Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies The Gambia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
The Gambia is a republic that operates under a presidential system of government, where the president serves as both the head of state and the head of government. The current Head of State, Adama Barrow, was democratically re-elected in 2021 for his second term, following his victory over the former dictator Yahya Jammeh in the December 2016 election. Since gaining independence in 1965, The Gambia initially stood out as one of Africa’s few multiparty democracies under the leadership of Dawda Jawara. However, a coup d’état in 1994 led to Yahya Jammeh’s 22-year dictatorship. Since the end of long-term autocratic rule in 2016, the country has undergone a significant democratic transition. This transition has resulted in important developments, including more pluralistic elections, the establishment of the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission (TRRC) to document past atrocities committed during Jammeh’s regime, an expanded space for civil society, and greater judicial independence. Despite these advancements, The Gambia still faces ongoing challenges, including weaknesses in the legal and institutional framework governing elections, pressure on media outlets and political critics, and occasional restrictions on protests and civil liberties.
National elections are largely free and fair. Since the end of Jammeh’s autocratic rule in 2016, the country has undergone a democratic transition, allowing major opposition candidates to compete freely in national elections without facing hurdles from the regime. Although the ruling party enjoys campaign advantages by using state resources, it does not engage in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud, making the elections largely competitive.
Independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Despite the progress the country has made in expanding civic space, significant challenges remain. Journalists and civil society organizations often face intimidation, protests are repressed through administrative hurdles and police intervention, and legal restrictions inherited from the previous regime continue to silence dissenting speech.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Executive overreach and imbalances in institutional power continue to pose significant challenges to democracy in The Gambia. The judiciary has experienced notable reforms but also faces capacity issues, highlighting both progress and ongoing concerns about its ability to effectively check the executive branch and protect individual rights. Political interference, along with practical challenges such as limited resources, infrastructure constraints, and a heavy workload, undermines the independence and operational effectiveness of judicial institutions. The parliament occasionally operates independently of regime influence; however, it is structurally limited by the president’s extensive constitutional authority. Oversight institutions are often constrained by the ruling power, which intervenes directly in their composition and may even remove independent key figures from their positions.
National elections are largely free and fair. Although the ruling National People’s Party (NPP) enjoys such significant and unfair campaign advantages, it does not bar opposition candidates from competing in elections and does not engage in widespread electoral irregularities.
The regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. There has not been an outright ban on major opposition candidates, but procedural obstacles have impacted the participation of smaller candidates. In the 2021 presidential election, out of 21 candidates, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) only accepted six nominations. These included the incumbent’s main rivals, Ousainou Darboe of the United Democratic Party (UDP), and Mama Kandeh of the Gambia Democratic Congress (GDC), who had previously aligned himself with former president Jammeh. The IEC did not provide the other 15 rejected candidates with an opportunity to correct the issues in their nomination papers. This was despite a provision in the Elections Act that allows for a fresh nomination to be submitted before the close of the nomination period if the first one is rejected. Three of the unsuccessful candidates challenged their rejections before the High Court and won their legal claims regarding the unfair procedures of the IEC. However, these rulings came too late to allow them to participate.
The regime has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. The 2021 presidential election was widely regarded by international observer missions as peaceful, credible, transparent, and inclusive. It was the first free and fair election held since 2016, when Barrow took power through an election, ousting dictator Jammeh, who had ruled the country for 22 years. President Barrow won reelection with 53 percent of the vote, and both international and domestic observers deemed the election peaceful, free, and fair, albeit with some minor administrative issues. Major observer groups, including the Commonwealth Observer Group, the European Union Election Observation Mission, and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), described the procedures on election day as orderly and reflective of the voters’ will. The peaceful conditions in which the 2021 presidential election took place represent a significant shift from the previous election held under former president Jammeh. The 2016 presidential election, which brought President Barrow to power, was historic but took place amid repressive conditions. Although the election resulted in a democratic transition of power, international civil society organizations (CSOs), such as Human Rights Watch, reported widespread intimidation of critics and arbitrary arrests of opposition leaders and protesters by the Jammeh regime. This created a climate of fear in the lead-up to the vote. More than 90 peaceful protesters were detained, and several opposition figures died in custody, which undermined the pre-election environment. Amnesty International similarly highlighted the arrests of journalists and activists, calling on authorities to protect freedom of expression and assembly ahead of the 2016 vote.
