Democracy
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HRF classifies South Africa as democratic.
Since transitioning to a multiracial democracy in 1994, after decades of white minority rule under the repressive apartheid system, South Africa has held one of the most robust democratic political systems on the African continent. The 1996 constitution, the product of two years of all-inclusive public consultations, remains one of the world’s most advanced charters, with a Bill of Rights second to none. The separation of powers and independent judiciary have withstood threats to democracy emanating from extreme inequality, public corruption, and some administrations’ attempts to undermine checks and balances.
Elections are largely free and fair. Political parties enjoy vibrant electoral competition marked by the protection of political rights such as freedom of speech, association, and assembly. Political parties are free to compete for public office, and the electorate can vote and determine the election outcome without coercion.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to criticize or challenge the government openly. There is a vibrant, independent, and critical media, and regular protests are primarily peaceful and free from excessive force.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government, consistently restraining attempts to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, or weaken accountability mechanisms. It plays a crucial role in political and democratic oversight by examining the actions of the government and those of political entities.
National elections in South Africa are largely free and fair. The government does not unfairly bar the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections. South African elections are transparent, having clear and accessible information on the election procedure and results. Furthermore, elections are managed by an impartial body, the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), which is free from political influence and is overseen by the Electoral Court. The election process, methods, and results are considered secure, verifiable, and prompt.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Political parties are largely free to compete for public office. However, in March 2024, the ANC sought the deregistration of MK from the IEC, alleging that irregularities marred its registration process. The Electoral Court dismissed the case, upholding the IEC’s decision to register MK. Also, the real, mainstream opposition in South Africa enjoys the protection of political rights such as freedom of speech, association, and assembly, and an equal opportunity and chance of accessing public forums, media, and funding.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. The election process is characterized by serious contests among political parties, and mainstream opposition parties’ campaigns are not hindered. The electorate is free to vote and determine the election outcome without coercion. There are no indications of widespread vote rigging or significant electoral malpractices. However, while four of the top five political parties—the ANC, DA, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)—accepted the results of the 2024 elections, the main opposition party, MK, disputed the election outcome since it was announced on June 2, taking the case to the Electoral Court, citing “serious election irregularities,” denouncing the election as neither free nor fair, and seeking the proclamation of a new election.
In South Africa, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to criticize or challenge the government openly. The media landscape is vibrant, and protests and dissenting speech are allowed to occur. While there are isolated cases of intimidation and violence, the government largely does not retaliate against dissenting speech.
Although the nation enjoys a dynamic, vibrant, independent, and critical media, there have been allegations of the ruling party using it as a promotional stage through political influence and interference. For instance, during Jacob Zuma’s presidency (2009-2018), it is alleged that the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) enforced editorial policies that favored the ruling party, censoring content critical of the government. Furthermore, the president appoints board members, making the SABC board predominantly comprised of ANC loyalists. Additionally, Phathiswa Magopeni, the former Head of News and Current Affairs at the SABC, was allegedly pressurized by the SABC CEO and SABC Chairperson to allocate more airtime to the ANC during elections and to conduct additional interviews with President Ramaphosa.
The government does not engage in systematic intimidation of dissenting people or entities. However, there have been instances where such intimidation has occurred. For example, in August 2022, 22 civil society organizations penned an open letter to President Ramaphosa addressing attacks against civil society and the shrinking space for civic engagement. Additionally, the media has raised concerns over a “growing trend” of physically intimidating journalists. For instance, from 2017 to 2022, there were 59 recorded incidents of physical attacks and harassment, with the South African Police Service (SAPS) and political parties identified as the main perpetrators.
There is a pattern of retaliation and attacks against dissenting grassroots organizations, human rights defenders, and whistleblowers in South Africa. Although there are no established links to the government, these cases often involve the government as a third party, and the government has been criticized for failing to pursue these cases or provide justice. Human rights defenders have experienced smear campaigns, threats, and harassment from state and non-state entities. For instance, the Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) has had 24 of its members murdered between 2009 and 2022, with only two cases leading to criminal convictions.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Protests in South Africa are frequent and widespread, often rooted in socioeconomic grievances. However, there have been severe but rare cases where the government used excessive force against protesters. In August 2012, 34 striking mine workers were shot dead by the SAPS. Furthermore, in 2021, South Africa experienced significant riots following the arrest of former President Zuma, marking the worst unrest since apartheid. The government deployed 25,000 soldiers to assist the police in controlling looters, resulting in 354 riot-related deaths.
