Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
In late 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) completed a full administrative and territorial takeover of Southern Yemen – effectively ending the IRG’s administrative presence in Yemen’s southern governorates. Given the recency of this shift, the methodological implications of the STC’s move have not yet been fully analyzed or integrated into current formal reporting. This summary should be viewed as an assessment of the IRG’s status up until this volatile transition period.
HRF classifies Yemen – PLC-controlled territory as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
Since the Arab Spring in 2011, Yemen has been embroiled in a prolonged and complex conflict that began with a popular uprising against long-standing authoritarian president Ali Abdullah Saleh. By early 2012, the conflict led to Saleh’s abdication and the subsequent transfer of power to his vice president, Abdrabbu Mansur Hadi. Hadi’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG), made up largely of Sunnis, continued to receive backing from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, the IRG appeared to exclude the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, a Zaidi Shia Muslim separatist group originating from Saada in northern Yemen that remained critical of the IRG. The conflict intensified in 2014, driven by political grievances between the IRG, based in Aden, and the Houthi movement, based in Sanaa. The Houthis, who had a history of clashing with Yemeni authorities dating back to the early 2000s, sought to expand their control and overthrow the IRG. The conflict has had devastating human costs: the United Nations estimates that 233,000 people have died since 2014, including deaths directly caused by violence and indirectly by famine, disease, and the collapse of healthcare services. In March 2022, the Saudi-led GCC coalition forced Hadi to transfer authority to an unelected GCC-appointed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) led by Rashad al-Alimi. This move aimed to unite various anti-Houthi factions and strengthen their opposition to the Houthi insurgency. However, efforts to broker peace through a subsequent UN-mediated truce beginning in April 2022 failed to produce a lasting peace, leaving the country in a fragile state of suspended conflict. By December 2025, Yemen’s territorial divide grew more pronounced following a significant expansion by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) across the southern governorates. While the Houthis remained entrenched in Sanaa and the northern highlands, the STC moved to consolidate its grip on Aden and the southern coast, effectively challenging the IRG/PLC’s grip on power. Meanwhile, the persistent presence of groups like ISIS and AQAP in isolated pockets continues to complicate the security environment, leaving Yemen with an increasingly fractured and multi-polar political landscape.
National-level elections are absent in areas under IRG/PLC control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. With the exception of a national referendum that saw Hadi run unopposed in 2012, presidential and legislative elections have been delayed by repeated cycles of conflict and violence and a lack of regular political activity. The PLC has faced significant challenges and criticisms, including internal fragmentation and rivalries among its members, who often command their own organized armed groups (OAGs) with differing agendas. This has led to a lack of a cohesive political strategy, undermining the council’s ability to govern effectively or facilitate elections. The council’s ability to assert its authority has also been questioned, as some of its members, particularly from the STC, control more powerful forces than the IRG/PLC chairman.
Independent media, political figures, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens suffer overt and systematic reprisal if they openly criticize or question the IRG/PLC. Independent journalists are at high risk in IRG/PLC-controlled areas. They are subjected to threats, intimidation, and physical attacks. In some cases, authorities have confiscated their equipment and shut down media outlets. The government’s control over state-run media and its restrictions on independent outlets severely limit the public’s access to diverse and critical information.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The most significant factor undermining the PLC’s effectiveness is the deep-seated rivalry among its members. The council comprises leaders from different political and military groups with competing agendas, such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks to secede, and the Islah Party, a political faction. This lack of a common vision prevents the council from functioning as a cohesive governing body.
National-level elections are absent in IRG/PLC areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Through pressure applied by the Saudi-led coalition, Hadi’s transitional IRG government was replaced by an unelected Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in 2022. The eight-person PLC, which serves as the executive body of Yemen’s IRG, consists of representatives from the most influential anti-Houthi factions in the country. These include five conflicting de facto authorities and major political parties: the People’s General Congress, the Islah Party, the STC, the National Resistance Forces, and tribal leaders. The PLC is currently chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, a former adviser to Interim President Hadi. The PLC’s appointment of Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak as prime minister in February 2024 deepened the existing schism between Aden and Sanaa, as Mubarak is a long-time adversary of the Houthis.
