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HRF classifies Spain as democratic.
Spain is a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy governed under the 1978 Constitution, in which the King serves as head of state with largely ceremonial and constitutional functions (such as sanctioning laws and formally appointing the prime minister), while executive power is exercised by the Government (“Consejo de Ministros”) led by the prime minister (“Presidente del Gobierno”). Legislative authority rests with the bicameral Cortes Generales, made up of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate: the 350-member Congress is elected for four-year terms by proportional representation, while the Senate combines directly elected provincial senators with senators designated by the autonomous communities. Spain operates as a multiparty system in which governments typically depend on coalitions or parliamentary support arrangements. After the July 2023 snap parliamentary election produced a divided parliament, Pedro Sánchez, who has served as Prime Minister since 2018, was re-elected in November 2023 after reaching support agreements with the left-wing electoral alliance Sumar and several smaller regional parties.
In Spain, national elections are largely free and fair. The nation maintains a competitive, pluralistic party system in which no major opposition force is barred from contesting elections, and governments often depend on coalition-building. Spain provides opposition parties with generally equal and unhindered opportunities to campaign, supported by clear legal rules, protected political freedoms, and independent electoral oversight.
Independent media, civil society, political actors, and citizens in Spain are largely free to criticize the government. The government ensures strong protections for freedom of association, a generally pluralistic media environment, and freedom of assembly that is usually respected in practice, despite some isolated legal and policing concerns that can have a chilling effect.
Independent institutions largely function as effective checks on the government: the constitutional and legal framework safeguards judicial independence, enables courts to hear cases against the state, and allows the judiciary to uphold electoral fairness, protect freedom of dissent, and hold public officials accountable for corruption and abuses of power through criminal enforcement and judicial oversight.
In Spain, national elections are largely free and fair. The country has a competitive, pluralistic party system in which no major opposition force is excluded from contesting elections, and governments often depend on coalition-building rather than dominant majorities. Opposition parties are typically able to campaign on equal terms, supported by clear legal rules, protected political freedoms, and independent electoral oversight.
The Spanish government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In Spain, parties compete on an equal footing, and elections tend to be highly competitive and rarely result in landslides. This relative parity between parties with competing, at times opposing, policy agendas complicates the formation of lasting governing majorities. Successful no-confidence votes and government reshuffles were ubiquitous in the early and mid-2010s when PP and PSOE often struggled to rally parliamentary support on critical issues, such as the state budget. To illustrate, in July 2023, in Spain’s snap general election, voters elected all 350 members of the Congress of Deputies, but no party reached the 176-seat majority required to govern alone. The People’s Party (PP), led by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, won the most votes with 33.1% and 137 seats. The incumbent PSOE, led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, followed with 31.7% and 121 seats. Vox received 12.4% and 33 seats, while the left-wing alliance Sumar won 12.3% and 31 seats. Because PP and PP-aligned Vox together held only 170 seats, they could not form a majority. Feijóo failed to secure parliamentary approval to become prime minister in September 2023. Subsequently, Sánchez reached agreements with the left-wing electoral alliance Sumar and several smaller regional parties and was re-elected prime minister in November 2023 with 179 votes, forming a new government without a repeat election. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) assessed the electoral campaign preceding the 2023 snap parliamentary elections as “vibrant and pluralistic,” offering voters a wide range of choices.
