Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Thailand as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Since becoming a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thailand has experienced 12 military coups and adopted 20 constitutions, most of which were drafted by military juntas or as an indirect result of the coups. Many coups were primarily driven by deep-seated tensions between conservative elites and oppositional factions supporting monarchy reforms and were orchestrated in the name of protecting the monarchy, a venerated institution that has enjoyed virtual immunity from accountability. The King’s significant influence over state policy – including the constitutional trajectory, key political appointments, and legislative reforms – has resulted in growing scrutiny from pro-reform advocates. The monarchy has also lent legitimacy to incoming regimes through tacit approval of military coups. The latest coup in 2014, led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, toppled the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra, a member of the influential Shinawatra family.
In August 2024, Yingluck’s niece, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, assumed the prime ministership after the Shinawatras’ Pheu Thai Party (PTP) entered into a coalition with pro-military parties in a delicate bid to restore the family’s political influence, abandoning its alliance with progressive parties. In August 2025, however, Paetongtarn was removed from office by a Constitutional Court ruling over a leaked phone call between her and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen amid an escalating border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. Paetongtarn is the fifth prime minister removed by the courts since 2008. Former deputy prime minister Anutin Charnvirakul succeeded her with support from several parties, including the PTP, the main opposition People’s Party, and Prayut Chan-o-cha’s former political vessel Palang Pracharat. As of December 2025, Anutin has dissolved parliament in preparation for fresh elections. He is the leader of the conservative Bhumjaithai Party that is historically seen as right-leaning and pro-military.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance to win. The 2019 and 2023 elections were administered under electoral rules that afforded pro-establishment parties an unfair advantage. While major opposition parties could register for these elections and win votes, the regime nullified their electoral successes by dissolving them and banning their leaders from politics after polling concluded. The election management body is historically biased in favor of the pro-establishment camp, with limited exceptions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the 2014 coup, the regime has restricted critical media, pursued criminal charges against thousands of dissidents based on vague speech laws, repressed peaceful protests, and censored online criticism. It has also been implicated in transnational repression against dissidents abroad and enables transnational repression by neighboring countries. The civic space has nevertheless remained resilient, with sizable numbers of independent media and civil society organizations.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on various administrations. Institutions in Thailand continue to operate under the military-drafted 2017 Constitution, which entrenches mechanisms that could be abused to manipulate election results and protect establishment interests. The judiciary – especially the Constitutional Court – plays a central role in dissolving opposition parties, disqualifying politicians, and enforcing harsh laws. Executive authority is weakened by vague “ethical” standards and the Court’s sweeping power to remove prime ministers. The legislature remains structurally skewed toward unelected actors, with an opaque Senate capable of blocking reforms and targeting progressive parties.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance to win. The Thai military plays a central role in influencing election administration and shaping electoral rules. As a result, although elections have led to transfers of power, pro-establishment (military-aligned or monarchy-aligned) parties are typically more likely to assume power compared to progressive parties. Following the 2014 coup, the military has overhauled the constitution to allow it outsized control over government formation. Successive governments close to the military have overseen the dissolution of popular pro-reform parties, although they are allowed to be represented on the opposition side of parliament. The election management body is also deferential to the conservative camp, consistently imposing rules that inhibit progressive parties from advocating for monarchy reforms. These realities have continued to characterize the state of electoral competition in Thailand despite the fact that the country is now led by a civilian government.
The military has engaged in significant electoral law manipulation that has continued to undermine electoral competition under subsequent civilian leaderships. The 2017 Constitution, drafted under junta oversight, enshrines electoral rules that benefit military-aligned parties. Article 269 of the 2017 Constitution, for example, provides that during the transitional period between military rule and civilian rule following the 2014 coup, the entire 250-member Senate is appointed by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the military junta. All members vote jointly with the House of Representatives to select the Prime Minister. This greatly reduced the House’s control over government formation and effectively allowed the Senate to veto any government it did not approve of. The system enabled the Senate to block the Move Forward Party (MFP), a progressive party that advocates for monarchy reforms, from taking office in 2023, although it won the most votes in elections that year.
Real, mainstream opposition groups and candidates have been unfairly excluded from elections by the military and pro-establishment governments. Pro-reform parties frequently face dissolutions. One such dissolution was ordered by the Constitutional Court in February 2020, under the rule of coup leader General Prayut Chan-o-cha, against the MFP’s predecessor, the Future Forward Party (FFP), following allegations that the party had received approximately 191.2 baht (approximately $5.3 million) in illegal donations; claims that were widely considered politically motivated. FFP finished third in the 2019 elections, making it a significant challenger to the junta’s proxy party, Palang Pracharat. The court banned more than a dozen FFP leaders, including its leader Thanathorn Juangroonruangkit, from politics and stripped them of their voting rights. All of them were forced to vacate their parliamentary seats. In 2020, many elected FFP lawmakers formed the MFP to succeed the party. Although the MFP contested the 2023 elections, campaigned, and won the most seats, it was barred from forming a government and dissolved by the Constitutional Court in August 2024. 10 MFP executive members were also banned from politics for ten years. MFP was succeeded by the People’s Party in August 2024.
