Europe and Central Asia

Turkmenistan

Ashgabat

Fully Authoritarian

0.09%

World’s Population

7,736,630

Population

HRF classifies Turkmenistan as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.

The country declared independence on October 27, 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Power was initially seized by Saparmurat Niyazov, who established an eccentric personality cult and ruled as “President for Life” until his death in 2006. He was succeeded by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who maintained the repressive system while gradually establishing his own dynasty. In March 2022, Gurbanguly handed the presidency to his son, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, completing the first dynastic succession in post-Soviet Central Asia. However, the elder Berdimuhamedov retains significant control as the “National Leader” and Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council), a representative body re-established in 2023 with wide-ranging powers that effectively supersede the president. Formally, Turkmenistan is a presidential republic, but in practice, all branches of government are subordinate to the executive and the Berdimuhamedov family. The legislature (Mejlis) is dominated by the ruling Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) and two proxy parties, lacking any genuine opposition. The judiciary is completely subservient to the regime, serving as a tool for political repression.

In Turkmenistan, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The elections are characterized by the manipulation of constitutional norms to ensure dynastic succession. The regime precludes meaningful competition by preventing independent candidates from accessing the ballot and engaging in widespread voting irregularities to manufacture desired results. Furthermore, the ruling power leverages state resources to secure unfair campaign advantages, rendering genuine political contestation impossible.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Critics face severe retaliation in an environment defined by the enforced disappearance of dissidents and a state monopoly on information. The administration enforces a complete ban on independent civil society and public assembly, effectively eradicating domestic opposition. This repression extends transnationally, as the regime actively pursues and intimidates critics living in exile to silence any challenge to its authority.

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The executive branch utilizes the judiciary as a coercive tool to silence dissent and guarantees impunity for state officials involved in human rights violations. Moreover, the administration has restructured the constitutional order to formalize dynastic control over the legislature and maintain the absolute subservience of the judicial system to the presidency.

In Turkmenistan, elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The Berdimuhamedov regime maintains power by manipulating constitutional norms to ensure dynastic succession, systematically barring independent candidates from the ballot, engaging in widespread voting irregularities, and utilizing state resources to secure unfair campaign advantages that render meaningful contestation impossible

The regime has skewed the electoral playing field to such a degree that it generally claims victory with a very high vote share. This is characterized by the manipulation of constitutional norms to ensure dynastic succession and consolidation of power. In the March 2022 snap presidential election, Serdar Berdimuhamedov claimed the presidency with 73% of the vote in a controlled transfer of power from his father. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov routinely claimed over 90% of the vote in previous election cycles and extended the presidential term to seven years in 2016, while the first dictator, Saparmurat Niyazov, was proclaimed “President for life” by the parliament in 1999, effectively canceling elections entirely until his death in 2006.

The Berdimuhamedov administration has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. The legal framework prevents the emergence of any genuine alternative to the ruling Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT). In the March 2023 parliamentary elections, the OSCE noted that voters were presented with no real alternatives, as all candidates, including those from the nominally independent Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (TSTP) and the Agrarian Party (TAP), fully supported the President’s policies. These “proxy” parties, the only ones allowed to register since the 2012 Law on Political Parties was passed, have explicitly aligned themselves with the regime’s agenda. This political exclusion dates back to the regime’s inception; in the early 1990s, Niyazov effectively uprooted the Agzybirlik opposition movement, which advocated for democratic reforms. Its leader, Shirali Nurmuradov, was arrested in 1990 on fabricated fraud charges, and other members were forced into exile, thereby establishing a decades-long one-party monopoly.

State officials have engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Elections are routinely characterized by widespread manipulation to ensure the desired outcome. During the March 2023 parliamentary elections, international observers documented multiple voting, ballot-box stuffing, and vote-counting errors systemic enough to lead the OSCE ODIHR to conclude that the process “cast doubt on the veracity of the final results”. Similarly, the OSCE declined to deploy an observation mission for the 2022 presidential election, citing the regime’s failure to guarantee the integrity of the process. These practices mirror those of previous cycles; the 2013 and 2018 elections were also criticized by observers as fundamentally fraudulent, cementing the conclusion that Turkmenistan has never held a free and fair election.

