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Note: Parts of the eastern regions of Ukraine have been occupied by Russia and its proxies since 2014, and parts of the southern regions by Russian forces since 2022. HRF analyzes those territories in its forthcoming Ukraine Full Report.
HRF classifies Ukraine as democratic.
Ukraine is a semi-presidential republic. The president is the head of state and has considerable executive powers. The legislature (the Verkhovna Rada) is unicameral, composed of 450 members elected for a five-year term. Ukraine gained independence from the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991. The consolidation of democratic institutions proved challenging in the first decades post-independence, given episodic executive overreach and the growing influence of oligarchic networks. In 2014, the mass Euromaidan protests culminated in the ouster of then-president Viktor Yanukovych and ushered in the most consequential transformation of the Ukrainian political system in the post-Soviet period. Taking advantage of the brief power vacuum after Yanukovych’s ouster, Russia moved to invade and subsequently annex the previously autonomous republic of Crimea in February, and stoke violent pro-Russian separatist movements in the country’s Eastern region. As a result, in the same year, illegal armed groups proclaimed the independent People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (an area collectively known as Donbas), triggering a protracted armed conflict with the central government of Ukraine. Despite the destabilizing effects of the conflict, Ukraine made important steps towards consolidating its democratic institutions between 2015 and 2022. It implemented anti-corruption measures, attempted to reform the judiciary, which had frequently failed to check Yanukovych’s regime, and carried out other critical domestic reforms. The Servant of the People party, led by current president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, campaigned on an extensive anti-corruption reformist platform and achieved an outright majority following the 2019 parliamentary election. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, has placed these democratic gains under strain. While warranted by the existential threat Ukraine is facing and constitutionally permissible, the imposition of martial law at the onset of the war has constrained democratic mechanisms, such as regular national elections and certain aspects of media independence, most notably by centralizing television broadcasting to counter disinformation.
Recent national elections, in 2014 and 2019, were largely free and fair. The introduction of martial law following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 entailed the indefinite suspension of national elections. Restoring the electoral process would require significant amendments to the Constitution (which explicitly prohibits elections during war) and would entail addressing multiple security, logistical, and financial challenges. President Zelensky’s ban on pro-Russian parties in 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, also somewhat constrained electoral competition. However, given the unprecedented scale of Russia’s attack, these measures received substantial public backing at the time.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public in Ukraine are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government, although freedom of dissent has come under increasing pressure before and after the invasion. Ukraine’s once pluralistic media sector has experienced significant centralisation under martial law. Independent civil society organizations have continued to operate freely, despite isolated reports of government pressure against corruption watchdogs. The government also largely upholds the freedom of assembly and has demonstrated responsiveness to demonstrations, which have become a critical accountability mechanism in the absence of national elections.
In Ukraine, institutions are somewhat independent but are frequently constrained by the current government and the legacies of previous non-democratic governance. The judiciary remains plagued by large-scale corruption, resistance to impartial oversight, and severe backlogs, as reforms introduced by Presidents Poroshenko and Zelensky have shown mixed results. Frequent leadership reshuffles and personnel shortages have also hampered the capacity of executive institutions as the war dragged on. On the other hand, independent oversight institutions (particularly Ukraine’s specialized anti-corruption bodies) have carried out their duties effectively and impartially, serving as a crucial bulwark of horizontal accountability. The Verkhovna Rada has also remained at least partially effective in its legislative oversight of the executive branch.
In Ukraine, national elections are largely free and fair. The Central Election Commission has administered recent elections, the most recent of which took place in 2019, in a sound and transparent manner. While the wartime ban on pro-Russian parties narrowed the playing field somewhat, it addressed legitimate security concerns, as discussed further below. The ongoing suspension of elections, while extraordinary, is both constitutionally permissible and warranted by extreme logistical and security constraints.
The government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. International observers assessed the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections as notable improvements relative to prior electoral cycles (especially in the early 2000s), which were marred by widespread fraud. By contrast, the 2019 parliamentary election, in which President Zelenskyy’s party, Servant of the People, won in a landslide (43.16% of the popular vote for proportionally-allocated mandates and 130 out of 225 single-member constituencies), was effectively administered by the Central Election Commission (CEC). Notwithstanding very sporadic procedural irregularities and some reports of illicit voter mobilization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) assessed voting in the 2019 elections positively in an “overwhelming majority of polling stations observed.” The election was also highly contested, allowing a broad field of candidates to campaign freely, as indicated by the breakthrough of Servant of the People, registered in 2018, and the decline of outgoing President Petro Poroshenko’s European Solidarity party.
