Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Uzbekistan as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The country declared independence on August 31, 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its political system was shaped by Islam Karimov, a former Soviet apparatchik who served as the country’s President from 1991 until his death in 2016. Karimov originally rose to power amidst the violent ethnic clashes in the Fergana Valley targeting Meskhetian Turks, which he used to justify establishing a ruthless police state. Since gaining independence, Uzbekistan has never held a free and fair election. The regime has systematically prevented any genuine opposition from emerging, ensuring that power remains within the executive. Karimov’s successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has continued this legacy, consolidating power through constitutional changes in 2023 that extended the presidential term and effectively reset his term count, allowing him to rule potentially until 2040.
Formally, Uzbekistan is a presidential republic with a separation of powers, though in practice, it’s a consolidated authoritarian state where power is concentrated in the hands of the executive. Legislative authority is vested in the Oliy Majlis, a bicameral parliament consisting of the Legislative Chamber (lower house) and the Senate (upper house). However, the legislature lacks genuine independence and is composed entirely of pro-government parties that rubber-stamp executive initiatives. The judicial branch, comprising the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and lower courts, is nominally independent but remains subservient to the President, who appoints the majority of the Supreme Judicial Council and nominates key judges. The country includes the sovereign Republic of Karakalpakstan, an autonomous region in the northwest with the constitutional right to secede. However, this autonomy exists largely on paper. In July 2022, the region faced a brutal crackdown after mass protests erupted against proposed constitutional amendments that sought to strip Karakalpakstan of its right to secession. The regime suppressed the unrest with lethal force and subsequently imprisoned local leaders, further cementing its centralized control.
In Uzbekistan, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime cultivates a heavily skewed playing field to guarantee the incumbent claims victory with overwhelmingly high vote shares, while systematically barring genuine opposition parties from the ballot. Official Tashkent manufactures desired results through widespread voting irregularities and strictly limits independent electoral oversight, utilizing state resources to secure unfair campaign advantages that render meaningful contestation impossible.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime enforces strict control by criminalizing online expression through the weaponization of defamation laws and maintaining a total ban on public assembly. High-profile critics are subjected to forced psychiatric detention and custodial abuse, while state agencies actively hunt down dissidents abroad through transnational repression. Furthermore, the administration systematically dismantles independent civil society and minority groups by labeling them as “extremist” organizations and enforcing restrictive legislation.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The executive branch exerts total control over the state apparatus, utilizing the judiciary to rubber-stamp the repression of critics rather than dispense justice. The administration ensures systematic impunity for officials involved in state violence and human rights abuses, while simultaneously neutralizing the independence of oversight mechanisms through restrictive legislative reforms and absolute control over key appointments.
In Uzbekistan, elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The ruling power ensures this outcome by cultivating a heavily skewed playing field to claim victory with overwhelmingly high vote shares, systematically barring genuine opposition parties from the ballot, and engaging in widespread voting irregularities to manufacture results. Furthermore, the incumbent strictly limits independent electoral oversight while utilizing state resources to secure unfair campaign advantages.
Ruling elites have skewed the electoral playing field so much so that they generally claim victory with a very high vote share. This is characterized by the total absence of viable opponents and the manipulation of constitutional norms to extend the incumbent’s rule. In the July 2023 snap presidential election, Shavkat Mirziyoyev secured a landslide victory with 87.1% of the vote against three token candidates who endorsed his policies. This followed the April 2023 constitutional referendum, which extended the presidential term from five to seven years and reset Mirziyoyev’s term count, effectively allowing him to remain in power until 2040. Most recently, in the October 2024 parliamentary elections, the regime maintained its monopoly; international observers from the OSCE ODIHR noted that while the elections were “technically well-prepared,” they offered “no genuine choice” to voters, as all five registered parties were pro-government and avoided criticizing the executive.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. No genuine opposition party operates legally in Uzbekistan, as the officials repeatedly use administrative and judicial tools to deny registration or ban movements entirely. Most recently, in February 2024, the Supreme Court designated the opposition movement “Alga Karakalpakstan” as an “extremist organization,” effectively banning it. Previously, the Ministry of Justice repeatedly denied registration to the “Haqiqat va Taraqqiyot” (Truth and Progress) social democratic party in 2021 and 2023, preventing it from fielding candidates. This systematic exclusion dates back to the early 1990s, when the first opposition party, Erk (Liberty), was banned since its leader, Muhammad Solih, ran against the Soviet-era Communist Party chair Karimov in the 1991 presidential race, and, according to some independent observers, won. The official announcement that Solih had claimed a mere 12.7% of the vote prompted mass protests, which the regime brutally suppressed. Amid the widespread harassment and prosecution of opposition members that followed, Solih fled to Azerbaijan in 1993, only to be tried in absentia on bogus charges of terrorism and sentenced to fifteen years in prison in 2000. Regime officials continue to deny Erk legal recognition and have repeatedly harassed and intimidated its members when they have attempted to meet or campaign publicly, most recently in 2003.
