presidential primaries. In January 2024, the TSJ upheld the 15-year ban, thereby preventing the opposition from fielding its strongest candidate in the elections. In November 2024, the regime initiated a new investigation against Machado involving charges of treason and criminal conspiracy in retaliation for her leading role in the opposition’s electoral campaign.
In Venezuela, courts have also systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism and retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary regularly enables the jailing of dissidents on politically motivated charges. In 2017, the regime passed the Constitutional Law Against Hatred, for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance (known as the Law Against Hatred), which establishes severe penalties for loosely defined hate speech, including fines, the shutdown of media companies and political parties, and prison sentences of up to 20 years. Between 2017 and 2023, the CSO Espacio Público identified at least 83 individuals who were either threatened with prosecution or effectively prosecuted with charges linked to the Law Against Hatred. Individuals accused of violating the Law Against Hatred suffer from unfair pre-trial detention in poor conditions, violations of due process during trials, and arbitrary penalties. For example, in February 2025, political activist and opposition member Nelson Piñero was sentenced to 15 years in prison by Judge Luis Ovalles for online criticism of the Maduro regime, including criticism of the regime’s border dispute with Guyana. The courts have also issued unfair and severe sentences against members of the public for less overt criticism of the regime. In June 2025, Merlys Oropeza was sentenced to 10 years in prison for publishing a WhatsApp status in August 2024 that indirectly criticized the regime’s food distribution program (CLAP), widely known for its corruption and as a mechanism for the regime to buy votes. Oropeza was ultimately released in July 2025.
Individuals who are not sentenced to prison for their critical speech can face arbitrary court-ordered “precautionary measures” that can include prohibitions on leaving the country or using social media, as well as orders to issue a public apology. In 2022, TikTok entertainer Olga Mata was subjected to court-ordered precautionary measures and had to film a public apology after she was detained and charged for publishing a short video satirizing regime officials, including President Nicolás Maduro. Venezuela’s Attorney General Tarek William Saab shared Mata’s apology widely on his official social media accounts, which serves to intimidate and silence regime critics.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Institutions are sometimes pressured into holding certain officials accountable, but this is usually motivated by internal conflict; the regime regularly leverages these incidents to make itself look legitimate. In Venezuela, regime officials are able to commit serious crimes with impunity. For example, in 2017 and 2024, regime security forces repeatedly employed excessive use of force to violently repress large anti-regime protests, resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of serious injuries. Security forces have not been investigated or charged for these human rights violations, even when credible evidence exists of their involvement. In the aftermath of the 2024 protests, witnesses posted numerous videos online showing security forces firing indiscriminately into crowds. Nonetheless, officials from the Public Ministry repeatedly affirmed that security forces were not implicated in the deaths of protesters. Instead, the regime attempted to pin the blame on criminal groups and other non-state actors. These serious human rights violations and the lack of accountability that enables perpetrators have drawn international scrutiny. For instance, in 2018, prosecutors from the International Criminal Court (ICC) launched an investigation into the actions of regime security forces. In response, President Nicolás Maduro announced a “judicial revolution” that was supposed to render the justice system more efficient and hold officials accountable. However, according to the legal rights CSO Acceso a la Justicia, the 38 laws passed during 2021 and 2022 that constituted the “judicial revolution” did not meaningfully reform the justice system nor address the ruling party’s undue influence over judicial appointments and judicial decisions. In effect, the “judicial revolution” only served to divert criticism while preserving a status quo that was favorable to the regime. With the repressive Operation Tun Tun in 2024 and 2025, criminal acts against dissidents and the political opposition have only become more overt, and regime officials in Venezuela continue to violate human rights with impunity.
