Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Somalia as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Following the 1991 collapse of Siad Barre’s military regime, Somalia entered a prolonged period of state failure defined by internal conflict, clan-based fragmentation, and the rise of extremist groups like Al-Shabaab – an extremist armed organized group (OAG) which primarily exerts control over rural swathes of southern and central Somalia. While the 2012 transition to a permanent federal government signaled a move toward institutional recovery, the nation remains a complex patchwork of six recognized Federal Member States (FMSs) and the de facto independent Republic of Somaliland. Each of these member states has a certain – and varied – degree of autonomy, in economic, political, and social terms, from the internationally recognized Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu. Somalia is characterized by a fragile balance of power, where the FGS has increasingly sought to centralize authority and consolidate executive control by leveraging the security crisis and co-opting traditional clan structures, often at the expense of regional autonomy and constitutional progress.
Elections in Somalia are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Somalia’s “4.5 formula” institutionalizes a clan-based system that distributes political power among four major clans while relegating all other minority groups to a shared “0.5” status, effectively marginalizing them from high-level decision-making. Since the state’s collapse in 1991, indirect electoral cycles have been frequently marred by voting irregularities, including widespread allegations of bribery, seat-buying, and manipulation by both federal and regional authorities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. In areas under the control of the FGS, dissidents face a sophisticated system of regime-led intimidation characterized by the frequent use of the national security apparatus to stifle criticism. Journalists and activists must navigate red lines where crossing powerful political figures can lead to arbitrary detention, the shuttering of media outlets, and the controversial weaponization of an outdated penal system to prosecute civilians on security-related charges.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Instead, the constitutional promise of a balanced federation remains unfulfilled, as power is consolidated within an executive branch that has become adept at navigating and manipulating these fragile systems. By exerting influence over parliamentary agendas and ensuring judicial appointments remain politically aligned, the executive effectively bypasses institutional friction, allowing the state’s security and administrative apparatus to serve the interests of the current leadership rather than the mandates of the law.
Elections in Somalia are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The institutionalization of Somalia’s indirect voting system functions as a structural disenfranchisement mechanism, replacing a popular mandate with a tiered citizenship that commodifies political participation through high entry fees and exclusionary power-sharing. This framework enables the regime to engage in legalistic autocracy, utilizing the narrative of transitioning to universal suffrage as a strategic tool to centralize executive authority. By codifying a three-party limit and packing electoral boards with loyalists, the regime creates a gatekeeping apparatus that effectively prices out the average citizen while forcing mainstream opposition into a cycle of boycotts and alienation, and marginalizes minority groups under the guise of stabilizing national reforms.
Elections in Somalia have historically functioned through an indirect, clan-based model rather than a direct one-person, one-vote system. In this system, clan elders select delegates, who then elect members of the Lower House of Parliament. State legislatures elect members of the Upper House. These two houses then come together to elect the President. Somalia’s reliance on the 4.5 clan-based power-sharing system—which allocates equal political representation to the Dir, Isaaq, Darood, and Hawiye clans while relegating minority groups to a half-share—functions as a structural blockade against mainstream political opposition. By prioritizing patrilineal lineage over ideological platforms, this framework ensures that political challengers lack a realistic path to meaningfully compete or win, as power remains brokered through traditional hierarchies rather than a popular mandate. The progression of this system began in 2012, when a small group of 135 male clan leaders held the exclusive power to appoint all 275 members of parliament. By 2016, a multi-layered approach was introduced where these elders selected electoral colleges of 51 members to vote for each legislative seat. Although the size of these colleges expanded to 101 members by 2021, the total number of participants reached only about 28,000, leaving the vast majority of the citizenry excluded from the electoral process.
The regime engages in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. In August 2024, the FGS unanimously approved the Political Associations and Parties Bill and the National Electoral Bill, which it promoted as a transition from the traditional 4.5 clan-based system to a direct “one-person, one-vote.” However, the model risks constraining pluralism. For instance, the new controversial unilateral electoral law dictates that all members of parliament must belong to one of three legislated national parties. The FGS defends this restriction as a stabilizing measure designed to prevent the fragmentation of the political landscape along narrow sub-clan lines and to ensure a manageable electoral process. Opponents argue it represents a significant blow to electoral inclusivity. By establishing a legal ceiling on the number of parties, the regime effectively creates a gatekeeping mechanism where the criteria for registration—such as high financial fees or the requirement for a specific membership quota across all FMSs—can be weaponized to favor regime incumbents.