Substate institutions in IRG/PLC territory are run by unelected officials and organized armed groups, undermining the Yemeni people’s ability to establish electoral processes and access any meaningful public or basic services, benefits, or judicial due process. For example, in July 2022, the IRG/PLC appointed an STC figure as the governor of the island of Socotra, effectively formalizing the group’s local dominance after the STS had disregarded earlier objections to their presence and activities on the island. Across IRG/PLC-controlled areas, various local OAGs often dominate different districts and cities. They operate checkpoints, control basic services, levy informal taxes, and provide security, frequently prioritizing their own interests over human rights and due process. Consequently, citizens’ access to basic services such as water, electricity, and healthcare largely depends on their relationships with these groups rather than any formal state provisions. As a result, citizens are forced to opt into unreliable patronage networks through bribes, grafts, and kickbacks to conduct any official business or finalize any civil processes.
In 2012, in a one-candidate referendum supported by the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and designed to create an interim governing authority, Abdrabbu Mansur Hadi was appointed interim president and entrusted with delivering free and fair elections. However, his interim presidency was marred by continuous political turbulence, including the Houthi uprising in Sanaa and surrounding areas, which delayed elections indefinitely. This period of instability followed the ouster of long-time president Ali Abdallah Saleh after widespread protests against his regime in 2011. Under Saleh’s rule, elections were often marked by high volatility, political unrest, and widespread allegations of fraud, voter intimidation, and a lack of transparency, which limited genuine political participation.
In 2022, the GCC, through pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, removed Abdrabbu Mansur Hadi, the former interim president, from office in April 2022 after placing him under house arrest in Riyadh, and replaced his cabinet with an unelected eight-man PLC, headed by a chairman, Rashad al-Alimi. This move came after Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the primary supporters of the anti-Houthi coalition, began to see Hadi’s continued rule as a significant obstacle to achieving a political resolution with the Houthi rebels. The PLC was established with the aim of uniting anti-Houthi factions in order to politically isolate the Houthis. However, due to internal disputes, competing interests, and frequent military confrontations between units commanded by its members, the PLC has been unable to construct any real sense of governance or rule of law, introduce an election framework, or allow inhabitants in PLC-controlled territory to achieve or advocate for political representation.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the IRG/PLC. Violations against journalists include murder, enforced disappearances, detentions, and assaults. The regime also leverages outdated penal codes to criminalize dissent, employing archaic laws such as those related to treason, defamation, and subversion to unjustly imprison, intimidate, and silence critics under the guise of maintaining national security.
The IRG/PLC heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor. In April 2023, the STC stormed the headquarters of the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate in Aden, disrupting the organization and intimidating its staff. This attack was part of a broader strategy to control media coverage and suppress independent reporting in Yemen, reflecting ongoing efforts by factions vying for power to manipulate media in their favor. By intimidating journalists and disrupting the syndicate’s operations, the STC sought to limit dissent and shape public narratives, thereby consolidating its influence and ensuring that media coverage aligns with its interests.
The IRG/PLC seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. The IRG/PLC has heavily relied on the broadly interpreted articles within the 1994 Penal Code to justify their actions against dissenters. The 1994 Yemeni Penal Code is frequently used to prosecute, imprison, and threaten journalists with the death penalty, particularly under Articles 125, 126, 135, and 136. These provisions, primarily associated with national security and crimes against the state, allow for severe penalties for “spreading false news” and execution for “spying.” This legal framework has been used to arrest and imprison activists, human rights advocates, and political figures who criticize their authority.