Uzbek officials have engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Elections are routinely marred by procedural violations that undermine the integrity of the vote, including ballot manipulation and the disregard of counting protocols. During the October 2024 parliamentary elections, OSCE observers documented numerous irregularities, including ballot stuffing, disregard for counting procedures, and discrepancies between the number of voters casting ballots and official turnout figures. These practices mirror those observed during the 2023 constitutional referendum and presidential election, where “carousel voting” and the addition of large numbers of voters to supplementary lists without safeguards were widespread.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The legislative framework deliberately restricts the ability of civil society to monitor elections, allowing only state-approved entities to validate the process. Uzbek law does not provide for citizen election observation; only political parties, international organizations, and mahallas (neighborhood committees linked to the government) are permitted to deploy observers. This exclusion prevents independent watchdogs from validating results or documenting fraud. In the 2024 elections, this lack of transparency was compounded by media restrictions that limited voters’ access to diverse viewpoints.
The incumbent has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party ensures that the incumbent dominates the information space. In the run-up to the 2023 and 2024 votes, the regime mobilized public employees to attend campaign events and utilized state-owned media to promote government achievements while ignoring alternative perspectives. International observers noted that the advertising market is limited and subject to “undue external interference,” forcing private media into self-censorship and leaving the electorate without critical analysis of the government’s performance.
In Uzbekistan, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. This is enforced by criminalizing online expression through the weaponization of defamation laws, subjecting high-profile critics to forced psychiatric detention and custodial abuse, and maintaining a total ban on public assembly; state agencies actively hunt down dissidents abroad through transnational repression and systematically dismantle independent civil society and minority groups through “extremism” designations and restrictive legislation.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech. This is characterized by the widespread weaponization of “defamation” and “insult” laws to silence online criticism. In the first ten months of 2024 alone, the regime prosecuted over 30,000 individuals under administrative charges of defamation and insult, many for social media posts criticizing state policies. A 2021 law criminalizing “insulting the President” online continues to be aggressively enforced. For instance, in August 2023, blogger Abduqodir Muminov was sentenced to over seven years in prison shortly after publishing an investigation into the alleged corruption involving the president’s family. Furthermore, the regime has intensified internet censorship with the 2024 launch of the “Unified Register of Digital Evidence.” This system enables state agencies to deanonymize critics by linking online activity, including IP addresses and private Telegram messages, directly to citizens’ biometric IDs, thereby automating the collection of evidence for prosecution.
State officials have systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, and civil society. Executive power targets high-profile critics with long prison sentences and forced psychiatric confinement. In February 2025, Karakalpak blogger Mustafa Tursynbayev died in custody; while authorities claimed his death was due to a construction accident, rights groups raised concerns about potential torture and the denial of urgent medical care shortly after he was sentenced to five years on dubious extortion charges. Similarly, blogger Shokhida Salomova remained in forced psychiatric detention throughout 2024 and 2025 for criticizing President Mirziyoyev and his family; her detention has been condemned by international rights groups as a punitive abuse of psychiatry.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. The regime maintains a de facto ban on all public assemblies by criminalizing any “unsanctioned” demonstration and ensuring total impunity for past state violence to deter future mobilization. As of 2025, no senior officials have been held accountable for the lethal crackdown on the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan, where security forces killed at least 21 people. In November 2024, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) issued Opinion No. 62/2024, explicitly declaring the imprisonment of protest leader Dauletmurat Tajimuratov arbitrary and a violation of his fundamental right to peaceful assembly. Despite this international ruling calling for his immediate release, Tajimuratov continues to serve a 16-year sentence, creating a chilling effect that effectively suppresses current activism.