The history of electoral irregularities in Somalia is defined by the monetization of the indirect 4.5 clan-based voting system, where parliamentary seats are frequently secured through massive financial bribes rather than popular mandate. During the selection of President Mohamud in his first non-sequential term in 2012, the voting system was compromised at its foundation. Reports indicate that many clan elders were paid approximately $5,000 in bribes to select specific representatives for Parliament. By the next cycle, the “price of democracy” skyrocketed. While some elders were reportedly offered $3,000, the competition for the presidency led to massive capital injections; other candidates offered up to $1.3 million in bribes to secure a parliamentary seat. In 2022, President Mohamud secured 214 out of the 328 parliamentary votes (65.2 percent). The 2017 electoral cycle also established steep financial barriers to entry, mandating that Upper House nominees contribute $20,000 to participate, while those seeking seats in the Lower House were charged $10,000. While the regime defended these high registration fees as a necessary mechanism for financing the country’s voting infrastructure, the practical effect was the exclusion of the average citizen. Consequently, the political arena became the exclusive domain of the affluent elite and those backed by wealthy benefactors, effectively pricing out most Somalis from the electoral process.
The real, mainstream opposition threatens to or ultimately boycott the elections, as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition. The FGS’s move away from consultative frameworks has created a volatile political environment characterized by the boycott of key stakeholders. By alienating essential stakeholders in its effort to usher in universal suffrage, the regime has transformed former allies into a formidable opposition bloc that increasingly views the transition to universal suffrage not as a democratic milestone, but as a unilateral power grab. High-profile figures such as Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, whose support was structurally vital during the 2022 elections, have transitioned into opposition roles and effectively withdrawn from the federal system in protest of the FSG’s unilateral constitutional changes. This trend of alienation extends to key ideological leaders like Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame and the leadership of Jubbaland, further narrowing the regime’s domestic legitimacy. The convergence of these disparate actors—including former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre—into a vocal opposition bloc, as evidenced by the formation of the Somali Future Council (previously known as the Somali Salvation Forum or Madasha Mustaqbal Soomaaliya, in Arabic) in October 2025, underscores the breakdown of the elite bargain that has been historically necessary for both Somali state-building and elections. Without the endorsement of these key actors and the regions they represent, the 2026 polls risk being restricted to Mogadishu alone, effectively ending the FGS’s claim to national authority and potentially leading to a total breakdown of the Somali state-building project.
Between 2020 and 2022, the Council of Presidential Candidates (CPC)—an umbrella group of opposition figures including Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—repeatedly threatened to boycott the electoral process. They accused then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo of packing electoral boards with loyalists, intelligence agents, and civil servants. However, despite their repeated efforts to characterize the 2022 as “illegal” and “fraudulent,” they ultimately chose to participate once the May 2021 Pact was reached, which shifted electoral management more toward the Prime Minister.
The regime systematically disenfranchises specific groups of voters. This disenfranchisement is rarely defined by explicit laws banning specific groups; instead, it occurs through the instrumentalization of the 4.5 Clan System. By institutionalizing a tiered citizenship, the 4.5 arrangement ensures that political power is unevenly distributed. This formula segregates the population into four primary groups and a marginalized “0.5” share, stripping minority groups of a fair stake in the nation’s governance based on arbitrary notions of clan purity. This constitutionalized structure divides power among four “major” pastoralist clans (Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and Rahanweyn) while lumping all other groups into a “0.5” caste category, effectively marginalizing them socially and politically. These groups include but are not limited to: Gabooye/Madhiban, Jareer/Bantu, and the Benadiri/Bravenese. While the 0.5 entitlement guarantees some seats in parliament (roughly 12 percent compared to the 88 percent shared by the four major clans), it ensures that these groups collectively can never outvote or hold the same weight as any single one of the four major clans.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The FGS maintains a monopoly over the national narrative by operationalizing archaic penal codes and recent legislation to reframe any form of dissent, including investigative journalism and peaceful assembly, as existential threats to national security. This paradigm shifts the state’s focus from legitimate counter-terrorism to the preservation of incumbency, utilizing arbitrary detention, extrajudicial raids, and the suppression of civil society to insulate the executive from accountability.
