Democracy
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HRF classifies Taiwan as democratic.
Taiwan (Republic of China) transitioned to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule under the Kuomintang (KMT). Since the first direct presidential election in 1996, Taiwan has experienced peaceful power transfers between its two main political parties: the KMT, which generally supports closer ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which emphasizes a distinct Taiwanese identity and promotes the maintenance of the current status quo of Taiwan as an independent nation.
National elections are largely free and fair. Taiwan holds presidential and legislative elections every four years. The most recent election took place in 2024, when the DPP won the presidency for a third term but lost its majority in the legislature. The election management body is independent, both statutorily and in practice. The campaign environment is open and vibrant. Evidence of election interference by the CCP has prompted Taiwanese authorities to take action against suspected infiltrators.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Civil society is abundant. The media is diverse, albeit deeply polarized. The government rarely restricts civil liberties, with a few exceptions. An anti-infiltration law passed in 2019 has been used to investigate and prosecute thousands of individuals accused of meddling with Taiwan’s internal affairs on behalf of the CCP.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government. The judiciary is capable of upholding electoral integrity and reviewing potential government overreach. Judicial scrutiny of several controversial legislative proposals and criminal investigations into opposition politicians since 2024 have led the opposition to allege institutional bias.
National elections are largely free and fair. There have been peaceful transfers of power since 2000, with the emergence of third parties competing with the KMT and DPP, an independent Central Election Commission, recall campaigns, and broad and unrestricted access to a vibrant campaign environment.
The DPP and the KMT are the primary rivals in these elections and have been able to compete without any significant hindrances. The ruling government has switched between KMT and DDP since 2000, with two third-party contenders rising. The DPP lost its majority in the legislature in the 2024 election. The KMT was in power from 2008 to 2016, before it was unseated by the DPP. Since then, the DPP has won three presidential elections — 2016, 2020, and 2024. The 2024 general election also saw the increasing popularity of third parties such as the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), established by former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, and the New Power Party (NPP), which emerged from the 2014 Sunflower Movement, a series of student-led protests against a trade deal between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
There is independent electoral oversight. Taiwan’s elections are administered by an independent Central Election Commission. The chairperson, vice chairperson, and nine members of the CEC are appointed by the Premier with approval from the Legislative Yuan. There may not be more than one-third of the members affiliated with the same political party. The CEC has faced occasional accusations of bias from the KMT, as seen in 2025 during a large wave of recall campaigns calling for the removal of 32 legislators — 1 from the DPP, and 31 from the KMT. In April 2025, the KMT criticized what it considered to be the Central Election Commission’s selective probes into KMT-led campaigns following reports that the party used signatures of deceased voters. Recall efforts did not pass the legal threshold, and all legislators targeted kept their seats.
The campaign environment is vibrant. Election candidates, both from the ruling DPP to opposition parties such as the KMT and TPP, enjoy broad and unrestricted access to a range of campaign channels, including rallies, motorcades, banners and posters, and online platforms. However, Chinese influence operations and disinformation are a persistent concern in Taiwanese elections. These tactics are generally aimed at skewing the elections in favor of pro-China CCP-favored candidates, many of whom are from the KMT.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. There are active media platforms and civil society groups that publicly dissent freely against the government. Limitations exist due to legal and regulatory boundaries concerning foreign interference.
