Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies the breakaway region of Transnistria as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Transnistria (also known as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) is a breakaway territory situated along Moldova’s eastern border with Ukraine. In 1991, amid the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Transnistria announced its independence from Moldova. This unilateral move was rejected by Moldova and the international community. The political standoff quickly escalated into an armed conflict, in which remnants of Russia’s 14th Army, stationed in Moldova as part of the former Soviet Union’s armed forces, directly supported the separatists through arms supplies, logistical support, and direct artillery fire against Moldovan forces. The fighting ended with a ceasefire agreement, signed between Russia and Moldova in July 1992. The ceasefire established a tripartite peacekeeping force, composed of Moldovan, Russian, and Transnistrian troops, effectively freezing the conflict. In 2006, Transnistria held an independence referendum that reasserted its secession from Moldova. The referendum was considered illegal by most of the international community, effectively turning Transnistria into an unrecognized de facto state that functions independently but lacks any global legal status.
Despite periodic negotiations mediated by the OSCE, Transnistria remains unrecognized internationally and is widely regarded as part of Moldova’s sovereign territory. The de facto regime is heavily dependent on Moscow, both economically and militarily. In addition, the Russian Federation maintains a permanent deployment of about 1,500 troops in the region, which the Council of Europe declared tantamount to an “occupation” in a 2022 resolution. In addition, some estimates suggest that about 200,000 (or about 55%) of Transnistrian residents hold Russian citizenship, reflecting the Kremlin’s longstanding policy of passportization in contested territories in what it perceives to be its sphere of influence.
The current de facto leader, President Vadim Krasnoselsky, first elected in 2016 and re-elected in 2021, maintains close ties to Russia and to the Renewal Party (Obnovlenie), which has dominated Transnistria’s political landscape for nearly two decades.
Elections in Transnistria are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The de facto regime ensures the ruling party’s dominance by utilizing opaque administrative barriers and judicial persecution to exclude genuine opposition candidates from the ballot. This lack of competition is compounded by the symbiotic relationship between the political leadership and the Sheriff – an economic conglomerate which monopolized media and financial resources to tilt the playing field. Consequently, electoral cycles are characterized by a total absence of meaningful campaigning and a prevalence of districts where incumbents run unopposed.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Dissent is silenced through a comprehensive strategy that combines the monopolization of the information space by allied oligarchic structures with a climate of impunity for extrajudicial violence against prominent critics. The de facto administration further suppresses independent activity by weaponizing vague anti-extremism legislation to imprison dissidents, enforcing legal restrictions that criminalize civic activism, and utilizing restrictive authorization rules to effectively ban public protests.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the de facto governing authority. The judiciary lacks structural autonomy due to the executive’s direct control over appointments and the legal system’s operational dependence on Russia, its patrol state. Rather than upholding the rule of law, the courts actively enable political repression by conducting non-transparent trials and issuing politically motivated convictions. Ultimately, judicial bodies function as a protective shield for the executive’s coercive apparatus, ensuring total impunity for state-sanctioned abuses and preserving the political and economic monopoly of the ruling elite.
Elections in Transnistria are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime systematically bars genuine opposition through opaque registration procedures and arbitrary judicial persecution, while affiliated non-state actors distort the political landscape via the abuse of economic and media monopolies. Consequently, the electoral playing field is heavily skewed, characterized by the absence of genuine campaigning and the prevalence of uncontested electoral districts.
The de facto regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. This exclusion relies on opaque registration procedures and imposes insurmountable administrative burdens on independent candidates. Since first coming to power in 2006, the Renewal has systematically engaged in arbitrary judicial persecution of political opponents and outright political violence. The Transnistrian Communist Party, once a viable contender in the Supreme Council elections, was effectively banned following the 2018 imprisonment of its leader, Oleg Khorzhan. The effective elimination of the Communist Party fits an established pattern of preempting viable competition at the polls. Ahead of the 2021 presidential election, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) declined to register hopefuls Anatoly Dirun and Nikolai Malyshev, ostensibly due to missing personal data of the citizens who signed the petitions supporting their candidacies. Transnistria has a steep barrier to participation (2-3% of the electorate must support a candidacy via their signature, compared to 1% in most other countries) and excessive administrative requirements for submitting a candidacy. Further, the CEC’s decisions are largely non-transparent and rarely, if ever, challenged in the courts.