The regime has enjoyed such significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermined the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. The 2021 campaigns were vibrant and free from violence, allowing all candidates to gather crowds and present their agendas. However, significant inequities in political finance created an uneven playing field that favored the ruling party. State media, particularly the public broadcaster Gambia Radio and Television Services (GRTS), gave disproportionate coverage to President Barrow and the ruling NPP. Some news segments provided nearly three times more airtime to the incumbent than to the main opposition. Additionally, Barrow’s “Meet the People Tour,” which was officially framed as a presidential outreach initiative, effectively functioned as a campaign platform. This initiative relied on state resources, including government vehicles and fuel, as well as the mobilization of civil servants to support NPP activities.
Independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The ruling NPP has intimidated independent media and civil society organizations, repressed protests, and silenced dissenting speech.
The Barrow regime has seriously intimidated independent, dissenting media, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. Since 2016, the media landscape in The Gambia has expanded significantly. This change followed the loss of the public broadcasting monopoly, the emergence of several private and community television channels and radio stations, and the return from exile of numerous journalists after the end of Yahya Jammeh’s 22-year dictatorship. In 2021, the Access to Information Act was adopted, recognizing, for the first time, access to information as a fundamental human right in the country. Despite these advancements, independent media continues to face challenges, including intimidation, arbitrary arrests, judicial harassment, and legal restrictions. Recent incidents underscore the persistence of pressure on journalists and media actors. In September 2025, journalist Kadijah Bokum of the state broadcaster GRTS had her phone seized by officers from the Police Intervention Unit (PIU) while covering protests, with reports that her family members were also harassed. In the same month, Bakary Tamba, a journalist with Gambia Talents Promotion, was detained while filming a police raid on the Auditor General’s office. In September 2024, editors at The Voice newspaper, including Musa Sheriff and Momodou Justice Darboe, were arrested and charged with “false publication” after reporting on an alleged exit strategy by President Barrow. In September 2023, journalist Bakary Mankajang, the owner of the online publication Mankajang Daily, was detained and later released on bail after being charged with “interference with witnesses.” This charge came following Mankajang’s reporting on the murder of two police officers, for which he had traveled to Casamance, a region in Senegal, to conduct interviews related to the arrest of a suspect in the case.
The regime has seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Protests are legally permitted but in practice sometimes face administrative hurdles or heavy‑handed police responses. Longstanding protest movements, including groups like Three Years Jotna, have mobilized public demonstrations calling for political reform, but authorities have occasionally restricted permits or responded with arrests. In 2025, several notable protests illustrate this dynamic: on July 23, youth-led demonstrators under the coalition Gambians Against Looted Assets (GALA) marched against corruption, demanding transparency and accountability, with some participants subsequently detained. On August 22, peaceful protesters gathered outside the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority headquarters in Serekunda to protest sharp increases in internet data costs, resulting in the arrest of at least 23 participants. In September, further arrests targeted GALA members amid ongoing anti-corruption activism. Additionally, smaller-scale demonstrations arose over market relocations and enforcement of bans on foreign Tuk‑tuk drivers, reflecting broader citizen mobilization around economic grievances, sometimes met with police force.
The regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. The space for political critique expanded, with citizens being able to express opposition views more freely following the end of Jammeh’s repressive regime. However, national laws, including sedition and communications statutes, remain in force that can be used to suppress dissent. Ordinary citizens, journalists, and activists still face pressure or legal action for criticizing regime officials. Recent cases illustrate how these constraints continue to operate in practice. In March 2025, The Voice newspaper published a report highlighting the decline in public trust in government institutions, based on an Afrobarometer survey conducted in October 2024. In response to this story, the country’s Minister of Information, Dr. Ismaila Ceesay, summoned the newspaper’s editor, along with executives from the Gambia Press Union (GPU), the Media Council, and the newspaper publishers’ association, to his office. During the meeting, the Minister conveyed that the article is damaging to the government and the country’s fragile democracy, sparking debate on press freedom. Additionally, the GPU expressed concerns about defamation lawsuits initiated by the president and other senior officials against journalists and media outlets. For instance, in October 2024, President Barrow filed a civil defamation suit against The Voice newspaper and its editor-in-chief, Sheriff. This lawsuit followed a September 23 report claiming that the president was planning to select a successor as part of an exit strategy. However, after mediation from media stakeholders, he withdrew the civil defamation lawsuit. In that same month, Environment Minister Rohey John Manjang sued investigative journalist Kebba Ansu Manneh and The Alkamba Times for 50 million dalasis (approximately $725,000) over a June 19 story that alleged her involvement in illegal transactions involving seized logs. The GPU contends that these actions could jeopardize press freedom and lead to self-censorship, thereby reversing recent advancements in media freedom in the country. In December 2022, Momodou Sabally, then campaign manager for the United Democratic Party (UDP), was detained for several days over a TikTok video deemed “subversive,” though he was later released without charge and subsequently defected to the ruling party.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Since the transition in 2016, the end of the 22-year dictatorship of Jammeh has not completely resolved the issues of executive overreach. Checks and balances continue to be undermined as judicial and oversight institutions are subjected to political interference and practical limitations, such as resource constraints.
The regime subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Despite President Barrow repeatedly emphasizing judicial independence, the rule of law, and strategic reforms, the existing constitutional and institutional framework continues to embed significant executive influence over the judiciary. Under Section 138 of the 1997 Constitution, the Chief Justice is appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), while other superior court judges are appointed on the recommendation of the JSC. In practice, however, the President exercises considerable indirect control over this process, as he appoints several members of the JSC, including its Chairperson. This creates a circular system of influence in which presidential appointees play a decisive role in recommending future judicial candidates, raising persistent concerns about the depth of judicial independence. Furthermore, practical challenges frequently undermine public confidence and the judiciary’s oversight function. Court backlogs have grown, with nearly 8,682 pending cases at the start of 2026, despite improvements in case disposals. Limited resources, infrastructure constraints, and a heavy workload remain significant hurdles to timely justice delivery and impartial adjudication.
The regime has subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. It has achieved this by dismissing key independent figures from their oversight positions and by interfering in the composition of these institutions. A stark example of tensions between the executive and independent oversight institutions occurred in September 2025, when President Adama Barrow forcefully removed the Auditor General, Modou Ceesay, after the latter pursued audits that reportedly embarrassed senior state interests and raised concerns about electoral implications. Ceesay’s court challenge alleged that his removal contravened constitutional protections for the independence and tenure of the Auditor General, an office designed to act as a check on executive financial conduct. The Supreme Court began hearing the case, underscoring its potential to become a landmark test of executive interference in oversight bodies, but the government defended the dismissal as lawful, framing Ceesay’s purported acceptance of a ministerial post as creating a vacancy. Furthermore, concerns about the IEC’s independence are closely tied to its appointment framework. Under Section 42 of the 1997 Constitution, the President appoints the Chairperson and four other members of the IEC in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and the Public Service Commission (PSC). However, this process still grants significant executive influence. The requirement of consultation does not amount to consent, leaving a consultation loophole that enables the President to proceed without meaningful institutional constraint. For instance, in July 2025, President Barrow appointed Joseph Colley as Chairperson and Cherno M. Jallow as Deputy Chairperson, decisions that some critics characterized as strategic placements of familiar figures ahead of the 2026 elections.