To maintain control over the narrative, the IRG/PLC has actively targeted dissidents—including journalists and human rights defenders—as part of a broader effort to dominate discourse within its territory. This pattern of repression is exemplified by the impunity often enjoyed by armed groups within the PLC, such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which makes it difficult to hold perpetrators accountable. A notable illustration of this trend occurred in April 2025, when security personnel detained Awad Kashmeem in Hadhramaut. At the time of his arrest, Kashmeem served as a journalist and the leader of the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate’s Freedom Committee in the region. Prior to his arrest, which was condemned as arbitrary by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Kashmeem had been critical of local authorities and had been the subject of surveillance, intimidation, and a raid on his home by security forces. Another example is the arbitrary and unlawful imprisonment of human rights lawyer Sami Yassin Ka’id Marsh in November 2023. As of 2025, Marsh, who is an advocate for accountability and justice for IRG/PLC violations committed in Aden, is believed to be held in incommunicado detention at the Bir Ahmad prison in Aden, an informal IRG/PLC detention facility. Adel al-Hasani, a CNN-affiliated journalist, was imprisoned for six months in 2020 and 2021, during which time he was tortured and subjected to solitary confinement. Prior to his arrest, al-Hasani had worked on an exclusive CNN investigation that revealed that the UAE and its coalition partners, including the STC, had delivered American-made weapons to al-Qaeda-linked fighters, radical Salafi OAGs, and other factions fighting in Yemen, in violation of their agreements with the US government. He was eventually released in response to pressure from the US government.
According to the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, between January and December 2023, the parties to the conflict committed a total of 82 violations against journalists, with the IRG/PLC responsible for approximately 52 percent of these incidents and the Houthis for around 38 percent.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The IRG/PLC has not established fully functional legislative or judicial bodies that can effectively legislate or adjudicate the actions of the governing authority, or represent the interests of the population. Instead, governance mechanisms are characterized by a lack of transparent legislative and judicial processes, with decisions typically made by local authorities, OAGs, or appointed officials rather than through institutional procedures. Foreign powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, support different factions within the PLC, and their competing interests create constant friction. For example, the UAE’s backing of the STC’s separatist agenda routinely clashes with the Saudi goal of a unified Yemen.
Since August 2017, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary in Aden has worked to resurrect the judiciary in IRG/PLC-controlled areas. However, the judiciary is generally not independent and is heavily influenced or overseen by the executive, PLC, and local power brokers, including armed groups. The separation of powers is thus weak or largely absent, and judicial institutions often operate under the sway of those in control of the security and political environment.
Courts frequently and unfairly enable the governing authority’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Journalists and activists are often subjected to trumped-up charges, such as “insulting a public employee” or “disturbing public order,” which carry prison sentences. They are frequently arrested without a warrant and held in arbitrary detention for extended periods without due process. For example, Ahmad Maher, a journalist reporting on national developments with a focus on southern Yemen, was arbitrarily detained in August 2022, held for months without charge, and subjected to repeated physical and psychological torture. Instead of investigating his prolonged detention or torture allegations, an Aden-based Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) falsely charged him with “publishing fake and misleading news intended to disrupt peace and security” in May 2024. Maher was released in January 2025 after being acquitted of the charges against him the previous month.
The IRG/PLC subjects executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. By indefinitely postponing the formalization of its internal bylaws, the IRG/PLC effectively replaced a rules-based executive order with a consensus-based patronage system that prioritizes factional quotas over operational effectiveness. As a result, civil servants and mid-level bureaucrats are caught in a crossfire of conflicting orders from various IRG/PLC members who command their own military and financial resources. By failing to establish institutional safeguards and a clear hierarchy, the IRG/PLC has fundamentally weakened the state’s ability to project authority. The result is a hollowed-out executive branch that maintains the outward appearance of a sovereign government while its inner mechanisms have been dismantled to serve the survival of a fragile, multi-headed coalition. Further, IRG/PLC is subject to external meddling that prevents it from adopting a unified strategy, as its members regularly prioritize their foreign patrons’ interests over a common national agenda.