Similarly, the government has not unfairly or significantly hindered the electoral campaigns of real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates. In Spain, parties are generally able to campaign freely and compete on an equal basis. The law sets out a short but clearly defined official campaign period, applies the same rules to all contestants, and safeguards core freedoms of expression, assembly, and political competition. Within this framework, parties may use a broad range of campaign methods, including rallies, media appearances, printed materials, and social networks to present their platforms to voters. Factors also potentially contributing to the robustness of electoral competition in Spain include the effective independence of the Central Election Commission (CEC), which oversees all lower-level electoral administrative bodies, reviews the voter census, and monitors political actors’ compliance with the Electoral Law, and comprehensive campaign finance regulations significantly expanded in the 2010s. The majority of the CEC’s members (8 out of 13) are appointed from a pool of eligible judges, and the remaining five are academics, appointed by parliamentary parties. The CEC has also sanctioned high-ranking politicians for violating the “principle of neutrality” enshrined in the electoral code by campaigning in their official governing capacity. In 2020, for instance, CEC fined Prime Minister and PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez for giving an interview from his formal residence in which he lauded his party’s achievements. As briefly discussed under the Judicial Independence pillar, Sánchez subsequently lost his appeal of the fine before the Supreme Court.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Spain protects freedom of association, enabling a large and diverse civil society to operate independently, while the nation’s media landscape is generally pluralistic and free from systematic government manipulation. The government allows journalists to work freely and publish critical reporting without systematic censorship, even though isolated instances of legislative measures and police misconduct have created a chilling effect on media freedom. Freedom of assembly in Spain is generally respected in practice, with even highly contentious protests taking place peacefully.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. With more than tens of thousands of registered CSOs, Spain has a robust civil society. Spain’s legal framework generally upholds freedom of association and provides strong constitutional and legal protections for the creation and operation of associations. Freedom of association is guaranteed as a fundamental right under Article 22 of the Spanish Constitution and supported by a specialized regulatory framework, which allows a wide range of civil society organizations to operate across political, social, and cultural fields. Associations can be formed without prior authorization; registration mainly serves publicity and legal capacity purposes; and dissolution is only possible by a court decision. In practice, the government generally refrained from systematically targeting dissenting CSOs.
Similarly, the government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Spain’s media sector is diverse, with a mix of public and private outlets operating at national and regional levels, and freedom of expression and information is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution. Media organizations are generally able to report on government actions and political actors, including critical coverage of those in power. At the same time, concerns exist within the media sector regarding structural vulnerabilities that may affect its independence, particularly in broadcasting. While Spain has many independent outlets, the television market is highly concentrated: the public broadcaster RTVE and the private groups Atresmedia, Mediaset, and CCMA together control nearly 80% of the television advertising market. RTVE is largely financed through state subsidies, making it structurally dependent on public funding. In October 2024, lawmakers lowered the parliamentary threshold required to appoint RTVE’s board of directors, a move that drew criticism from media-freedom watchdogs, including the International Press Institute, which warned that the change risked undermining the broadcaster’s already fragile impartiality. As of December 2025, this legal framework remains in force.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, nor has it seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Journalists can generally operate and publish criticism, and Spain, as mentioned above, has a wide range of private and public outlets across print, radio, television, and digital media. However, this generally favourable media environment is undermined by a few legal and structural constraints that continue to chill journalistic activity and dissenting expression. In particular, the Ley Orgánica 4/2015 de Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana, widely known as the “Gag Law”, remains a significant obstacle to full media freedom. The law, among other things, granted broad discretionary powers to law enforcement and imposed heavy administrative fines for vaguely defined offences, including for “endangering” law enforcement through the reporting. In practice, these provisions have disproportionately affected journalists, creating a chilling effect on reporting in the public interest. Additionally, in 2019, police beat or detained a number of media workers reporting on pro-independencе protests in the autonomous region of Catalonia. Albert Garcia, a reporter with the national daily El País, was arbitrarily detained for 24 hours after photographing the arrest of a protester without obstructing or threatening law enforcement in the process, while others, such as Elise Gazengel (CTXT magazine) and Pol Pareja (Eldiario.es) were hit with batons by police while peacefully reporting on the October 2019 demonstrations in Catalonia despite wearing bracelets indicating they were accredited journalists. These challenges notwithstanding, multiple outlets remain vocal in criticizing the government’s policies and investigating possible wrongdoing by authorities.