Since coming to office, the government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In May 2022, months after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Zelensky signed a law that banned political parties engaged in “justification, recognition as legitimate, denial of armed aggression against Ukraine […] and denial of the temporary occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine” for the duration of martial law. This led to the dissolution of the largest opposition party, the Opposition Platform – for Life (OPZZh), which came second in the 2019 parliamentary elections and held 37 out of 225 seats in Parliament. While unprecedented, these exceptional measures were not unwarranted, and their practical impact has been limited. OPZZh had close ties with Vladimir Putin’s regime. Viktor Medvedchuk, the leader of the OPZZh, for instance, was sanctioned by the Obama administration following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 for acting “on behalf of senior Russian officials” to undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Some OPZZh members of parliament found ways to remain in office, including by breaking off from the OPZZh and forming other parliamentary groups. Overall, the ban impacted only a small fraction of Ukraine’s current parliamentarians and political parties, rather than systematically targeting the mainstream opposition. Hence, it is unlikely that it will seriously and unfairly hinder the opposition from competing in future elections.
Elections remain suspended for the duration of martial law. While unprecedented, the suspension is constitutional and, under the extreme circumstances, arguably warranted. Holding elections during wartime, with up to 20% of Ukraine’s territory under de facto Russian control, would pose insurmountable safety and logistical challenges. Voting would be an immediate security risk for citizens, electoral staff, and observers, given Russia’s track record of targeting civilians. Administrative costs would run in the hundreds of millions in an already overtaxed wartime economy. With a large percentage of the population being either refugees or internally displaced persons, ensuring equal voting rights would also be unfeasible. In addition, polls have repeatedly indicated that a majority of Ukrainians oppose holding elections during wartime, with the most recent survey (February 2025) estimating that 63% of respondents were against the idea. Equally important, other accountability mechanisms, discussed in more depth in the third pillar, remain effective even in the absence of parliamentary elections.
In Ukraine, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The wartime centralization of broadcasting at the onset of war was criticized by domestic and international observers, but it hasn’t severely constrained the media sector, which remains robust, according to most expert assessments. Other emergency measures, such as expanding the scope of “collaborationism” as a criminal offense, have had more concerning implications, sanctioning disproportionate penalties for relatively minor offenses that did not immediately undermine national security or the war effort. On the other hand, the government has largely upheld the freedoms of association and assembly, despite isolated instances of pressure against anti-corruption activists.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Before the invasion, Ukraine had a diverse media landscape, bolstered further by the 2014 ouster of aspiring autocrat Viktor Yanukovych and the democratic reforms that followed. However, Zelenskyy’s government has taken some extraordinary measures to curb Russian influence in public discourse, both before and after the onset of the war. In 2021, three major outlets, ZIK, NewsOne, and 112 Ukraine, associated with opposition parliamentarians, were effectively banned from broadcasting for five years. Representatives of Zelensky’s government argued that these media had received Russian funding and threatened national security by amplifying Russia’s influence in the war-scarred regions of the country. In late February 2022, shortly after the start of the full-scale invasion, the country’s largest television stations, including 1+1 Media, Inter Media, Starlight Media, and the public broadcaster Suspilne, collaborated to create the 24-hour news channel Telemarathon “Edyni novyny” (United News). The intended goal was to counter the Russian disinformation campaign and provide unified coverage during the war; this move was formalized by a presidential decree in March 2022. At the time, the move was framed as a national security issue and was widely supported by Ukraine’s general public, which viewed it as an effective way to unite the country as Russian forces closed in on the nation’s capital. As the war progressed, however, concerns grew over the government’s editorial interference with Telemarathon and the channel’s ability to accurately highlight pressing issues, and public trust in the platform declined to just above 40 percent by the end of 2023. By 2024, the Telemarathon’s viewership had dropped to just 10 percent of the television audience, with 70 percent of Ukrainians reporting that they sought information elsewhere due to a lack of alternative opinions on the platform by 2023. Despite these persistent challenges, the media sector in Ukraine has remained diverse and robust: independent CSOs monitoring media freedom estimated that, as of December 2025, more than 250 independent, trustworthy news outlets continued operating across the country. Equally important, the Zelenskyy government has not constrained their ability to cover critical issues impartially.