Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies South Sudan as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
South Sudan is a de facto presidential republic, and the Head of State, Salva Kiir, assumed power as the leader of Sudan’s erstwhile semiautonomous region of Southern Sudan after the southern Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for separation in 2011, following two decades of civil war with the northern-dominated central government. Since independence, however, a violent power struggle between Kiir, the head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Government (SPLM-IG), and his rival Riek Machar, the head of the the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition SPLM-IO, has splintered the main political movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, and plunged the country into a stasis of recurring factional armed conflict and political and ethnic violence. As a result, South Sudan suffers from one of the world’s worst man-made humanitarian crises, with more than two-thirds of the population, totaling over 9.3 million, requiring urgent humanitarian assistance, with more than four million of those either internally displaced or refugees in neighboring countries.
National-level elections have been absent in South Sudan since the country’s independence in 2011, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. As a result, the unelected Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU)—a power-sharing regime set up in 2020 between the previously warring factions of the SPLM-IG (In Government) of Kiir and SPLM-IO (In Opposition) of rival Machiar setup— represents the highest density of unelected constitutional post-holders in Africa. The R-TGoNU has repeatedly failed to hold elections and delayed them due to a lack of political will for the implementation of crucial pre-election benchmarks stipulated in a 2018 peace deal.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The R-TGoNU maintains control through the unchecked powers of the National Security Service (NSS), which employs arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions, and enforced disappearances against human rights defenders, journalists, and activists. Critical media outlets are censored, intimidated, or shut down, leading to widespread self-censorship and a decline in free expression. Political opponents and civil society leaders who criticize corruption or election delays encounter bureaucratic obstacles, harassment, and false charges, prompting many to flee the country and severely weakening the civic space essential for democracy.
Institutions in South Sudan largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. This is primarily due to political capture, a lack of resources, and the systematic non-implementation of mandated reforms. The transitional legislature, while reconstituted, often operates as a rubber stamp for the executive, delaying critical laws and lacking the political leverage to hold powerful R-TGoNU figures accountable. Vital oversight mechanisms required by the peace agreement—such as the National Elections Commission and anti-corruption bodies—have often been either inadequately funded or deliberately stalled, ensuring that these institutions remain powerless and unable to challenge the regime’s continuous consolidation of power.
National-level elections have been absent in South Sudan since the country’s independence in 2011, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. By repeatedly delaying elections, targeting political opponents, intentionally stalling or undermining the establishment of foundational electoral frameworks and oversight mechanisms, and ensuring that the pervasive threat of political insecurity remains, the ruling SPLM-IG forestalls any possibility of electoral competition for power.
The regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition candidates’ electoral campaigns. The SPLM-IG has consistently targeted significant opposition figures, such as First Vice President Riek Machar and other leaders of the SPLM-IO political faction. For example, in March 2025, the regime placed Machar under house arrest for allegedly supporting the White Army, a pro-SPLM-IO armed group. Machar’s supporters argue that his detention has effectively voided the 2018 peace deal. In August 2021, regime operatives arrested Machar’s ally, Kuel Aguer Kuel, the former Governor of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State, because he signed a document approving peaceful protests for President Kiir’s removal. Kuel remained in arbitrary custody for more than twelve months without facing any formal charges. In October 2021, he was eventually arraigned and faced eight criminal counts, including the attempt to unconstitutionally overthrow the government.
The R-TGoNU seriously undermines independent electoral oversight. A key pre-electoral benchmark of the peace agreement was the full reformation and operationalization of the National Elections Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Council (PPC), a regulatory body responsible for registering and monitoring the activities of all political parties in the country. However, these bodies remain under-resourced, lack the financial and logistical autonomy to plan a complex national poll, and are often staffed by political appointees lacking genuine neutrality. This calculated failure to establish well-funded, independent, and institutionally empowered oversight bodies ensures that the R-TGoNU retains total control over the pace and conditions of the transitional process, rendering any future electoral monitoring mechanism weak and politically susceptible to the incumbent regime.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society figures, organizations, and ordinary citizens face overt and systematic retaliation whenever they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The SPLM-IG regime maintains its grip on power by employing a strategic blend of bureaucratic chokeholds to shutter the nation’s independent media outlets—particularly those providing a voice to civil society—alongside the targeted application of physical violence and lethal force. This strategy of intimidation extends beyond the media; political activists and humanitarian aid workers are routinely subjected to arbitrary detention, instilling a climate of fear that permeates every level of society. In addition to violently cracking down on protests, the regime’s security apparatus extends its reach through transnational operations, targeting critics in neighboring countries with kidnappings and forced returns.