Non-state actors with ties to the de facto governing authority have systematically contributed to the governing authority enjoying significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. This influence is embodied through the monopolization of campaign finance, the abuse of media dominance by affiliated oligarchic structures, and clientelist vote mobilization. The region’s politics are dominated by the Sheriff holding company – a business conglomerate led by oligarch Viktor Gushan that controls approximately 60% of the Transnistrian economy. Sheriff effectively owns and funds the ruling “Obnovlenie” party, converting its economic monopoly into total political control. This symbiotic relationship provided the ruling party with advantages during the 2020 Supreme Council elections, where Obnovlenie secured 29 out of 33 seats, with the remaining four going to “independent” candidates also linked to Sheriff. The holding’s media arm, particularly the TSV television channel, dominates the information space, providing exclusive positive coverage to incumbents while ignoring or disparaging dissenters. Furthermore, given Sheriff’s status as the primary employer and taxpayer, the electorate faces significant pressure to vote for company-backed candidates to preserve their livelihoods, rendering the electoral playing field uneven to the point of irrelevance.
Ruling elites have skewed the electoral playing field so much so that they generally claim victory with a very high vote share. This is characterized by the absence of genuine campaigning and the prevalence of uncontested electoral districts; the virtual nonexistence of a viable opposition renders campaigning largely moot. Local observers reported that incumbent president Vadim Krasnoselsky did not organize a single campaign event ahead of the 2021 presidential election. He faced only one handpicked facade opponent, Sergei Pinzar, an obscure farmer with no political experience, who also did not put forth a coherent policy programme. Similarly, in the 2020 Supreme Council election, Obnovlenie candidates ran unopposed in 29 out of the country’s 33 single-member electoral districts, making the outcome of the voting – a solid majority for the ruling party – a foregone conclusion. This absence of genuine alternatives also likely discourages political engagement among Transnistria’s residents. This is reflected in the territory’s historically low voter turnout, which has hovered around 25%.
In Transnistria, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. This systematic repression is driven by the heavy manipulation of the media landscape by affiliated non-state actors and a pattern of extrajudicial violence targeting high-profile critics with impunity. Furthermore, the de facto officials weaponize vague “anti-extremism” legislation to imprison dissidents, criminalize independent civic action, and impose restrictions that effectively ban public protests.
Non-state actors with ties to the de facto regime have systematically contributed to heavily manipulating media coverage. This manipulation is achieved through the monopolization of the media landscape by affiliated oligarchic structures and the suppression of external information sources. Through its control of the Public Agency of Telecommunications, the main media oversight body, and close ties with the business behemoth Sheriff Holding, which accounts for up to 60% of the local economy, according to some estimates, the regime has heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Sheriff’s media empire comprises the most popular TV channel (TSV), several radio stations (Inter, Shanson, Dacha, etc.), and a few newspapers. Through its ownership of the largest transmission operator, Interdnestrkom, Sheriff has amplified the reach of Russian propaganda channels, while denying viewers access to outlets based in Moldova. The few nominally independent television outlets in Transnistria refrain from political or human rights reporting. Sheriff’s ties to the current de facto regime are overt: current President Vadim Krasnoselsky was once an employee of the company, and multiple members of the current Supreme Council are its former associates.