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Nonetheless, some of its efforts to sustain wartime mobilization in both the armed forces and civil society have raised concerns of a systemic chilling effect. For instance, a week after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, lawmakers amended the Criminal Code, expanding the definition of “collaborationism” to include public denials of Russia’s aggression and the “implementation of the aggressor country’s educational standards in the occupied territories.” According to local legal experts, the second provision is excessively broad and gives courts discretion to sanction legitimate activities or compliance with occupation forces under duress. Further, people convicted of these crimes may face punishments including corrective labor, a ban on holding public office, and even life imprisonment. The Office of the Prosecutor General reported nearly 9,000 criminal proceedings for collaborationism had been initiated between 2022 and 2024, with at least 790 verdicts delivered. Some of these rulings have already prompted closer scrutiny: In April 2024, a Kharkiv City Court sentenced a local physics teacher to one year of imprisonment and a 12-year ban on working in education and government. The ruling focused on his appointment as principal by Russian officials after the previous principal refused to work with the Russian academic curriculum and schedule. The court did not consider the short duration of the defendant’s tenure (the city of Kharkiv was liberated by the Ukrainian army shortly thereafter, and the former principal was restored to their position) or the possibility that he was coerced into accepting the post as mitigating circumstances. Albeit sporadic, such instances have raised concerns about the new provisions’ exceedingly broad application.
In addition, the government has pressured some activists and journalists working on sensitive issues, such as anti-corruption. Leading anti-corruption campaigner and co-founder of the Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC), Vitaliy Shabunin, was targeted in July 2025, when his house was raided by the State Bureau of Investigation without a warrant, seizing his family’s electronic devices before legal counsel could be secured. He now faces unfounded charges of draft evasion and fraud, even though he has been serving in the military since 2022. These charges carry up to 10 years imprisonment, and Shabunin has been banned from leaving the military unit where he serves. The AntAC had previously criticized the Ministry of Defense and the Presidential Office over corruption in weapons procurement. Dozens of watchdog groups have condemned the proceedings as a politically motivated attempt to silence dissent. In parallel, Ukrayinska Pravda’s editorial board, one of the biggest independent newspapers in the country, has also alleged “a threat to the sustainable work of the editorial team” and a pressure campaign by the Office of the President, including repeated attempts to force a change in ownership.
The Zelenskyy government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. Civil society organizations have played an even more vital role since the onset of the war, including coordinating citizens’ civilian defense and humanitarian relief efforts and serving as watchdogs monitoring the government and the military complex’s actions. According to 2022 estimates, more than 80% of Ukrainian citizens had engaged in some form of civic action since the invasion. At the same time, international observers have noted that security measures under martial law have circumscribed civic space. For example, the government banned religious organizations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church (widely regarded as affiliated with Russian intelligence services) in August 2024. While international observers acknowledged the legitimate security concerns underpinning the law’s adoption, they also noted the law’s wording, officially titled “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations”, was overly broad and could undermine regular individuals’ religious freedoms.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Ukrainians have regularly held rallies on a range of issues (from the war budget to welfare policies) in both the capital, Kyiv, and various cities closer to the front lines, such as Odesa and Dnipro. In the summer of 2025, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets to protest government reforms that would have hollowed out key anti-corruption agencies (as discussed in more detail below), with no reported incidents of undue law enforcement interference.