Further, the military and pro-establishment governments have somewhat undermined independent electoral oversight. The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) oversees the administration of elections and is historically partial to the pro-establishment camp. Since 2006, ECT commissioners have been appointed by military juntas or under constitutions that maximized the power of junta proxies to control the appointment. The body proposed the dissolution of FFP and MFP, introduced electoral guidelines that restricted the ability of progressive parties to advocate for monarchy reforms, and refused to investigate suspected election law violations by Palang Pracharat. Nevertheless, its administration of elections over the years still allows opposition parties to secure significant support. A few civil society observers monitored the 2019 and 2023 elections, lending some balance to electoral oversight in Thailand. Additionally, after substantial and unexplained delays, in July 2024, the ECT endorsed 200 new senators, elected by professional and social groups across the country, to replace the junta-appointed Senate. The administration of the senatorial elections was nevertheless perceived as prone to manipulation and restrictive. The ECT, for instance, prohibited candidates from distributing leaflets, giving media interviews, and using social media to introduce themselves to the public. The ECT also shut down a civil society website intended to promote greater transparency about the candidates, www.senate67.com, accusing it of attempting to manipulate the polling process. The website was co-created by civil society organizations, including iLaw, We Watch, WeVis, and Progressive Movement, a group founded by Thanathorn Juangroonruangkit.
The regime’s systematic pressure on opposition parties has undermined their viability for future elections. Opposition parties that run on progressive platforms and call for drastic reforms of the monarchy or conservative establishment, lèse-majesté, and other social issues, face severe crackdowns, as seen with the FFP and MFP. The Shinawatras’ political vessel, PTP, abandoned its long-standing opposition to pro-military parties and allied with them instead to retain its hold on power. This frail alliance broke down, resulting in the removal of former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and a Constitutional Court ruling in September 2025 ordering the Shinawatras’ patriarch, Thaksin, to serve one year in jail in relation to an old corruption case.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the 2014 coup, civic space has significantly deteriorated. Despite the return of civilian rule in Thailand, successive governments have continued to enable the systematic repression of criticisms against the monarchy and the military, including through a media shutdown, the rise of coordinated cyberattacks on journalists, and the recent arrest and conviction of a foreign journalist. Successive administrations have also seriously and unfairly repressed protests and gatherings, resulting in a significant drop in the frequency of public demonstrations since 2020. There has also been a consistent pattern of Thai dissidents abroad disappearing and being killed, possibly linked to a transnational repression campaign.
The military and pro-establishment governments have somewhat intimidated independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or regular people, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. Although censorship of critical journalism has eased since the period of direct military rule in the country, journalists are still operating in precarious conditions. Digital surveillance is particularly pervasive: on March 25, 2025, an opposition lawmaker disclosed internal documents from a Joint Command Center (JCC) operated by police and military units. The documents revealed that JCC cyber teams had explicitly designated civil society organizations, prominent activists, opposition leaders, academics, youth figures, and other pro-democracy individuals as “high-value targets” for coordinated state-sponsored online influence operations. These revelations corroborate findings by civil society groups that Thai officials have systematically deployed digital surveillance, coordinated online harassment, and cyber-operations to discredit or intimidate critics, especially those who challenge the role of the monarchy. In 2024 alone, the JCC reportedly conducted 84,641 cyber operations – including phishing attempts, DDoS attacks, account hacking efforts, and coordinated spam – against 85 individuals, under the pretext of safeguarding national security. Among them were MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat, Progressive Movement leader Pannika Wanich, Amnesty International Thailand, and Sereepisuth Temeeyaves, leader of the historically anti-military Thai Liberal Party. Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission has acknowledged the security forces’ role in these influence operations and raised concerns about their impact on fundamental rights. In August 2025, Thailand’s National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) issued a directive requiring all mobile phone operators to incorporate biometric liveness detection – a technology that entails users uploading their photos and videos for authentication – in the SIM card registration process. In November, the Anutin administration also released a draft notification that would oblige all social media platforms accessible in the country to implement mandatory identity verification for every user account and advertiser. While the measures were introduced as part of the government’s effort to combat online scam operations, they have raised concerns of eroding digital privacy.
More overt tactics, including shutdowns, have also been used. A notable case is Voice TV, a Shinawatra-owned station historically aligned with the opposition and one of the few outlets that provided extensive coverage of the pro-democracy protests in 2020-2021. In April 2024, under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s PTP government, Voice TV announced it would suspend all broadcasting, citing media-market saturation and stating that the station had “completed its mission.” The station ceased operations on May 31, 2024. Though Voice TV publicly emphasized business factors, its closure followed a decade of state pressure. According to the local NGO iLaw, there were at least 24 documented state interventions against the station between the 2014 coup and March 2019, including orders to alter reporting and multiple temporary suspensions by regulators. After the shutdown, some former Voice TV staff joined the state broadcaster, the National Broadcasting Services of Thailand.