HRF classifies The Gambia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
The Gambia is a republic that operates under a presidential system of government, where the president serves as both the head of state and the head of government. The current Head of State, Adama Barrow, was democratically re-elected in 2021 for his second term, following his victory over the former dictator Yahya Jammeh in the December 2016 election. Since gaining independence in 1965, The Gambia initially stood out as one of Africa’s few multiparty democracies under the leadership of Dawda Jawara. However, a coup d’état in 1994 led to Yahya Jammeh’s 22-year dictatorship. Since the end of long-term autocratic rule in 2016, the country has undergone a significant democratic transition. This transition has resulted in important developments, including more pluralistic elections, the establishment of the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission (TRRC) to document past atrocities committed during Jammeh’s regime, an expanded space for civil society, and greater judicial independence. Despite these advancements, The Gambia still faces ongoing challenges, including weaknesses in the legal and institutional framework governing elections, pressure on media outlets and political critics, and occasional restrictions on protests and civil liberties.
National elections are largely free and fair. Since the end of Jammeh’s autocratic rule in 2016, the country has undergone a democratic transition, allowing major opposition candidates to compete freely in national elections without facing hurdles from the regime. Although the ruling party enjoys campaign advantages by using state resources, it does not engage in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud, making the elections largely competitive.
Independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Despite the progress the country has made in expanding civic space, significant challenges remain. Journalists and civil society organizations often face intimidation, protests are repressed through administrative hurdles and police intervention, and legal restrictions inherited from the previous regime continue to silence dissenting speech.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Executive overreach and imbalances in institutional power continue to pose significant challenges to democracy in The Gambia. The judiciary has experienced notable reforms but also faces capacity issues, highlighting both progress and ongoing concerns about its ability to effectively check the executive branch and protect individual rights. Political interference, along with practical challenges such as limited resources, infrastructure constraints, and a heavy workload, undermines the independence and operational effectiveness of judicial institutions. The parliament occasionally operates independently of regime influence; however, it is structurally limited by the president’s extensive constitutional authority. Oversight institutions are often constrained by the ruling power, which intervenes directly in their composition and may even remove independent key figures from their positions.
National elections are largely free and fair. Although the ruling National People’s Party (NPP) enjoys such significant and unfair campaign advantages, it does not bar opposition candidates from competing in elections and does not engage in widespread electoral irregularities.
The regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. There has not been an outright ban on major opposition candidates, but procedural obstacles have impacted the participation of smaller candidates. In the 2021 presidential election, out of 21 candidates, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) only accepted six nominations. These included the incumbent’s main rivals, Ousainou Darboe of the United Democratic Party (UDP), and Mama Kandeh of the Gambia Democratic Congress (GDC), who had previously aligned himself with former president Jammeh. The IEC did not provide the other 15 rejected candidates with an opportunity to correct the issues in their nomination papers. This was despite a provision in the Elections Act that allows for a fresh nomination to be submitted before the close of the nomination period if the first one is rejected. Three of the unsuccessful candidates challenged their rejections before the High Court and won their legal claims regarding the unfair procedures of the IEC. However, these rulings came too late to allow them to participate.
The regime has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. The 2021 presidential election was widely regarded by international observer missions as peaceful, credible, transparent, and inclusive. It was the first free and fair election held since 2016, when Barrow took power through an election, ousting dictator Jammeh, who had ruled the country for 22 years. President Barrow won reelection with 53 percent of the vote, and both international and domestic observers deemed the election peaceful, free, and fair, albeit with some minor administrative issues. Major observer groups, including the Commonwealth Observer Group, the European Union Election Observation Mission, and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), described the procedures on election day as orderly and reflective of the voters’ will. The peaceful conditions in which the 2021 presidential election took place represent a significant shift from the previous election held under former president Jammeh. The 2016 presidential election, which brought President Barrow to power, was historic but took place amid repressive conditions. Although the election resulted in a democratic transition of power, international civil society organizations (CSOs), such as Human Rights Watch, reported widespread intimidation of critics and arbitrary arrests of opposition leaders and protesters by the Jammeh regime. This created a climate of fear in the lead-up to the vote. More than 90 peaceful protesters were detained, and several opposition figures died in custody, which undermined the pre-election environment. Amnesty International similarly highlighted the arrests of journalists and activists, calling on authorities to protect freedom of expression and assembly ahead of the 2016 vote.