The Transnistrian executive has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. This systematic obstruction is driven by the weaponization of vague anti-extremism laws to criminalize dissent and the arbitrary imprisonment of critics for “insulting” officials. A 2015 decree on combating extremism, issued by former president Yevgeny Shevchuk, granted the Transnistrian Security Services authority to request that the Prosecutor’s Office “block internet content deemed extremist.” The vague criteria and lack of judicial oversight have enabled widespread arbitrary censorship, with the regime frequently labeling opposition commentary and independent reporting as threats to “state security.” Private individuals expressing dissenting views have also been targeted under the extremism-related and other draconian provisions of the Criminal Code. In June 2022, Victor Plescanov, a human rights activist, was arrested for flying a Ukrainian flag on the balcony of his apartment and denouncing Russia’s invasion. While his initial charge was “hooliganism,” the prosecution changed that to “exciting extremism,” which carries considerably harsher penalties. Plescanov received a three-and-a-half-year prison sentence, of which he served nearly two, until an unexpected presidential pardon. Plescanov’s draconian sentence was not an isolated incident: in 2019, Sergei Mironovich, a vocal critic of Krasnoselsky, received a three-year sentence for “insulting the president” on social media. Mironovich spent two years in prison, during which he went on a hunger strike more than once to protest his unfair conviction, until Krasnoselsky pardoned him in 2021.
Non-state actors, with ties to the de facto governing authority, have systematically contributed to the killing or enforced disappearance of dissidents. This pattern of extrajudicial violence is perpetrated by assailants whose ties to the regime and affiliated monopolies are evidenced by their precise targeting of the regime’s most prominent challengers, coupled with the officials’ systemic refusal to conduct credible investigations. In 2023, opposition leader Oleg Khorzan was assassinated in his home by unidentified perpetrators, in a case that remains unsolved. De facto officials advanced the theory that his murder resulted from a robbery gone awry. However, multiple international and local watchdogs linked the killing to Khorzan’s persistent criticism of the regime. Similarly, on June 10, 2020, businessman Vadim Ceban, a vocal opponent of the Sheriff Corporation’s economic monopoly, was beaten to death near his home in Tiraspol. Days earlier, he had publicly criticized Sheriff Holding’s leadership and posted a social media message reading “Sheriff, repent!” In both instances, the connection between the assailants and the ruling elite is cemented by the state’s deliberate inaction; de facto officials granted the perpetrators absolute impunity by refusing to launch independent investigations, effectively functioning as accomplices after the fact.
Officials have systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. This repression is institutionalized through restrictive legislation that imposes burdensome reporting requirements and bans foreign funding for “political” activities. Following the adoption of a 2018 law introducing burdensome reporting requirements and severe sanctions for non-compliance, all Civil society organizations (CSOs) had to effectively coordinate their activities with the de facto regime or risk harassment, criminalization, or forced dissolution. The law also prohibits organizations receiving foreign funding from engaging in “political” activities, a definition vague enough to cover a broad spectrum of legitimate civic mobilization.
The de facto regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. This repression relies on draconian prior-approval requirements that effectively criminalize unauthorized public assemblies and disqualify past critics from organizing events. Under a repressive 2017 law, public gatherings require prior authorization 10 to 15 days in advance. Penalties for non-compliance are harsh, ranging from steep fines to 15 days of administrative detention. Further, the law prohibits individuals with prior arrests or convictions from organizing a gathering, a measure that disqualifies regime critics who may have faced arbitrary judicial persecution in the past. Reflecting the chilling effect of such restrictions, demonstrations remain sporadic to non-existent.
In Transnistria, institutions thoroughly fail to serve as independent checks on the de facto regime. This systemic failure is rooted in the executive’s direct control over judicial appointments and the judiciary’s operational dependence on Russia as its foreign patron state. The courts actively enable repression through non-transparent trials and politically motivated convictions, while serving as a protective shield for the executive’s coercive apparatus to ensure total impunity for state-sanctioned abuses.