Thailand has one of the world’s strictest royal defamation (lèse-majesté) laws, which has been used against at least 284 individuals in 317 cases between 2020 and October 2025. In April 2025, American political scientist Paul Chambers was arrested at his residence in northern Thailand and charged with lèse-majesté and the overbroad Computer Crimes Act (CCA), which allows the regime to censor online content deemed a threat to national security. The lèse-majesté charges were dropped in May, and Chambers reportedly left the country afterwards. On May 28, 2025, prominent pro-democracy activist Arnon Nampa, who has been arbitrarily detained since September 2023, received his eighth lèse-majesté conviction and was sentenced to an additional two years and eight months in prison. As of July 2025, Arnon’s prison sentence has totaled 29 years and one month. Aside from lèse-majesté and the CCA, successive governments have also abused laws such as Section 116 of the Penal Code on sedition, the Public Assembly Act, which stipulates stringent restrictions around public assemblies and gatherings. Between July 2020 and December 2025, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights documented 1,341 prosecutions implicating 1,987 individuals instituted in connection with their participation in public assemblies and their political opinions.
The military and pro-establishment governments have somewhat intimidated and unfairly repressed protests and gatherings. Repression of peaceful protests saw its peak from 2020 until 2022, and large-scale protests have since dwindled. Between 2020 and 2022, a series of peaceful demonstrations calling for the resignation of junta leader Prayut Chan-o-cha and the abolition of strict lèse-majesté laws were met with harsh crackdowns. The largest protest, organized under the “Free Youth” banner, attracted well over 100,000 participants. With the onset of COVID-19, the regime declared a state of emergency, issuing at least 47 regulations that it used to pursue charges against nearly 1,500 protesters. At least 457 protesters faced charges under the lèse-majesté laws and the CCA. By late 2025, most protest leaders had been imprisoned, had charges pending against them, or had quit their activism altogether, fearing regime retaliation. As a result, large-scale protests targeting issues related to the military and monarchy across the country had sharply declined by 2022. Repression continued into 2025. On January 16, 2025, activist Chiratchaya “Ginny” Sakunthong received an unsuspended two-year prison sentence for livestreaming a monarchy reforms protest in 2022 based on lèse-majesté and CCA charges filed against her by a member of an ultra-royalist group. Rights monitors also reported a continuing pattern of selective arrests, surveillance, and intimidation of organizers, making sustained protest coordination increasingly difficult. Despite this, Amnesty International Thailand documented at least 48 demonstrations from April to June 2025 concerning various issues such as land rights, community housing rights, the LGBTQ+ community, and calls for the resignation of former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra.
The military and establishment-aligned governments have been implicated in transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Since the 2014 coup, multiple exiled Thai activists have gone missing in neighboring countries, with some later found dead. At least nine Thai pro-democracy activists have disappeared while exiled in neighboring countries such as Laos and Cambodia. Two of those activists, Chatchan Boonphawal and Kraidet Luelert, were found dead on the banks of the Mekong River within the Thai border in January 2019. Boonphawal and Luelert had been exiled in Vientiane, Laos, before they went missing. In June 2024, Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission linked all documented cases of disappearance to the state. Thailand also enables the transnational repression leveled by neighboring countries, in a practice often referred to as “swap mart.” On September 29, 2025, officials arrested Australian journalist Murray Hunter on criminal defamation charges over his posts that were critical of the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC). The arrest was made following a complaint filed by legal representatives of the MCMC, and Murray’s trial began in Bangkok in December 2025. Thailand also deported at least 40 members of the persecuted Uyghur community to China in early 2025, sparking serious human rights concerns.
Thailand’s repression of dissent is especially pronounced when it comes to any criticism of the monarchy, which plays a central role in the military’s ongoing interference in civilian politics. However, outside this politically sensitive area, there remains some space for dissent. Independent media outlets continue to publish critical stories about various regime policies, and Thais have broad access to the Internet and social media to express their views, provided they do not offend the monarchy’s sanctity. As of 2021, there were at least 25,000 civil society organizations operating in the country, although they have been weakened since the 2014 coup.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on various administrations. Despite the transition to the Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Anutin Charnvirakul administrations, institutions continue to operate within the institutional architecture engineered by the NCPO junta that has been entrenched by the 2017 Constitution. The institutional landscape remains fundamentally shaped by arrangements that empower the establishment to manipulate election outcomes and keep elected governments out of power, weaken political opposition, and insulate the establishment from scrutiny. The judiciary continues to play a significant role in sidelining political opposition and dissidents, while shielding establishment-aligned actors from accountability. The legislature retains structural vulnerabilities that sustain the military’s role as the ultimate power broker, including an undemocratic Senate and hurdles for political parties to form a majority in the lower house. Executive authority is weakened through constitutional provisions that enable the removal of officeholders on vague grounds of “ethics” and render those who advocate for monarchy reforms prone to being accused of sedition. De jure independent commissions are subject to political influence by way of their appointments and have demonstrably played a role in supporting the establishment’s authoritarian consolidation.