Mirziyoyev’s regime has systematically engaged in, or enabled, transnational repression against dissidents abroad. State security services orchestrate the rendition of critics who have fled the country, particularly those in Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkey, by misusing bilateral security agreements and interstate warrant systems. In this cross-border crackdown, Kazakh authorities routinely detain Karakalpak activists on Uzbek warrants and deny their asylum requests, leaving them vulnerable to coercion. A prominent example is activist Rinat Uttambetov, who was arrested in Almaty in April 2024. Following the denial of his asylum claim and reported threats against his family in Uzbekistan, he was coerced into “voluntarily” returning to Nukus. Despite assurances of safety, he was immediately prosecuted and, in April 2025, sentenced to two and a half years in prison on charges of “encroaching on the constitutional order.” This case highlights the regime’s effective use of regional security pacts and proxy coercion to silence dissent beyond its borders.
The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. It uses “extremism” laws to ban opposition movements and restrictive legislation to force civil society groups into closure. In February 2024, the Supreme Court designated the “Alga Karakalpakstan” movement as an “extremist organization,” effectively criminalizing any affiliation with the group. Furthermore, the new law on Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), signed in August 2025, has accelerated the closure of independent groups; while it introduced minor administrative easings such as reduced registration fees, it simultaneously imposed strict new obligations, including mandatory government approval for all foreign grants, forcing many CSOs to suspend operations to avoid criminal liability.
Uzbek law enforcement has systematically and disproportionately undermined marginalized groups’ ability to dissent. Religious minorities face intensifying pressure through administrative and judicial harassment intended to curb their independent organization. In 2024, officials issued over 1,250 administrative penalties for “illegal” religious activities, targeting unregistered communities. Consequently, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) reported a further deterioration of religious freedom in 2025, citing the systematic liquidation of independent religious groups that refuse to submit to state control.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The executive utilizes the judiciary to rubber-stamp the repression of critics, ensures systematic impunity for officials involved in state violence, and neutralizes the independence of oversight mechanisms through restrictive reforms and appointment control.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. This is evident in the judiciary’s role as the primary enforcer of the crackdown on dissent. In July 2024, the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan rejected the appeal of Dauletmurat Tajimuratov, the lawyer and activist leading the Karakalpakstan protests, upholding his 16-year prison sentence despite credible allegations of torture and unfair trial proceedings. Furthermore, courts have facilitated the elimination of online critics; in February 2025, Karakalpak blogger Mustafa Tursynbayev died in custody shortly after a closed court sentenced him to five years in prison, while blogger Shokhida Salomova remained in forced psychiatric detention throughout 2024 and 2025 based on a court order that deemed her criticism of the president’s family “socially dangerous”.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. This is characterized by the systematic refusal to investigate instances of state violence and the shielding of security personnel from prosecution for human rights abuses. Despite the deaths of at least 21 people during the suppression of the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan, no senior officials or security commanders have been prosecuted as of 2025. The Parliamentary Commission established to investigate these events presented its final report to parliament in December 2024, but the document was never made public, and its findings led to no accountability. Instead, the judiciary focused exclusively on prosecuting the protesters themselves, effectively shielding the security services from scrutiny for the use of lethal force.
The regime has systematically subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. This is characterized by the establishment of nominally independent bodies that lack enforcement power against political elites and the maintenance of absolute executive control over key appointments. While the regime nominally established an Anti-Corruption Agency, it lacks the power to investigate high-level political corruption. Although a new law on “Conflicts of Interest” came into force in December 2024, ostensibly to regulate state employees’ financial disclosures and prohibit personal business gains, it has been applied primarily to lower-level bureaucrats. The President’s inner circle remains effectively immune from strict financial scrutiny and asset declaration requirements. Moreover, the executive maintains absolute control over the judiciary’s composition; the President appoints the majority of the Supreme Judicial Council and nominates all Constitutional Court judges, ensuring that the legal system remains a compliant instrument of the administration.
The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. This is characterized by the high judiciary’s complete abdication of its constitutional oversight function, serving instead to legally validate the executive’s consolidation of power and dismantle potential legal challenges to the regime’s power. For instance, the Constitutional Court, tasked with reviewing the legality of executive actions, effectively rubber-stamped the 2023 constitutional referendum. This move reset President Mirziyoyev’s term count and validated the extension of his rule until potentially 2040, demonstrating the court’s refusal to offer any genuine legal challenge to executive overreach.