The regime unfairly shuts down major independent, dissenting organizations. This is done either through physical targeting or administrative chokeholds, like revoking licenses. In July 2024, Intrepid South Sudan, a non-profit civil society organization (CSO) focused on peacebuilding, human rights, democracy, and empowering youth, faced an abrupt closure of its office in Bor, after NSS agents accused the organization of promoting civil unrest and protests over salaries. Though the office was reopened in August 2024 after negotiations, this incident highlights broader issues with shrinking civic space in the country. In August 2021, regime agents raided and shut down the offices of Radio Jonglei, and briefly detained three of its journalists – Matuor Mabior Anyang, Ayuen Garang Kur and Deng Gai Deng – and confiscated their mobile phones on suspension of sympathizing with the People’s Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA), a civic organization that aims at mobilizing democratic rights, after the radio station allegedly broadcasted a call urging their listeners to join a protest scheduled a few days later.
The SPLM-IG regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. Rajab Mohandis, the Executive Director of the Organization for Responsive Governance (ORG), joined forces with Governor Kuel to co-found the PCCA, an umbrella group that issued a bold manifesto demanding the resignation of the transitional government due to its failure to implement the peace agreement. While Kuel was arrested shortly after the manifesto’s release, in July 2021, and held for over a year, Mohandis managed to evade capture during a NSS raid on his office, and has since been forced into exile.
In January 2023, six journalists from the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SSBC) were detained for weeks without charge. They were targeted following the viral circulation of a video showing President Salva Kiir in an embarrassing light during an official event. In July 2021, Alfred Angasi, a news presenter with the SSBC, was arrested and held in arbitrary detention for more than two weeks after he refused to read part of a presidential decree during a news program. Journalists working for or associated with the United Nations-administered Radio Miraya have been arbitrarily detained and harassed on an ongoing basis. In August 2021, a Radio Miraya reporter was physically assaulted by a bodyguard of a Vice President for allegedly taking a photograph during a public event. In another incident, George Livio, another reporter at Radio Miraya, was held incommunicado for over 1,000 days in a National Security facility without charges before his release in 2017.
In August 2025, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) suspended all operational activities in Yei River and Morobo counties in South Sudan’s Central Equatoria State following the abduction of an MSF staff member by the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF), the regime’s official military force. Separately, in the same month, men dressed in SSPDF uniforms abducted another aid worker, James Unguba, in the county of Tambura in Western Equatoria state. He died in captivity on September 3, 2025, according to witness testimonies.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. The SPLM-IG regime utilizes a combination of aggressive security measures, including preemptive digital shutdowns and the use of lethal force against protestors. A notable example occurred on August 30, 2021, when the regime shut down internet access nationwide to preemptively stifle planned anti-corruption protests, which were subsequently prevented from taking place. A separate confrontation in Juba in June 2020 further demonstrates the regime’s readiness to use physical violence to stifle protests. The incident originated from a land dispute between local residents and armed military officers, reportedly led by Lieutenant Lual Akook Wol Kiir, a relative of President Salva Kiir, over property allegedly built on private land. According to witnesses, the Lieutenant’s forces opened fire randomly, resulting in the immediate deaths of three residents and injuries to at least seven others; a fourth resident later died from critical wounds. When approximately 1,000 people marched to a local police post to protest these killings, police and military officers responded by killing one man and injuring several more.