Judicial institutions have been subjected to reforms that seriously undermine their independence and operational effectiveness. Following the 2014 coup, the military junta expanded the jurisdiction of military courts, allowing them to try civilians for violations of military orders and national security offenses, including sedition and lèse-majesté. Over 1,000 cases against civilians were processed in these courts until July 2019, when the junta ordered the transfer of civilian cases to civilian courts. Although politically sensitive cases are now handled exclusively by civilian courts, these courts have continued to endorse military-backed efforts to undermine electoral competition and stifle dissent. This is particularly the case with the Constitutional Court, whose judges are appointed by the King with the approval of at least half of the Senate, which until 2024 had been entirely military-appointed and, as of 2025, comprises new senators who were not popularly elected. The Constitutional Court’s powers have continued to expand throughout the many iterations of Thailand’s constitution, and under the current 2017 Constitution, the Court, whose decisions are not subject to appeal, enjoys broad powers, including to order the cessation of any act or accusation against the monarchy, introduce organic bills (which holds the same legal status as the constitution), and remove cabinet ministers, and dissolve political parties. Constitutional judges may be removed if found to be in violation of “ethical standards”. These standards, however, are formulated with input from the Court. The Court is therefore virtually immune from scrutiny. In 2025, the legislature is also undertaking reforms to the powers and jurisdiction of military courts. One of the proposed drafts, the Military Court Reform Bill, initially aimed to curb impunity in crimes committed by military personnel against civilians by subjecting these cases to the jurisdiction of civilian courts. While the majority of parties initially supported this reform, in December 2025, Pheu Thai Party led a proposal that these powers remain within the military court system, which gained majority support.
Courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition and repress criticism against the establishment. The Constitutional Court’s dissolution of prominent opposition parties, such as the FFP and the MFP, highlights the judiciary’s failure to uphold the freedom and fairness of elections. The high rate of successful lèse-majesté prosecutions also exemplifies the judiciary’s failure to preserve free speech. The judiciary’s bias is particularly evident in the case of MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat. After the MFP won the 2023 elections, the Constitutional Court suspended him from parliament based on questionable allegations of violating the election law. It declined to assess the constitutionality of a parliamentary vote that obstructed his nomination as prime minister. Although he was cleared of all charges and reinstated in February 2024, by that time, parliament had already appointed Srettha Thavisin from the PTP as prime minister, with significant support from the junta-appointed Senate and pro-military parties. In another significant case from September 2023, the Supreme Court imposed a lifetime political ban on Pannika Wanich, an elected MFP lawmaker, due to Facebook photos she posted 13 years earlier that were deemed disrespectful to the monarchy. Severe lèse-majesté convictions, like the one imposed on Pannika Wanich, are commonplace. Between 79% and 90% of cases initiated under the law since the onset of nationwide pro-democracy protests in 2020 have resulted in guilty verdicts. The harshest lesé-majestè sentence to date totals 54 years and six months and was handed to activist Mongkol “Busbas” Thirakot for sharing 27 Facebook posts, including videos from foreign sources critical of the monarchy. This sentence was later reduced to 46 years by the Supreme Court.
Executive institutions have been subjected to reforms that seriously undermine their independence and operational effectiveness. The 2017 Constitution entrenches mechanisms that allow members of the executive branch to be easily removed if they defy the establishment. Sections 160 and 170, for example, enable the removal of cabinet ministers for breaching ill-defined “ethical standards.” Section 49 further constrains executive autonomy by designating the King not just a head of state, but also a revered entity whose position “shall not be violated” and prohibiting any action or accusation that could be construed as undermining the monarchy. This provision exposes any person, including executive officials, to allegations of attempting to overthrow the state if they defy the monarchy (Section 49). These sections operate alongside the sweeping authority of the Constitutional Court, which has played an outsized role in the removal of executive chiefs. To date, the Court has removed five prime ministers. In August 2024, the Court removed Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on the grounds that he “grossly violated ethical standards” by appointing a former lawyer who had been briefly jailed for contempt of court as a minister. In August 2025, the Court also dismissed Paetongtarn Shinawatra as prime minister for a “serious violation of ethical standards” over her leaked phone call with former Cambodian leader Hun Sen, which occurred during a time when both countries were engaged in a border dispute. Both decisions coincided with the unraveling of the PTP’s alliance with pro-establishment parties.
Legislative institutions have been subjected to reforms that seriously weaken their independence and operational effectiveness. The 2017 Constitution establishes a legislative framework that assigns a dominant role to non-elected actors. In particular, the Senate was, for five years (2019-2024), entirely appointed by the NCPO junta, which gave the military and its aligned elites decisive influence over legislation and government formation. Although the military-appointed Senate’s term expired in May 2024, and a new batch of 200 senators was installed, they were installed via an indirect election process that has been dubbed the “most complicated in the world,” where the 3,000 registered candidates, acting as representatives of different professional and social groups, vote among themselves at the district, provincial, and ultimately, national levels. The complexity and opacity of the process have been criticized as intentional, designed to make the Senate less accountable. Crucially, although senators no longer select the prime minister, they will retain the power to veto constitutional amendments and oversee appointments to key bodies, such as the Constitutional Court, National Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Election Commission. As of November 2025, the National Anti-Corruption Commission is investigating the People’s Party as well as 44 former and current lawmakers (including 29 who belong to the People’s Party) for allegedly violating the 2017 Constitution for seeking to amend Thailand’s lèse-majesté law. If found guilty, the People’s Party may face dissolution, removing the sole pro-reform representation from parliament and further subjugating the legislature to the conservative establishment.