The government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. However, there have been isolated incidents where the government has been accused of censoring dissent. In 2016, the SABC declined to cover protests, citing the need to prevent further violence. This was perceived as an effort to suppress news and control content. Eight journalists were fired after disagreeing with the ban on covering violent protests. The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) accused the SABC of blocking the public’s right to information and acting outside its power, demanding that the SABC withdraw its resolution to ban the broadcasting of violent protests. Although the SABC initially refused to comply with ICASA’s ruling, it rescinded the ban on protest coverage in July 2016.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government, consistently restraining attempts to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, or weaken accountability mechanisms.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Through the Electoral Court of South Africa, a special court that oversees the IEC and elections, the judiciary in South Africa has mechanisms for electoral dispute resolution and avenues for elected officials to be held accountable for any electoral regulation violations. To illustrate, the ANC lost several court cases it brought against the newly formed uMkonto weSizwe (MK) party in an attempt to disqualify and deregister the party, alleging that irregularities marred the registration process. The case was dismissed by the Electoral Court, which upheld the IEC’s decision to register MK. Furthermore, a 2016 Constitutional Court ruling stated that the IEC had failed to fulfill its obligation to ensure that the voters’ roll contained sufficient details to allow for free and fair elections.
The South African government has not seriously undermined judicial independence to the point where cases are no longer brought to the courts. However, in 2015, during an African Union summit, it defied a High Court ruling that ordered former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, wanted by the International Criminal Court, to remain in the country for arrest. The government granted him safe passage, undermining the judiciary.
Judicial institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government authority officials accountable. Courts in South Africa frequently uphold sentences for a wide range of offenses. In June 2021, former President Zuma was charged and sentenced for contempt of court after defying a commission investigating corruption allegations.
HRF classifies South Africa as democratic.
Since transitioning to a multiracial democracy in 1994, after decades of white minority rule under the repressive apartheid system, South Africa has held one of the most robust democratic political systems on the African continent. The 1996 constitution, the product of two years of all-inclusive public consultations, remains one of the world’s most advanced charters, with a Bill of Rights second to none. The separation of powers and independent judiciary have withstood threats to democracy emanating from extreme inequality, public corruption, and some administrations’ attempts to undermine checks and balances.
Elections are largely free and fair. Political parties enjoy vibrant electoral competition marked by the protection of political rights such as freedom of speech, association, and assembly. Political parties are free to compete for public office, and the electorate can vote and determine the election outcome without coercion.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to criticize or challenge the government openly. There is a vibrant, independent, and critical media, and regular protests are primarily peaceful and free from excessive force.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government, consistently restraining attempts to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, or weaken accountability mechanisms. It plays a crucial role in political and democratic oversight by examining the actions of the government and those of political entities.
National elections in South Africa are largely free and fair. The government does not unfairly bar the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections. South African elections are transparent, having clear and accessible information on the election procedure and results. Furthermore, elections are managed by an impartial body, the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), which is free from political influence and is overseen by the Electoral Court. The election process, methods, and results are considered secure, verifiable, and prompt.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Political parties are largely free to compete for public office. However, in March 2024, the ANC sought the deregistration of MK from the IEC, alleging that irregularities marred its registration process. The Electoral Court dismissed the case, upholding the IEC’s decision to register MK. Also, the real, mainstream opposition in South Africa enjoys the protection of political rights such as freedom of speech, association, and assembly, and an equal opportunity and chance of accessing public forums, media, and funding.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. The election process is characterized by serious contests among political parties, and mainstream opposition parties’ campaigns are not hindered. The electorate is free to vote and determine the election outcome without coercion. There are no indications of widespread vote rigging or significant electoral malpractices. However, while four of the top five political parties—the ANC, DA, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)—accepted the results of the 2024 elections, the main opposition party, MK, disputed the election outcome since it was announced on June 2, taking the case to the Electoral Court, citing “serious election irregularities,” denouncing the election as neither free nor fair, and seeking the proclamation of a new election.