The regime unfairly shuts down or takes measures that lead to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. The escalating tension between the Somali state and independent media culminated in March 2025, when regime agents forcibly raided and closed the Mogadishu headquarters of the Risaala Media, an independent TV and radio outlet in Mogadishu. Five journalists were taken into arbitrary custody. The outlet was the first to report on an Al-Shabaab ambush directed at President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s motorcade near the entrance of the presidential palace (Villa Somalia). This crackdown was not an isolated incident but rather the execution of prior warnings. Only one week earlier, the Minister of Information, Daud Aweis, had publicly threatened the press with harsh repercussions for any reporting that highlighted security lapses in Mogadishu.
The FGS seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. This systematic suppression manifests through large-scale security sweeps, intelligence-led raids on journalists’ homes, and the practice of equating public dissent with support for insurgency to justify the arbitrary detention of critics. In the wake of an Al-Shabab ambush on a presidential motorcade in March 2025, federal police in Somalia conducted a sweep that led to the brief imprisonment of no fewer than 22 members of the press. During this period of heightened tension, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) targeted the private residences of several media professionals. Among those targeted was RTN TV’s Bahjo Abdullahi Salad, who was interrogated for several hours. The pretext for her arbitrary detention involved a deleted TikTok post in which she had criticized local government incompetence regarding waste management in Mogadishu. In the two months following the attack, FGS agents perpetrated at least 41 documented instances of arrest, physical assault, or harassment targeting independent journalists.
This regime weaponizes vaguely worded penal codes and the 2020 Media Law to silence opposition and independent reporting. Despite amendments, the 2020 Media Law contains vague language regarding “fake news” and “encouraging conflict,” which the executive branch uses to justify the arrest of journalists or the shuttering of outlets that provide platforms for the opposition. The most effective tool for hindering dissent is invoking “national security.” Because Somalia is in a state of active conflict with Al-Shabaab, any criticism of the FGS is frequently framed by the state as providing “aid and comfort to terrorists.” This framing effectively chills public discourse, as members of the general public fear that being labeled a “security threat” or an “insurgent sympathizer” can lead to indefinite detention or worse. In May 2020, independent journalist Mohamed Abdiwahab Nuur (“Abuuja”) was held incommunicado and reportedly subject to torture for several months. While the regime initially used security justifications, his detention stemmed from his reporting on the social impacts of regime policy, framed by officials as “spreading misinformation” and being a “member of Al-Shabab.” In August 2020, Nuur was acquitted by a military court and released.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. In November 2025, after local community members held a protest against a planned forced eviction and land grab in the Yaaqshiid district of Mogadishu. Armed FGS police attempted to violently disperse crowds using live ammunition, resulting in the killing of two protesters. In September 2025, the Mayor of Mogadishu, Hassan Mohamed Hussein “Muungaab,” banned all protests not explicitly cleared by his office and vowed that any such protest would be met with a “firm” security response. This came after opposition leaders vowed to hold peaceful demonstrations against President Mohamud’s regime, which they accuse of corruption, power grabs, and constitutional violations. This pattern of suppression aligns with tactics previously employed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) under the administration of former President Farmaajo. A notable precedent occurred in February 2021, when FGS agents opened fire on opposition supporters during a peaceful march in Mogadishu. That incident resulted in an undisclosed number of casualties, with several protesters killed or injured.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. This systemic failure manifests as executive aggrandizement, with the formal separation of powers being hollowed out through the deliberate maintenance of a legal vacuum, institutional purging, and the weaponization of presidential decrees. This cycle of patronage ensures that the judiciary functions as a tool of regime retaliation rather than an arbiter of law, effectively shielding regime agents from accountability while criminalizing dissent under the guise of protecting national security. By dismantling the operational effectiveness of electoral and judicial bodies, the regime has successfully transformed independent institutions into extensions of executive fiat, leading to a breakdown of the elite bargain and the resulting withdrawal of recognition from key federal member states.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The executive branch of the FGS has increasingly consolidated power through the use of presidential decrees, a trend facilitated by the persistent absence of a functional, independent Constitutional Court. Although the 2012 provisional constitution explicitly mandates a federal republic built upon the separation of powers, the lack of a neutral arbiter to resolve constitutional disputes has allowed executive authority to expand unchecked. This centralization of power is most visible in the executive’s historical interference with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC)—the body intended to safeguard the judiciary’s independence by overseeing the appointment, promotion, and discipline of judges.