Official Tiraspol has systematically subjected judicial institutions to practices that abolish and seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. This subjugation is characterized by the executive’s direct control over judicial appointments and the judiciary’s operational dependence on a foreign patron state. As Transnistria formalized its institutional framework in the 1990s and early 2000s following its declaration of independence, the very setup of judicial institutions seriously weakened their independence and operational effectiveness. Firstly, there is no meaningful oversight of the appointment, professional advancement, or disciplinary censure and dismissal of magistrates, enabling nepotism and retaliatory measures by the executive against dissenting judges. The President and the Supreme Council directly appoint four out of six justices to the Supreme Court (the highest judicial instance, which also performs many of the functions of a Constitutional Court), guaranteeing a majority of loyalists. Secondly, Transnistria heavily relied on Russian personnel and know-how in establishing a working judiciary following its declaration of independence, a legacy which endures in the present. In several notable judgments, the European Court of Human Rights (e.g., Ilascu and Others vs. Moldova and Russia, 2004) assessed that Transnistrian tribunals were “under the effective control of Russia,” and failed to offer an effective legal remedy. Owing to Transnistria’s ongoing military, economic, and diplomatic dependence on Russia, this informal influence continues to thwart any semblance of judicial independence.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition. This is demonstrated through non-transparent trials, denial of due process rights, and politically motivated convictions based on trumped-up charges. To illustrate, in the notable case of Cazac and Surchician v. Moldova and Russia (2020), the European Court of Human Rights found that former Moldovan tax official Ilie Cazac had been tortured in pretrial detention and prison following a conviction for “high treason” that was politically motivated. Importantly, the judgment established that Russia still had effective control over Transnistria’s judicial branch, as outlined above. It was thereby the “responsible party” and owed the plaintiffs compensation of $50,000 for non-pecuniary damages. As of 2025, Russia has not complied with the ruling. The Transnistrian courts have also rubber-stamped the de facto regime’s attempts to gain leverage in negotiations with Moldova by kidnapping and imprisoning Moldovan citizens. In a prominent case, Moldovan Adrian Glijin was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment in 2021 on bogus charges of espionage. He was held in protracted incommunicado detention, coerced into accepting a state-appointed attorney, and, finally, denied access to the Court’s official decision on the grounds that it would compromise “state secrecy.” He was only released in 2023, as part of a prisoner exchange with Moldova. Attorneys and relatives who attempt to challenge abuses face harassment and intimidation (as was the case with Adrian Glijin’s mother, who faced persistent surveillance, intimidation by security services, and a strict gag order when she attempted to establish contact with her son during his pre-trial detention).
Judicial institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold officials accountable. This systematic failure stems from the judiciary’s role as a protective shield for the executive’s coercive apparatus, ensuring total impunity for state-sanctioned abuses. Despite well-documented instances of torture and arbitrary detention by security services, local courts have consistently refused to investigate or prosecute responsible officials. Instead, the judiciary actively facilitates such abuses, as seen in the abovementioned cases of Adrian Glijin, Ilie Cazac, Stela Surchician, and Oleg Khorzhan, which confirmed that the de facto judicial system acts under Russian control and offers no protection against state violence. Another illustration of this pattern is the case of Vitalie Eriomenco, a local businessman targeted after resisting a hostile takeover by companies affiliated with the Sheriff Holding. Arrested without a warrant on fabricated charges in 2011, he was sentenced to 12 years in prison on charges of theft and fraud. His assets were subsequently appropriated by structures linked to the Sheriff Holding. Despite Eriomenco’s repeated complaints during court hearings regarding severe health deterioration and the denial of medical care in detention, amounting to torture, judges have systematically dismissed his appeals and refused to investigate the negligence of prison officials. Eriomenco was only released in 2016, after the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) court sided with him and ruled that he was a victim of arbitrary arrest and torture by the Transnistrian regime. Despite this, as of today, no investigation has been launched, and there is still no accountability for anyone involved in his abuse.