In late 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) completed a full administrative and territorial takeover of Southern Yemen – effectively ending the IRG’s administrative presence in Yemen’s southern governorates. Given the recency of this shift, the methodological implications of the STC’s move have not yet been fully analyzed or integrated into current formal reporting. This summary should be viewed as an assessment of the IRG’s status up until this volatile transition period.
HRF classifies Yemen – PLC-controlled territory as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
Since the Arab Spring in 2011, Yemen has been embroiled in a prolonged and complex conflict that began with a popular uprising against long-standing authoritarian president Ali Abdullah Saleh. By early 2012, the conflict led to Saleh’s abdication and the subsequent transfer of power to his vice president, Abdrabbu Mansur Hadi. Hadi’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG), made up largely of Sunnis, continued to receive backing from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, the IRG appeared to exclude the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, a Zaidi Shia Muslim separatist group originating from Saada in northern Yemen that remained critical of the IRG. The conflict intensified in 2014, driven by political grievances between the IRG, based in Aden, and the Houthi movement, based in Sanaa. The Houthis, who had a history of clashing with Yemeni authorities dating back to the early 2000s, sought to expand their control and overthrow the IRG. The conflict has had devastating human costs: the United Nations estimates that 233,000 people have died since 2014, including deaths directly caused by violence and indirectly by famine, disease, and the collapse of healthcare services. In March 2022, the Saudi-led GCC coalition forced Hadi to transfer authority to an unelected GCC-appointed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) led by Rashad al-Alimi. This move aimed to unite various anti-Houthi factions and strengthen their opposition to the Houthi insurgency. However, efforts to broker peace through a subsequent UN-mediated truce beginning in April 2022 failed to produce a lasting peace, leaving the country in a fragile state of suspended conflict. By December 2025, Yemen’s territorial divide grew more pronounced following a significant expansion by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) across the southern governorates. While the Houthis remained entrenched in Sanaa and the northern highlands, the STC moved to consolidate its grip on Aden and the southern coast, effectively challenging the IRG/PLC’s grip on power. Meanwhile, the persistent presence of groups like ISIS and AQAP in isolated pockets continues to complicate the security environment, leaving Yemen with an increasingly fractured and multi-polar political landscape.
National-level elections are absent in areas under IRG/PLC control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. With the exception of a national referendum that saw Hadi run unopposed in 2012, presidential and legislative elections have been delayed by repeated cycles of conflict and violence and a lack of regular political activity. The PLC has faced significant challenges and criticisms, including internal fragmentation and rivalries among its members, who often command their own organized armed groups (OAGs) with differing agendas. This has led to a lack of a cohesive political strategy, undermining the council’s ability to govern effectively or facilitate elections. The council’s ability to assert its authority has also been questioned, as some of its members, particularly from the STC, control more powerful forces than the IRG/PLC chairman.
Independent media, political figures, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens suffer overt and systematic reprisal if they openly criticize or question the IRG/PLC. Independent journalists are at high risk in IRG/PLC-controlled areas. They are subjected to threats, intimidation, and physical attacks. In some cases, authorities have confiscated their equipment and shut down media outlets. The government’s control over state-run media and its restrictions on independent outlets severely limit the public’s access to diverse and critical information.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The most significant factor undermining the PLC’s effectiveness is the deep-seated rivalry among its members. The council comprises leaders from different political and military groups with competing agendas, such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks to secede, and the Islah Party, a political faction. This lack of a common vision prevents the council from functioning as a cohesive governing body.
National-level elections are absent in IRG/PLC areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Through pressure applied by the Saudi-led coalition, Hadi’s transitional IRG government was replaced by an unelected Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in 2022. The eight-person PLC, which serves as the executive body of Yemen’s IRG, consists of representatives from the most influential anti-Houthi factions in the country. These include five conflicting de facto authorities and major political parties: the People’s General Congress, the Islah Party, the STC, the National Resistance Forces, and tribal leaders. The PLC is currently chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, a former adviser to Interim President Hadi. The PLC’s appointment of Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak as prime minister in February 2024 deepened the existing schism between Aden and Sanaa, as Mubarak is a long-time adversary of the Houthis.