Finally, the government has not seriously or unfairly repressed protests or public gatherings, and freedom of assembly is generally upheld in practice. Even demonstrations on highly contentious issues – such as the amnesty deal for Catalan separatists advanced by PSOE Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez in 2023 to secure support for his coalition government – were, overall, conducted peacefully. This is the case notwithstanding the aforementioned ‘Gag Law’ that allows sanctions for participation in “unauthorized” demonstrations near key infrastructure and government buildings, with fines of up to €600,000 (approx. $700,000). That said, there is no evidence that these provisions have been systematically or selectively enforced to target peaceful protesters.
In Spain, institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Spain’s legal and constitutional framework safeguards judicial independence and allows courts to hear cases against the government. As a result, Spanish courts effectively uphold electoral fairness and protect freedom of dissent. Similarly, Spain’s institutions generally hold public officials accountable for corruption and abuse of power through effective criminal enforcement and judicial oversight.
The Spanish government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Spain’s legal and institutional framework ensures judicial independence. The Spanish Constitution enshrines principles of independence, irremovability, impartiality, and legality, while Ley Orgánica 6/1985 on the Judiciary establishes safeguards governing appointments, tenure, disciplinary procedures, and judicial review. At the institutional level, judicial independence in Spain is structured around the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ), an independent body that governs the judiciary and is responsible for functions such as appointing, promoting, and transferring judges in the lower courts. The CGPJ is composed of twenty members plus a President, who is simultaneously the President of the Supreme Court. Of these twenty members, twelve must be judges or magistrates from all judicial categories (six elected by the Congress of Deputies and six by the Senate from among candidates endorsed within the judiciary). The remaining eight must be lawyers or other jurists of recognized competence with at least fifteen years of professional experience (four are elected by the Congress and four by the Senate, in each case by a three-fifths majority). During their mandate, members cannot be removed except under legally defined circumstances. As a result, the CGPJ effectively safeguards judicial independence from the executive and legislative branches, and Spain’s judiciary remains able to hear and adjudicate politically sensitive cases.
Specifically, Spain’s courts have not unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. While election complaints are rare, international observers, such as the OSCE, have assessed the legal framework for electoral dispute resolution as sound. In 2021, the Supreme Court’s ruling upheld the CEC’s fine against PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez for violating the principle of neutrality during the 2019 election campaign by giving a campaign-linked interview from the official prime ministerial residence. The Court’s decision made Sánchez the first sitting Spanish prime minister to be sanctioned and ultimately required him to pay awarded costs to an opposition party, setting an important precedent and underscoring the ability of Spanish institutions to hold even the most senior government officials to account.
Moreover, the nation’s judiciary has not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism. In fact, the Spanish courts have a strong track record of upholding the freedom of dissent. Still, there have been isolated instances in which the courts have sanctioned legitimate expressions of dissent. Most recently, in 2021, the Constitutional Court upheld most of the “Gag Law’s” provisions, including articles that sanctioned “showing disrespect” (Art. 37) and “disobeying” (Art. 36) police. International experts, such as the Venice Commission, have criticized these and several other articles as vaguely defined and entrusting law enforcement with exceedingly broad powers, with few guidelines.
Finally, Spain’s judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Public officials in Spain can be held accountable for corruption and abuse of office through the ordinary criminal justice system under the Spanish Criminal Code. Such accountability is implemented through a robust institutional framework, including the Office on Conflicts of Interest that tracks compliance, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office that conducts certain investigations and prosecutes corruption offences. Spanish courts also have a strong track record of holding public officials accountable for abuses of power, including corruption and graft. Prominent examples include the 2018 trial and conviction of Luis Bárcenas, former treasurer of the PP party and ally of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. Bárcenas was sentenced to 33 years’ imprisonment for money laundering and fraud, having organized a lucrative public procurement scheme. Equally important, Spain’s court found that the PP had kept a parallel bookkeeping system to process illegal donations under Bárcenas’s supervision, and used some of the funds as bonuses for senior members. The court fined the party nearly $250,000, an unprecedented amount at the time.