HRF classifies the breakaway region of Transnistria as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Transnistria (also known as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) is a breakaway territory situated along Moldova’s eastern border with Ukraine. In 1991, amid the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Transnistria announced its independence from Moldova. This unilateral move was rejected by Moldova and the international community. The political standoff quickly escalated into an armed conflict, in which remnants of Russia’s 14th Army, stationed in Moldova as part of the former Soviet Union’s armed forces, directly supported the separatists through arms supplies, logistical support, and direct artillery fire against Moldovan forces. The fighting ended with a ceasefire agreement, signed between Russia and Moldova in July 1992. The ceasefire established a tripartite peacekeeping force, composed of Moldovan, Russian, and Transnistrian troops, effectively freezing the conflict. In 2006, Transnistria held an independence referendum that reasserted its secession from Moldova. The referendum was considered illegal by most of the international community, effectively turning Transnistria into an unrecognized de facto state that functions independently but lacks any global legal status.
Despite periodic negotiations mediated by the OSCE, Transnistria remains unrecognized internationally and is widely regarded as part of Moldova’s sovereign territory. The de facto regime is heavily dependent on Moscow, both economically and militarily. In addition, the Russian Federation maintains a permanent deployment of about 1,500 troops in the region, which the Council of Europe declared tantamount to an “occupation” in a 2022 resolution. In addition, some estimates suggest that about 200,000 (or about 55%) of Transnistrian residents hold Russian citizenship, reflecting the Kremlin’s longstanding policy of passportization in contested territories in what it perceives to be its sphere of influence.
The current de facto leader, President Vadim Krasnoselsky, first elected in 2016 and re-elected in 2021, maintains close ties to Russia and to the Renewal Party (Obnovlenie), which has dominated Transnistria’s political landscape for nearly two decades.
Elections in Transnistria are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The de facto regime ensures the ruling party’s dominance by utilizing opaque administrative barriers and judicial persecution to exclude genuine opposition candidates from the ballot. This lack of competition is compounded by the symbiotic relationship between the political leadership and the Sheriff – an economic conglomerate which monopolized media and financial resources to tilt the playing field. Consequently, electoral cycles are characterized by a total absence of meaningful campaigning and a prevalence of districts where incumbents run unopposed.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Dissent is silenced through a comprehensive strategy that combines the monopolization of the information space by allied oligarchic structures with a climate of impunity for extrajudicial violence against prominent critics. The de facto administration further suppresses independent activity by weaponizing vague anti-extremism legislation to imprison dissidents, enforcing legal restrictions that criminalize civic activism, and utilizing restrictive authorization rules to effectively ban public protests.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the de facto governing authority. The judiciary lacks structural autonomy due to the executive’s direct control over appointments and the legal system’s operational dependence on Russia, its patrol state. Rather than upholding the rule of law, the courts actively enable political repression by conducting non-transparent trials and issuing politically motivated convictions. Ultimately, judicial bodies function as a protective shield for the executive’s coercive apparatus, ensuring total impunity for state-sanctioned abuses and preserving the political and economic monopoly of the ruling elite.
Elections in Transnistria are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime systematically bars genuine opposition through opaque registration procedures and arbitrary judicial persecution, while affiliated non-state actors distort the political landscape via the abuse of economic and media monopolies. Consequently, the electoral playing field is heavily skewed, characterized by the absence of genuine campaigning and the prevalence of uncontested electoral districts.
The de facto regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. This exclusion relies on opaque registration procedures and imposes insurmountable administrative burdens on independent candidates. Since first coming to power in 2006, the Renewal has systematically engaged in arbitrary judicial persecution of political opponents and outright political violence. The Transnistrian Communist Party, once a viable contender in the Supreme Council elections, was effectively banned following the 2018 imprisonment of its leader, Oleg Khorzhan. The effective elimination of the Communist Party fits an established pattern of preempting viable competition at the polls. Ahead of the 2021 presidential election, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) declined to register hopefuls Anatoly Dirun and Nikolai Malyshev, ostensibly due to missing personal data of the citizens who signed the petitions supporting their candidacies. Transnistria has a steep barrier to participation (2-3% of the electorate must support a candidacy via their signature, compared to 1% in most other countries) and excessive administrative requirements for submitting a candidacy. Further, the CEC’s decisions are largely non-transparent and rarely, if ever, challenged in the courts.