Moreover, when regime-controlled institutions launch investigations into officials for alleged wrongdoing, this is usually linked to internal party conflicts rather than true accountability. These incidents also serve the regime’s attempts to legitimize itself. Throughout his presidency, Nicolás Maduro has frequently declared “war” on corruption and used the Anticorruption Police to conduct internal purges and establish a façade of accountability. For example, in September 2025, the Attorney General issued a public statement claiming that a total of 592 former officials have been successfully charged with corruption and removed from their posts since 2017. However, it is known that the Maduro regime openly engages in corruption and only leverages corruption charges for political reasons. For example, in 2023, two members of the judiciary were accused of accepting a bribe that led to the release of a gang member; however, only Judge José Macsimino Márquez García was arrested and charged. The individual who issued the release order, Mario Aquino, was not investigated. Due to the opacity with which the regime operates, there is no information available on the precise reasons as to why certain regime-allied officials are prosecuted, and others are not. However, there is enough credible evidence to establish that officials are generally able to act with impunity, unless they somehow fall out of favor with the regime.
HRF classifies Venezuela as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The consolidation of power in the hands of President Nicolás Maduro and his ruling party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), was preceded by the progressive erosion of the country’s democratic institutions under former president Hugo Chávez, as well as a period of significant political instability at the turn of the 20th century, which led to Chávez’s rise. In 1992, Chávez gained political prominence after he led a failed coup against then-President Carlos Andrés Pérez. The following year, Pérez was impeached on corruption charges, and in 1994, his successor pardoned Chávez. This cleared the way for Chávez’s successful 1998 presidential campaign. After taking office in 1999, Chávez displayed increasingly authoritarian tendencies, a trend that intensified after 2002, following a coup attempt led by segments of the military, with the support of some of the civilian opposition. The coup attempt failed, and Chávez hardened his stance towards all critics and dissidents; he went on to rule the country until his death in 2013. Following Chávez’s death, former Vice President Nicolás Maduro rose to power, under whom Venezuela’s democratic backsliding accelerated, and serious, systematic human rights abuses intensified. During the 2024 general elections, the regime overtly falsified elections to unfairly maintain Maduro in power. Additionally, under Chávez and Maduro, non-state actors allied with the regime have contributed significantly to authoritarian consolidation in Venezuela. Armed groups—such as guerrillas, urban militias, and gangs—have been known to engage in electoral violence and repress dissent on behalf of the regime in exchange for resources, such as weapons, and control of illicit economies.
In Venezuela, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. President Nicolás Maduro and the PSUV have engaged in widespread electoral fraud so as to unfairly remain in power. Non-state actors with ties to the regime regularly intimidate and coerce individuals into voting for Maduro and the PSUV. Regime officials have also unfairly barred prominent opposition candidates and political parties from competing in elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime of Nicolás Maduro and the PSUV. Dissidents regularly face arbitrary detentions, physical aggression, and judicial harassment from regime officials—in the most extreme cases, officials have forcibly disappeared and killed dissidents. The regime in Venezuela has also unfairly persecuted independent dissenting organizations, leading many to shut down or leave the country. Dissidents who are forced into exile due to the regime’s persecution continue to face risks abroad due to transnational repression. Armed non-state actors with ties to the Maduro regime have also been implicated in the kidnapping and assassination of dissidents abroad.
Institutions in Venezuela largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The judiciary, as well as regulatory bodies and oversight institutions, are subservient to Nicolás Maduro and the ruling PSUV party. Venezuela’s institutions largely fail to uphold electoral integrity and do not protect the rights of dissidents. In effect, judges regularly facilitate regime action that undermines the political opposition and silences critical voices. At the same time that critics and political leaders are unfairly criminalized, regime officials are able to commit serious crimes with impunity.
In Venezuela, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime of Nicolás Maduro has overtly falsified electoral results to unfairly remain in power, in addition to engaging in widespread vote buying and voter intimidation. Regime-allied non-state actors have also employed violent intimidation and coercion to unfairly boost Maduro and the PSUV in the polls. Moreover, the regime has criminalized and barred prominent opposition candidates and political parties from competing in elections. In response to widespread electoral fraud and systematic persecution of opposition members, the majority of the real, mainstream opposition boycotted the 2020 and 2025 legislative elections.