HRF classifies Uzbekistan as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The country declared independence on August 31, 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its political system was shaped by Islam Karimov, a former Soviet apparatchik who served as the country’s President from 1991 until his death in 2016. Karimov originally rose to power amidst the violent ethnic clashes in the Fergana Valley targeting Meskhetian Turks, which he used to justify establishing a ruthless police state. Since gaining independence, Uzbekistan has never held a free and fair election. The regime has systematically prevented any genuine opposition from emerging, ensuring that power remains within the executive. Karimov’s successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has continued this legacy, consolidating power through constitutional changes in 2023 that extended the presidential term and effectively reset his term count, allowing him to rule potentially until 2040.
Formally, Uzbekistan is a presidential republic with a separation of powers, though in practice, it’s a consolidated authoritarian state where power is concentrated in the hands of the executive. Legislative authority is vested in the Oliy Majlis, a bicameral parliament consisting of the Legislative Chamber (lower house) and the Senate (upper house). However, the legislature lacks genuine independence and is composed entirely of pro-government parties that rubber-stamp executive initiatives. The judicial branch, comprising the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and lower courts, is nominally independent but remains subservient to the President, who appoints the majority of the Supreme Judicial Council and nominates key judges. The country includes the sovereign Republic of Karakalpakstan, an autonomous region in the northwest with the constitutional right to secede. However, this autonomy exists largely on paper. In July 2022, the region faced a brutal crackdown after mass protests erupted against proposed constitutional amendments that sought to strip Karakalpakstan of its right to secession. The regime suppressed the unrest with lethal force and subsequently imprisoned local leaders, further cementing its centralized control.
In Uzbekistan, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime cultivates a heavily skewed playing field to guarantee the incumbent claims victory with overwhelmingly high vote shares, while systematically barring genuine opposition parties from the ballot. Official Tashkent manufactures desired results through widespread voting irregularities and strictly limits independent electoral oversight, utilizing state resources to secure unfair campaign advantages that render meaningful contestation impossible.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime enforces strict control by criminalizing online expression through the weaponization of defamation laws and maintaining a total ban on public assembly. High-profile critics are subjected to forced psychiatric detention and custodial abuse, while state agencies actively hunt down dissidents abroad through transnational repression. Furthermore, the administration systematically dismantles independent civil society and minority groups by labeling them as “extremist” organizations and enforcing restrictive legislation.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The executive branch exerts total control over the state apparatus, utilizing the judiciary to rubber-stamp the repression of critics rather than dispense justice. The administration ensures systematic impunity for officials involved in state violence and human rights abuses, while simultaneously neutralizing the independence of oversight mechanisms through restrictive legislative reforms and absolute control over key appointments.
In Uzbekistan, elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The ruling power ensures this outcome by cultivating a heavily skewed playing field to claim victory with overwhelmingly high vote shares, systematically barring genuine opposition parties from the ballot, and engaging in widespread voting irregularities to manufacture results. Furthermore, the incumbent strictly limits independent electoral oversight while utilizing state resources to secure unfair campaign advantages.
Ruling elites have skewed the electoral playing field so much so that they generally claim victory with a very high vote share. This is characterized by the total absence of viable opponents and the manipulation of constitutional norms to extend the incumbent’s rule. In the July 2023 snap presidential election, Shavkat Mirziyoyev secured a landslide victory with 87.1% of the vote against three token candidates who endorsed his policies. This followed the April 2023 constitutional referendum, which extended the presidential term from five to seven years and reset Mirziyoyev’s term count, effectively allowing him to remain in power until 2040. Most recently, in the October 2024 parliamentary elections, the regime maintained its monopoly; international observers from the OSCE ODIHR noted that while the elections were “technically well-prepared,” they offered “no genuine choice” to voters, as all five registered parties were pro-government and avoided criticizing the executive.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. No genuine opposition party operates legally in Uzbekistan, as the officials repeatedly use administrative and judicial tools to deny registration or ban movements entirely. Most recently, in February 2024, the Supreme Court designated the opposition movement “Alga Karakalpakstan” as an “extremist organization,” effectively banning it. Previously, the Ministry of Justice repeatedly denied registration to the “Haqiqat va Taraqqiyot” (Truth and Progress) social democratic party in 2021 and 2023, preventing it from fielding candidates. This systematic exclusion dates back to the early 1990s, when the first opposition party, Erk (Liberty), was banned since its leader, Muhammad Solih, ran against the Soviet-era Communist Party chair Karimov in the 1991 presidential race, and, according to some independent observers, won. The official announcement that Solih had claimed a mere 12.7% of the vote prompted mass protests, which the regime brutally suppressed. Amid the widespread harassment and prosecution of opposition members that followed, Solih fled to Azerbaijan in 1993, only to be tried in absentia on bogus charges of terrorism and sentenced to fifteen years in prison in 2000. Regime officials continue to deny Erk legal recognition and have repeatedly harassed and intimidated its members when they have attempted to meet or campaign publicly, most recently in 2003.
