Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) controlled territories of Sudan as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
Sudan plunged into a conflict in April 2023 after a power struggle broke out between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful organized armed group (OAG). Following the 2019 ousting of long-serving President Omar al-Bashir, who came to power in a coup in 1989, the SAF capitalized on street protests calling for an end to his near three-decade authoritarian rule and mounted a coup against him. In October 2021, a joint military-civilian government was established with the aim of facilitating elections, but it was overthrown in another coup in the same month. The 2021 coup was staged by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the SAF and in effect the country’s president, and his previous deputy, RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti.” However, due to disagreements on incorporating the RSF’s 100,000 members into the formal military, confrontations between the two sides started in April 2023. The SAF controls Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, and the country’s north and east, including Port Sudan, which served as the de facto capital, while the RSF holds sway over most of western Sudan, particularly the Darfur and Kordofan regions. A separate rebel group, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N), controls parts of the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan. More than 150,000 people have died in the conflict across the country, and about 12 to 14 million have been forcibly displaced.
National-level elections are absent in SAF areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Since the conflict began in April 2023, the SAF has solidified its political authority by systematically dissolving or neutralizing all civilian mechanisms that could challenge its authority. The SAF ensures that its areas of control function purely as a military administration governed by wartime mandates.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. By targeting dissidents through arbitrary detention, censorship, administrative closures and extrajudicial killings, the SAF intentionally deposes the organized opposition capable of mobilizing collective action or proposing a viable alternative governance model, and ensures self-censorship and political demobilization, thereby transforming the territory into a political vacuum where the military’s authority is absolute and uncontested.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The power of the SAF, derived from force rather than constitutional mandate, places it above the rule of law. Institutions that once provided a degree of scrutiny, such as the judiciary, the central bank, and various government ministries, are now either staffed by military appointees or operate under explicit military directives. Consequently, any accountability mechanism—whether legislative oversight, judicial review of military orders, or even independent financial audit—is structurally nullified.
National-level elections are absent in SAF areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Sudan’s electoral history is deeply marred by long periods of authoritarian rule, most recently under former President Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in 1989. Throughout his nearly three-decade rule, democratic elections were largely a sham; polls were often boycotted by opposition parties, marred by widespread irregularities, and primarily served to legitimize his military-backed regime, which systematically suppressed political freedoms, curtailed civil society, and consolidated power through patronage and force. Following his overthrow in 2019, all executive powers were transferred to the Transitional Military Council (TMC), and the country entered a fragile political transition aimed at restoring civilian rule. In 2019, the TMC transferred its powers to the Sovereignty Council of Sudan (SCS), a joint military-civilian ruling body tasked with eventually holding free and fair elections, the process that was derailed by the subsequent 2021 military coup and ultimately collapsed with the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023.
The governing authority systematically and unfairly bars mainstream opposition groups from competing in elections. Key opposition blocks and pro-democracy coalitions, such as the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which was the political partner in the failed civilian transition following the ousting of President Bashir, remain functionally suppressed. The FCC, originally composed of over 40 parties, represented a broad alliance of political parties, armed groups, and professional associations, including the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and the Resistance Committees (RCs). The SAF neutralized their leaders through detention, house arrest, and by politically sidelining them from any governing structure, ensuring they cannot organize a national electoral platform. On October 25, 2021, the SAF arrested former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other senior SCS figures in a coup d’état, most of whom were nominated by the FFC to lead the civilian transitional government. While they were released a month later, and Hamdok was reinstated as prime minister as part of an agreement with the SAF, he resigned in January 2022 amid mass public protests against a power-sharing agreement between the SCS and the SAF.