Throughout Maduro’s presidency, the regime has engaged in systematic, significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, and electoral fraud. These fraudulent practices include the overt falsification of results, widespread vote buying, and voter intimidation. In 2024, President Nicolás Maduro claimed that he had been reelected to a third presidential term with 51.95% of the vote. However, these results were proven to be fraudulent—data collected directly from poll stations and validated by international electoral observers from the civil society organization (CSO), the Carter Center, proved Maduro’s real vote share to be approximately 30%. The main opposition candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, is believed to have obtained approximately 67% of the vote. The Maduro regime was able to leverage its control over the National Electoral Council (CNE) to overtly falsify the results and unfairly remain in power. Moreover, the regime in Venezuela has systematically abused state resources to engage in large-scale vote buying and coerce state employees as well as beneficiaries of state services into casting votes for Maduro and the PSUV.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, have systematically contributed to orchestrating electoral irregularities or fraud. Armed non-state actors, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla and the pro-regime urban militias known as “colectivos,” have coerced and intimidated voters on behalf of the regime during electoral cycles. For example, during the 2024 presidential elections, the ELN deployed armed patrols on pickup trucks in the border regions of Táchira and Apure. According to eye-witnesses, armed ELN members monitored and threatened voters against voting for the opposition before and during election day.
The regime has also systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. Members of the real mainstream opposition, including both campaign managers and political leaders, are regularly subjected to politically motivated charges of corruption, terrorism, treason, and criminal association, among others. The regime has systematically leveraged its control over the Attorney General’s office and the judiciary to unfairly bar opposition candidates from participating in elections. In 2024, the opposition’s most popular presidential candidate, María Corina Machado, was arbitrarily barred from contesting the race by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ). Between 2010 and 2023, the regime barred approximately 1,441 individuals from holding office in Venezuela. Moreover, due to the risk of politically motivated imprisonment and other human rights abuses, prominent opposition members have been forced to seek political asylum in embassies and abroad, such as Edmundo González Urrutia, who is living in exile in Spain after the 2024 election, which independent observers broadly agree he won by a wide margin. As of 2025, the majority of real mainstream opposition parties in Venezuela have either been barred from participating in elections or taken over by regime loyalists.
Venezuela’s mainstream opposition parties have boycotted several elections in recent years as a way of protesting the lack of free and fair electoral competition. In response to widespread electoral fraud and the systematic persecution of opposition members, the majority of the real, mainstream opposition boycotted the 2020 and 2025 legislative elections. In 2025, the ruling Simón Bolívar Great Patriotic Pole (GPPSB) political coalition, which consists primarily of the PSUV as well as other smaller regime-controlled parties, increased its dominance over the National Assembly, claiming 253 of 285 available seats. The majority of the remaining seats in the legislature were distributed to sham opposition parties.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime of Nicolás Maduro and the PSUV. Dissidents regularly face arbitrary detentions, physical aggression, and judicial harassment, while independent organizations are intimidated, fined, prosecuted, and often forced into exile. Officials have been implicated in systematic enforced disappearances as well as some extrajudicial killings of dissidents. Protesters have regularly faced excessive use of force, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and torture. The regime also harasses, threatens, and kidnaps individuals with close relationships with exiled dissidents, while loyalist armed non-state actors kidnap and assassinate dissidents abroad.
To suppress dissent, the regime in Venezuela has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Dissidents regularly face arbitrary detentions and physical aggression from regime officials and unfounded legal action based on the regime’s gag laws. Throughout 2024 and 2025, Operation Tun Tun (also known as Operation Knock Knock) has represented an escalation in the prosecution and jailing of journalists, civil society leaders, activists, volunteers, and their families. In 2024, the Institute for the Press and Society (IPYS Venezuela) documented a rise in physical and verbal aggressions perpetuated by the regime and its non-state allies against journalists and media workers. Journalists reported suffering physical injuries inflicted by both security forces and non-state allies. They have also been subject to arbitrary detentions and the seizure of their equipment by regime security forces. Similarly, civil society leaders have increasingly faced serious obstruction and intimidation from the regime. Security forces have arbitrarily detained, and in some cases forcibly disappeared, civil society leaders at the head of prominent Venezuelan CSOs, including the director of the CSO Control Ciudadano, human rights attorney Rocío San Miguel, in February 2024; the director of CSO Espacio Público, press freedom advocate Carlos Correa, in January 2025; and a leading member of the CSO Súmate, Nélida Sánchez, in August 2024. While Correa was ultimately released nine days after he was detained, San Miguel and Sánchez remained imprisoned throughout 2025.