The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party ensures that the incumbent dominates the information space. In the run-up to the 2023 elections, the Central Election Commission (CEC) failed to enforce legal requirements for equal campaign visibility. Instead of facilitating open debates, the CEC and local authorities organized “meetings with voters” that were strictly staged events attended only by pre-vetted public employees. This state-led mobilization of resources left the electorate without access to alternative viewpoints, as the government maintained a total monopoly over all domestic television, radio, and print media, while simultaneously blocking independent digital platforms and foreign news websites.

In Turkmenistan, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Berdimuhamedov family maintains an environment of total silence by systematically forcibly disappearing dissidents, monopolizing the information landscape, and enforcing a complete ban on independent civil society and public assembly; the administration actively pursues critics beyond its borders through transnational repression, and enforces a complete ban on all public assemblies.

State officials have systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. It is characterized by the widespread use of incommunicado detention to silence perceived threats, denying families any information about their loved ones for years. The international campaign “Prove They Are Alive!” has documented over 160 cases of enforced disappearances of convicted regime critics between 2013 and 2022, with at least 27 confirmed deaths in custody. This practice continues to be a core tool of repression; prominent cases include Gulgeldy Annaniyazov, an activist arrested in 2008 whose sentence was arbitrarily extended in prison and whose whereabouts still remain unconfirmed by the state. Similarly, in 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee held the regime responsible for the 2006 death in custody of journalist Ogulsapar Muradova, who was tortured after being sentenced on fabricated charges.

The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. The state maintains an absolute monopoly on information, banning independent media outlets and prohibiting their operation within the country. To enforce this, the regime aggressively censors the internet; in 2023, law enforcement intensified raids on private homes to check phones for VPN software, imposing prohibitive fines of up to 15,000 manat (approx. $4,285) on users attempting to access blocked independent news sites like Turkmen.news or Chronicles of Turkmenistan. This digital crackdown builds on a decades-long policy of information isolation established under Niyazov, where state television and newspapers serve solely as mouthpieces for the ruler’s personality cult.

The Berdimuhamedov administration systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Onerous legal barriers have effectively eradicated independent civil society. According to 2023 OSCE data, there are only 135 officially registered citizens’ associations in the entire country, all of which are state-affiliated. Independent Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are forced to operate in exile, and their local networks remain under siege. In 2022 and 2023, security services in Ashgabat illegally surveilled and physically assaulted Soltan Achilova, a 74-year-old reporter for the exiled Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR), confiscating her equipment to prevent her from documenting food shortages. This systematic obstruction is rooted in legislation, including the Law on Public Associations and a resolution by the Cabinet of Ministers from 2013, designed to criminalize unregistered civic activity and cut off foreign funding.

The regime has systematically engaged in transnational repression against dissidents abroad. The government actively targets critics living in exile, employing intimidation and physical violence. In August 2022, activists protesting human rights abuses in front of the Turkmen Consulate in Istanbul were beaten by individuals identified as consulate employees, resulting in severe injuries. Beyond direct attacks, the regime leverages collective punishment; law enforcement routinely interrogates and intimidates the relatives of exiled dissidents who remain in Turkmenistan, such as the 80-year-old mother of TIHR head Farid Tukhbatulin, to pressure them into silence.

Law enforcement in Turkmenistan has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Public assemblies are effectively banned through a restrictive authorization system that systematically denies permits to non-state groups. Consequently, protests are virtually non-existent. This de facto ban is enforced by the threat of severe retribution, a precedent set by the violent dispersal of the July 1995 pro-democracy demonstration in Ashgabat, when protesters were badly beaten and organizers sentenced to long prison terms. Since then, the regime has prevented any large-scale public mobilization through preemptive arrests and pervasive surveillance. For example, following online calls for protests in 2020 and 2022, the Ministry of National Security preemptively detained suspected activists and intentionally slowed down internet speeds nationwide to block coordination. Similarly, sporadic, spontaneous protests by women over food shortages in regional provinces are immediately surrounded by security forces and dispersed before they can gain momentum.

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The executive branch utilizes the judiciary as a repressive tool to silence dissent, ensures total impunity for state officials involved in human rights abuses, and has restructured the constitutional order to formalize dynastic control over the legislature while maintaining absolute subservience of the judiciary.

Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary functions as a repressive tool, routinely convicting dissidents in closed trials on fabricated charges. In September 2025, a court sentenced activist Murat Dushemov to an additional eight years in prison on fabricated charges of “alleged disobedience to prison administration” shortly before his scheduled release, following a closed trial where he was denied effective legal representation. Similarly, courts have continued to facilitate the persecution of religious minorities; in late 2023, Ashyrbay Bekiev was sentenced to 23 years in prison for “conducting religious classes” after being illegally deported from Russia, a verdict condemned by human rights groups as politically motivated in January 2024. These recent rulings follow a long-established pattern of using the legal system to silence dissent, exemplified by the 2017 conviction of 18 men, accused of ties to the Gülen movement, to lengthy prison terms on bogus charges of “incitement of hostility” after they were held incommunicado.

Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Impunity for gross human rights violations, particularly torture and enforced disappearances, remains absolute. As of 2025, the “Prove They Are Alive!” campaign estimates that 96 individuals remain forcibly disappeared in Turkmen prisons, with no officials held responsible for the 27 confirmed deaths in custody. The regime has failed to investigate the 2025 disappearances of activists Alisher Sakhatov and Abdulla Orusov, who went missing immediately after their reported release from detention following deportation from Turkey. This lack of accountability persists despite international condemnation; notably, the regime never opened an independent investigation into the 2006 death in custody of journalist Ogulsapar Muradova, despite a 2018 UN Human Rights Committee finding that the state was responsible.

The regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The constitutional order has been restructured to formalize the dominance of the Berdimuhamedov family over all branches of government. In January 2023, the regime re-established the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) as the “supreme representative body,” chaired by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. This body possesses the power to supervise all branches of government, including the judiciary, effectively nullifying any pretense of separation of powers and placing the “National Leader” above the law. This move cements the trend of arbitrary constitutional manipulation seen in the 2016 amendments that extended the presidential term from five to seven years and removed age limits to facilitate dynastic succession.

The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. The executive maintains complete de facto control over judicial appointments, ensuring total subservience. The President appoints and dismisses all judges, including those of the Supreme Court, without any meaningful parliamentary oversight. Consequently, the judiciary has never ruled against the executive’s interests, rubber-stamping every decree and validating the regime’s repressive measures, such as the travel bans arbitrarily imposed on thousands of citizens as of 2024. These measures follow arbitrary security reviews driven by the regime’s efforts to curb mass emigration and suppress dissent, effectively trapping citizens within the country through the use of extensive, politically motivated “blacklists” maintained by the Ministry of National Security.

Country Context

HRF classifies Turkmenistan as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.

The country declared independence on October 27, 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Power was initially seized by Saparmurat Niyazov, who established an eccentric personality cult and ruled as “President for Life” until his death in 2006. He was succeeded by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who maintained the repressive system while gradually establishing his own dynasty. In March 2022, Gurbanguly handed the presidency to his son, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, completing the first dynastic succession in post-Soviet Central Asia. However, the elder Berdimuhamedov retains significant control as the “National Leader” and Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council), a representative body re-established in 2023 with wide-ranging powers that effectively supersede the president. Formally, Turkmenistan is a presidential republic, but in practice, all branches of government are subordinate to the executive and the Berdimuhamedov family. The legislature (Mejlis) is dominated by the ruling Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) and two proxy parties, lacking any genuine opposition. The judiciary is completely subservient to the regime, serving as a tool for political repression.

Key Highlights

In Turkmenistan, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The elections are characterized by the manipulation of constitutional norms to ensure dynastic succession. The regime precludes meaningful competition by preventing independent candidates from accessing the ballot and engaging in widespread voting irregularities to manufacture desired results. Furthermore, the ruling power leverages state resources to secure unfair campaign advantages, rendering genuine political contestation impossible.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Critics face severe retaliation in an environment defined by the enforced disappearance of dissidents and a state monopoly on information. The administration enforces a complete ban on independent civil society and public assembly, effectively eradicating domestic opposition. This repression extends transnationally, as the regime actively pursues and intimidates critics living in exile to silence any challenge to its authority.

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The executive branch utilizes the judiciary as a coercive tool to silence dissent and guarantees impunity for state officials involved in human rights violations. Moreover, the administration has restructured the constitutional order to formalize dynastic control over the legislature and maintain the absolute subservience of the judicial system to the presidency.