HRF classifies Thailand as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Since becoming a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thailand has experienced 12 military coups and adopted 20 constitutions, most of which were drafted by military juntas or as an indirect result of the coups. Many coups were primarily driven by deep-seated tensions between conservative elites and oppositional factions supporting monarchy reforms and were orchestrated in the name of protecting the monarchy, a venerated institution that has enjoyed virtual immunity from accountability. The King’s significant influence over state policy – including the constitutional trajectory, key political appointments, and legislative reforms – has resulted in growing scrutiny from pro-reform advocates. The monarchy has also lent legitimacy to incoming regimes through tacit approval of military coups. The latest coup in 2014, led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, toppled the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra, a member of the influential Shinawatra family.
In August 2024, Yingluck’s niece, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, assumed the prime ministership after the Shinawatras’ Pheu Thai Party (PTP) entered into a coalition with pro-military parties in a delicate bid to restore the family’s political influence, abandoning its alliance with progressive parties. In August 2025, however, Paetongtarn was removed from office by a Constitutional Court ruling over a leaked phone call between her and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen amid an escalating border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. Paetongtarn is the fifth prime minister removed by the courts since 2008. Former deputy prime minister Anutin Charnvirakul succeeded her with support from several parties, including the PTP, the main opposition People’s Party, and Prayut Chan-o-cha’s former political vessel Palang Pracharat. As of December 2025, Anutin has dissolved parliament in preparation for fresh elections. He is the leader of the conservative Bhumjaithai Party that is historically seen as right-leaning and pro-military.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance to win. The 2019 and 2023 elections were administered under electoral rules that afforded pro-establishment parties an unfair advantage. While major opposition parties could register for these elections and win votes, the regime nullified their electoral successes by dissolving them and banning their leaders from politics after polling concluded. The election management body is historically biased in favor of the pro-establishment camp, with limited exceptions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the 2014 coup, the regime has restricted critical media, pursued criminal charges against thousands of dissidents based on vague speech laws, repressed peaceful protests, and censored online criticism. It has also been implicated in transnational repression against dissidents abroad and enables transnational repression by neighboring countries. The civic space has nevertheless remained resilient, with sizable numbers of independent media and civil society organizations.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on various administrations. Institutions in Thailand continue to operate under the military-drafted 2017 Constitution, which entrenches mechanisms that could be abused to manipulate election results and protect establishment interests. The judiciary – especially the Constitutional Court – plays a central role in dissolving opposition parties, disqualifying politicians, and enforcing harsh laws. Executive authority is weakened by vague “ethical” standards and the Court’s sweeping power to remove prime ministers. The legislature remains structurally skewed toward unelected actors, with an opaque Senate capable of blocking reforms and targeting progressive parties.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance to win. The Thai military plays a central role in influencing election administration and shaping electoral rules. As a result, although elections have led to transfers of power, pro-establishment (military-aligned or monarchy-aligned) parties are typically more likely to assume power compared to progressive parties. Following the 2014 coup, the military has overhauled the constitution to allow it outsized control over government formation. Successive governments close to the military have overseen the dissolution of popular pro-reform parties, although they are allowed to be represented on the opposition side of parliament. The election management body is also deferential to the conservative camp, consistently imposing rules that inhibit progressive parties from advocating for monarchy reforms. These realities have continued to characterize the state of electoral competition in Thailand despite the fact that the country is now led by a civilian government.
The military has engaged in significant electoral law manipulation that has continued to undermine electoral competition under subsequent civilian leaderships. The 2017 Constitution, drafted under junta oversight, enshrines electoral rules that benefit military-aligned parties. Article 269 of the 2017 Constitution, for example, provides that during the transitional period between military rule and civilian rule following the 2014 coup, the entire 250-member Senate is appointed by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the military junta. All members vote jointly with the House of Representatives to select the Prime Minister. This greatly reduced the House’s control over government formation and effectively allowed the Senate to veto any government it did not approve of. The system enabled the Senate to block the Move Forward Party (MFP), a progressive party that advocates for monarchy reforms, from taking office in 2023, although it won the most votes in elections that year.
Real, mainstream opposition groups and candidates have been unfairly excluded from elections by the military and pro-establishment governments. Pro-reform parties frequently face dissolutions. One such dissolution was ordered by the Constitutional Court in February 2020, under the rule of coup leader General Prayut Chan-o-cha, against the MFP’s predecessor, the Future Forward Party (FFP), following allegations that the party had received approximately 191.2 baht (approximately $5.3 million) in illegal donations; claims that were widely considered politically motivated. FFP finished third in the 2019 elections, making it a significant challenger to the junta’s proxy party, Palang Pracharat. The court banned more than a dozen FFP leaders, including its leader Thanathorn Juangroonruangkit, from politics and stripped them of their voting rights. All of them were forced to vacate their parliamentary seats. In 2020, many elected FFP lawmakers formed the MFP to succeed the party. Although the MFP contested the 2023 elections, campaigned, and won the most seats, it was barred from forming a government and dissolved by the Constitutional Court in August 2024. 10 MFP executive members were also banned from politics for ten years. MFP was succeeded by the People’s Party in August 2024.