Uzbek officials have engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Elections are routinely marred by procedural violations that undermine the integrity of the vote, including ballot manipulation and the disregard of counting protocols. During the October 2024 parliamentary elections, OSCE observers documented numerous irregularities, including ballot stuffing, disregard for counting procedures, and discrepancies between the number of voters casting ballots and official turnout figures. These practices mirror those observed during the 2023 constitutional referendum and presidential election, where “carousel voting” and the addition of large numbers of voters to supplementary lists without safeguards were widespread.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The legislative framework deliberately restricts the ability of civil society to monitor elections, allowing only state-approved entities to validate the process. Uzbek law does not provide for citizen election observation; only political parties, international organizations, and mahallas (neighborhood committees linked to the government) are permitted to deploy observers. This exclusion prevents independent watchdogs from validating results or documenting fraud. In the 2024 elections, this lack of transparency was compounded by media restrictions that limited voters’ access to diverse viewpoints.
The incumbent has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party ensures that the incumbent dominates the information space. In the run-up to the 2023 and 2024 votes, the regime mobilized public employees to attend campaign events and utilized state-owned media to promote government achievements while ignoring alternative perspectives. International observers noted that the advertising market is limited and subject to “undue external interference,” forcing private media into self-censorship and leaving the electorate without critical analysis of the government’s performance.
In Uzbekistan, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. This is enforced by criminalizing online expression through the weaponization of defamation laws, subjecting high-profile critics to forced psychiatric detention and custodial abuse, and maintaining a total ban on public assembly; state agencies actively hunt down dissidents abroad through transnational repression and systematically dismantle independent civil society and minority groups through “extremism” designations and restrictive legislation.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech. This is characterized by the widespread weaponization of “defamation” and “insult” laws to silence online criticism. In the first ten months of 2024 alone, the regime prosecuted over 30,000 individuals under administrative charges of defamation and insult, many for social media posts criticizing state policies. A 2021 law criminalizing “insulting the President” online continues to be aggressively enforced. For instance, in August 2023, blogger Abduqodir Muminov was sentenced to over seven years in prison shortly after publishing an investigation into the alleged corruption involving the president’s family. Furthermore, the regime has intensified internet censorship with the 2024 launch of the “Unified Register of Digital Evidence.” This system enables state agencies to deanonymize critics by linking online activity, including IP addresses and private Telegram messages, directly to citizens’ biometric IDs, thereby automating the collection of evidence for prosecution.
State officials have systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, and civil society. Executive power targets high-profile critics with long prison sentences and forced psychiatric confinement. In February 2025, Karakalpak blogger Mustafa Tursynbayev died in custody; while authorities claimed his death was due to a construction accident, rights groups raised concerns about potential torture and the denial of urgent medical care shortly after he was sentenced to five years on dubious extortion charges. Similarly, blogger Shokhida Salomova remained in forced psychiatric detention throughout 2024 and 2025 for criticizing President Mirziyoyev and his family; her detention has been condemned by international rights groups as a punitive abuse of psychiatry.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. The regime maintains a de facto ban on all public assemblies by criminalizing any “unsanctioned” demonstration and ensuring total impunity for past state violence to deter future mobilization. As of 2025, no senior officials have been held accountable for the lethal crackdown on the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan, where security forces killed at least 21 people. In November 2024, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) issued Opinion No. 62/2024, explicitly declaring the imprisonment of protest leader Dauletmurat Tajimuratov arbitrary and a violation of his fundamental right to peaceful assembly. Despite this international ruling calling for his immediate release, Tajimuratov continues to serve a 16-year sentence, creating a chilling effect that effectively suppresses current activism.