Non-state actors with ties to the de facto governing authority have systematically contributed to the governing authority enjoying significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. This influence is embodied through the monopolization of campaign finance, the abuse of media dominance by affiliated oligarchic structures, and clientelist vote mobilization. The region’s politics are dominated by the Sheriff holding company – a business conglomerate led by oligarch Viktor Gushan that controls approximately 60% of the Transnistrian economy. Sheriff effectively owns and funds the ruling “Obnovlenie” party, converting its economic monopoly into total political control. This symbiotic relationship provided the ruling party with advantages during the 2020 Supreme Council elections, where Obnovlenie secured 29 out of 33 seats, with the remaining four going to “independent” candidates also linked to Sheriff. The holding’s media arm, particularly the TSV television channel, dominates the information space, providing exclusive positive coverage to incumbents while ignoring or disparaging dissenters. Furthermore, given Sheriff’s status as the primary employer and taxpayer, the electorate faces significant pressure to vote for company-backed candidates to preserve their livelihoods, rendering the electoral playing field uneven to the point of irrelevance.
Ruling elites have skewed the electoral playing field so much so that they generally claim victory with a very high vote share. This is characterized by the absence of genuine campaigning and the prevalence of uncontested electoral districts; the virtual nonexistence of a viable opposition renders campaigning largely moot. Local observers reported that incumbent president Vadim Krasnoselsky did not organize a single campaign event ahead of the 2021 presidential election. He faced only one handpicked facade opponent, Sergei Pinzar, an obscure farmer with no political experience, who also did not put forth a coherent policy programme. Similarly, in the 2020 Supreme Council election, Obnovlenie candidates ran unopposed in 29 out of the country’s 33 single-member electoral districts, making the outcome of the voting – a solid majority for the ruling party – a foregone conclusion. This absence of genuine alternatives also likely discourages political engagement among Transnistria’s residents. This is reflected in the territory’s historically low voter turnout, which has hovered around 25%.
In Transnistria, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. This systematic repression is driven by the heavy manipulation of the media landscape by affiliated non-state actors and a pattern of extrajudicial violence targeting high-profile critics with impunity. Furthermore, the de facto officials weaponize vague “anti-extremism” legislation to imprison dissidents, criminalize independent civic action, and impose restrictions that effectively ban public protests.
Non-state actors with ties to the de facto regime have systematically contributed to heavily manipulating media coverage. This manipulation is achieved through the monopolization of the media landscape by affiliated oligarchic structures and the suppression of external information sources. Through its control of the Public Agency of Telecommunications, the main media oversight body, and close ties with the business behemoth Sheriff Holding, which accounts for up to 60% of the local economy, according to some estimates, the regime has heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Sheriff’s media empire comprises the most popular TV channel (TSV), several radio stations (Inter, Shanson, Dacha, etc.), and a few newspapers. Through its ownership of the largest transmission operator, Interdnestrkom, Sheriff has amplified the reach of Russian propaganda channels, while denying viewers access to outlets based in Moldova. The few nominally independent television outlets in Transnistria refrain from political or human rights reporting. Sheriff’s ties to the current de facto regime are overt: current President Vadim Krasnoselsky was once an employee of the company, and multiple members of the current Supreme Council are its former associates.