By 2025, any semblance of a functional electoral process or independent political life was entirely suspended in SAF-controlled territories. While the SAF has not formally dissolved the transitional government structures, the reality is that the control centers operate under military command, meaning all political parties have either ceased activity entirely or operate under extreme duress, leaving them unable to mediate between the SAF and RSF. The environment is defined by military rule where the actions of armed groups override any semblance of a functional legal or constitutional order; thus, the focus is on military logistics and conflict management, rendering the possibility of political debate, campaigning, or holding free and fair elections completely non-operational.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge governing authority. While many civilian leaders, including former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who led the SCS from 2019 to 2021, fled the country after the 2021 coup, those who remained and attempted to maintain any political platform opposing the military’s absolute control have been placed under house arrest, strict surveillance, or forced into political silence by the SAF security apparatus. By seizing control of state broadcasting infrastructure and censoring or shutting down critical outlets, the SAF has actively sought to eliminate alternative sources of information and shape public perception. Civil society and humanitarian actors are obstructed through bureaucratic hurdles, detentions, and expulsions, effectively neutralizing grassroots aid networks and undermining international assistance amidst ongoing unrest and rising humanitarian needs. The SAF has also routinely suppressed the political mobilization of society, particularly among pro-democracy groups, by using excessive force and carrying out mass arrests.
The governing authority unfairly shuts down or takes measures that lead to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. Immediately following its consolidation of power, the SAF seized control of the state-run Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation (SNBC) infrastructure in Khartoum, shutting down all non-military programming and repurposing the entity entirely for military communication. This systematic targeting soon extended to independent publications and broadcasters. In August 2024, SAF agents from the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) confiscated four prominent independent newspapers—Al-Ayam, Al-Jareeda, Al-Tayyar, and Al-Youm al-Tali—and ordered the closure of the private Omdurman TV. These actions often followed coverage critical of the governing authority, such as reports on opposition calls for a nationwide strike against fuel subsidy cuts. Regional channels, including Al Arabiya, Al Hadath, and Sky News Arabia, faced office closures and suspended broadcasting in April 2024 by the governing authority. More recently, in February 2025, the Saudi-owned Al Sharq news channel was suspended for over a month, specifically for including a comment from an RSF spokesperson, unequivocally demonstrating the military’s strict demand that all coverage, local or international, aligns exclusively with the SAF’s narrative.
The governing authority seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. In SAF-controlled areas, members of political grassroots protest organizations, like the RCs, Sudan’s largest pro-democracy protest group, have been actively targeted for detention, surveillance, and disappearance. The RCs were the primary engine of the civilian protest movement that led to the downfall of Al-Bashir and demanded full civilian rule afterward. In June 2025, Bahaa El-Din Suleiman, a member of the RCs and a volunteer at Al-Tamayoz Hospital, was arrested in Khartoum as part of a systematic repression policy targeting pro-democracy activists. In June 2023, three RC members, Muzamil Mohamed Osman, Suleiman Ahmed Khalid, and Alshareef Hussein, were arrested after they advocated for a ceasefire, calling upon SAF and RSF to agree to halt the conflict and stop the armed conflict. They were arrested by SAF Military Intelligence (SMI) officers and detained at the SAF detention center in Manawi town, where they were allegedly subjected to torture.
The SAF deliberately targets journalists through a coordinated, multi-faceted approach that includes physical violence, legal intimidation, and institutional control. In July 2025, independent journalists Nasr Yaqoub and Mohamed Ahmed Nazar were arbitrarily detained by members of the Sudan Liberation Movement – Transitional Council (SLM-TC), an organized armed group affiliated with the SAF. The arrest took place after Yaqoub publicly claimed that an SLM-TC fighter shot him the week before, after he refused to surrender his Starlink satellite-internet device. Nazar was arrested because he circulated Yaqoub’s claim on social media. In April 2024, Emtithal Abdel Fadil, a reporter for the independent Al-Jareedda newspaper, was arbitrarily detained for three days in the eastern city of Kassala. The SAF blindfolded her during her arrest, searched her phone and social media accounts, and questioned her for three days before releasing her without charge on the condition that she did not violate a non-judicial travel ban order. In November 2021, journalist Ali Farsab sustained a head injury after SAF agents opened fire at protesters, and was arbitrarily detained and beaten by over 30 agents and subsequently dragged down the street, before his personal belongings were confiscated. During the protest movement between October 2021 and March 2022, at least 55 attacks against journalists were reported.