In Ukraine, institutions are somewhat independent but are frequently constrained. Judicial reform remains partial, constrained by adversarial judicial bodies beholden to their members’ private interests, the dearth of qualified personnel, and institutional inertia. On the other hand, legislative and executive institutions remain broadly efficacious and independent. Independent oversight bodies have also functioned impartially, despite sporadic political interference. Given the persistent challenges confronting these accountability mechanisms and the incomplete institutionalization of good practices, institutional accountability in Ukraine still falls short of rigorous democratic standards.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. On the contrary, Zelenskyy and his predecessors, Petro Poroshenko and his European Solidarity party, took important steps, albeit with limited efficacy, to mitigate the endemic corruption and clientelism that continue to plague the judiciary. Illustrating high-ranking magistrates’ efforts to skirt accountability, in 2019, the Constitutional Court rescinded the powers of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) to verify officials’ asset declarations. The decision came shortly after at least four of the justices received a warning from the agency for failing to disclose personal assets. The extraordinary measure precipitated a constitutional crisis and a protracted stand-off with the executive. Zelenskyy’s attempts to overhaul the Constitutional Court in response ultimately proved unsuccessful, even aside from their questionable constitutionality: its members struck down the presidential decree dismissing Judges Oleksandr Tupytskyi and Oleksandr Kasminin as unconstitutional and declined to swear in new justices. The episode highlighted the dilemma between efficacy and adherence to constitutional procedure in reforming adversarial, deeply corrupt judicial bodies. These challenges notwithstanding, the EU’s decision to grant Ukraine candidate status in 2022 and its ongoing technical assistance on judicial reforms have provided a new impetus for improving other aspects of judicial independence. For instance, international experts have facilitated the selection of new officers of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), the governing bodies responsible for disciplinary actions against magistrates and assessing the professional fitness of judges, respectively, with some promising results. Still, the large number of remaining court vacancies, the slow pace of vetting of potential magistrates, and the limited capacity of the judicial oversight bodies mentioned above have hampered the overall efficacy of the judicial branch. Assessing Ukraine’s progress towards EU accession criteria, experts from the Council of Europe have also noted that depoliticizing the office of the Prosecutor General, improving the selection of Supreme and Constitutional Court justices, and implementing a fully transparent case management system remain outstanding key areas for future reform.
The government has not subjected legislative institutions to reforms weakening their independence or operational effectiveness, despite the ongoing suspension of elections. The Verkhovna Rada has continued to exercise its powers, driving the adoption of legislation and reviewing the executive’s actions. In 2024, Parliament approved measures to enhance its own transparency, including legal amendments reinstating the live broadcasting of parliamentary sessions and the open “Hour of Questions to the Government,” which allows inquiries from citizens and civil organizations. It also strengthened the independence of the Accounting Chamber, Ukraine’s supreme audit institution, and obligated the relevant parliamentary committees to take the Accounting Chamber’s external audit reports into account.
While Zelensky has refrained from using his prerogatives to systematically subjugate executive institutions, the centralization of executive authority under martial law has arguably impacted their functioning. For instance, frequent leadership reshuffles initiated by the president have possibly chilled internal dissent. In February 2024, Zelensky controversially dismissed Armed Forces Commander Valery Zaluzhny, following profound disagreements over wartime strategy and, as many observers pointed out, Zaluzhny’s growing popularity. In September of the same year, Dmytro Kuleba, the Foreign Minister, submitted his resignation following a comprehensive cabinet shake-up. Western partners had previously praised Kuleba for his leadership and diplomatic acumen.
Key oversight agencies, particularly those tackling corruption, remain broadly independent despite some attempts by the central government to obstruct them. On July 22, 2025, Parliament approved reforms effectively hollowing out the country’s anti-corruption agencies. The reforms gave the politically appointed Prosecutor General power over the independent National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), which had previously investigated top-ranking officials. According to local media, at least 18 members of parliament who supported the reforms were under active investigation by the NABU. Under the new framework, the Prosecutor General would have had discretion to reassign cases taken up by the NABU and SAPO to other prosecutors, effectively circumventing safeguards against political meddling in potentially sensitive investigations. The law triggered mass protests and international censure. In response, the government reversed course and reinstated the functional independence of the NABU and SAPO. The two agencies have since resumed their investigations into business elites and high-ranking officials, such as Timur Mindich, a former business associate of the president, who is currently accused of involvement in a corruption scheme at the state-owned nuclear corporation Energoatom. Despite the tenacity of the NABU and SAPO, isolated interference with their activities persists: Ruslan Mahamedrasulov, a NABU officer who worked on the Energoatom case, was arrested by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in July 2025 on dubious grounds (linked to his alleged contacts with representatives of banned pro-Russian parties) and remained in pre-trial detention until December of the same year. While Mahamedrasulov is no longer in custody as of the end of the year, the investigation against him is ongoing.