The SPLM-IG regime engages in transnational repression against dissidents abroad, including through surveillance or other forms of intimidation. The NSS has targeted critics and political opponents in neighboring countries like Kenya and Uganda with threats, harassment, kidnappings, and forced returns. A prominent example is the case of Morris Mabior Awikjok, a human rights advocate who was forcibly taken from his residence in Nairobi, Kenya, in February 2023. He was subsequently held in an NSS facility in Juba for three months without formal charges. Although he was granted bail in April 2024 following a defamation charge brought against him by the NSS Director General, Akol Koor Kuc, the NSS continued to detain him under the purported investigation of state crimes. In 2017, two outspoken political activists and critics, Dong Samuel Luak and Aggrey Ezbon Idri, were forcibly disappeared from Nairobi by NSS agents, only to be later killed after being unlawfully returned to South Sudan.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Institutional failure in South Sudan is characterized by a system where loyalty to the SPLM-IG leadership supersedes constitutional mandates, effectively undermining the rule of law and public accountability. Courts frequently act as tools to legitimize arbitrary detention and repression of political opponents, while high-ranking officials, security actors, and judges who challenge the regime’s narrative or act independently risk retaliation, including arbitrary dismissal. Meanwhile, the SPLM-IG regime repeatedly extends the mandate of an unelected legislature subservient to the executive to delay crucial political dialogue and electoral reforms, maintain a façade of transitional legitimacy, and entrench the regime’s grip on power.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary lacks the independence required to challenge executive overreach, primarily because judges are appointed and dismissed directly by the President. This creates a judicial environment highly sensitive to political pressure, where courts are frequently used to provide a legal veneer for the arbitrary detention of activists and political rivals. A prominent example is the leveling of grave charges, such as treason and subverting constitutional government, against PCCA co-founders like Kuel Aguer Kuel. Furthermore, this system fosters a culture of absolute impunity for state actors; crimes committed by the NSS or military officers, including the 2020 Juba land dispute killings, rarely reach trial, and high-ranking officials remain consistently shielded from accountability.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to the regime’s interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, frequently face retaliation. A primary method of retaliation is the arbitrary dismissal of judges, a practice enabled by the transitional constitution, which grants the President the discretionary power to appoint and remove judicial officers. This authority is frequently exercised to purge the bench of independent voices; for instance, in 2017, President Salva Kiir dismissed at least 14 judges by decree after they went on strike to demand better working conditions and judicial autonomy. Among those removed was Justice Malek Mathiang Malek, who subsequently challenged his dismissal at the regional East African Court of Justice (EACJ). Although the EACJ ruled in his favor in 2020, the regime refused to reinstate him.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. Despite extensive documentation by international bodies—such as the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (UNMISS)—regarding extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, and the misappropriation of state resources, no senior political or military figures have been held legally responsible. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2016 Terrain Hotel attack, in which regime agents gang-raped foreign aid workers and murdered a local journalist, low-level soldiers were eventually convicted under intense international scrutiny, but the regime failed to pursue the command responsibility of the political and military elite who oversaw the units involved.
The regime subjects legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Given the bloated size of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly (R-TNLA) and the fact that its members are non-elected appointees, the legislature is defined by a state of engineered stagnation. Pieces of legislation, such as the National Elections Act and the permanent constitution-making process, have been stalled for years, ensuring that the legal framework for a democratic transition remains incomplete and thereby indefinitely extends the political authority of temporary appointees. This legislative bloat serves as a deliberate strategy of shared impunity, creating a collective veto for a political elite that is incentivized to maintain the status quo; consequently, the parliament has unilaterally extended its own term and the president’s mandate multiple times, circumventing the need for popular consent. Because these officials owe their positions and salaries to the peace agreement’s appointment quotas rather than a popular mandate, they are structurally discouraged from enacting reforms that would lead to genuine democratic competition, which would likely result in their loss of power. Furthermore, the executive branch maintains control over the assembly’s agenda through the consensus requirement of the R-ARCSS, which allows any major party to block progress on sensitive issues, such as security sector reform or judicial independence.
The R-TGoNU regime systematically undermines the independence and operational capacity of key institutions through targeted reforms. This is primarily achieved through a strategy of administrative suppression, whereby critical oversight bodies—such as the National Elections Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Council (PPC), which is responsible for ensuring that a multi-party system thrives by enhancing dialogue and negotiation between political actors —are rendered ineffective. The regime deliberately withholds necessary funding, delays the appointment of impartial leadership, and postpones the enactment of secondary legislation or administrative procedures essential for these institutions to function effectively. Such measures prevent these bodies from establishing the foundational frameworks required for credible democratic processes. This deliberate immobilization hampers the development of a fair electoral environment and preserves the current power structure.