The regime has enjoyed such significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermined the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. The 2021 campaigns were vibrant and free from violence, allowing all candidates to gather crowds and present their agendas. However, significant inequities in political finance created an uneven playing field that favored the ruling party. State media, particularly the public broadcaster Gambia Radio and Television Services (GRTS), gave disproportionate coverage to President Barrow and the ruling NPP. Some news segments provided nearly three times more airtime to the incumbent than to the main opposition. Additionally, Barrow’s “Meet the People Tour,” which was officially framed as a presidential outreach initiative, effectively functioned as a campaign platform. This initiative relied on state resources, including government vehicles and fuel, as well as the mobilization of civil servants to support NPP activities.
Independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The ruling NPP has intimidated independent media and civil society organizations, repressed protests, and silenced dissenting speech.
The Barrow regime has seriously intimidated independent, dissenting media, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. Since 2016, the media landscape in The Gambia has expanded significantly. This change followed the loss of the public broadcasting monopoly, the emergence of several private and community television channels and radio stations, and the return from exile of numerous journalists after the end of Yahya Jammeh’s 22-year dictatorship. In 2021, the Access to Information Act was adopted, recognizing, for the first time, access to information as a fundamental human right in the country. Despite these advancements, independent media continues to face challenges, including intimidation, arbitrary arrests, judicial harassment, and legal restrictions. Recent incidents underscore the persistence of pressure on journalists and media actors. In September 2025, journalist Kadijah Bokum of the state broadcaster GRTS had her phone seized by officers from the Police Intervention Unit (PIU) while covering protests, with reports that her family members were also harassed. In the same month, Bakary Tamba, a journalist with Gambia Talents Promotion, was detained while filming a police raid on the Auditor General’s office. In September 2024, editors at The Voice newspaper, including Musa Sheriff and Momodou Justice Darboe, were arrested and charged with “false publication” after reporting on an alleged exit strategy by President Barrow. In September 2023, journalist Bakary Mankajang, the owner of the online publication Mankajang Daily, was detained and later released on bail after being charged with “interference with witnesses.” This charge came following Mankajang’s reporting on the murder of two police officers, for which he had traveled to Casamance, a region in Senegal, to conduct interviews related to the arrest of a suspect in the case.
The regime has seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Protests are legally permitted but in practice sometimes face administrative hurdles or heavy‑handed police responses. Longstanding protest movements, including groups like Three Years Jotna, have mobilized public demonstrations calling for political reform, but authorities have occasionally restricted permits or responded with arrests. In 2025, several notable protests illustrate this dynamic: on July 23, youth-led demonstrators under the coalition Gambians Against Looted Assets (GALA) marched against corruption, demanding transparency and accountability, with some participants subsequently detained. On August 22, peaceful protesters gathered outside the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority headquarters in Serekunda to protest sharp increases in internet data costs, resulting in the arrest of at least 23 participants. In September, further arrests targeted GALA members amid ongoing anti-corruption activism. Additionally, smaller-scale demonstrations arose over market relocations and enforcement of bans on foreign Tuk‑tuk drivers, reflecting broader citizen mobilization around economic grievances, sometimes met with police force.
The regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. The space for political critique expanded, with citizens being able to express opposition views more freely following the end of Jammeh’s repressive regime. However, national laws, including sedition and communications statutes, remain in force that can be used to suppress dissent. Ordinary citizens, journalists, and activists still face pressure or legal action for criticizing regime officials. Recent cases illustrate how these constraints continue to operate in practice. In March 2025, The Voice newspaper published a report highlighting the decline in public trust in government institutions, based on an Afrobarometer survey conducted in October 2024. In response to this story, the country’s Minister of Information, Dr. Ismaila Ceesay, summoned the newspaper’s editor, along with executives from the Gambia Press Union (GPU), the Media Council, and the newspaper publishers’ association, to his office. During the meeting, the Minister conveyed that the article is damaging to the government and the country’s fragile democracy, sparking debate on press freedom. Additionally, the GPU expressed concerns about defamation lawsuits initiated by the president and other senior officials against journalists and media outlets. For instance, in October 2024, President Barrow filed a civil defamation suit against The Voice newspaper and its editor-in-chief, Sheriff. This lawsuit followed a September 23 report claiming that the president was planning to select a successor as part of an exit strategy. However, after mediation from media stakeholders, he withdrew the civil defamation lawsuit. In that same month, Environment Minister Rohey John Manjang sued investigative journalist Kebba Ansu Manneh and The Alkamba Times for 50 million dalasis (approximately $725,000) over a June 19 story that alleged her involvement in illegal transactions involving seized logs. The GPU contends that these actions could jeopardize press freedom and lead to self-censorship, thereby reversing recent advancements in media freedom in the country. In December 2022, Momodou Sabally, then campaign manager for the United Democratic Party (UDP), was detained for several days over a TikTok video deemed “subversive,” though he was later released without charge and subsequently defected to the ruling party.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Since the transition in 2016, the end of the 22-year dictatorship of Jammeh has not completely resolved the issues of executive overreach. Checks and balances continue to be undermined as judicial and oversight institutions are subjected to political interference and practical limitations, such as resource constraints.
The regime subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Despite President Barrow repeatedly emphasizing judicial independence, the rule of law, and strategic reforms, the existing constitutional and institutional framework continues to embed significant executive influence over the judiciary. Under Section 138 of the 1997 Constitution, the Chief Justice is appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), while other superior court judges are appointed on the recommendation of the JSC. In practice, however, the President exercises considerable indirect control over this process, as he appoints several members of the JSC, including its Chairperson. This creates a circular system of influence in which presidential appointees play a decisive role in recommending future judicial candidates, raising persistent concerns about the depth of judicial independence. Furthermore, practical challenges frequently undermine public confidence and the judiciary’s oversight function. Court backlogs have grown, with nearly 8,682 pending cases at the start of 2026, despite improvements in case disposals. Limited resources, infrastructure constraints, and a heavy workload remain significant hurdles to timely justice delivery and impartial adjudication.
The regime has subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. It has achieved this by dismissing key independent figures from their oversight positions and by interfering in the composition of these institutions. A stark example of tensions between the executive and independent oversight institutions occurred in September 2025, when President Adama Barrow forcefully removed the Auditor General, Modou Ceesay, after the latter pursued audits that reportedly embarrassed senior state interests and raised concerns about electoral implications. Ceesay’s court challenge alleged that his removal contravened constitutional protections for the independence and tenure of the Auditor General, an office designed to act as a check on executive financial conduct. The Supreme Court began hearing the case, underscoring its potential to become a landmark test of executive interference in oversight bodies, but the government defended the dismissal as lawful, framing Ceesay’s purported acceptance of a ministerial post as creating a vacancy. Furthermore, concerns about the IEC’s independence are closely tied to its appointment framework. Under Section 42 of the 1997 Constitution, the President appoints the Chairperson and four other members of the IEC in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and the Public Service Commission (PSC). However, this process still grants significant executive influence. The requirement of consultation does not amount to consent, leaving a consultation loophole that enables the President to proceed without meaningful institutional constraint. For instance, in July 2025, President Barrow appointed Joseph Colley as Chairperson and Cherno M. Jallow as Deputy Chairperson, decisions that some critics characterized as strategic placements of familiar figures ahead of the 2026 elections.