HRF classifies Spain as democratic.
Spain is a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy governed under the 1978 Constitution, in which the King serves as head of state with largely ceremonial and constitutional functions (such as sanctioning laws and formally appointing the prime minister), while executive power is exercised by the Government (“Consejo de Ministros”) led by the prime minister (“Presidente del Gobierno”). Legislative authority rests with the bicameral Cortes Generales, made up of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate: the 350-member Congress is elected for four-year terms by proportional representation, while the Senate combines directly elected provincial senators with senators designated by the autonomous communities. Spain operates as a multiparty system in which governments typically depend on coalitions or parliamentary support arrangements. After the July 2023 snap parliamentary election produced a divided parliament, Pedro Sánchez, who has served as Prime Minister since 2018, was re-elected in November 2023 after reaching support agreements with the left-wing electoral alliance Sumar and several smaller regional parties.
In Spain, national elections are largely free and fair. The nation maintains a competitive, pluralistic party system in which no major opposition force is barred from contesting elections, and governments often depend on coalition-building. Spain provides opposition parties with generally equal and unhindered opportunities to campaign, supported by clear legal rules, protected political freedoms, and independent electoral oversight.
Independent media, civil society, political actors, and citizens in Spain are largely free to criticize the government. The government ensures strong protections for freedom of association, a generally pluralistic media environment, and freedom of assembly that is usually respected in practice, despite some isolated legal and policing concerns that can have a chilling effect.
Independent institutions largely function as effective checks on the government: the constitutional and legal framework safeguards judicial independence, enables courts to hear cases against the state, and allows the judiciary to uphold electoral fairness, protect freedom of dissent, and hold public officials accountable for corruption and abuses of power through criminal enforcement and judicial oversight.
In Spain, national elections are largely free and fair. The country has a competitive, pluralistic party system in which no major opposition force is excluded from contesting elections, and governments often depend on coalition-building rather than dominant majorities. Opposition parties are typically able to campaign on equal terms, supported by clear legal rules, protected political freedoms, and independent electoral oversight.
The Spanish government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In Spain, parties compete on an equal footing, and elections tend to be highly competitive and rarely result in landslides. This relative parity between parties with competing, at times opposing, policy agendas complicates the formation of lasting governing majorities. Successful no-confidence votes and government reshuffles were ubiquitous in the early and mid-2010s when PP and PSOE often struggled to rally parliamentary support on critical issues, such as the state budget. To illustrate, in July 2023, in Spain’s snap general election, voters elected all 350 members of the Congress of Deputies, but no party reached the 176-seat majority required to govern alone. The People’s Party (PP), led by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, won the most votes with 33.1% and 137 seats. The incumbent PSOE, led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, followed with 31.7% and 121 seats. Vox received 12.4% and 33 seats, while the left-wing alliance Sumar won 12.3% and 31 seats. Because PP and PP-aligned Vox together held only 170 seats, they could not form a majority. Feijóo failed to secure parliamentary approval to become prime minister in September 2023. Subsequently, Sánchez reached agreements with the left-wing electoral alliance Sumar and several smaller regional parties and was re-elected prime minister in November 2023 with 179 votes, forming a new government without a repeat election. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) assessed the electoral campaign preceding the 2023 snap parliamentary elections as “vibrant and pluralistic,” offering voters a wide range of choices.