HRF classifies South Sudan as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
South Sudan is a de facto presidential republic, and the Head of State, Salva Kiir, assumed power as the leader of Sudan’s erstwhile semiautonomous region of Southern Sudan after the southern Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for separation in 2011, following two decades of civil war with the northern-dominated central government. Since independence, however, a violent power struggle between Kiir, the head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Government (SPLM-IG), and his rival Riek Machar, the head of the the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition SPLM-IO, has splintered the main political movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, and plunged the country into a stasis of recurring factional armed conflict and political and ethnic violence. As a result, South Sudan suffers from one of the world’s worst man-made humanitarian crises, with more than two-thirds of the population, totaling over 9.3 million, requiring urgent humanitarian assistance, with more than four million of those either internally displaced or refugees in neighboring countries.
National-level elections have been absent in South Sudan since the country’s independence in 2011, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. As a result, the unelected Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU)—a power-sharing regime set up in 2020 between the previously warring factions of the SPLM-IG (In Government) of Kiir and SPLM-IO (In Opposition) of rival Machiar setup— represents the highest density of unelected constitutional post-holders in Africa. The R-TGoNU has repeatedly failed to hold elections and delayed them due to a lack of political will for the implementation of crucial pre-election benchmarks stipulated in a 2018 peace deal.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The R-TGoNU maintains control through the unchecked powers of the National Security Service (NSS), which employs arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions, and enforced disappearances against human rights defenders, journalists, and activists. Critical media outlets are censored, intimidated, or shut down, leading to widespread self-censorship and a decline in free expression. Political opponents and civil society leaders who criticize corruption or election delays encounter bureaucratic obstacles, harassment, and false charges, prompting many to flee the country and severely weakening the civic space essential for democracy.
Institutions in South Sudan largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. This is primarily due to political capture, a lack of resources, and the systematic non-implementation of mandated reforms. The transitional legislature, while reconstituted, often operates as a rubber stamp for the executive, delaying critical laws and lacking the political leverage to hold powerful R-TGoNU figures accountable. Vital oversight mechanisms required by the peace agreement—such as the National Elections Commission and anti-corruption bodies—have often been either inadequately funded or deliberately stalled, ensuring that these institutions remain powerless and unable to challenge the regime’s continuous consolidation of power.
National-level elections have been absent in South Sudan since the country’s independence in 2011, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. By repeatedly delaying elections, targeting political opponents, intentionally stalling or undermining the establishment of foundational electoral frameworks and oversight mechanisms, and ensuring that the pervasive threat of political insecurity remains, the ruling SPLM-IG forestalls any possibility of electoral competition for power.
The regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition candidates’ electoral campaigns. The SPLM-IG has consistently targeted significant opposition figures, such as First Vice President Riek Machar and other leaders of the SPLM-IO political faction. For example, in March 2025, the regime placed Machar under house arrest for allegedly supporting the White Army, a pro-SPLM-IO armed group. Machar’s supporters argue that his detention has effectively voided the 2018 peace deal. In August 2021, regime operatives arrested Machar’s ally, Kuel Aguer Kuel, the former Governor of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State, because he signed a document approving peaceful protests for President Kiir’s removal. Kuel remained in arbitrary custody for more than twelve months without facing any formal charges. In October 2021, he was eventually arraigned and faced eight criminal counts, including the attempt to unconstitutionally overthrow the government.
The R-TGoNU seriously undermines independent electoral oversight. A key pre-electoral benchmark of the peace agreement was the full reformation and operationalization of the National Elections Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Council (PPC), a regulatory body responsible for registering and monitoring the activities of all political parties in the country. However, these bodies remain under-resourced, lack the financial and logistical autonomy to plan a complex national poll, and are often staffed by political appointees lacking genuine neutrality. This calculated failure to establish well-funded, independent, and institutionally empowered oversight bodies ensures that the R-TGoNU retains total control over the pace and conditions of the transitional process, rendering any future electoral monitoring mechanism weak and politically susceptible to the incumbent regime.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society figures, organizations, and ordinary citizens face overt and systematic retaliation whenever they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The SPLM-IG regime maintains its grip on power by employing a strategic blend of bureaucratic chokeholds to shutter the nation’s independent media outlets—particularly those providing a voice to civil society—alongside the targeted application of physical violence and lethal force. This strategy of intimidation extends beyond the media; political activists and humanitarian aid workers are routinely subjected to arbitrary detention, instilling a climate of fear that permeates every level of society. In addition to violently cracking down on protests, the regime’s security apparatus extends its reach through transnational operations, targeting critics in neighboring countries with kidnappings and forced returns.