Electoral Competition

In Turkmenistan, elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The Berdimuhamedov regime maintains power by manipulating constitutional norms to ensure dynastic succession, systematically barring independent candidates from the ballot, engaging in widespread voting irregularities, and utilizing state resources to secure unfair campaign advantages that render meaningful contestation impossible

The regime has skewed the electoral playing field to such a degree that it generally claims victory with a very high vote share. This is characterized by the manipulation of constitutional norms to ensure dynastic succession and consolidation of power. In the March 2022 snap presidential election, Serdar Berdimuhamedov claimed the presidency with 73% of the vote in a controlled transfer of power from his father. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov routinely claimed over 90% of the vote in previous election cycles and extended the presidential term to seven years in 2016, while the first dictator, Saparmurat Niyazov, was proclaimed “President for life” by the parliament in 1999, effectively canceling elections entirely until his death in 2006.

The Berdimuhamedov administration has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. The legal framework prevents the emergence of any genuine alternative to the ruling Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT). In the March 2023 parliamentary elections, the OSCE noted that voters were presented with no real alternatives, as all candidates, including those from the nominally independent Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (TSTP) and the Agrarian Party (TAP), fully supported the President’s policies. These “proxy” parties, the only ones allowed to register since the 2012 Law on Political Parties was passed, have explicitly aligned themselves with the regime’s agenda. This political exclusion dates back to the regime’s inception; in the early 1990s, Niyazov effectively uprooted the Agzybirlik opposition movement, which advocated for democratic reforms. Its leader, Shirali Nurmuradov, was arrested in 1990 on fabricated fraud charges, and other members were forced into exile, thereby establishing a decades-long one-party monopoly.

State officials have engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Elections are routinely characterized by widespread manipulation to ensure the desired outcome. During the March 2023 parliamentary elections, international observers documented multiple voting, ballot-box stuffing, and vote-counting errors systemic enough to lead the OSCE ODIHR to conclude that the process “cast doubt on the veracity of the final results”. Similarly, the OSCE declined to deploy an observation mission for the 2022 presidential election, citing the regime’s failure to guarantee the integrity of the process. These practices mirror those of previous cycles; the 2013 and 2018 elections were also criticized by observers as fundamentally fraudulent, cementing the conclusion that Turkmenistan has never held a free and fair election.

The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party ensures that the incumbent dominates the information space. In the run-up to the 2023 elections, the Central Election Commission (CEC) failed to enforce legal requirements for equal campaign visibility. Instead of facilitating open debates, the CEC and local authorities organized “meetings with voters” that were strictly staged events attended only by pre-vetted public employees. This state-led mobilization of resources left the electorate without access to alternative viewpoints, as the government maintained a total monopoly over all domestic television, radio, and print media, while simultaneously blocking independent digital platforms and foreign news websites.

Freedom of Dissent

In Turkmenistan, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Berdimuhamedov family maintains an environment of total silence by systematically forcibly disappearing dissidents, monopolizing the information landscape, and enforcing a complete ban on independent civil society and public assembly; the administration actively pursues critics beyond its borders through transnational repression, and enforces a complete ban on all public assemblies.

State officials have systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. It is characterized by the widespread use of incommunicado detention to silence perceived threats, denying families any information about their loved ones for years. The international campaign “Prove They Are Alive!” has documented over 160 cases of enforced disappearances of convicted regime critics between 2013 and 2022, with at least 27 confirmed deaths in custody. This practice continues to be a core tool of repression; prominent cases include Gulgeldy Annaniyazov, an activist arrested in 2008 whose sentence was arbitrarily extended in prison and whose whereabouts still remain unconfirmed by the state. Similarly, in 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee held the regime responsible for the 2006 death in custody of journalist Ogulsapar Muradova, who was tortured after being sentenced on fabricated charges.

The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. The state maintains an absolute monopoly on information, banning independent media outlets and prohibiting their operation within the country. To enforce this, the regime aggressively censors the internet; in 2023, law enforcement intensified raids on private homes to check phones for VPN software, imposing prohibitive fines of up to 15,000 manat (approx. $4,285) on users attempting to access blocked independent news sites like Turkmen.news or Chronicles of Turkmenistan. This digital crackdown builds on a decades-long policy of information isolation established under Niyazov, where state television and newspapers serve solely as mouthpieces for the ruler’s personality cult.

The Berdimuhamedov administration systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Onerous legal barriers have effectively eradicated independent civil society. According to 2023 OSCE data, there are only 135 officially registered citizens’ associations in the entire country, all of which are state-affiliated. Independent Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are forced to operate in exile, and their local networks remain under siege. In 2022 and 2023, security services in Ashgabat illegally surveilled and physically assaulted Soltan Achilova, a 74-year-old reporter for the exiled Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR), confiscating her equipment to prevent her from documenting food shortages. This systematic obstruction is rooted in legislation, including the Law on Public Associations and a resolution by the Cabinet of Ministers from 2013, designed to criminalize unregistered civic activity and cut off foreign funding.