Similarly, the government has not unfairly or significantly hindered the electoral campaigns of real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates. In Spain, parties are generally able to campaign freely and compete on an equal basis. The law sets out a short but clearly defined official campaign period, applies the same rules to all contestants, and safeguards core freedoms of expression, assembly, and political competition. Within this framework, parties may use a broad range of campaign methods, including rallies, media appearances, printed materials, and social networks to present their platforms to voters. Factors also potentially contributing to the robustness of electoral competition in Spain include the effective independence of the Central Election Commission (CEC), which oversees all lower-level electoral administrative bodies, reviews the voter census, and monitors political actors’ compliance with the Electoral Law, and comprehensive campaign finance regulations significantly expanded in the 2010s. The majority of the CEC’s members (8 out of 13) are appointed from a pool of eligible judges, and the remaining five are academics, appointed by parliamentary parties. The CEC has also sanctioned high-ranking politicians for violating the “principle of neutrality” enshrined in the electoral code by campaigning in their official governing capacity. In 2020, for instance, CEC fined Prime Minister and PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez for giving an interview from his formal residence in which he lauded his party’s achievements. As briefly discussed under the Judicial Independence pillar, Sánchez subsequently lost his appeal of the fine before the Supreme Court.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Spain protects freedom of association, enabling a large and diverse civil society to operate independently, while the nation’s media landscape is generally pluralistic and free from systematic government manipulation. The government allows journalists to work freely and publish critical reporting without systematic censorship, even though isolated instances of legislative measures and police misconduct have created a chilling effect on media freedom. Freedom of assembly in Spain is generally respected in practice, with even highly contentious protests taking place peacefully.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. With more than tens of thousands of registered CSOs, Spain has a robust civil society. Spain’s legal framework generally upholds freedom of association and provides strong constitutional and legal protections for the creation and operation of associations. Freedom of association is guaranteed as a fundamental right under Article 22 of the Spanish Constitution and supported by a specialized regulatory framework, which allows a wide range of civil society organizations to operate across political, social, and cultural fields. Associations can be formed without prior authorization; registration mainly serves publicity and legal capacity purposes; and dissolution is only possible by a court decision. In practice, the government generally refrained from systematically targeting dissenting CSOs.
Similarly, the government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Spain’s media sector is diverse, with a mix of public and private outlets operating at national and regional levels, and freedom of expression and information is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution. Media organizations are generally able to report on government actions and political actors, including critical coverage of those in power. At the same time, concerns exist within the media sector regarding structural vulnerabilities that may affect its independence, particularly in broadcasting. While Spain has many independent outlets, the television market is highly concentrated: the public broadcaster RTVE and the private groups Atresmedia, Mediaset, and CCMA together control nearly 80% of the television advertising market. RTVE is largely financed through state subsidies, making it structurally dependent on public funding. In October 2024, lawmakers lowered the parliamentary threshold required to appoint RTVE’s board of directors, a move that drew criticism from media-freedom watchdogs, including the International Press Institute, which warned that the change risked undermining the broadcaster’s already fragile impartiality. As of December 2025, this legal framework remains in force.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, nor has it seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Journalists can generally operate and publish criticism, and Spain, as mentioned above, has a wide range of private and public outlets across print, radio, television, and digital media. However, this generally favourable media environment is undermined by a few legal and structural constraints that continue to chill journalistic activity and dissenting expression. In particular, the Ley Orgánica 4/2015 de Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana, widely known as the “Gag Law”, remains a significant obstacle to full media freedom. The law, among other things, granted broad discretionary powers to law enforcement and imposed heavy administrative fines for vaguely defined offences, including for “endangering” law enforcement through the reporting. In practice, these provisions have disproportionately affected journalists, creating a chilling effect on reporting in the public interest. Additionally, in 2019, police beat or detained a number of media workers reporting on pro-independencе protests in the autonomous region of Catalonia. Albert Garcia, a reporter with the national daily El País, was arbitrarily detained for 24 hours after photographing the arrest of a protester without obstructing or threatening law enforcement in the process, while others, such as Elise Gazengel (CTXT magazine) and Pol Pareja (Eldiario.es) were hit with batons by police while peacefully reporting on the October 2019 demonstrations in Catalonia despite wearing bracelets indicating they were accredited journalists. These challenges notwithstanding, multiple outlets remain vocal in criticizing the government’s policies and investigating possible wrongdoing by authorities.