The regime unfairly shuts down major independent, dissenting organizations. This is done either through physical targeting or administrative chokeholds, like revoking licenses. In July 2024, Intrepid South Sudan, a non-profit civil society organization (CSO) focused on peacebuilding, human rights, democracy, and empowering youth, faced an abrupt closure of its office in Bor, after NSS agents accused the organization of promoting civil unrest and protests over salaries. Though the office was reopened in August 2024 after negotiations, this incident highlights broader issues with shrinking civic space in the country. In August 2021, regime agents raided and shut down the offices of Radio Jonglei, and briefly detained three of its journalists – Matuor Mabior Anyang, Ayuen Garang Kur and Deng Gai Deng – and confiscated their mobile phones on suspension of sympathizing with the People’s Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA), a civic organization that aims at mobilizing democratic rights, after the radio station allegedly broadcasted a call urging their listeners to join a protest scheduled a few days later.
The SPLM-IG regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. Rajab Mohandis, the Executive Director of the Organization for Responsive Governance (ORG), joined forces with Governor Kuel to co-found the PCCA, an umbrella group that issued a bold manifesto demanding the resignation of the transitional government due to its failure to implement the peace agreement. While Kuel was arrested shortly after the manifesto’s release, in July 2021, and held for over a year, Mohandis managed to evade capture during a NSS raid on his office, and has since been forced into exile.
In January 2023, six journalists from the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SSBC) were detained for weeks without charge. They were targeted following the viral circulation of a video showing President Salva Kiir in an embarrassing light during an official event. In July 2021, Alfred Angasi, a news presenter with the SSBC, was arrested and held in arbitrary detention for more than two weeks after he refused to read part of a presidential decree during a news program. Journalists working for or associated with the United Nations-administered Radio Miraya have been arbitrarily detained and harassed on an ongoing basis. In August 2021, a Radio Miraya reporter was physically assaulted by a bodyguard of a Vice President for allegedly taking a photograph during a public event. In another incident, George Livio, another reporter at Radio Miraya, was held incommunicado for over 1,000 days in a National Security facility without charges before his release in 2017.
In August 2025, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) suspended all operational activities in Yei River and Morobo counties in South Sudan’s Central Equatoria State following the abduction of an MSF staff member by the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF), the regime’s official military force. Separately, in the same month, men dressed in SSPDF uniforms abducted another aid worker, James Unguba, in the county of Tambura in Western Equatoria state. He died in captivity on September 3, 2025, according to witness testimonies.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. The SPLM-IG regime utilizes a combination of aggressive security measures, including preemptive digital shutdowns and the use of lethal force against protestors. A notable example occurred on August 30, 2021, when the regime shut down internet access nationwide to preemptively stifle planned anti-corruption protests, which were subsequently prevented from taking place. A separate confrontation in Juba in June 2020 further demonstrates the regime’s readiness to use physical violence to stifle protests. The incident originated from a land dispute between local residents and armed military officers, reportedly led by Lieutenant Lual Akook Wol Kiir, a relative of President Salva Kiir, over property allegedly built on private land. According to witnesses, the Lieutenant’s forces opened fire randomly, resulting in the immediate deaths of three residents and injuries to at least seven others; a fourth resident later died from critical wounds. When approximately 1,000 people marched to a local police post to protest these killings, police and military officers responded by killing one man and injuring several more.