There are more than 135,000 civil society groups active in Taiwan, including national and sub-national associations. Taiwan also has a diverse and active media environment, with about 600 television and radio broadcasters, and hundreds of privately owned newspapers publishing in both Mandarin and English. The country consistently ranks among the top five in the world for internet freedom. However, media polarization is a significant issue. Many traditional news outlets are seen as aligned with either the ruling DPP or the opposition KMT, contributing to low public trust in mainstream media. Conservative, pro-KMT outlets are prone to Chinese influence and self-censorship. The issue of China’s interference with these outlets came to the forefront in November 2020, when Taiwan’s communications authority shut down CTi News, a TV station. The decision cited weak editorial oversight and interference from CTi’s main shareholder, a pro-China businessman with major investments in the PRC. Before its closure, CTi News had accumulated more than 920 viewer complaints for inaccurate reporting, received multiple government warnings, and paid over US$400,000 in fines for violating broadcast rules. In 2023, the Taipei High Administrative Court overturned the shutdown decision. CTi has not received a new broadcasting license since, but continues to air on its YouTube channel. Reporters Without Borders concluded that the shutdown of CTi News did not violate press freedom due to the outlet’s reception to China’s media interference.
Independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are able to dissent with minimal government interference. Restrictions on dissent are isolated. A rare example of interference with press freedom occurred in November 2024, when Taiwan Plus, a state-operated TV channel, removed and later edited a news segment that referred to U.S. President Donald Trump as a “convicted felon.” The change came after Taiwan’s Minister of Culture Li Yuan reportedly warned the broadcaster that the issue was “very serious.” The incident took place during a sensitive period of diplomatic tension between Taiwan and the United States and raised concerns about the government’s influence over public media.
CCP interference in Taiwan’s internal affairs continues to put pressure on civil liberties. Under the Anti-Infiltration Act, which was passed in 2019 under former President Tsai Ing-wen, any candidates, individuals, or entities found guilty of being influenced or bribed by foreign forces could be fined or face up to five years in prison. The law targets foreign attempts — such as illegal political donations, lobbying, and other disruptions to social order — to influence and manipulate Taiwanese elections. According to data from January 2024, prosecutors investigated 3,287 cases of election interference. At least 117 cases were implicated under the Anti-Infiltration Act in the three-month period leading up to the 2024 presidential and legislative elections. Ma Chih-wei, a former legislative candidate, was sentenced by a local court to two years and eight months’ imprisonment for receiving over NT$1 million (approximately US$30,681) from China to fund her election campaign in exchange for intelligence. Although the use of the Anti-Infiltration Act raises freedom of dissent concerns, it must be assessed within the context of the cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China, and substantial evidence of China’s interference in Taiwan’s internal affairs.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government. Taiwan’s judiciary exercises independent judicial power, while the executive and legislative branches operate without undue interference from one another. Together, the five branches of government — Judiciary, Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Examination Yuan, and Control Yuan — function through a system of checks and balances.
The judiciary has played a crucial role in protecting electoral integrity. The Constitutional Court can rule independently on the recount of an election, an election-related dispute, and interpretations of each law. In 2023, for example, the Constitutional Court set an important precedent by ruling that candidates of both national and local elections who lose by less than 0.3% of the total votes are entitled to a recount. The ruling was significant not only because Taiwan had no prior legal obligation to trigger recounts in extremely close races, but also because it marked the first time the Constitutional Court ruled directly on the substance of an election-related dispute. While courts have largely been capable of protecting the freedom of dissent, there are limits to their positive stance on civil liberties. Between 2023 and 2024, for instance, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of Taiwan’s death penalty, and its criminal defamation, slander, and insult of public officials laws. However, the Court also narrowly interpreted the scope of application of each law to attempt to minimize its potential adverse impact on the freedom of expression.
The executive and legislative branches operate independently and are operationally effective. The majority of legislative councils from the opposition can enact bills independently, while the Constitutional Court can interpret and rule to decide if it’s unconstitutional. Throughout 2024, the opposition caucus, comprising the KMT and the TPP, enacted bills that several considered to be controversial or anti-democratic. Among them is a set of amendments passed in May 2024 that sought to empower the parliament to investigate any person, including both public officials and members of the public, for contempt of parliament and penalize the act without judicial oversight. The amendments sparked mass peaceful protests, dubbed the Bluebird Movement, in Taipei due to their potential impact on limiting criticisms of parliament. In October 2024, the Constitutional Court ruled the amendments unconstitutional.