Substate institutions in IRG/PLC territory are run by unelected officials and organized armed groups, undermining the Yemeni people’s ability to establish electoral processes and access any meaningful public or basic services, benefits, or judicial due process. For example, in July 2022, the IRG/PLC appointed an STC figure as the governor of the island of Socotra, effectively formalizing the group’s local dominance after the STS had disregarded earlier objections to their presence and activities on the island. Across IRG/PLC-controlled areas, various local OAGs often dominate different districts and cities. They operate checkpoints, control basic services, levy informal taxes, and provide security, frequently prioritizing their own interests over human rights and due process. Consequently, citizens’ access to basic services such as water, electricity, and healthcare largely depends on their relationships with these groups rather than any formal state provisions. As a result, citizens are forced to opt into unreliable patronage networks through bribes, grafts, and kickbacks to conduct any official business or finalize any civil processes.
In 2012, in a one-candidate referendum supported by the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and designed to create an interim governing authority, Abdrabbu Mansur Hadi was appointed interim president and entrusted with delivering free and fair elections. However, his interim presidency was marred by continuous political turbulence, including the Houthi uprising in Sanaa and surrounding areas, which delayed elections indefinitely. This period of instability followed the ouster of long-time president Ali Abdallah Saleh after widespread protests against his regime in 2011. Under Saleh’s rule, elections were often marked by high volatility, political unrest, and widespread allegations of fraud, voter intimidation, and a lack of transparency, which limited genuine political participation.
In 2022, the GCC, through pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, removed Abdrabbu Mansur Hadi, the former interim president, from office in April 2022 after placing him under house arrest in Riyadh, and replaced his cabinet with an unelected eight-man PLC, headed by a chairman, Rashad al-Alimi. This move came after Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the primary supporters of the anti-Houthi coalition, began to see Hadi’s continued rule as a significant obstacle to achieving a political resolution with the Houthi rebels. The PLC was established with the aim of uniting anti-Houthi factions in order to politically isolate the Houthis. However, due to internal disputes, competing interests, and frequent military confrontations between units commanded by its members, the PLC has been unable to construct any real sense of governance or rule of law, introduce an election framework, or allow inhabitants in PLC-controlled territory to achieve or advocate for political representation.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the IRG/PLC. Violations against journalists include murder, enforced disappearances, detentions, and assaults. The regime also leverages outdated penal codes to criminalize dissent, employing archaic laws such as those related to treason, defamation, and subversion to unjustly imprison, intimidate, and silence critics under the guise of maintaining national security.
The IRG/PLC heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor. In April 2023, the STC stormed the headquarters of the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate in Aden, disrupting the organization and intimidating its staff. This attack was part of a broader strategy to control media coverage and suppress independent reporting in Yemen, reflecting ongoing efforts by factions vying for power to manipulate media in their favor. By intimidating journalists and disrupting the syndicate’s operations, the STC sought to limit dissent and shape public narratives, thereby consolidating its influence and ensuring that media coverage aligns with its interests.
The IRG/PLC seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. The IRG/PLC has heavily relied on the broadly interpreted articles within the 1994 Penal Code to justify their actions against dissenters. The 1994 Yemeni Penal Code is frequently used to prosecute, imprison, and threaten journalists with the death penalty, particularly under Articles 125, 126, 135, and 136. These provisions, primarily associated with national security and crimes against the state, allow for severe penalties for “spreading false news” and execution for “spying.” This legal framework has been used to arrest and imprison activists, human rights advocates, and political figures who criticize their authority.