This institutional erosion began as early as President Mohamud’s first term, when he issued a decree to dismiss the original JSC in 2015, effectively neutralizing its role as an independent watchdog. While the Somali court architecture is theoretically designed around a dual federal framework—comprising the Federal High Court at the national level and respective High Courts within the Federal Member States (FMS)—the transition to this model remains stalled. The consequences of this legal vacuum were further underscored during President Mohamud’s second term, when in October 2022, he once again used executive fiat to dissolve the JSC formed under his predecessor, former president Farmaajo, and rescind all its prior decisions. In his decree, President Mohamud cited a 2021 Upper House objection and ordered the cabinet to form a new commission, a move opposition members viewed as an effort to pack the body with loyalists. This repeated disruption of the commission’s mandate has created a persistent crisis of oversight; as of December 2025, the JSC has yet to be formally reconstituted, leaving a significant gap in judicial oversight and institutional independence.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The FGS regularly weaponizes the judiciary to shutter media houses and imprison dissidents under the guise of “national security” or “spreading false news.” For instance, after posting on social media that the FGS president’s office had taken a ventilator from a local hospital for its own use during the COVID pandemic, journalist Abdiaziz Gurbiye was arrested, and the Banadir regional court in Mogadishu sentenced him to six months in prison and a fine.
Judicial institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. At the highest level, the High Court has historically abdicated its role by avoiding rulings on the legality of term extensions or controversial executive decrees. This silence was most notable during the 2021 political crisis, when the judiciary failed to provide any legal check on the executive’s unilateral attempt to extend its mandate. This culture of avoidance extends to lower-level courts, which have actively shielded the regime’s use of force. Despite widespread evidence of state agents firing on peaceful protesters in February 2021, no military or police commanders faced successful prosecution in either civilian or military jurisdictions.
The case of Radio Mustaqbal further illustrates this judicial paralysis. Following a raid by regime agents on the station’s Mogadishu offices in April 2021, the outlet took the unprecedented step of filing a formal lawsuit against NISA Director Fahad Yasin and Presidential Spokesperson Abdinur Mohamed Ahmed. The suit alleged a calculated effort to dismantle the station’s operations and silence critical voices. However, the pursuit of justice was immediately stifled by the Attorney General’s Office, which refused to initiate investigations or issue subpoenas. While a police official eventually offered a verbal apology, no equipment was returned, no compensation was paid, and no agents were held accountable for the targeted harassment and beating of the station’s editor, Bashir Mohamud Yusuf.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, frequently face regime retaliation. This is achieved through a cycle of institutional purge and patronage, where members of the bench who act contrary to regime interests—or are perceived as threats to executive continuity—face immediate state retaliation. For instance, in May 2016, President Mohamud sacked Somalia’s chief justice, Aidid Ilkahanaf, who had served since 2011, and replaced him with Chief Justice Ibrahim Idle Suleiman, the former chief justice of the breakaway northern region of Somaliland, and a political ally of President Mohamud. Prior to his dismissal, Ilkahanaf frequently argued that the executive branch was overstepping its bounds in the appointment of judges without the proper vetting of a fully functional JSC. In September 2017, President Farmaajo dismissed 18 judges, including three judges from the Regional Appeals Court. In May 2018, he dismissed Chief Justice Suleiman, who originally hesitated to immediately carry out the mass firing of lower-court judges as part of an executive-led judicial overhaul, and replaced him with Bashe Yusuf Ahmed, a political ally of President Farmaajo.
The regime subjects legislative institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. A defining moment occurred in February 2025 with the passage of a landmark bill that fundamentally upended the constitutional balance of power. By granting the President unilateral authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister without legislative consent, the reform neutralized a position that had historically served as a critical check on executive overreach. This maneuver did more than merely centralize authority; it effectively dissolved the independent equilibrium of the executive-legislative relationship. The move triggered a profound constitutional crisis, prompting the semi-autonomous region of Puntland to disengage from the federal political process and formally withdraw its recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).
The regime subjects independent institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Through legislation passed in late 2024 (specifically the Election and Boundaries Commission Law), the regime unilaterally restructured the framework for national elections. The reform replaced the previously independent mandate of electoral bodies with a system designed to be self-serving. By stripping the commission of its neutral operational effectiveness and aligning it with laws that restrict political competition to only three state-sanctioned parties, the institution’s independence was effectively dissolved in favor of executive control.