Note: Parts of the eastern regions of Ukraine have been occupied by Russia and its proxies since 2014, and parts of the southern regions by Russian forces since 2022. HRF analyzes those territories in its forthcoming Ukraine Full Report.
HRF classifies Ukraine as democratic.
Ukraine is a semi-presidential republic. The president is the head of state and has considerable executive powers. The legislature (the Verkhovna Rada) is unicameral, composed of 450 members elected for a five-year term. Ukraine gained independence from the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991. The consolidation of democratic institutions proved challenging in the first decades post-independence, given episodic executive overreach and the growing influence of oligarchic networks. In 2014, the mass Euromaidan protests culminated in the ouster of then-president Viktor Yanukovych and ushered in the most consequential transformation of the Ukrainian political system in the post-Soviet period. Taking advantage of the brief power vacuum after Yanukovych’s ouster, Russia moved to invade and subsequently annex the previously autonomous republic of Crimea in February, and stoke violent pro-Russian separatist movements in the country’s Eastern region. As a result, in the same year, illegal armed groups proclaimed the independent People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (an area collectively known as Donbas), triggering a protracted armed conflict with the central government of Ukraine. Despite the destabilizing effects of the conflict, Ukraine made important steps towards consolidating its democratic institutions between 2015 and 2022. It implemented anti-corruption measures, attempted to reform the judiciary, which had frequently failed to check Yanukovych’s regime, and carried out other critical domestic reforms. The Servant of the People party, led by current president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, campaigned on an extensive anti-corruption reformist platform and achieved an outright majority following the 2019 parliamentary election. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, has placed these democratic gains under strain. While warranted by the existential threat Ukraine is facing and constitutionally permissible, the imposition of martial law at the onset of the war has constrained democratic mechanisms, such as regular national elections and certain aspects of media independence, most notably by centralizing television broadcasting to counter disinformation.
Recent national elections, in 2014 and 2019, were largely free and fair. The introduction of martial law following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 entailed the indefinite suspension of national elections. Restoring the electoral process would require significant amendments to the Constitution (which explicitly prohibits elections during war) and would entail addressing multiple security, logistical, and financial challenges. President Zelensky’s ban on pro-Russian parties in 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, also somewhat constrained electoral competition. However, given the unprecedented scale of Russia’s attack, these measures received substantial public backing at the time.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public in Ukraine are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government, although freedom of dissent has come under increasing pressure before and after the invasion. Ukraine’s once pluralistic media sector has experienced significant centralisation under martial law. Independent civil society organizations have continued to operate freely, despite isolated reports of government pressure against corruption watchdogs. The government also largely upholds the freedom of assembly and has demonstrated responsiveness to demonstrations, which have become a critical accountability mechanism in the absence of national elections.
In Ukraine, institutions are somewhat independent but are frequently constrained by the current government and the legacies of previous non-democratic governance. The judiciary remains plagued by large-scale corruption, resistance to impartial oversight, and severe backlogs, as reforms introduced by Presidents Poroshenko and Zelensky have shown mixed results. Frequent leadership reshuffles and personnel shortages have also hampered the capacity of executive institutions as the war dragged on. On the other hand, independent oversight institutions (particularly Ukraine’s specialized anti-corruption bodies) have carried out their duties effectively and impartially, serving as a crucial bulwark of horizontal accountability. The Verkhovna Rada has also remained at least partially effective in its legislative oversight of the executive branch.
In Ukraine, national elections are largely free and fair. The Central Election Commission has administered recent elections, the most recent of which took place in 2019, in a sound and transparent manner. While the wartime ban on pro-Russian parties narrowed the playing field somewhat, it addressed legitimate security concerns, as discussed further below. The ongoing suspension of elections, while extraordinary, is both constitutionally permissible and warranted by extreme logistical and security constraints.
The government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. International observers assessed the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections as notable improvements relative to prior electoral cycles (especially in the early 2000s), which were marred by widespread fraud. By contrast, the 2019 parliamentary election, in which President Zelenskyy’s party, Servant of the People, won in a landslide (43.16% of the popular vote for proportionally-allocated mandates and 130 out of 225 single-member constituencies), was effectively administered by the Central Election Commission (CEC). Notwithstanding very sporadic procedural irregularities and some reports of illicit voter mobilization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) assessed voting in the 2019 elections positively in an “overwhelming majority of polling stations observed.” The election was also highly contested, allowing a broad field of candidates to campaign freely, as indicated by the breakthrough of Servant of the People, registered in 2018, and the decline of outgoing President Petro Poroshenko’s European Solidarity party.