Civil society groups (CSOs) are subject to bureaucratic obstruction and targeted elimination. The SAF’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) creates deliberate, complex administrative hurdles to hinder aid delivery. This is designed to exert control over external CSO operations and has included attempts by the HAC to co-opt and control the Emergency Relief Rooms (ERRs), a vital grassroots network supplying essential aid and services. SAF intelligence services and SAF-aligned OAGs have harassed, detained, and even killed ERR activists. The ERRs are fundamentally the transformed and humanitarian successors of the RCs. Prior to the conflict, the RCs were the primary political vanguard of the pro-democracy movement, using their decentralized neighborhood structures to organize mass protests, strikes, and political mobilization. In July 2025, RC member and humanitarian activist Bakri Abd Allah Abker died after he was arbitrarily detained and tortured by SAF agents at an unofficial detention site east of Khartoum. In June 2025, SAF agents in Khartoum detained Bahaa El-Din Suleiman, a prominent member of the Third Degree Extension RC and a volunteer at Al-Tamayoz Hospital. This pattern continued two months later in August 2025 in Port Sudan, where Barir Al-Toum, a volunteer dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance to displaced communities through the Red Sea ERR, was also taken into custody.
The SAF has also been repeatedly implicated in detaining, interfering with, and expelling international aid workers and restricting humanitarian access. For instance, in October 2025, the SAF expelled the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) Country Director, Laurent Bukera, and Head of Operations, Samantha Katraj, from Sudan on unspecified accusations of neutrality violations and administrative breaches.
The governing authority seriously and unfairly censors dissenting speech. Censorship is widespread across Sudan; journalists and reporters who criticize the SAF’s conduct or investigate alleged abuses are particularly vulnerable in SAF-controlled areas. They face security intimidation and detention on false charges of undermining national security or spreading false information. In January 2024, SAF issued orders prohibiting the publication of any information that allegedly disparages the prestige of the state, or its members and bodies, including the military. Punishments for violating this order include fines of up to three million pounds ($4,970) and prison terms of up to five years. In May 2024, the SAF arrested freelance journalist Siddiq Dalay over a social media post related to his relative, the head of a local branch of the Sudanese Congress Party, who died from injuries allegedly inflicted during his detention by the SAF. In July 2024, NISS agents arrested Omar Mohamed Omar after he criticized the governor of North Kordofan on his personal Facebook page for the lack of services and the worsening water crisis.
The SAF seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. To suppress protests, the SAF regularly deploys the Central Reserve Police, locally known as Abu Tira. These units have been accused of serious human rights violations due to their use of excessive violence against protesters. By May 2023, these units were responsible for over 100 civilian targeting events involving the group since 2019, resulting in more than 50 civilian fatalities. Between September 2021 and October 2022, over 1,600 pro-democracy campaigners were arrested, 117 protesters were killed, and an estimated 7,700 protesters, including thousands of children, were seriously injured. Documented cases of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including rape, primarily targeting female protesters, have also been widely reported across Sudan, particularly during the pro-democracy movement, which started in October 2021 and continued for approximately 18 months. For instance, between October 2021 and December 2021, when protests were still active, at least 13 women had reported being raped by regime agents in Khartoum alone, according to the United Nations.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The judicial system has been severely compromised since the April 2023 civil war erupted. While the Supreme Court of Sudan remains the de jure highest judicial authority, the physical destruction, insecurity, and political dominance by military factions have led to the de facto suspension of all judicial proceedings across the country. Politically sensitive cases, like those of pro-democracy protestors, are directed to SAF-controlled military courts. Parliament is non-functional, as it was dissolved after the 2019 coup. This environment has effectively nullified the capacity of both the legislative and judicial branches to operate independently or consistently provide accountability, ensuring that power remains centralized and unconstrained within the military-backed apparatus.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to governing authority interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, frequently face governing authority retaliation. Even prior to the 2023 conflict, the judiciary was not insulated from executive influence, as evidenced by the 2021 politically-motivated removal of Sudan’s first-ever woman chief justice, Neimat Abdallah Mohamed Khair. Khair symbolized the civilian bloc’s commitment to accountability and the rule of law, making her a potential obstacle to any future military seizure of power. The judicial overhauls that included her removal were part of a larger series of major changes that also saw Attorney General Taj Al Sir Al Hibir resign in protest.