In addition to obstructing the work of dissidents, the regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations in Venezuela. It has also forced organizations to cease operating through a pattern of intimidation consisting of verbal threats, judicial harassment, financial penalties, and the arbitrary detention of staff members. In 2019, the National Commission of Telecommunications (Conatel) unfairly revoked Radio Caracas Radio’s (RCR) license to be on air due to its critical coverage of the regime. The removal of RCR from the air followed years of judicial, administrative, and financial harassment targeting the station. RCR shut down all its operations in 2023, after unsuccessfully attempting to keep running online; it was the oldest operating radio station in Venezuela. Other leading dissenting organizations have been forced to move their operations abroad due to the impending threat of effectively being shut down. For instance, major news outlets, such as El Nacional newspaper, and prominent civil society organizations, such as Transparencia Venezuela, have been forced into exile and must operate digitally. Prior to shutting down its Caracas-based print edition in 2018, El Nacional faced multiple attacks from the regime, including politically motivated judicial action and fines in retaliation for publishing criticism of government officials.
The Maduro regime has also systematically killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. Regime officials have played a direct role in the systematic enforced disappearance of dissidents. They have also been implicated in the extrajudicial killings of dissidents; however, assassinations are rarely investigated in Venezuela, which allows perpetrators to act with impunity and evade identification. Between May 1, 2024, and April 30, 2025, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was able to document 84 cases of enforced disappearances, some of which were of short duration, but others that lasted up to 159 days. According to the OHCHR, the main perpetrators of these crimes were state officials, such as intelligence officers from the Directorate for Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) and the Bolivarian National Service for Intelligence (SEBIN). Police and military members were also implicated in the disappearances. In 2019, the United Nations (UN) published a report that also directly linked regime officials with the assassination of dissidents. For instance, the report noted that agents of the Special Action Forces (FAES) were implicated in the 2019 killings of six men who had previously participated in anti-government protests.
The regime in Venezuela has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In addition to a disproportionate use of force against protesters by state security forces, which has resulted in multiple deaths and serious injuries, the regime has systematically repressed protests through arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, and abuse of detainees. During the 2024 and 2025 protests against the fraudulent reelection of Nicolás Maduro, hundreds of protesters suffered serious injuries, and several protesters were killed. According to the CSOs Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Foro Penal, at least 25 protesters were killed during the first few days of protests in late July 2024, and over 2,000 individuals were arbitrarily detained throughout the protests. While the majority of those detained in the aftermath of the 2024 elections were ultimately released, they continue to face politically motivated charges for terrorism and inciting hate, among others.
Furthermore, in response to dissidence abroad, the regime has also systematically engaged in, or enabled, transnational repression against critics in exile. The regime of Nicolás Maduro engages in coercion by proxy as a form of transnational repression. Regime officials regularly harass, threaten, and kidnap individuals with close relationships to exiled dissidents. For example, in January 2025, the regime forcibly disappeared Rafael Tudares, the son-in-law of exiled opposition leader and former presidential candidate Edmundo González Urrutia. On December 1, 2025, Tudares was sentenced in highly irregular and opaque proceedings to 30 years in prison on politically motivated charges of treason.