Further, the military and pro-establishment governments have somewhat undermined independent electoral oversight. The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) oversees the administration of elections and is historically partial to the pro-establishment camp. Since 2006, ECT commissioners have been appointed by military juntas or under constitutions that maximized the power of junta proxies to control the appointment. The body proposed the dissolution of FFP and MFP, introduced electoral guidelines that restricted the ability of progressive parties to advocate for monarchy reforms, and refused to investigate suspected election law violations by Palang Pracharat. Nevertheless, its administration of elections over the years still allows opposition parties to secure significant support. A few civil society observers monitored the 2019 and 2023 elections, lending some balance to electoral oversight in Thailand. Additionally, after substantial and unexplained delays, in July 2024, the ECT endorsed 200 new senators, elected by professional and social groups across the country, to replace the junta-appointed Senate. The administration of the senatorial elections was nevertheless perceived as prone to manipulation and restrictive. The ECT, for instance, prohibited candidates from distributing leaflets, giving media interviews, and using social media to introduce themselves to the public. The ECT also shut down a civil society website intended to promote greater transparency about the candidates, www.senate67.com, accusing it of attempting to manipulate the polling process. The website was co-created by civil society organizations, including iLaw, We Watch, WeVis, and Progressive Movement, a group founded by Thanathorn Juangroonruangkit.
The regime’s systematic pressure on opposition parties has undermined their viability for future elections. Opposition parties that run on progressive platforms and call for drastic reforms of the monarchy or conservative establishment, lèse-majesté, and other social issues, face severe crackdowns, as seen with the FFP and MFP. The Shinawatras’ political vessel, PTP, abandoned its long-standing opposition to pro-military parties and allied with them instead to retain its hold on power. This frail alliance broke down, resulting in the removal of former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and a Constitutional Court ruling in September 2025 ordering the Shinawatras’ patriarch, Thaksin, to serve one year in jail in relation to an old corruption case.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the 2014 coup, civic space has significantly deteriorated. Despite the return of civilian rule in Thailand, successive governments have continued to enable the systematic repression of criticisms against the monarchy and the military, including through a media shutdown, the rise of coordinated cyberattacks on journalists, and the recent arrest and conviction of a foreign journalist. Successive administrations have also seriously and unfairly repressed protests and gatherings, resulting in a significant drop in the frequency of public demonstrations since 2020. There has also been a consistent pattern of Thai dissidents abroad disappearing and being killed, possibly linked to a transnational repression campaign.
The military and pro-establishment governments have somewhat intimidated independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or regular people, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. Although censorship of critical journalism has eased since the period of direct military rule in the country, journalists are still operating in precarious conditions. Digital surveillance is particularly pervasive: on March 25, 2025, an opposition lawmaker disclosed internal documents from a Joint Command Center (JCC) operated by police and military units. The documents revealed that JCC cyber teams had explicitly designated civil society organizations, prominent activists, opposition leaders, academics, youth figures, and other pro-democracy individuals as “high-value targets” for coordinated state-sponsored online influence operations. These revelations corroborate findings by civil society groups that Thai officials have systematically deployed digital surveillance, coordinated online harassment, and cyber-operations to discredit or intimidate critics, especially those who challenge the role of the monarchy. In 2024 alone, the JCC reportedly conducted 84,641 cyber operations – including phishing attempts, DDoS attacks, account hacking efforts, and coordinated spam – against 85 individuals, under the pretext of safeguarding national security. Among them were MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat, Progressive Movement leader Pannika Wanich, Amnesty International Thailand, and Sereepisuth Temeeyaves, leader of the historically anti-military Thai Liberal Party. Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission has acknowledged the security forces’ role in these influence operations and raised concerns about their impact on fundamental rights. In August 2025, Thailand’s National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) issued a directive requiring all mobile phone operators to incorporate biometric liveness detection – a technology that entails users uploading their photos and videos for authentication – in the SIM card registration process. In November, the Anutin administration also released a draft notification that would oblige all social media platforms accessible in the country to implement mandatory identity verification for every user account and advertiser. While the measures were introduced as part of the government’s effort to combat online scam operations, they have raised concerns of eroding digital privacy.
More overt tactics, including shutdowns, have also been used. A notable case is Voice TV, a Shinawatra-owned station historically aligned with the opposition and one of the few outlets that provided extensive coverage of the pro-democracy protests in 2020-2021. In April 2024, under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s PTP government, Voice TV announced it would suspend all broadcasting, citing media-market saturation and stating that the station had “completed its mission.” The station ceased operations on May 31, 2024. Though Voice TV publicly emphasized business factors, its closure followed a decade of state pressure. According to the local NGO iLaw, there were at least 24 documented state interventions against the station between the 2014 coup and March 2019, including orders to alter reporting and multiple temporary suspensions by regulators. After the shutdown, some former Voice TV staff joined the state broadcaster, the National Broadcasting Services of Thailand.