To maintain control over the narrative, the IRG/PLC has actively targeted dissidents—including journalists and human rights defenders—as part of a broader effort to dominate discourse within its territory. This pattern of repression is exemplified by the impunity often enjoyed by armed groups within the PLC, such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which makes it difficult to hold perpetrators accountable. A notable illustration of this trend occurred in April 2025, when security personnel detained Awad Kashmeem in Hadhramaut. At the time of his arrest, Kashmeem served as a journalist and the leader of the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate’s Freedom Committee in the region. Prior to his arrest, which was condemned as arbitrary by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Kashmeem had been critical of local authorities and had been the subject of surveillance, intimidation, and a raid on his home by security forces. Another example is the arbitrary and unlawful imprisonment of human rights lawyer Sami Yassin Ka’id Marsh in November 2023. As of 2025, Marsh, who is an advocate for accountability and justice for IRG/PLC violations committed in Aden, is believed to be held in incommunicado detention at the Bir Ahmad prison in Aden, an informal IRG/PLC detention facility. Adel al-Hasani, a CNN-affiliated journalist, was imprisoned for six months in 2020 and 2021, during which time he was tortured and subjected to solitary confinement. Prior to his arrest, al-Hasani had worked on an exclusive CNN investigation that revealed that the UAE and its coalition partners, including the STC, had delivered American-made weapons to al-Qaeda-linked fighters, radical Salafi OAGs, and other factions fighting in Yemen, in violation of their agreements with the US government. He was eventually released in response to pressure from the US government.
According to the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, between January and December 2023, the parties to the conflict committed a total of 82 violations against journalists, with the IRG/PLC responsible for approximately 52 percent of these incidents and the Houthis for around 38 percent.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The IRG/PLC has not established fully functional legislative or judicial bodies that can effectively legislate or adjudicate the actions of the governing authority, or represent the interests of the population. Instead, governance mechanisms are characterized by a lack of transparent legislative and judicial processes, with decisions typically made by local authorities, OAGs, or appointed officials rather than through institutional procedures. Foreign powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, support different factions within the PLC, and their competing interests create constant friction. For example, the UAE’s backing of the STC’s separatist agenda routinely clashes with the Saudi goal of a unified Yemen.
Since August 2017, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary in Aden has worked to resurrect the judiciary in IRG/PLC-controlled areas. However, the judiciary is generally not independent and is heavily influenced or overseen by the executive, PLC, and local power brokers, including armed groups. The separation of powers is thus weak or largely absent, and judicial institutions often operate under the sway of those in control of the security and political environment.
Courts frequently and unfairly enable the governing authority’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Journalists and activists are often subjected to trumped-up charges, such as “insulting a public employee” or “disturbing public order,” which carry prison sentences. They are frequently arrested without a warrant and held in arbitrary detention for extended periods without due process. For example, Ahmad Maher, a journalist reporting on national developments with a focus on southern Yemen, was arbitrarily detained in August 2022, held for months without charge, and subjected to repeated physical and psychological torture. Instead of investigating his prolonged detention or torture allegations, an Aden-based Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) falsely charged him with “publishing fake and misleading news intended to disrupt peace and security” in May 2024. Maher was released in January 2025 after being acquitted of the charges against him the previous month.
The IRG/PLC subjects executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. By indefinitely postponing the formalization of its internal bylaws, the IRG/PLC effectively replaced a rules-based executive order with a consensus-based patronage system that prioritizes factional quotas over operational effectiveness. As a result, civil servants and mid-level bureaucrats are caught in a crossfire of conflicting orders from various IRG/PLC members who command their own military and financial resources. By failing to establish institutional safeguards and a clear hierarchy, the IRG/PLC has fundamentally weakened the state’s ability to project authority. The result is a hollowed-out executive branch that maintains the outward appearance of a sovereign government while its inner mechanisms have been dismantled to serve the survival of a fragile, multi-headed coalition. Further, IRG/PLC is subject to external meddling that prevents it from adopting a unified strategy, as its members regularly prioritize their foreign patrons’ interests over a common national agenda.