Non-state actors tied to the regime have systematically contributed to the governing authority’s transnational repression, with criminal groups implicated in the kidnapping and assassination of dissidents abroad. For example, in 2024, Ronald Ojeda, a former Venezuelan military official and dissident exiled in Chile, was kidnapped and murdered by individuals disguised as local police officers. Investigations led by Chilean authorities implicated members of the Tren de Aragua criminal gang in the murder, as well as top officials of the Maduro regime. Furthermore, Venezuelan dissidents exiled in Colombia face significant risks due to the widespread presence of multiple armed groups with ties to the regime of Nicolás Maduro within the country. In October 2025, two prominent regime critics, Yendri Velásquez and Luis Peche Arteaga, were violently attacked in Bogotá by two unknown assailants. Velásquez and Peche Arteaga suffered serious injuries as a result of gunfire. While police investigations in Colombia are still ongoing, Velásquez had previously been detained by regime officials in Venezuela, and his passport has been arbitrarily annulled by the regime. According to the CSO, Coalición por los Derechos Humanos, members of the Tren de Aragua gang and the ELN guerrilla regularly surveil, coerce, attack, and kidnap Venezuelan dissidents in Colombia, sometimes in order to hand them over to regime officials at the border.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime in Venezuela. The regime-controlled judiciary has been instrumental in legitimizing Maduro’s fraudulent electoral victories and criminalizing the political opposition. Judges also regularly facilitate regime action that silences critical voices and dissidents. As part of the 2024 and 2025 post-election crackdown, loyalist judges have issued multiple arrest warrants against opposition leaders and dissidents who denounced Maduro’s fraudulent reelection. At the same time that critics are unfairly criminalized, regime officials are able to commit serious crimes with impunity.
Courts in Venezuela have systematically and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition and make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The regime-controlled judiciary has been instrumental in legitimizing fraudulent electoral results and criminalizing the political opposition so as to perpetuate President Nicolás Maduro and the PSUV’s hold on power. In August 2024, the president of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), Caryslia Rodríguez, dismissed well-founded evidence that the regime had committed large-scale electoral fraud and certified Maduro’s reelection. The TSJ’s validation of the results was done at the request of Nicolás Maduro, who appointed Rodríguez to lead the TSJ in January 2024. Prior to her appointment, Rodríguez held political office as a PSUV member. In addition to enabling Maduro’s fraudulent reelection, the TSJ also contributed to the unfair persecution of the opposition’s 2024 presidential candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, and other prominent opposition leaders. The TSJ provided its decision validating the fraudulent results to the Attorney General’s office so that it could be used to prosecute opposition members who denounced electoral fraud. The TSJ also held González Urrutia in contempt after he rejected the regime-orchestrated results verification process and refused to hand over the opposition’s material evidence of widespread electoral fraud. In September 2024, another judge presiding over a special anti-terrorism court, Edward Briceño Cisneros, issued an arrest warrant for González Urrutia, who ultimately had to flee the country.
The regime’s systematic abuse of the judiciary to criminally prosecute political leaders predates the 2024 and 2025 post-election crackdown. Courts have repeatedly upheld unfair electoral bans imposed on prominent opposition candidates by regime officials. In 2015, María Corina Machado was barred from holding office for 12 months on politically motivated charges of corruption. In 2023, the original sentence was arbitrarily extended to 15 years after Machado emerged as the popular frontrunner in the opposition’s presidential primaries. In January 2024, the TSJ upheld the 15-year ban, thereby preventing the opposition from fielding its strongest candidate in the elections. In November 2024, the regime initiated a new investigation against Machado involving charges of treason and criminal conspiracy in retaliation for her leading role in the opposition’s electoral campaign.