HRF classifies Somalia as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Following the 1991 collapse of Siad Barre’s military regime, Somalia entered a prolonged period of state failure defined by internal conflict, clan-based fragmentation, and the rise of extremist groups like Al-Shabaab – an extremist armed organized group (OAG) which primarily exerts control over rural swathes of southern and central Somalia. While the 2012 transition to a permanent federal government signaled a move toward institutional recovery, the nation remains a complex patchwork of six recognized Federal Member States (FMSs) and the de facto independent Republic of Somaliland. Each of these member states has a certain – and varied – degree of autonomy, in economic, political, and social terms, from the internationally recognized Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu. Somalia is characterized by a fragile balance of power, where the FGS has increasingly sought to centralize authority and consolidate executive control by leveraging the security crisis and co-opting traditional clan structures, often at the expense of regional autonomy and constitutional progress.
Elections in Somalia are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Somalia’s “4.5 formula” institutionalizes a clan-based system that distributes political power among four major clans while relegating all other minority groups to a shared “0.5” status, effectively marginalizing them from high-level decision-making. Since the state’s collapse in 1991, indirect electoral cycles have been frequently marred by voting irregularities, including widespread allegations of bribery, seat-buying, and manipulation by both federal and regional authorities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. In areas under the control of the FGS, dissidents face a sophisticated system of regime-led intimidation characterized by the frequent use of the national security apparatus to stifle criticism. Journalists and activists must navigate red lines where crossing powerful political figures can lead to arbitrary detention, the shuttering of media outlets, and the controversial weaponization of an outdated penal system to prosecute civilians on security-related charges.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Instead, the constitutional promise of a balanced federation remains unfulfilled, as power is consolidated within an executive branch that has become adept at navigating and manipulating these fragile systems. By exerting influence over parliamentary agendas and ensuring judicial appointments remain politically aligned, the executive effectively bypasses institutional friction, allowing the state’s security and administrative apparatus to serve the interests of the current leadership rather than the mandates of the law.
Elections in Somalia are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The institutionalization of Somalia’s indirect voting system functions as a structural disenfranchisement mechanism, replacing a popular mandate with a tiered citizenship that commodifies political participation through high entry fees and exclusionary power-sharing. This framework enables the regime to engage in legalistic autocracy, utilizing the narrative of transitioning to universal suffrage as a strategic tool to centralize executive authority. By codifying a three-party limit and packing electoral boards with loyalists, the regime creates a gatekeeping apparatus that effectively prices out the average citizen while forcing mainstream opposition into a cycle of boycotts and alienation, and marginalizes minority groups under the guise of stabilizing national reforms.
Elections in Somalia have historically functioned through an indirect, clan-based model rather than a direct one-person, one-vote system. In this system, clan elders select delegates, who then elect members of the Lower House of Parliament. State legislatures elect members of the Upper House. These two houses then come together to elect the President. Somalia’s reliance on the 4.5 clan-based power-sharing system—which allocates equal political representation to the Dir, Isaaq, Darood, and Hawiye clans while relegating minority groups to a half-share—functions as a structural blockade against mainstream political opposition. By prioritizing patrilineal lineage over ideological platforms, this framework ensures that political challengers lack a realistic path to meaningfully compete or win, as power remains brokered through traditional hierarchies rather than a popular mandate. The progression of this system began in 2012, when a small group of 135 male clan leaders held the exclusive power to appoint all 275 members of parliament. By 2016, a multi-layered approach was introduced where these elders selected electoral colleges of 51 members to vote for each legislative seat. Although the size of these colleges expanded to 101 members by 2021, the total number of participants reached only about 28,000, leaving the vast majority of the citizenry excluded from the electoral process.
The regime engages in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. In August 2024, the FGS unanimously approved the Political Associations and Parties Bill and the National Electoral Bill, which it promoted as a transition from the traditional 4.5 clan-based system to a direct “one-person, one-vote.” However, the model risks constraining pluralism. For instance, the new controversial unilateral electoral law dictates that all members of parliament must belong to one of three legislated national parties. The FGS defends this restriction as a stabilizing measure designed to prevent the fragmentation of the political landscape along narrow sub-clan lines and to ensure a manageable electoral process. Opponents argue it represents a significant blow to electoral inclusivity. By establishing a legal ceiling on the number of parties, the regime effectively creates a gatekeeping mechanism where the criteria for registration—such as high financial fees or the requirement for a specific membership quota across all FMSs—can be weaponized to favor regime incumbents.