The governing authority directs certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, SAF-controlled courts, such as military courts or tribunals. Following the October 2021 coup, dozens of pro-democracy activists, particularly leaders and members of the Khartoum Resistance Committees, were arrested during mass protests. Instead of being charged under civilian law, many were held in security detention and had their cases transferred to military or emergency courts under false charges such as “undermining the constitutional order” or “incitement against the armed forces.”
The parliament is non-functional, having been dissolved after the 2019 coup. Although a Transitional Legislative Council (TLC) was planned as an interim legislature, it never materialized due to chronic political disputes and the subsequent military coup in 2021. Consequently, legislative authority is now unilaterally concentrated in the military-backed executive, the Transitional Legislative Authority, which is composed of members from the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the Cabinet.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly failed to hold governing authority officials accountable. Despite clear evidence of abuses and killings during the 2021-2022 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters, the SAF has demonstrated a complete refusal to hold any of its officials or security personnel accountable for these crimes. Instead of allowing independent investigations or prosecutions, the SAF established military-led investigative committees that invariably found no one culpable and ignored calls for justice from civilian groups, regional bodies, and the international community. The SAF extends impunity for all conflict-related violations and abuses, even when clear footage of these crimes is made public. For instance, on October 18, 2023, video footage evidenced SAF field executions of three blindfolded detainees, possibly children under the age of 18, in Omdurman, northwest of the capital city, Khartoum. At least one of the perpetrators was in full uniform of the Central Reserve Police. While SAF-affiliated authorities announced national investigations into RSF abuses, they made no mention of investigating crimes committed by their own forces.
HRF classifies the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) controlled territories of Sudan as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
Sudan plunged into a conflict in April 2023 after a power struggle broke out between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful organized armed group (OAG). Following the 2019 ousting of long-serving President Omar al-Bashir, who came to power in a coup in 1989, the SAF capitalized on street protests calling for an end to his near three-decade authoritarian rule and mounted a coup against him. In October 2021, a joint military-civilian government was established with the aim of facilitating elections, but it was overthrown in another coup in the same month. The 2021 coup was staged by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the SAF and in effect the country’s president, and his previous deputy, RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti.” However, due to disagreements on incorporating the RSF’s 100,000 members into the formal military, confrontations between the two sides started in April 2023. The SAF controls Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, and the country’s north and east, including Port Sudan, which served as the de facto capital, while the RSF holds sway over most of western Sudan, particularly the Darfur and Kordofan regions. A separate rebel group, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N), controls parts of the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan. More than 150,000 people have died in the conflict across the country, and about 12 to 14 million have been forcibly displaced.
National-level elections are absent in SAF areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Since the conflict began in April 2023, the SAF has solidified its political authority by systematically dissolving or neutralizing all civilian mechanisms that could challenge its authority. The SAF ensures that its areas of control function purely as a military administration governed by wartime mandates.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. By targeting dissidents through arbitrary detention, censorship, administrative closures and extrajudicial killings, the SAF intentionally deposes the organized opposition capable of mobilizing collective action or proposing a viable alternative governance model, and ensures self-censorship and political demobilization, thereby transforming the territory into a political vacuum where the military’s authority is absolute and uncontested.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The power of the SAF, derived from force rather than constitutional mandate, places it above the rule of law. Institutions that once provided a degree of scrutiny, such as the judiciary, the central bank, and various government ministries, are now either staffed by military appointees or operate under explicit military directives. Consequently, any accountability mechanism—whether legislative oversight, judicial review of military orders, or even independent financial audit—is structurally nullified.