Thailand has one of the world’s strictest royal defamation (lèse-majesté) laws, which has been used against at least 284 individuals in 317 cases between 2020 and October 2025. In April 2025, American political scientist Paul Chambers was arrested at his residence in northern Thailand and charged with lèse-majesté and the overbroad Computer Crimes Act (CCA), which allows the regime to censor online content deemed a threat to national security. The lèse-majesté charges were dropped in May, and Chambers reportedly left the country afterwards. On May 28, 2025, prominent pro-democracy activist Arnon Nampa, who has been arbitrarily detained since September 2023, received his eighth lèse-majesté conviction and was sentenced to an additional two years and eight months in prison. As of July 2025, Arnon’s prison sentence has totaled 29 years and one month. Aside from lèse-majesté and the CCA, successive governments have also abused laws such as Section 116 of the Penal Code on sedition, the Public Assembly Act, which stipulates stringent restrictions around public assemblies and gatherings. Between July 2020 and December 2025, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights documented 1,341 prosecutions implicating 1,987 individuals instituted in connection with their participation in public assemblies and their political opinions.
The military and pro-establishment governments have somewhat intimidated and unfairly repressed protests and gatherings. Repression of peaceful protests saw its peak from 2020 until 2022, and large-scale protests have since dwindled. Between 2020 and 2022, a series of peaceful demonstrations calling for the resignation of junta leader Prayut Chan-o-cha and the abolition of strict lèse-majesté laws were met with harsh crackdowns. The largest protest, organized under the “Free Youth” banner, attracted well over 100,000 participants. With the onset of COVID-19, the regime declared a state of emergency, issuing at least 47 regulations that it used to pursue charges against nearly 1,500 protesters. At least 457 protesters faced charges under the lèse-majesté laws and the CCA. By late 2025, most protest leaders had been imprisoned, had charges pending against them, or had quit their activism altogether, fearing regime retaliation. As a result, large-scale protests targeting issues related to the military and monarchy across the country had sharply declined by 2022. Repression continued into 2025. On January 16, 2025, activist Chiratchaya “Ginny” Sakunthong received an unsuspended two-year prison sentence for livestreaming a monarchy reforms protest in 2022 based on lèse-majesté and CCA charges filed against her by a member of an ultra-royalist group. Rights monitors also reported a continuing pattern of selective arrests, surveillance, and intimidation of organizers, making sustained protest coordination increasingly difficult. Despite this, Amnesty International Thailand documented at least 48 demonstrations from April to June 2025 concerning various issues such as land rights, community housing rights, the LGBTQ+ community, and calls for the resignation of former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra.
The military and establishment-aligned governments have been implicated in transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Since the 2014 coup, multiple exiled Thai activists have gone missing in neighboring countries, with some later found dead. At least nine Thai pro-democracy activists have disappeared while exiled in neighboring countries such as Laos and Cambodia. Two of those activists, Chatchan Boonphawal and Kraidet Luelert, were found dead on the banks of the Mekong River within the Thai border in January 2019. Boonphawal and Luelert had been exiled in Vientiane, Laos, before they went missing. In June 2024, Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission linked all documented cases of disappearance to the state. Thailand also enables the transnational repression leveled by neighboring countries, in a practice often referred to as “swap mart.” On September 29, 2025, officials arrested Australian journalist Murray Hunter on criminal defamation charges over his posts that were critical of the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC). The arrest was made following a complaint filed by legal representatives of the MCMC, and Murray’s trial began in Bangkok in December 2025. Thailand also deported at least 40 members of the persecuted Uyghur community to China in early 2025, sparking serious human rights concerns.
Thailand’s repression of dissent is especially pronounced when it comes to any criticism of the monarchy, which plays a central role in the military’s ongoing interference in civilian politics. However, outside this politically sensitive area, there remains some space for dissent. Independent media outlets continue to publish critical stories about various regime policies, and Thais have broad access to the Internet and social media to express their views, provided they do not offend the monarchy’s sanctity. As of 2021, there were at least 25,000 civil society organizations operating in the country, although they have been weakened since the 2014 coup.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on various administrations. Despite the transition to the Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Anutin Charnvirakul administrations, institutions continue to operate within the institutional architecture engineered by the NCPO junta that has been entrenched by the 2017 Constitution. The institutional landscape remains fundamentally shaped by arrangements that empower the establishment to manipulate election outcomes and keep elected governments out of power, weaken political opposition, and insulate the establishment from scrutiny. The judiciary continues to play a significant role in sidelining political opposition and dissidents, while shielding establishment-aligned actors from accountability. The legislature retains structural vulnerabilities that sustain the military’s role as the ultimate power broker, including an undemocratic Senate and hurdles for political parties to form a majority in the lower house. Executive authority is weakened through constitutional provisions that enable the removal of officeholders on vague grounds of “ethics” and render those who advocate for monarchy reforms prone to being accused of sedition. De jure independent commissions are subject to political influence by way of their appointments and have demonstrably played a role in supporting the establishment’s authoritarian consolidation.