The history of electoral irregularities in Somalia is defined by the monetization of the indirect 4.5 clan-based voting system, where parliamentary seats are frequently secured through massive financial bribes rather than popular mandate. During the selection of President Mohamud in his first non-sequential term in 2012, the voting system was compromised at its foundation. Reports indicate that many clan elders were paid approximately $5,000 in bribes to select specific representatives for Parliament. By the next cycle, the “price of democracy” skyrocketed. While some elders were reportedly offered $3,000, the competition for the presidency led to massive capital injections; other candidates offered up to $1.3 million in bribes to secure a parliamentary seat. In 2022, President Mohamud secured 214 out of the 328 parliamentary votes (65.2 percent). The 2017 electoral cycle also established steep financial barriers to entry, mandating that Upper House nominees contribute $20,000 to participate, while those seeking seats in the Lower House were charged $10,000. While the regime defended these high registration fees as a necessary mechanism for financing the country’s voting infrastructure, the practical effect was the exclusion of the average citizen. Consequently, the political arena became the exclusive domain of the affluent elite and those backed by wealthy benefactors, effectively pricing out most Somalis from the electoral process.
The real, mainstream opposition threatens to or ultimately boycott the elections, as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition. The FGS’s move away from consultative frameworks has created a volatile political environment characterized by the boycott of key stakeholders. By alienating essential stakeholders in its effort to usher in universal suffrage, the regime has transformed former allies into a formidable opposition bloc that increasingly views the transition to universal suffrage not as a democratic milestone, but as a unilateral power grab. High-profile figures such as Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, whose support was structurally vital during the 2022 elections, have transitioned into opposition roles and effectively withdrawn from the federal system in protest of the FSG’s unilateral constitutional changes. This trend of alienation extends to key ideological leaders like Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame and the leadership of Jubbaland, further narrowing the regime’s domestic legitimacy. The convergence of these disparate actors—including former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre—into a vocal opposition bloc, as evidenced by the formation of the Somali Future Council (previously known as the Somali Salvation Forum or Madasha Mustaqbal Soomaaliya, in Arabic) in October 2025, underscores the breakdown of the elite bargain that has been historically necessary for both Somali state-building and elections. Without the endorsement of these key actors and the regions they represent, the 2026 polls risk being restricted to Mogadishu alone, effectively ending the FGS’s claim to national authority and potentially leading to a total breakdown of the Somali state-building project.
Between 2020 and 2022, the Council of Presidential Candidates (CPC)—an umbrella group of opposition figures including Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—repeatedly threatened to boycott the electoral process. They accused then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo of packing electoral boards with loyalists, intelligence agents, and civil servants. However, despite their repeated efforts to characterize the 2022 as “illegal” and “fraudulent,” they ultimately chose to participate once the May 2021 Pact was reached, which shifted electoral management more toward the Prime Minister.
The regime systematically disenfranchises specific groups of voters. This disenfranchisement is rarely defined by explicit laws banning specific groups; instead, it occurs through the instrumentalization of the 4.5 Clan System. By institutionalizing a tiered citizenship, the 4.5 arrangement ensures that political power is unevenly distributed. This formula segregates the population into four primary groups and a marginalized “0.5” share, stripping minority groups of a fair stake in the nation’s governance based on arbitrary notions of clan purity. This constitutionalized structure divides power among four “major” pastoralist clans (Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and Rahanweyn) while lumping all other groups into a “0.5” caste category, effectively marginalizing them socially and politically. These groups include but are not limited to: Gabooye/Madhiban, Jareer/Bantu, and the Benadiri/Bravenese. While the 0.5 entitlement guarantees some seats in parliament (roughly 12 percent compared to the 88 percent shared by the four major clans), it ensures that these groups collectively can never outvote or hold the same weight as any single one of the four major clans.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The FGS maintains a monopoly over the national narrative by operationalizing archaic penal codes and recent legislation to reframe any form of dissent, including investigative journalism and peaceful assembly, as existential threats to national security. This paradigm shifts the state’s focus from legitimate counter-terrorism to the preservation of incumbency, utilizing arbitrary detention, extrajudicial raids, and the suppression of civil society to insulate the executive from accountability.