National-level elections are absent in SAF areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Sudan’s electoral history is deeply marred by long periods of authoritarian rule, most recently under former President Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in 1989. Throughout his nearly three-decade rule, democratic elections were largely a sham; polls were often boycotted by opposition parties, marred by widespread irregularities, and primarily served to legitimize his military-backed regime, which systematically suppressed political freedoms, curtailed civil society, and consolidated power through patronage and force. Following his overthrow in 2019, all executive powers were transferred to the Transitional Military Council (TMC), and the country entered a fragile political transition aimed at restoring civilian rule. In 2019, the TMC transferred its powers to the Sovereignty Council of Sudan (SCS), a joint military-civilian ruling body tasked with eventually holding free and fair elections, the process that was derailed by the subsequent 2021 military coup and ultimately collapsed with the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023.
The governing authority systematically and unfairly bars mainstream opposition groups from competing in elections. Key opposition blocks and pro-democracy coalitions, such as the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which was the political partner in the failed civilian transition following the ousting of President Bashir, remain functionally suppressed. The FCC, originally composed of over 40 parties, represented a broad alliance of political parties, armed groups, and professional associations, including the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and the Resistance Committees (RCs). The SAF neutralized their leaders through detention, house arrest, and by politically sidelining them from any governing structure, ensuring they cannot organize a national electoral platform. On October 25, 2021, the SAF arrested former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other senior SCS figures in a coup d’état, most of whom were nominated by the FFC to lead the civilian transitional government. While they were released a month later, and Hamdok was reinstated as prime minister as part of an agreement with the SAF, he resigned in January 2022 amid mass public protests against a power-sharing agreement between the SCS and the SAF.
By 2025, any semblance of a functional electoral process or independent political life was entirely suspended in SAF-controlled territories. While the SAF has not formally dissolved the transitional government structures, the reality is that the control centers operate under military command, meaning all political parties have either ceased activity entirely or operate under extreme duress, leaving them unable to mediate between the SAF and RSF. The environment is defined by military rule where the actions of armed groups override any semblance of a functional legal or constitutional order; thus, the focus is on military logistics and conflict management, rendering the possibility of political debate, campaigning, or holding free and fair elections completely non-operational.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge governing authority. While many civilian leaders, including former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who led the SCS from 2019 to 2021, fled the country after the 2021 coup, those who remained and attempted to maintain any political platform opposing the military’s absolute control have been placed under house arrest, strict surveillance, or forced into political silence by the SAF security apparatus. By seizing control of state broadcasting infrastructure and censoring or shutting down critical outlets, the SAF has actively sought to eliminate alternative sources of information and shape public perception. Civil society and humanitarian actors are obstructed through bureaucratic hurdles, detentions, and expulsions, effectively neutralizing grassroots aid networks and undermining international assistance amidst ongoing unrest and rising humanitarian needs. The SAF has also routinely suppressed the political mobilization of society, particularly among pro-democracy groups, by using excessive force and carrying out mass arrests.
The governing authority unfairly shuts down or takes measures that lead to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. Immediately following its consolidation of power, the SAF seized control of the state-run Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation (SNBC) infrastructure in Khartoum, shutting down all non-military programming and repurposing the entity entirely for military communication. This systematic targeting soon extended to independent publications and broadcasters. In August 2024, SAF agents from the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) confiscated four prominent independent newspapers—Al-Ayam, Al-Jareeda, Al-Tayyar, and Al-Youm al-Tali—and ordered the closure of the private Omdurman TV. These actions often followed coverage critical of the governing authority, such as reports on opposition calls for a nationwide strike against fuel subsidy cuts. Regional channels, including Al Arabiya, Al Hadath, and Sky News Arabia, faced office closures and suspended broadcasting in April 2024 by the governing authority. More recently, in February 2025, the Saudi-owned Al Sharq news channel was suspended for over a month, specifically for including a comment from an RSF spokesperson, unequivocally demonstrating the military’s strict demand that all coverage, local or international, aligns exclusively with the SAF’s narrative.