Judicial institutions have been subjected to reforms that seriously undermine their independence and operational effectiveness. Following the 2014 coup, the military junta expanded the jurisdiction of military courts, allowing them to try civilians for violations of military orders and national security offenses, including sedition and lèse-majesté. Over 1,000 cases against civilians were processed in these courts until July 2019, when the junta ordered the transfer of civilian cases to civilian courts. Although politically sensitive cases are now handled exclusively by civilian courts, these courts have continued to endorse military-backed efforts to undermine electoral competition and stifle dissent. This is particularly the case with the Constitutional Court, whose judges are appointed by the King with the approval of at least half of the Senate, which until 2024 had been entirely military-appointed and, as of 2025, comprises new senators who were not popularly elected. The Constitutional Court’s powers have continued to expand throughout the many iterations of Thailand’s constitution, and under the current 2017 Constitution, the Court, whose decisions are not subject to appeal, enjoys broad powers, including to order the cessation of any act or accusation against the monarchy, introduce organic bills (which holds the same legal status as the constitution), and remove cabinet ministers, and dissolve political parties. Constitutional judges may be removed if found to be in violation of “ethical standards”. These standards, however, are formulated with input from the Court. The Court is therefore virtually immune from scrutiny. In 2025, the legislature is also undertaking reforms to the powers and jurisdiction of military courts. One of the proposed drafts, the Military Court Reform Bill, initially aimed to curb impunity in crimes committed by military personnel against civilians by subjecting these cases to the jurisdiction of civilian courts. While the majority of parties initially supported this reform, in December 2025, Pheu Thai Party led a proposal that these powers remain within the military court system, which gained majority support.
Courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition and repress criticism against the establishment. The Constitutional Court’s dissolution of prominent opposition parties, such as the FFP and the MFP, highlights the judiciary’s failure to uphold the freedom and fairness of elections. The high rate of successful lèse-majesté prosecutions also exemplifies the judiciary’s failure to preserve free speech. The judiciary’s bias is particularly evident in the case of MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat. After the MFP won the 2023 elections, the Constitutional Court suspended him from parliament based on questionable allegations of violating the election law. It declined to assess the constitutionality of a parliamentary vote that obstructed his nomination as prime minister. Although he was cleared of all charges and reinstated in February 2024, by that time, parliament had already appointed Srettha Thavisin from the PTP as prime minister, with significant support from the junta-appointed Senate and pro-military parties. In another significant case from September 2023, the Supreme Court imposed a lifetime political ban on Pannika Wanich, an elected MFP lawmaker, due to Facebook photos she posted 13 years earlier that were deemed disrespectful to the monarchy. Severe lèse-majesté convictions, like the one imposed on Pannika Wanich, are commonplace. Between 79% and 90% of cases initiated under the law since the onset of nationwide pro-democracy protests in 2020 have resulted in guilty verdicts. The harshest lesé-majestè sentence to date totals 54 years and six months and was handed to activist Mongkol “Busbas” Thirakot for sharing 27 Facebook posts, including videos from foreign sources critical of the monarchy. This sentence was later reduced to 46 years by the Supreme Court.
Executive institutions have been subjected to reforms that seriously undermine their independence and operational effectiveness. The 2017 Constitution entrenches mechanisms that allow members of the executive branch to be easily removed if they defy the establishment. Sections 160 and 170, for example, enable the removal of cabinet ministers for breaching ill-defined “ethical standards.” Section 49 further constrains executive autonomy by designating the King not just a head of state, but also a revered entity whose position “shall not be violated” and prohibiting any action or accusation that could be construed as undermining the monarchy. This provision exposes any person, including executive officials, to allegations of attempting to overthrow the state if they defy the monarchy (Section 49). These sections operate alongside the sweeping authority of the Constitutional Court, which has played an outsized role in the removal of executive chiefs. To date, the Court has removed five prime ministers. In August 2024, the Court removed Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on the grounds that he “grossly violated ethical standards” by appointing a former lawyer who had been briefly jailed for contempt of court as a minister. In August 2025, the Court also dismissed Paetongtarn Shinawatra as prime minister for a “serious violation of ethical standards” over her leaked phone call with former Cambodian leader Hun Sen, which occurred during a time when both countries were engaged in a border dispute. Both decisions coincided with the unraveling of the PTP’s alliance with pro-establishment parties.
Legislative institutions have been subjected to reforms that seriously weaken their independence and operational effectiveness. The 2017 Constitution establishes a legislative framework that assigns a dominant role to non-elected actors. In particular, the Senate was, for five years (2019-2024), entirely appointed by the NCPO junta, which gave the military and its aligned elites decisive influence over legislation and government formation. Although the military-appointed Senate’s term expired in May 2024, and a new batch of 200 senators was installed, they were installed via an indirect election process that has been dubbed the “most complicated in the world,” where the 3,000 registered candidates, acting as representatives of different professional and social groups, vote among themselves at the district, provincial, and ultimately, national levels. The complexity and opacity of the process have been criticized as intentional, designed to make the Senate less accountable. Crucially, although senators no longer select the prime minister, they will retain the power to veto constitutional amendments and oversee appointments to key bodies, such as the Constitutional Court, National Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Election Commission. As of November 2025, the National Anti-Corruption Commission is investigating the People’s Party as well as 44 former and current lawmakers (including 29 who belong to the People’s Party) for allegedly violating the 2017 Constitution for seeking to amend Thailand’s lèse-majesté law. If found guilty, the People’s Party may face dissolution, removing the sole pro-reform representation from parliament and further subjugating the legislature to the conservative establishment.