HRF classifies Taiwan as democratic.
Taiwan (Republic of China) transitioned to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule under the Kuomintang (KMT). Since the first direct presidential election in 1996, Taiwan has experienced peaceful power transfers between its two main political parties: the KMT, which generally supports closer ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which emphasizes a distinct Taiwanese identity and promotes the maintenance of the current status quo of Taiwan as an independent nation.
National elections are largely free and fair. Taiwan holds presidential and legislative elections every four years. The most recent election took place in 2024, when the DPP won the presidency for a third term but lost its majority in the legislature. The election management body is independent, both statutorily and in practice. The campaign environment is open and vibrant. Evidence of election interference by the CCP has prompted Taiwanese authorities to take action against suspected infiltrators.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Civil society is abundant. The media is diverse, albeit deeply polarized. The government rarely restricts civil liberties, with a few exceptions. An anti-infiltration law passed in 2019 has been used to investigate and prosecute thousands of individuals accused of meddling with Taiwan’s internal affairs on behalf of the CCP.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government. The judiciary is capable of upholding electoral integrity and reviewing potential government overreach. Judicial scrutiny of several controversial legislative proposals and criminal investigations into opposition politicians since 2024 have led the opposition to allege institutional bias.
National elections are largely free and fair. There have been peaceful transfers of power since 2000, with the emergence of third parties competing with the KMT and DPP, an independent Central Election Commission, recall campaigns, and broad and unrestricted access to a vibrant campaign environment.
The DPP and the KMT are the primary rivals in these elections and have been able to compete without any significant hindrances. The ruling government has switched between KMT and DDP since 2000, with two third-party contenders rising. The DPP lost its majority in the legislature in the 2024 election. The KMT was in power from 2008 to 2016, before it was unseated by the DPP. Since then, the DPP has won three presidential elections — 2016, 2020, and 2024. The 2024 general election also saw the increasing popularity of third parties such as the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), established by former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, and the New Power Party (NPP), which emerged from the 2014 Sunflower Movement, a series of student-led protests against a trade deal between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
There is independent electoral oversight. Taiwan’s elections are administered by an independent Central Election Commission. The chairperson, vice chairperson, and nine members of the CEC are appointed by the Premier with approval from the Legislative Yuan. There may not be more than one-third of the members affiliated with the same political party. The CEC has faced occasional accusations of bias from the KMT, as seen in 2025 during a large wave of recall campaigns calling for the removal of 32 legislators — 1 from the DPP, and 31 from the KMT. In April 2025, the KMT criticized what it considered to be the Central Election Commission’s selective probes into KMT-led campaigns following reports that the party used signatures of deceased voters. Recall efforts did not pass the legal threshold, and all legislators targeted kept their seats.
The campaign environment is vibrant. Election candidates, both from the ruling DPP to opposition parties such as the KMT and TPP, enjoy broad and unrestricted access to a range of campaign channels, including rallies, motorcades, banners and posters, and online platforms. However, Chinese influence operations and disinformation are a persistent concern in Taiwanese elections. These tactics are generally aimed at skewing the elections in favor of pro-China CCP-favored candidates, many of whom are from the KMT.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. There are active media platforms and civil society groups that publicly dissent freely against the government. Limitations exist due to legal and regulatory boundaries concerning foreign interference.