The governing authority seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. In SAF-controlled areas, members of political grassroots protest organizations, like the RCs, Sudan’s largest pro-democracy protest group, have been actively targeted for detention, surveillance, and disappearance. The RCs were the primary engine of the civilian protest movement that led to the downfall of Al-Bashir and demanded full civilian rule afterward. In June 2025, Bahaa El-Din Suleiman, a member of the RCs and a volunteer at Al-Tamayoz Hospital, was arrested in Khartoum as part of a systematic repression policy targeting pro-democracy activists. In June 2023, three RC members, Muzamil Mohamed Osman, Suleiman Ahmed Khalid, and Alshareef Hussein, were arrested after they advocated for a ceasefire, calling upon SAF and RSF to agree to halt the conflict and stop the armed conflict. They were arrested by SAF Military Intelligence (SMI) officers and detained at the SAF detention center in Manawi town, where they were allegedly subjected to torture.
The SAF deliberately targets journalists through a coordinated, multi-faceted approach that includes physical violence, legal intimidation, and institutional control. In July 2025, independent journalists Nasr Yaqoub and Mohamed Ahmed Nazar were arbitrarily detained by members of the Sudan Liberation Movement – Transitional Council (SLM-TC), an organized armed group affiliated with the SAF. The arrest took place after Yaqoub publicly claimed that an SLM-TC fighter shot him the week before, after he refused to surrender his Starlink satellite-internet device. Nazar was arrested because he circulated Yaqoub’s claim on social media. In April 2024, Emtithal Abdel Fadil, a reporter for the independent Al-Jareedda newspaper, was arbitrarily detained for three days in the eastern city of Kassala. The SAF blindfolded her during her arrest, searched her phone and social media accounts, and questioned her for three days before releasing her without charge on the condition that she did not violate a non-judicial travel ban order. In November 2021, journalist Ali Farsab sustained a head injury after SAF agents opened fire at protesters, and was arbitrarily detained and beaten by over 30 agents and subsequently dragged down the street, before his personal belongings were confiscated. During the protest movement between October 2021 and March 2022, at least 55 attacks against journalists were reported.
Civil society groups (CSOs) are subject to bureaucratic obstruction and targeted elimination. The SAF’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) creates deliberate, complex administrative hurdles to hinder aid delivery. This is designed to exert control over external CSO operations and has included attempts by the HAC to co-opt and control the Emergency Relief Rooms (ERRs), a vital grassroots network supplying essential aid and services. SAF intelligence services and SAF-aligned OAGs have harassed, detained, and even killed ERR activists. The ERRs are fundamentally the transformed and humanitarian successors of the RCs. Prior to the conflict, the RCs were the primary political vanguard of the pro-democracy movement, using their decentralized neighborhood structures to organize mass protests, strikes, and political mobilization. In July 2025, RC member and humanitarian activist Bakri Abd Allah Abker died after he was arbitrarily detained and tortured by SAF agents at an unofficial detention site east of Khartoum. In June 2025, SAF agents in Khartoum detained Bahaa El-Din Suleiman, a prominent member of the Third Degree Extension RC and a volunteer at Al-Tamayoz Hospital. This pattern continued two months later in August 2025 in Port Sudan, where Barir Al-Toum, a volunteer dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance to displaced communities through the Red Sea ERR, was also taken into custody.
The SAF has also been repeatedly implicated in detaining, interfering with, and expelling international aid workers and restricting humanitarian access. For instance, in October 2025, the SAF expelled the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) Country Director, Laurent Bukera, and Head of Operations, Samantha Katraj, from Sudan on unspecified accusations of neutrality violations and administrative breaches.