The regime unfairly shuts down or takes measures that lead to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. The escalating tension between the Somali state and independent media culminated in March 2025, when regime agents forcibly raided and closed the Mogadishu headquarters of the Risaala Media, an independent TV and radio outlet in Mogadishu. Five journalists were taken into arbitrary custody. The outlet was the first to report on an Al-Shabaab ambush directed at President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s motorcade near the entrance of the presidential palace (Villa Somalia). This crackdown was not an isolated incident but rather the execution of prior warnings. Only one week earlier, the Minister of Information, Daud Aweis, had publicly threatened the press with harsh repercussions for any reporting that highlighted security lapses in Mogadishu.
The FGS seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. This systematic suppression manifests through large-scale security sweeps, intelligence-led raids on journalists’ homes, and the practice of equating public dissent with support for insurgency to justify the arbitrary detention of critics. In the wake of an Al-Shabab ambush on a presidential motorcade in March 2025, federal police in Somalia conducted a sweep that led to the brief imprisonment of no fewer than 22 members of the press. During this period of heightened tension, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) targeted the private residences of several media professionals. Among those targeted was RTN TV’s Bahjo Abdullahi Salad, who was interrogated for several hours. The pretext for her arbitrary detention involved a deleted TikTok post in which she had criticized local government incompetence regarding waste management in Mogadishu. In the two months following the attack, FGS agents perpetrated at least 41 documented instances of arrest, physical assault, or harassment targeting independent journalists.
This regime weaponizes vaguely worded penal codes and the 2020 Media Law to silence opposition and independent reporting. Despite amendments, the 2020 Media Law contains vague language regarding “fake news” and “encouraging conflict,” which the executive branch uses to justify the arrest of journalists or the shuttering of outlets that provide platforms for the opposition. The most effective tool for hindering dissent is invoking “national security.” Because Somalia is in a state of active conflict with Al-Shabaab, any criticism of the FGS is frequently framed by the state as providing “aid and comfort to terrorists.” This framing effectively chills public discourse, as members of the general public fear that being labeled a “security threat” or an “insurgent sympathizer” can lead to indefinite detention or worse. In May 2020, independent journalist Mohamed Abdiwahab Nuur (“Abuuja”) was held incommunicado and reportedly subject to torture for several months. While the regime initially used security justifications, his detention stemmed from his reporting on the social impacts of regime policy, framed by officials as “spreading misinformation” and being a “member of Al-Shabab.” In August 2020, Nuur was acquitted by a military court and released.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. In November 2025, after local community members held a protest against a planned forced eviction and land grab in the Yaaqshiid district of Mogadishu. Armed FGS police attempted to violently disperse crowds using live ammunition, resulting in the killing of two protesters. In September 2025, the Mayor of Mogadishu, Hassan Mohamed Hussein “Muungaab,” banned all protests not explicitly cleared by his office and vowed that any such protest would be met with a “firm” security response. This came after opposition leaders vowed to hold peaceful demonstrations against President Mohamud’s regime, which they accuse of corruption, power grabs, and constitutional violations. This pattern of suppression aligns with tactics previously employed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) under the administration of former President Farmaajo. A notable precedent occurred in February 2021, when FGS agents opened fire on opposition supporters during a peaceful march in Mogadishu. That incident resulted in an undisclosed number of casualties, with several protesters killed or injured.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. This systemic failure manifests as executive aggrandizement, with the formal separation of powers being hollowed out through the deliberate maintenance of a legal vacuum, institutional purging, and the weaponization of presidential decrees. This cycle of patronage ensures that the judiciary functions as a tool of regime retaliation rather than an arbiter of law, effectively shielding regime agents from accountability while criminalizing dissent under the guise of protecting national security. By dismantling the operational effectiveness of electoral and judicial bodies, the regime has successfully transformed independent institutions into extensions of executive fiat, leading to a breakdown of the elite bargain and the resulting withdrawal of recognition from key federal member states.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The executive branch of the FGS has increasingly consolidated power through the use of presidential decrees, a trend facilitated by the persistent absence of a functional, independent Constitutional Court. Although the 2012 provisional constitution explicitly mandates a federal republic built upon the separation of powers, the lack of a neutral arbiter to resolve constitutional disputes has allowed executive authority to expand unchecked. This centralization of power is most visible in the executive’s historical interference with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC)—the body intended to safeguard the judiciary’s independence by overseeing the appointment, promotion, and discipline of judges.