Since coming to office, the government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In May 2022, months after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Zelensky signed a law that banned political parties engaged in “justification, recognition as legitimate, denial of armed aggression against Ukraine […] and denial of the temporary occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine” for the duration of martial law. This led to the dissolution of the largest opposition party, the Opposition Platform – for Life (OPZZh), which came second in the 2019 parliamentary elections and held 37 out of 225 seats in Parliament. While unprecedented, these exceptional measures were not unwarranted, and their practical impact has been limited. OPZZh had close ties with Vladimir Putin’s regime. Viktor Medvedchuk, the leader of the OPZZh, for instance, was sanctioned by the Obama administration following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 for acting “on behalf of senior Russian officials” to undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Some OPZZh members of parliament found ways to remain in office, including by breaking off from the OPZZh and forming other parliamentary groups. Overall, the ban impacted only a small fraction of Ukraine’s current parliamentarians and political parties, rather than systematically targeting the mainstream opposition. Hence, it is unlikely that it will seriously and unfairly hinder the opposition from competing in future elections.
Elections remain suspended for the duration of martial law. While unprecedented, the suspension is constitutional and, under the extreme circumstances, arguably warranted. Holding elections during wartime, with up to 20% of Ukraine’s territory under de facto Russian control, would pose insurmountable safety and logistical challenges. Voting would be an immediate security risk for citizens, electoral staff, and observers, given Russia’s track record of targeting civilians. Administrative costs would run in the hundreds of millions in an already overtaxed wartime economy. With a large percentage of the population being either refugees or internally displaced persons, ensuring equal voting rights would also be unfeasible. In addition, polls have repeatedly indicated that a majority of Ukrainians oppose holding elections during wartime, with the most recent survey (February 2025) estimating that 63% of respondents were against the idea. Equally important, other accountability mechanisms, discussed in more depth in the third pillar, remain effective even in the absence of parliamentary elections.
In Ukraine, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The wartime centralization of broadcasting at the onset of war was criticized by domestic and international observers, but it hasn’t severely constrained the media sector, which remains robust, according to most expert assessments. Other emergency measures, such as expanding the scope of “collaborationism” as a criminal offense, have had more concerning implications, sanctioning disproportionate penalties for relatively minor offenses that did not immediately undermine national security or the war effort. On the other hand, the government has largely upheld the freedoms of association and assembly, despite isolated instances of pressure against anti-corruption activists.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Before the invasion, Ukraine had a diverse media landscape, bolstered further by the 2014 ouster of aspiring autocrat Viktor Yanukovych and the democratic reforms that followed. However, Zelenskyy’s government has taken some extraordinary measures to curb Russian influence in public discourse, both before and after the onset of the war. In 2021, three major outlets, ZIK, NewsOne, and 112 Ukraine, associated with opposition parliamentarians, were effectively banned from broadcasting for five years. Representatives of Zelensky’s government argued that these media had received Russian funding and threatened national security by amplifying Russia’s influence in the war-scarred regions of the country. In late February 2022, shortly after the start of the full-scale invasion, the country’s largest television stations, including 1+1 Media, Inter Media, Starlight Media, and the public broadcaster Suspilne, collaborated to create the 24-hour news channel Telemarathon “Edyni novyny” (United News). The intended goal was to counter the Russian disinformation campaign and provide unified coverage during the war; this move was formalized by a presidential decree in March 2022. At the time, the move was framed as a national security issue and was widely supported by Ukraine’s general public, which viewed it as an effective way to unite the country as Russian forces closed in on the nation’s capital. As the war progressed, however, concerns grew over the government’s editorial interference with Telemarathon and the channel’s ability to accurately highlight pressing issues, and public trust in the platform declined to just above 40 percent by the end of 2023. By 2024, the Telemarathon’s viewership had dropped to just 10 percent of the television audience, with 70 percent of Ukrainians reporting that they sought information elsewhere due to a lack of alternative opinions on the platform by 2023. Despite these persistent challenges, the media sector in Ukraine has remained diverse and robust: independent CSOs monitoring media freedom estimated that, as of December 2025, more than 250 independent, trustworthy news outlets continued operating across the country. Equally important, the Zelenskyy government has not constrained their ability to cover critical issues impartially.