The governing authority seriously and unfairly censors dissenting speech. Censorship is widespread across Sudan; journalists and reporters who criticize the SAF’s conduct or investigate alleged abuses are particularly vulnerable in SAF-controlled areas. They face security intimidation and detention on false charges of undermining national security or spreading false information. In January 2024, SAF issued orders prohibiting the publication of any information that allegedly disparages the prestige of the state, or its members and bodies, including the military. Punishments for violating this order include fines of up to three million pounds ($4,970) and prison terms of up to five years. In May 2024, the SAF arrested freelance journalist Siddiq Dalay over a social media post related to his relative, the head of a local branch of the Sudanese Congress Party, who died from injuries allegedly inflicted during his detention by the SAF. In July 2024, NISS agents arrested Omar Mohamed Omar after he criticized the governor of North Kordofan on his personal Facebook page for the lack of services and the worsening water crisis.
The SAF seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. To suppress protests, the SAF regularly deploys the Central Reserve Police, locally known as Abu Tira. These units have been accused of serious human rights violations due to their use of excessive violence against protesters. By May 2023, these units were responsible for over 100 civilian targeting events involving the group since 2019, resulting in more than 50 civilian fatalities. Between September 2021 and October 2022, over 1,600 pro-democracy campaigners were arrested, 117 protesters were killed, and an estimated 7,700 protesters, including thousands of children, were seriously injured. Documented cases of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including rape, primarily targeting female protesters, have also been widely reported across Sudan, particularly during the pro-democracy movement, which started in October 2021 and continued for approximately 18 months. For instance, between October 2021 and December 2021, when protests were still active, at least 13 women had reported being raped by regime agents in Khartoum alone, according to the United Nations.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The judicial system has been severely compromised since the April 2023 civil war erupted. While the Supreme Court of Sudan remains the de jure highest judicial authority, the physical destruction, insecurity, and political dominance by military factions have led to the de facto suspension of all judicial proceedings across the country. Politically sensitive cases, like those of pro-democracy protestors, are directed to SAF-controlled military courts. Parliament is non-functional, as it was dissolved after the 2019 coup. This environment has effectively nullified the capacity of both the legislative and judicial branches to operate independently or consistently provide accountability, ensuring that power remains centralized and unconstrained within the military-backed apparatus.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to governing authority interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, frequently face governing authority retaliation. Even prior to the 2023 conflict, the judiciary was not insulated from executive influence, as evidenced by the 2021 politically-motivated removal of Sudan’s first-ever woman chief justice, Neimat Abdallah Mohamed Khair. Khair symbolized the civilian bloc’s commitment to accountability and the rule of law, making her a potential obstacle to any future military seizure of power. The judicial overhauls that included her removal were part of a larger series of major changes that also saw Attorney General Taj Al Sir Al Hibir resign in protest.
The governing authority directs certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, SAF-controlled courts, such as military courts or tribunals. Following the October 2021 coup, dozens of pro-democracy activists, particularly leaders and members of the Khartoum Resistance Committees, were arrested during mass protests. Instead of being charged under civilian law, many were held in security detention and had their cases transferred to military or emergency courts under false charges such as “undermining the constitutional order” or “incitement against the armed forces.”
The parliament is non-functional, having been dissolved after the 2019 coup. Although a Transitional Legislative Council (TLC) was planned as an interim legislature, it never materialized due to chronic political disputes and the subsequent military coup in 2021. Consequently, legislative authority is now unilaterally concentrated in the military-backed executive, the Transitional Legislative Authority, which is composed of members from the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the Cabinet.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly failed to hold governing authority officials accountable. Despite clear evidence of abuses and killings during the 2021-2022 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters, the SAF has demonstrated a complete refusal to hold any of its officials or security personnel accountable for these crimes. Instead of allowing independent investigations or prosecutions, the SAF established military-led investigative committees that invariably found no one culpable and ignored calls for justice from civilian groups, regional bodies, and the international community. The SAF extends impunity for all conflict-related violations and abuses, even when clear footage of these crimes is made public. For instance, on October 18, 2023, video footage evidenced SAF field executions of three blindfolded detainees, possibly children under the age of 18, in Omdurman, northwest of the capital city, Khartoum. At least one of the perpetrators was in full uniform of the Central Reserve Police. While SAF-affiliated authorities announced national investigations into RSF abuses, they made no mention of investigating crimes committed by their own forces.