There are more than 135,000 civil society groups active in Taiwan, including national and sub-national associations. Taiwan also has a diverse and active media environment, with about 600 television and radio broadcasters, and hundreds of privately owned newspapers publishing in both Mandarin and English. The country consistently ranks among the top five in the world for internet freedom. However, media polarization is a significant issue. Many traditional news outlets are seen as aligned with either the ruling DPP or the opposition KMT, contributing to low public trust in mainstream media. Conservative, pro-KMT outlets are prone to Chinese influence and self-censorship. The issue of China’s interference with these outlets came to the forefront in November 2020, when Taiwan’s communications authority shut down CTi News, a TV station. The decision cited weak editorial oversight and interference from CTi’s main shareholder, a pro-China businessman with major investments in the PRC. Before its closure, CTi News had accumulated more than 920 viewer complaints for inaccurate reporting, received multiple government warnings, and paid over US$400,000 in fines for violating broadcast rules. In 2023, the Taipei High Administrative Court overturned the shutdown decision. CTi has not received a new broadcasting license since, but continues to air on its YouTube channel. Reporters Without Borders concluded that the shutdown of CTi News did not violate press freedom due to the outlet’s reception to China’s media interference.
Independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are able to dissent with minimal government interference. Restrictions on dissent are isolated. A rare example of interference with press freedom occurred in November 2024, when Taiwan Plus, a state-operated TV channel, removed and later edited a news segment that referred to U.S. President Donald Trump as a “convicted felon.” The change came after Taiwan’s Minister of Culture Li Yuan reportedly warned the broadcaster that the issue was “very serious.” The incident took place during a sensitive period of diplomatic tension between Taiwan and the United States and raised concerns about the government’s influence over public media.
CCP interference in Taiwan’s internal affairs continues to put pressure on civil liberties. Under the Anti-Infiltration Act, which was passed in 2019 under former President Tsai Ing-wen, any candidates, individuals, or entities found guilty of being influenced or bribed by foreign forces could be fined or face up to five years in prison. The law targets foreign attempts — such as illegal political donations, lobbying, and other disruptions to social order — to influence and manipulate Taiwanese elections. According to data from January 2024, prosecutors investigated 3,287 cases of election interference. At least 117 cases were implicated under the Anti-Infiltration Act in the three-month period leading up to the 2024 presidential and legislative elections. Ma Chih-wei, a former legislative candidate, was sentenced by a local court to two years and eight months’ imprisonment for receiving over NT$1 million (approximately US$30,681) from China to fund her election campaign in exchange for intelligence. Although the use of the Anti-Infiltration Act raises freedom of dissent concerns, it must be assessed within the context of the cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China, and substantial evidence of China’s interference in Taiwan’s internal affairs.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government. Taiwan’s judiciary exercises independent judicial power, while the executive and legislative branches operate without undue interference from one another. Together, the five branches of government — Judiciary, Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Examination Yuan, and Control Yuan — function through a system of checks and balances.
The judiciary has played a crucial role in protecting electoral integrity. The Constitutional Court can rule independently on the recount of an election, an election-related dispute, and interpretations of each law. In 2023, for example, the Constitutional Court set an important precedent by ruling that candidates of both national and local elections who lose by less than 0.3% of the total votes are entitled to a recount. The ruling was significant not only because Taiwan had no prior legal obligation to trigger recounts in extremely close races, but also because it marked the first time the Constitutional Court ruled directly on the substance of an election-related dispute. While courts have largely been capable of protecting the freedom of dissent, there are limits to their positive stance on civil liberties. Between 2023 and 2024, for instance, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of Taiwan’s death penalty, and its criminal defamation, slander, and insult of public officials laws. However, the Court also narrowly interpreted the scope of application of each law to attempt to minimize its potential adverse impact on the freedom of expression.
The executive and legislative branches operate independently and are operationally effective. The majority of legislative councils from the opposition can enact bills independently, while the Constitutional Court can interpret and rule to decide if it’s unconstitutional. Throughout 2024, the opposition caucus, comprising the KMT and the TPP, enacted bills that several considered to be controversial or anti-democratic. Among them is a set of amendments passed in May 2024 that sought to empower the parliament to investigate any person, including both public officials and members of the public, for contempt of parliament and penalize the act without judicial oversight. The amendments sparked mass peaceful protests, dubbed the Bluebird Movement, in Taipei due to their potential impact on limiting criticisms of parliament. In October 2024, the Constitutional Court ruled the amendments unconstitutional.