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Nonetheless, some of its efforts to sustain wartime mobilization in both the armed forces and civil society have raised concerns of a systemic chilling effect. For instance, a week after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, lawmakers amended the Criminal Code, expanding the definition of “collaborationism” to include public denials of Russia’s aggression and the “implementation of the aggressor country’s educational standards in the occupied territories.” According to local legal experts, the second provision is excessively broad and gives courts discretion to sanction legitimate activities or compliance with occupation forces under duress. Further, people convicted of these crimes may face punishments including corrective labor, a ban on holding public office, and even life imprisonment. The Office of the Prosecutor General reported nearly 9,000 criminal proceedings for collaborationism had been initiated between 2022 and 2024, with at least 790 verdicts delivered. Some of these rulings have already prompted closer scrutiny: In April 2024, a Kharkiv City Court sentenced a local physics teacher to one year of imprisonment and a 12-year ban on working in education and government. The ruling focused on his appointment as principal by Russian officials after the previous principal refused to work with the Russian academic curriculum and schedule. The court did not consider the short duration of the defendant’s tenure (the city of Kharkiv was liberated by the Ukrainian army shortly thereafter, and the former principal was restored to their position) or the possibility that he was coerced into accepting the post as mitigating circumstances. Albeit sporadic, such instances have raised concerns about the new provisions’ exceedingly broad application.
In addition, the government has pressured some activists and journalists working on sensitive issues, such as anti-corruption. Leading anti-corruption campaigner and co-founder of the Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC), Vitaliy Shabunin, was targeted in July 2025, when his house was raided by the State Bureau of Investigation without a warrant, seizing his family’s electronic devices before legal counsel could be secured. He now faces unfounded charges of draft evasion and fraud, even though he has been serving in the military since 2022. These charges carry up to 10 years imprisonment, and Shabunin has been banned from leaving the military unit where he serves. The AntAC had previously criticized the Ministry of Defense and the Presidential Office over corruption in weapons procurement. Dozens of watchdog groups have condemned the proceedings as a politically motivated attempt to silence dissent. In parallel, Ukrayinska Pravda’s editorial board, one of the biggest independent newspapers in the country, has also alleged “a threat to the sustainable work of the editorial team” and a pressure campaign by the Office of the President, including repeated attempts to force a change in ownership.
The Zelenskyy government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. Civil society organizations have played an even more vital role since the onset of the war, including coordinating citizens’ civilian defense and humanitarian relief efforts and serving as watchdogs monitoring the government and the military complex’s actions. According to 2022 estimates, more than 80% of Ukrainian citizens had engaged in some form of civic action since the invasion. At the same time, international observers have noted that security measures under martial law have circumscribed civic space. For example, the government banned religious organizations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church (widely regarded as affiliated with Russian intelligence services) in August 2024. While international observers acknowledged the legitimate security concerns underpinning the law’s adoption, they also noted the law’s wording, officially titled “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations”, was overly broad and could undermine regular individuals’ religious freedoms.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Ukrainians have regularly held rallies on a range of issues (from the war budget to welfare policies) in both the capital, Kyiv, and various cities closer to the front lines, such as Odesa and Dnipro. In the summer of 2025, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets to protest government reforms that would have hollowed out key anti-corruption agencies (as discussed in more detail below), with no reported incidents of undue law enforcement interference.