Mirziyoyev’s regime has systematically engaged in, or enabled, transnational repression against dissidents abroad. State security services orchestrate the rendition of critics who have fled the country, particularly those in Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkey, by misusing bilateral security agreements and interstate warrant systems. In this cross-border crackdown, Kazakh authorities routinely detain Karakalpak activists on Uzbek warrants and deny their asylum requests, leaving them vulnerable to coercion. A prominent example is activist Rinat Uttambetov, who was arrested in Almaty in April 2024. Following the denial of his asylum claim and reported threats against his family in Uzbekistan, he was coerced into “voluntarily” returning to Nukus. Despite assurances of safety, he was immediately prosecuted and, in April 2025, sentenced to two and a half years in prison on charges of “encroaching on the constitutional order.” This case highlights the regime’s effective use of regional security pacts and proxy coercion to silence dissent beyond its borders.
The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. It uses “extremism” laws to ban opposition movements and restrictive legislation to force civil society groups into closure. In February 2024, the Supreme Court designated the “Alga Karakalpakstan” movement as an “extremist organization,” effectively criminalizing any affiliation with the group. Furthermore, the new law on Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), signed in August 2025, has accelerated the closure of independent groups; while it introduced minor administrative easings such as reduced registration fees, it simultaneously imposed strict new obligations, including mandatory government approval for all foreign grants, forcing many CSOs to suspend operations to avoid criminal liability.
Uzbek law enforcement has systematically and disproportionately undermined marginalized groups’ ability to dissent. Religious minorities face intensifying pressure through administrative and judicial harassment intended to curb their independent organization. In 2024, officials issued over 1,250 administrative penalties for “illegal” religious activities, targeting unregistered communities. Consequently, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) reported a further deterioration of religious freedom in 2025, citing the systematic liquidation of independent religious groups that refuse to submit to state control.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The executive utilizes the judiciary to rubber-stamp the repression of critics, ensures systematic impunity for officials involved in state violence, and neutralizes the independence of oversight mechanisms through restrictive reforms and appointment control.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. This is evident in the judiciary’s role as the primary enforcer of the crackdown on dissent. In July 2024, the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan rejected the appeal of Dauletmurat Tajimuratov, the lawyer and activist leading the Karakalpakstan protests, upholding his 16-year prison sentence despite credible allegations of torture and unfair trial proceedings. Furthermore, courts have facilitated the elimination of online critics; in February 2025, Karakalpak blogger Mustafa Tursynbayev died in custody shortly after a closed court sentenced him to five years in prison, while blogger Shokhida Salomova remained in forced psychiatric detention throughout 2024 and 2025 based on a court order that deemed her criticism of the president’s family “socially dangerous”.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. This is characterized by the systematic refusal to investigate instances of state violence and the shielding of security personnel from prosecution for human rights abuses. Despite the deaths of at least 21 people during the suppression of the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan, no senior officials or security commanders have been prosecuted as of 2025. The Parliamentary Commission established to investigate these events presented its final report to parliament in December 2024, but the document was never made public, and its findings led to no accountability. Instead, the judiciary focused exclusively on prosecuting the protesters themselves, effectively shielding the security services from scrutiny for the use of lethal force.
The regime has systematically subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. This is characterized by the establishment of nominally independent bodies that lack enforcement power against political elites and the maintenance of absolute executive control over key appointments. While the regime nominally established an Anti-Corruption Agency, it lacks the power to investigate high-level political corruption. Although a new law on “Conflicts of Interest” came into force in December 2024, ostensibly to regulate state employees’ financial disclosures and prohibit personal business gains, it has been applied primarily to lower-level bureaucrats. The President’s inner circle remains effectively immune from strict financial scrutiny and asset declaration requirements. Moreover, the executive maintains absolute control over the judiciary’s composition; the President appoints the majority of the Supreme Judicial Council and nominates all Constitutional Court judges, ensuring that the legal system remains a compliant instrument of the administration.
The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. This is characterized by the high judiciary’s complete abdication of its constitutional oversight function, serving instead to legally validate the executive’s consolidation of power and dismantle potential legal challenges to the regime’s power. For instance, the Constitutional Court, tasked with reviewing the legality of executive actions, effectively rubber-stamped the 2023 constitutional referendum. This move reset President Mirziyoyev’s term count and validated the extension of his rule until potentially 2040, demonstrating the court’s refusal to offer any genuine legal challenge to executive overreach.