The Transnistrian executive has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. This systematic obstruction is driven by the weaponization of vague anti-extremism laws to criminalize dissent and the arbitrary imprisonment of critics for “insulting” officials. A 2015 decree on combating extremism, issued by former president Yevgeny Shevchuk, granted the Transnistrian Security Services authority to request that the Prosecutor’s Office “block internet content deemed extremist.” The vague criteria and lack of judicial oversight have enabled widespread arbitrary censorship, with the regime frequently labeling opposition commentary and independent reporting as threats to “state security.” Private individuals expressing dissenting views have also been targeted under the extremism-related and other draconian provisions of the Criminal Code. In June 2022, Victor Plescanov, a human rights activist, was arrested for flying a Ukrainian flag on the balcony of his apartment and denouncing Russia’s invasion. While his initial charge was “hooliganism,” the prosecution changed that to “exciting extremism,” which carries considerably harsher penalties. Plescanov received a three-and-a-half-year prison sentence, of which he served nearly two, until an unexpected presidential pardon. Plescanov’s draconian sentence was not an isolated incident: in 2019, Sergei Mironovich, a vocal critic of Krasnoselsky, received a three-year sentence for “insulting the president” on social media. Mironovich spent two years in prison, during which he went on a hunger strike more than once to protest his unfair conviction, until Krasnoselsky pardoned him in 2021.
Non-state actors, with ties to the de facto governing authority, have systematically contributed to the killing or enforced disappearance of dissidents. This pattern of extrajudicial violence is perpetrated by assailants whose ties to the regime and affiliated monopolies are evidenced by their precise targeting of the regime’s most prominent challengers, coupled with the officials’ systemic refusal to conduct credible investigations. In 2023, opposition leader Oleg Khorzan was assassinated in his home by unidentified perpetrators, in a case that remains unsolved. De facto officials advanced the theory that his murder resulted from a robbery gone awry. However, multiple international and local watchdogs linked the killing to Khorzan’s persistent criticism of the regime. Similarly, on June 10, 2020, businessman Vadim Ceban, a vocal opponent of the Sheriff Corporation’s economic monopoly, was beaten to death near his home in Tiraspol. Days earlier, he had publicly criticized Sheriff Holding’s leadership and posted a social media message reading “Sheriff, repent!” In both instances, the connection between the assailants and the ruling elite is cemented by the state’s deliberate inaction; de facto officials granted the perpetrators absolute impunity by refusing to launch independent investigations, effectively functioning as accomplices after the fact.
Officials have systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. This repression is institutionalized through restrictive legislation that imposes burdensome reporting requirements and bans foreign funding for “political” activities. Following the adoption of a 2018 law introducing burdensome reporting requirements and severe sanctions for non-compliance, all Civil society organizations (CSOs) had to effectively coordinate their activities with the de facto regime or risk harassment, criminalization, or forced dissolution. The law also prohibits organizations receiving foreign funding from engaging in “political” activities, a definition vague enough to cover a broad spectrum of legitimate civic mobilization.
The de facto regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. This repression relies on draconian prior-approval requirements that effectively criminalize unauthorized public assemblies and disqualify past critics from organizing events. Under a repressive 2017 law, public gatherings require prior authorization 10 to 15 days in advance. Penalties for non-compliance are harsh, ranging from steep fines to 15 days of administrative detention. Further, the law prohibits individuals with prior arrests or convictions from organizing a gathering, a measure that disqualifies regime critics who may have faced arbitrary judicial persecution in the past. Reflecting the chilling effect of such restrictions, demonstrations remain sporadic to non-existent.
In Transnistria, institutions thoroughly fail to serve as independent checks on the de facto regime. This systemic failure is rooted in the executive’s direct control over judicial appointments and the judiciary’s operational dependence on Russia as its foreign patron state. The courts actively enable repression through non-transparent trials and politically motivated convictions, while serving as a protective shield for the executive’s coercive apparatus to ensure total impunity for state-sanctioned abuses.