The SPLM-IG regime engages in transnational repression against dissidents abroad, including through surveillance or other forms of intimidation. The NSS has targeted critics and political opponents in neighboring countries like Kenya and Uganda with threats, harassment, kidnappings, and forced returns. A prominent example is the case of Morris Mabior Awikjok, a human rights advocate who was forcibly taken from his residence in Nairobi, Kenya, in February 2023. He was subsequently held in an NSS facility in Juba for three months without formal charges. Although he was granted bail in April 2024 following a defamation charge brought against him by the NSS Director General, Akol Koor Kuc, the NSS continued to detain him under the purported investigation of state crimes. In 2017, two outspoken political activists and critics, Dong Samuel Luak and Aggrey Ezbon Idri, were forcibly disappeared from Nairobi by NSS agents, only to be later killed after being unlawfully returned to South Sudan.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Institutional failure in South Sudan is characterized by a system where loyalty to the SPLM-IG leadership supersedes constitutional mandates, effectively undermining the rule of law and public accountability. Courts frequently act as tools to legitimize arbitrary detention and repression of political opponents, while high-ranking officials, security actors, and judges who challenge the regime’s narrative or act independently risk retaliation, including arbitrary dismissal. Meanwhile, the SPLM-IG regime repeatedly extends the mandate of an unelected legislature subservient to the executive to delay crucial political dialogue and electoral reforms, maintain a façade of transitional legitimacy, and entrench the regime’s grip on power.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary lacks the independence required to challenge executive overreach, primarily because judges are appointed and dismissed directly by the President. This creates a judicial environment highly sensitive to political pressure, where courts are frequently used to provide a legal veneer for the arbitrary detention of activists and political rivals. A prominent example is the leveling of grave charges, such as treason and subverting constitutional government, against PCCA co-founders like Kuel Aguer Kuel. Furthermore, this system fosters a culture of absolute impunity for state actors; crimes committed by the NSS or military officers, including the 2020 Juba land dispute killings, rarely reach trial, and high-ranking officials remain consistently shielded from accountability.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to the regime’s interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, frequently face retaliation. A primary method of retaliation is the arbitrary dismissal of judges, a practice enabled by the transitional constitution, which grants the President the discretionary power to appoint and remove judicial officers. This authority is frequently exercised to purge the bench of independent voices; for instance, in 2017, President Salva Kiir dismissed at least 14 judges by decree after they went on strike to demand better working conditions and judicial autonomy. Among those removed was Justice Malek Mathiang Malek, who subsequently challenged his dismissal at the regional East African Court of Justice (EACJ). Although the EACJ ruled in his favor in 2020, the regime refused to reinstate him.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. Despite extensive documentation by international bodies—such as the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (UNMISS)—regarding extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, and the misappropriation of state resources, no senior political or military figures have been held legally responsible. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2016 Terrain Hotel attack, in which regime agents gang-raped foreign aid workers and murdered a local journalist, low-level soldiers were eventually convicted under intense international scrutiny, but the regime failed to pursue the command responsibility of the political and military elite who oversaw the units involved.
The regime subjects legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Given the bloated size of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly (R-TNLA) and the fact that its members are non-elected appointees, the legislature is defined by a state of engineered stagnation. Pieces of legislation, such as the National Elections Act and the permanent constitution-making process, have been stalled for years, ensuring that the legal framework for a democratic transition remains incomplete and thereby indefinitely extends the political authority of temporary appointees. This legislative bloat serves as a deliberate strategy of shared impunity, creating a collective veto for a political elite that is incentivized to maintain the status quo; consequently, the parliament has unilaterally extended its own term and the president’s mandate multiple times, circumventing the need for popular consent. Because these officials owe their positions and salaries to the peace agreement’s appointment quotas rather than a popular mandate, they are structurally discouraged from enacting reforms that would lead to genuine democratic competition, which would likely result in their loss of power. Furthermore, the executive branch maintains control over the assembly’s agenda through the consensus requirement of the R-ARCSS, which allows any major party to block progress on sensitive issues, such as security sector reform or judicial independence.
The R-TGoNU regime systematically undermines the independence and operational capacity of key institutions through targeted reforms. This is primarily achieved through a strategy of administrative suppression, whereby critical oversight bodies—such as the National Elections Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Council (PPC), which is responsible for ensuring that a multi-party system thrives by enhancing dialogue and negotiation between political actors —are rendered ineffective. The regime deliberately withholds necessary funding, delays the appointment of impartial leadership, and postpones the enactment of secondary legislation or administrative procedures essential for these institutions to function effectively. Such measures prevent these bodies from establishing the foundational frameworks required for credible democratic processes. This deliberate immobilization hampers the development of a fair electoral environment and preserves the current power structure.