In South Africa, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to criticize or challenge the government openly. The media landscape is vibrant, and protests and dissenting speech are allowed to occur. While there are isolated cases of intimidation and violence, the government largely does not retaliate against dissenting speech.
Although the nation enjoys a dynamic, vibrant, independent, and critical media, there have been allegations of the ruling party using it as a promotional stage through political influence and interference. For instance, during Jacob Zuma’s presidency (2009-2018), it is alleged that the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) enforced editorial policies that favored the ruling party, censoring content critical of the government. Furthermore, the president appoints board members, making the SABC board predominantly comprised of ANC loyalists. Additionally, Phathiswa Magopeni, the former Head of News and Current Affairs at the SABC, was allegedly pressurized by the SABC CEO and SABC Chairperson to allocate more airtime to the ANC during elections and to conduct additional interviews with President Ramaphosa.
The government does not engage in systematic intimidation of dissenting people or entities. However, there have been instances where such intimidation has occurred. For example, in August 2022, 22 civil society organizations penned an open letter to President Ramaphosa addressing attacks against civil society and the shrinking space for civic engagement. Additionally, the media has raised concerns over a “growing trend” of physically intimidating journalists. For instance, from 2017 to 2022, there were 59 recorded incidents of physical attacks and harassment, with the South African Police Service (SAPS) and political parties identified as the main perpetrators.
There is a pattern of retaliation and attacks against dissenting grassroots organizations, human rights defenders, and whistleblowers in South Africa. Although there are no established links to the government, these cases often involve the government as a third party, and the government has been criticized for failing to pursue these cases or provide justice. Human rights defenders have experienced smear campaigns, threats, and harassment from state and non-state entities. For instance, the Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) has had 24 of its members murdered between 2009 and 2022, with only two cases leading to criminal convictions.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Protests in South Africa are frequent and widespread, often rooted in socioeconomic grievances. However, there have been severe but rare cases where the government used excessive force against protesters. In August 2012, 34 striking mine workers were shot dead by the SAPS. Furthermore, in 2021, South Africa experienced significant riots following the arrest of former President Zuma, marking the worst unrest since apartheid. The government deployed 25,000 soldiers to assist the police in controlling looters, resulting in 354 riot-related deaths.
The government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. However, there have been isolated incidents where the government has been accused of censoring dissent. In 2016, the SABC declined to cover protests, citing the need to prevent further violence. This was perceived as an effort to suppress news and control content. Eight journalists were fired after disagreeing with the ban on covering violent protests. The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) accused the SABC of blocking the public’s right to information and acting outside its power, demanding that the SABC withdraw its resolution to ban the broadcasting of violent protests. Although the SABC initially refused to comply with ICASA’s ruling, it rescinded the ban on protest coverage in July 2016.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government, consistently restraining attempts to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, or weaken accountability mechanisms.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Through the Electoral Court of South Africa, a special court that oversees the IEC and elections, the judiciary in South Africa has mechanisms for electoral dispute resolution and avenues for elected officials to be held accountable for any electoral regulation violations. To illustrate, the ANC lost several court cases it brought against the newly formed uMkonto weSizwe (MK) party in an attempt to disqualify and deregister the party, alleging that irregularities marred the registration process. The case was dismissed by the Electoral Court, which upheld the IEC’s decision to register MK. Furthermore, a 2016 Constitutional Court ruling stated that the IEC had failed to fulfill its obligation to ensure that the voters’ roll contained sufficient details to allow for free and fair elections.
The South African government has not seriously undermined judicial independence to the point where cases are no longer brought to the courts. However, in 2015, during an African Union summit, it defied a High Court ruling that ordered former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, wanted by the International Criminal Court, to remain in the country for arrest. The government granted him safe passage, undermining the judiciary.
Judicial institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government authority officials accountable. Courts in South Africa frequently uphold sentences for a wide range of offenses. In June 2021, former President Zuma was charged and sentenced for contempt of court after defying a commission investigating corruption allegations.