Official Tiraspol has systematically subjected judicial institutions to practices that abolish and seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. This subjugation is characterized by the executive’s direct control over judicial appointments and the judiciary’s operational dependence on a foreign patron state. As Transnistria formalized its institutional framework in the 1990s and early 2000s following its declaration of independence, the very setup of judicial institutions seriously weakened their independence and operational effectiveness. Firstly, there is no meaningful oversight of the appointment, professional advancement, or disciplinary censure and dismissal of magistrates, enabling nepotism and retaliatory measures by the executive against dissenting judges. The President and the Supreme Council directly appoint four out of six justices to the Supreme Court (the highest judicial instance, which also performs many of the functions of a Constitutional Court), guaranteeing a majority of loyalists. Secondly, Transnistria heavily relied on Russian personnel and know-how in establishing a working judiciary following its declaration of independence, a legacy which endures in the present. In several notable judgments, the European Court of Human Rights (e.g., Ilascu and Others vs. Moldova and Russia, 2004) assessed that Transnistrian tribunals were “under the effective control of Russia,” and failed to offer an effective legal remedy. Owing to Transnistria’s ongoing military, economic, and diplomatic dependence on Russia, this informal influence continues to thwart any semblance of judicial independence.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition. This is demonstrated through non-transparent trials, denial of due process rights, and politically motivated convictions based on trumped-up charges. To illustrate, in the notable case of Cazac and Surchician v. Moldova and Russia (2020), the European Court of Human Rights found that former Moldovan tax official Ilie Cazac had been tortured in pretrial detention and prison following a conviction for “high treason” that was politically motivated. Importantly, the judgment established that Russia still had effective control over Transnistria’s judicial branch, as outlined above. It was thereby the “responsible party” and owed the plaintiffs compensation of $50,000 for non-pecuniary damages. As of 2025, Russia has not complied with the ruling. The Transnistrian courts have also rubber-stamped the de facto regime’s attempts to gain leverage in negotiations with Moldova by kidnapping and imprisoning Moldovan citizens. In a prominent case, Moldovan Adrian Glijin was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment in 2021 on bogus charges of espionage. He was held in protracted incommunicado detention, coerced into accepting a state-appointed attorney, and, finally, denied access to the Court’s official decision on the grounds that it would compromise “state secrecy.” He was only released in 2023, as part of a prisoner exchange with Moldova. Attorneys and relatives who attempt to challenge abuses face harassment and intimidation (as was the case with Adrian Glijin’s mother, who faced persistent surveillance, intimidation by security services, and a strict gag order when she attempted to establish contact with her son during his pre-trial detention).
Judicial institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold officials accountable. This systematic failure stems from the judiciary’s role as a protective shield for the executive’s coercive apparatus, ensuring total impunity for state-sanctioned abuses. Despite well-documented instances of torture and arbitrary detention by security services, local courts have consistently refused to investigate or prosecute responsible officials. Instead, the judiciary actively facilitates such abuses, as seen in the abovementioned cases of Adrian Glijin, Ilie Cazac, Stela Surchician, and Oleg Khorzhan, which confirmed that the de facto judicial system acts under Russian control and offers no protection against state violence. Another illustration of this pattern is the case of Vitalie Eriomenco, a local businessman targeted after resisting a hostile takeover by companies affiliated with the Sheriff Holding. Arrested without a warrant on fabricated charges in 2011, he was sentenced to 12 years in prison on charges of theft and fraud. His assets were subsequently appropriated by structures linked to the Sheriff Holding. Despite Eriomenco’s repeated complaints during court hearings regarding severe health deterioration and the denial of medical care in detention, amounting to torture, judges have systematically dismissed his appeals and refused to investigate the negligence of prison officials. Eriomenco was only released in 2016, after the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) court sided with him and ruled that he was a victim of arbitrary arrest and torture by the Transnistrian regime. Despite this, as of today, no investigation has been launched, and there is still no accountability for anyone involved in his abuse.