Finally, the government has not seriously or unfairly repressed protests or public gatherings, and freedom of assembly is generally upheld in practice. Even demonstrations on highly contentious issues – such as the amnesty deal for Catalan separatists advanced by PSOE Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez in 2023 to secure support for his coalition government – were, overall, conducted peacefully. This is the case notwithstanding the aforementioned ‘Gag Law’ that allows sanctions for participation in “unauthorized” demonstrations near key infrastructure and government buildings, with fines of up to €600,000 (approx. $700,000). That said, there is no evidence that these provisions have been systematically or selectively enforced to target peaceful protesters.
In Spain, institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Spain’s legal and constitutional framework safeguards judicial independence and allows courts to hear cases against the government. As a result, Spanish courts effectively uphold electoral fairness and protect freedom of dissent. Similarly, Spain’s institutions generally hold public officials accountable for corruption and abuse of power through effective criminal enforcement and judicial oversight.
The Spanish government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Spain’s legal and institutional framework ensures judicial independence. The Spanish Constitution enshrines principles of independence, irremovability, impartiality, and legality, while Ley Orgánica 6/1985 on the Judiciary establishes safeguards governing appointments, tenure, disciplinary procedures, and judicial review. At the institutional level, judicial independence in Spain is structured around the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ), an independent body that governs the judiciary and is responsible for functions such as appointing, promoting, and transferring judges in the lower courts. The CGPJ is composed of twenty members plus a President, who is simultaneously the President of the Supreme Court. Of these twenty members, twelve must be judges or magistrates from all judicial categories (six elected by the Congress of Deputies and six by the Senate from among candidates endorsed within the judiciary). The remaining eight must be lawyers or other jurists of recognized competence with at least fifteen years of professional experience (four are elected by the Congress and four by the Senate, in each case by a three-fifths majority). During their mandate, members cannot be removed except under legally defined circumstances. As a result, the CGPJ effectively safeguards judicial independence from the executive and legislative branches, and Spain’s judiciary remains able to hear and adjudicate politically sensitive cases.
Specifically, Spain’s courts have not unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. While election complaints are rare, international observers, such as the OSCE, have assessed the legal framework for electoral dispute resolution as sound. In 2021, the Supreme Court’s ruling upheld the CEC’s fine against PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez for violating the principle of neutrality during the 2019 election campaign by giving a campaign-linked interview from the official prime ministerial residence. The Court’s decision made Sánchez the first sitting Spanish prime minister to be sanctioned and ultimately required him to pay awarded costs to an opposition party, setting an important precedent and underscoring the ability of Spanish institutions to hold even the most senior government officials to account.
Moreover, the nation’s judiciary has not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism. In fact, the Spanish courts have a strong track record of upholding the freedom of dissent. Still, there have been isolated instances in which the courts have sanctioned legitimate expressions of dissent. Most recently, in 2021, the Constitutional Court upheld most of the “Gag Law’s” provisions, including articles that sanctioned “showing disrespect” (Art. 37) and “disobeying” (Art. 36) police. International experts, such as the Venice Commission, have criticized these and several other articles as vaguely defined and entrusting law enforcement with exceedingly broad powers, with few guidelines.
Finally, Spain’s judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Public officials in Spain can be held accountable for corruption and abuse of office through the ordinary criminal justice system under the Spanish Criminal Code. Such accountability is implemented through a robust institutional framework, including the Office on Conflicts of Interest that tracks compliance, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office that conducts certain investigations and prosecutes corruption offences. Spanish courts also have a strong track record of holding public officials accountable for abuses of power, including corruption and graft. Prominent examples include the 2018 trial and conviction of Luis Bárcenas, former treasurer of the PP party and ally of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. Bárcenas was sentenced to 33 years’ imprisonment for money laundering and fraud, having organized a lucrative public procurement scheme. Equally important, Spain’s court found that the PP had kept a parallel bookkeeping system to process illegal donations under Bárcenas’s supervision, and used some of the funds as bonuses for senior members. The court fined the party nearly $250,000, an unprecedented amount at the time.