In Ukraine, institutions are somewhat independent but are frequently constrained. Judicial reform remains partial, constrained by adversarial judicial bodies beholden to their members’ private interests, the dearth of qualified personnel, and institutional inertia. On the other hand, legislative and executive institutions remain broadly efficacious and independent. Independent oversight bodies have also functioned impartially, despite sporadic political interference. Given the persistent challenges confronting these accountability mechanisms and the incomplete institutionalization of good practices, institutional accountability in Ukraine still falls short of rigorous democratic standards.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. On the contrary, Zelenskyy and his predecessors, Petro Poroshenko and his European Solidarity party, took important steps, albeit with limited efficacy, to mitigate the endemic corruption and clientelism that continue to plague the judiciary. Illustrating high-ranking magistrates’ efforts to skirt accountability, in 2019, the Constitutional Court rescinded the powers of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) to verify officials’ asset declarations. The decision came shortly after at least four of the justices received a warning from the agency for failing to disclose personal assets. The extraordinary measure precipitated a constitutional crisis and a protracted stand-off with the executive. Zelenskyy’s attempts to overhaul the Constitutional Court in response ultimately proved unsuccessful, even aside from their questionable constitutionality: its members struck down the presidential decree dismissing Judges Oleksandr Tupytskyi and Oleksandr Kasminin as unconstitutional and declined to swear in new justices. The episode highlighted the dilemma between efficacy and adherence to constitutional procedure in reforming adversarial, deeply corrupt judicial bodies. These challenges notwithstanding, the EU’s decision to grant Ukraine candidate status in 2022 and its ongoing technical assistance on judicial reforms have provided a new impetus for improving other aspects of judicial independence. For instance, international experts have facilitated the selection of new officers of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), the governing bodies responsible for disciplinary actions against magistrates and assessing the professional fitness of judges, respectively, with some promising results. Still, the large number of remaining court vacancies, the slow pace of vetting of potential magistrates, and the limited capacity of the judicial oversight bodies mentioned above have hampered the overall efficacy of the judicial branch. Assessing Ukraine’s progress towards EU accession criteria, experts from the Council of Europe have also noted that depoliticizing the office of the Prosecutor General, improving the selection of Supreme and Constitutional Court justices, and implementing a fully transparent case management system remain outstanding key areas for future reform.
The government has not subjected legislative institutions to reforms weakening their independence or operational effectiveness, despite the ongoing suspension of elections. The Verkhovna Rada has continued to exercise its powers, driving the adoption of legislation and reviewing the executive’s actions. In 2024, Parliament approved measures to enhance its own transparency, including legal amendments reinstating the live broadcasting of parliamentary sessions and the open “Hour of Questions to the Government,” which allows inquiries from citizens and civil organizations. It also strengthened the independence of the Accounting Chamber, Ukraine’s supreme audit institution, and obligated the relevant parliamentary committees to take the Accounting Chamber’s external audit reports into account.
While Zelensky has refrained from using his prerogatives to systematically subjugate executive institutions, the centralization of executive authority under martial law has arguably impacted their functioning. For instance, frequent leadership reshuffles initiated by the president have possibly chilled internal dissent. In February 2024, Zelensky controversially dismissed Armed Forces Commander Valery Zaluzhny, following profound disagreements over wartime strategy and, as many observers pointed out, Zaluzhny’s growing popularity. In September of the same year, Dmytro Kuleba, the Foreign Minister, submitted his resignation following a comprehensive cabinet shake-up. Western partners had previously praised Kuleba for his leadership and diplomatic acumen.
Key oversight agencies, particularly those tackling corruption, remain broadly independent despite some attempts by the central government to obstruct them. On July 22, 2025, Parliament approved reforms effectively hollowing out the country’s anti-corruption agencies. The reforms gave the politically appointed Prosecutor General power over the independent National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), which had previously investigated top-ranking officials. According to local media, at least 18 members of parliament who supported the reforms were under active investigation by the NABU. Under the new framework, the Prosecutor General would have had discretion to reassign cases taken up by the NABU and SAPO to other prosecutors, effectively circumventing safeguards against political meddling in potentially sensitive investigations. The law triggered mass protests and international censure. In response, the government reversed course and reinstated the functional independence of the NABU and SAPO. The two agencies have since resumed their investigations into business elites and high-ranking officials, such as Timur Mindich, a former business associate of the president, who is currently accused of involvement in a corruption scheme at the state-owned nuclear corporation Energoatom. Despite the tenacity of the NABU and SAPO, isolated interference with their activities persists: Ruslan Mahamedrasulov, a NABU officer who worked on the Energoatom case, was arrested by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in July 2025 on dubious grounds (linked to his alleged contacts with representatives of banned pro-Russian parties) and remained in pre-trial detention until December of the same year. While Mahamedrasulov is no longer in custody as of the end of the year, the investigation against him is ongoing.