This institutional erosion began as early as President Mohamud’s first term, when he issued a decree to dismiss the original JSC in 2015, effectively neutralizing its role as an independent watchdog. While the Somali court architecture is theoretically designed around a dual federal framework—comprising the Federal High Court at the national level and respective High Courts within the Federal Member States (FMS)—the transition to this model remains stalled. The consequences of this legal vacuum were further underscored during President Mohamud’s second term, when in October 2022, he once again used executive fiat to dissolve the JSC formed under his predecessor, former president Farmaajo, and rescind all its prior decisions. In his decree, President Mohamud cited a 2021 Upper House objection and ordered the cabinet to form a new commission, a move opposition members viewed as an effort to pack the body with loyalists. This repeated disruption of the commission’s mandate has created a persistent crisis of oversight; as of December 2025, the JSC has yet to be formally reconstituted, leaving a significant gap in judicial oversight and institutional independence.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The FGS regularly weaponizes the judiciary to shutter media houses and imprison dissidents under the guise of “national security” or “spreading false news.” For instance, after posting on social media that the FGS president’s office had taken a ventilator from a local hospital for its own use during the COVID pandemic, journalist Abdiaziz Gurbiye was arrested, and the Banadir regional court in Mogadishu sentenced him to six months in prison and a fine.
Judicial institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. At the highest level, the High Court has historically abdicated its role by avoiding rulings on the legality of term extensions or controversial executive decrees. This silence was most notable during the 2021 political crisis, when the judiciary failed to provide any legal check on the executive’s unilateral attempt to extend its mandate. This culture of avoidance extends to lower-level courts, which have actively shielded the regime’s use of force. Despite widespread evidence of state agents firing on peaceful protesters in February 2021, no military or police commanders faced successful prosecution in either civilian or military jurisdictions.
The case of Radio Mustaqbal further illustrates this judicial paralysis. Following a raid by regime agents on the station’s Mogadishu offices in April 2021, the outlet took the unprecedented step of filing a formal lawsuit against NISA Director Fahad Yasin and Presidential Spokesperson Abdinur Mohamed Ahmed. The suit alleged a calculated effort to dismantle the station’s operations and silence critical voices. However, the pursuit of justice was immediately stifled by the Attorney General’s Office, which refused to initiate investigations or issue subpoenas. While a police official eventually offered a verbal apology, no equipment was returned, no compensation was paid, and no agents were held accountable for the targeted harassment and beating of the station’s editor, Bashir Mohamud Yusuf.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, frequently face regime retaliation. This is achieved through a cycle of institutional purge and patronage, where members of the bench who act contrary to regime interests—or are perceived as threats to executive continuity—face immediate state retaliation. For instance, in May 2016, President Mohamud sacked Somalia’s chief justice, Aidid Ilkahanaf, who had served since 2011, and replaced him with Chief Justice Ibrahim Idle Suleiman, the former chief justice of the breakaway northern region of Somaliland, and a political ally of President Mohamud. Prior to his dismissal, Ilkahanaf frequently argued that the executive branch was overstepping its bounds in the appointment of judges without the proper vetting of a fully functional JSC. In September 2017, President Farmaajo dismissed 18 judges, including three judges from the Regional Appeals Court. In May 2018, he dismissed Chief Justice Suleiman, who originally hesitated to immediately carry out the mass firing of lower-court judges as part of an executive-led judicial overhaul, and replaced him with Bashe Yusuf Ahmed, a political ally of President Farmaajo.
The regime subjects legislative institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. A defining moment occurred in February 2025 with the passage of a landmark bill that fundamentally upended the constitutional balance of power. By granting the President unilateral authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister without legislative consent, the reform neutralized a position that had historically served as a critical check on executive overreach. This maneuver did more than merely centralize authority; it effectively dissolved the independent equilibrium of the executive-legislative relationship. The move triggered a profound constitutional crisis, prompting the semi-autonomous region of Puntland to disengage from the federal political process and formally withdraw its recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).
The regime subjects independent institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Through legislation passed in late 2024 (specifically the Election and Boundaries Commission Law), the regime unilaterally restructured the framework for national elections. The reform replaced the previously independent mandate of electoral bodies with a system designed to be self-serving. By stripping the commission of its neutral operational effectiveness and aligning it with laws that restrict political competition to only three state-sanctioned parties, the institution’s independence was effectively dissolved in favor of executive control.