In Venezuela, courts have also systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism and retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary regularly enables the jailing of dissidents on politically motivated charges. In 2017, the regime passed the Constitutional Law Against Hatred, for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance (known as the Law Against Hatred), which establishes severe penalties for loosely defined hate speech, including fines, the shutdown of media companies and political parties, and prison sentences of up to 20 years. Between 2017 and 2023, the CSO Espacio Público identified at least 83 individuals who were either threatened with prosecution or effectively prosecuted with charges linked to the Law Against Hatred. Individuals accused of violating the Law Against Hatred suffer from unfair pre-trial detention in poor conditions, violations of due process during trials, and arbitrary penalties. For example, in February 2025, political activist and opposition member Nelson Piñero was sentenced to 15 years in prison by Judge Luis Ovalles for online criticism of the Maduro regime, including criticism of the regime’s border dispute with Guyana. The courts have also issued unfair and severe sentences against members of the public for less overt criticism of the regime. In June 2025, Merlys Oropeza was sentenced to 10 years in prison for publishing a WhatsApp status in August 2024 that indirectly criticized the regime’s food distribution program (CLAP), widely known for its corruption and as a mechanism for the regime to buy votes. Oropeza was ultimately released in July 2025.
Individuals who are not sentenced to prison for their critical speech can face arbitrary court-ordered “precautionary measures” that can include prohibitions on leaving the country or using social media, as well as orders to issue a public apology. In 2022, TikTok entertainer Olga Mata was subjected to court-ordered precautionary measures and had to film a public apology after she was detained and charged for publishing a short video satirizing regime officials, including President Nicolás Maduro. Venezuela’s Attorney General Tarek William Saab shared Mata’s apology widely on his official social media accounts, which serves to intimidate and silence regime critics.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Institutions are sometimes pressured into holding certain officials accountable, but this is usually motivated by internal conflict; the regime regularly leverages these incidents to make itself look legitimate. In Venezuela, regime officials are able to commit serious crimes with impunity. For example, in 2017 and 2024, regime security forces repeatedly employed excessive use of force to violently repress large anti-regime protests, resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of serious injuries. Security forces have not been investigated or charged for these human rights violations, even when credible evidence exists of their involvement. In the aftermath of the 2024 protests, witnesses posted numerous videos online showing security forces firing indiscriminately into crowds. Nonetheless, officials from the Public Ministry repeatedly affirmed that security forces were not implicated in the deaths of protesters. Instead, the regime attempted to pin the blame on criminal groups and other non-state actors. These serious human rights violations and the lack of accountability that enables perpetrators have drawn international scrutiny. For instance, in 2018, prosecutors from the International Criminal Court (ICC) launched an investigation into the actions of regime security forces. In response, President Nicolás Maduro announced a “judicial revolution” that was supposed to render the justice system more efficient and hold officials accountable. However, according to the legal rights CSO Acceso a la Justicia, the 38 laws passed during 2021 and 2022 that constituted the “judicial revolution” did not meaningfully reform the justice system nor address the ruling party’s undue influence over judicial appointments and judicial decisions. In effect, the “judicial revolution” only served to divert criticism while preserving a status quo that was favorable to the regime. With the repressive Operation Tun Tun in 2024 and 2025, criminal acts against dissidents and the political opposition have only become more overt, and regime officials in Venezuela continue to violate human rights with impunity.
Moreover, when regime-controlled institutions launch investigations into officials for alleged wrongdoing, this is usually linked to internal party conflicts rather than true accountability. These incidents also serve the regime’s attempts to legitimize itself. Throughout his presidency, Nicolás Maduro has frequently declared “war” on corruption and used the Anticorruption Police to conduct internal purges and establish a façade of accountability. For example, in September 2025, the Attorney General issued a public statement claiming that a total of 592 former officials have been successfully charged with corruption and removed from their posts since 2017. However, it is known that the Maduro regime openly engages in corruption and only leverages corruption charges for political reasons. For example, in 2023, two members of the judiciary were accused of accepting a bribe that led to the release of a gang member; however, only Judge José Macsimino Márquez García was arrested and charged. The individual who issued the release order, Mario Aquino, was not investigated. Due to the opacity with which the regime operates, there is no information available on the precise reasons as to why certain regime-allied officials are prosecuted, and others are not. However, there is enough credible evidence to establish that officials are generally able to act with impunity, unless they somehow fall out of favor with the regime.