The regime has systematically engaged in transnational repression against dissidents abroad. The government actively targets critics living in exile, employing intimidation and physical violence. In August 2022, activists protesting human rights abuses in front of the Turkmen Consulate in Istanbul were beaten by individuals identified as consulate employees, resulting in severe injuries. Beyond direct attacks, the regime leverages collective punishment; law enforcement routinely interrogates and intimidates the relatives of exiled dissidents who remain in Turkmenistan, such as the 80-year-old mother of TIHR head Farid Tukhbatulin, to pressure them into silence.

Law enforcement in Turkmenistan has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Public assemblies are effectively banned through a restrictive authorization system that systematically denies permits to non-state groups. Consequently, protests are virtually non-existent. This de facto ban is enforced by the threat of severe retribution, a precedent set by the violent dispersal of the July 1995 pro-democracy demonstration in Ashgabat, when protesters were badly beaten and organizers sentenced to long prison terms. Since then, the regime has prevented any large-scale public mobilization through preemptive arrests and pervasive surveillance. For example, following online calls for protests in 2020 and 2022, the Ministry of National Security preemptively detained suspected activists and intentionally slowed down internet speeds nationwide to block coordination. Similarly, sporadic, spontaneous protests by women over food shortages in regional provinces are immediately surrounded by security forces and dispersed before they can gain momentum.

Institutional Accountability

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The executive branch utilizes the judiciary as a repressive tool to silence dissent, ensures total impunity for state officials involved in human rights abuses, and has restructured the constitutional order to formalize dynastic control over the legislature while maintaining absolute subservience of the judiciary.

Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary functions as a repressive tool, routinely convicting dissidents in closed trials on fabricated charges. In September 2025, a court sentenced activist Murat Dushemov to an additional eight years in prison on fabricated charges of “alleged disobedience to prison administration” shortly before his scheduled release, following a closed trial where he was denied effective legal representation. Similarly, courts have continued to facilitate the persecution of religious minorities; in late 2023, Ashyrbay Bekiev was sentenced to 23 years in prison for “conducting religious classes” after being illegally deported from Russia, a verdict condemned by human rights groups as politically motivated in January 2024. These recent rulings follow a long-established pattern of using the legal system to silence dissent, exemplified by the 2017 conviction of 18 men, accused of ties to the Gülen movement, to lengthy prison terms on bogus charges of “incitement of hostility” after they were held incommunicado.

Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Impunity for gross human rights violations, particularly torture and enforced disappearances, remains absolute. As of 2025, the “Prove They Are Alive!” campaign estimates that 96 individuals remain forcibly disappeared in Turkmen prisons, with no officials held responsible for the 27 confirmed deaths in custody. The regime has failed to investigate the 2025 disappearances of activists Alisher Sakhatov and Abdulla Orusov, who went missing immediately after their reported release from detention following deportation from Turkey. This lack of accountability persists despite international condemnation; notably, the regime never opened an independent investigation into the 2006 death in custody of journalist Ogulsapar Muradova, despite a 2018 UN Human Rights Committee finding that the state was responsible.

The regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The constitutional order has been restructured to formalize the dominance of the Berdimuhamedov family over all branches of government. In January 2023, the regime re-established the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) as the “supreme representative body,” chaired by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. This body possesses the power to supervise all branches of government, including the judiciary, effectively nullifying any pretense of separation of powers and placing the “National Leader” above the law. This move cements the trend of arbitrary constitutional manipulation seen in the 2016 amendments that extended the presidential term from five to seven years and removed age limits to facilitate dynastic succession.

The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. The executive maintains complete de facto control over judicial appointments, ensuring total subservience. The President appoints and dismisses all judges, including those of the Supreme Court, without any meaningful parliamentary oversight. Consequently, the judiciary has never ruled against the executive’s interests, rubber-stamping every decree and validating the regime’s repressive measures, such as the travel bans arbitrarily imposed on thousands of citizens as of 2024. These measures follow arbitrary security reviews driven by the regime’s efforts to curb mass emigration and suppress dissent, effectively trapping citizens within the country through the use of extensive, politically motivated “blacklists” maintained by the Ministry of National Security.