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HRF classifies Slovakia as democratic.
Slovakia is a unitary parliamentary republic in Central Europe that emerged as an independent democratic state on 1 January 1993 following the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia after the 1989 Velvet Revolution and the collapse of communist rule. The country consolidated its post-communist transition through constitutional reforms in the 1990s and European integration, joining NATO and the European Union in 2004. Slovakia operates under a parliamentary system in which executive authority is exercised by the government led by the prime minister, while a directly elected president serves as head of state with largely ceremonial and limited constitutional powers; legislative authority rests with the 150-member unicameral National Council elected by proportional representation. In the September 2023 parliamentary elections, the populist left-wing party SMER–SD returned to power at the head of a coalition with Voice – Social Democracy (Hlas-SD) and the nationalist SNS, bringing Robert Fico back as prime minister. Since 2024, the presidency has been held by Hlas-SD’s Peter Pellegrini, leaving Slovakia under a Fico-led coalition.
In Slovakia, national elections are largely free and fair. Multiple mainstream parties and candidates can participate and compete under broadly equal conditions in a competitive political environment. Opposition parties and candidates are generally able to campaign without significant obstruction.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to criticize and challenge the government. The country maintains a strong civil society and a pluralistic media environment with independent private outlets, despite government efforts to pressure critical voices through rhetoric, legal actions, and recent measures that risk burdening civic activity. Most private media remain independent, though reforms to public broadcasting have increased the risk of political influence. Protests and public gatherings have generally been allowed to take place without serious or unfair obstruction.
Slovak institutions are somewhat independent but are increasingly constrained by the governing authorities. The judiciary remains formally protected by constitutional and institutional safeguards, although recent government involvement in the composition and leadership of the Judicial Council has increased political pressure on the nation’s courts, and some judges have faced public criticism from officials over decisions contrary to government interests. Moreover, the incumbent government has weakened key anti-corruption and oversight bodies, reducing the capacity to hold senior officials accountable, even though some investigations and proceedings involving public figures continue.
National elections in Slovakia are largely free and fair. Multiple mainstream parties and candidates are able to participate and compete on broadly equal terms in a competitive political environment. Opposition parties and candidates generally campaign without significant obstruction, although some weaknesses remain, particularly in campaign finance oversight.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In Slovakia, various parties across the political spectrum compete on an equal playing field. To illustrate, recent national elections have produced genuinely competitive, multi-party outcomes. In the snap parliamentary election in 2023 (triggered after the government lost a no-confidence vote), no party came close to the 76 seats needed for a majority in the 150-seat National Council: Robert Fico’s SMER-SD finished first with about 23% of the vote and 42 seats, but pro-European Progressive Slovakia (PS), led by Michal Šimečka, placed second with roughly 18% and 32 seats, and Peter Pellegrini’s Hlas-SD followed with about 15% and 27 seats, alongside several other parties that cleared the threshold, including Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) and allies (16 seats), KDH (12), SaS (11), and SNS (10). Because the results required coalition bargaining. SMER-SD ultimately formed a governing coalition together with two parties (Hlas-SD and SNS), inaugurating Robert Fico’s fourth term as prime minister. This outcome marked a change from the previous electoral cycle, as it replaced the fragmented, anti-SMER coalition led by OĽaNO and restored SMER-SD to government after three years in opposition. In its assessment of the parliamentary elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has concluded that they “were competitive and pluralistic, with fundamental rights and freedom respected.” Similarly, Slovakia’s direct presidential election in 2024 featured open, two-round competition: independent candidate Ivan Korčok led the first round with 42.5% of the vote, ahead of Peter Pellegrini of Hlas-SD with 37.0%. In the runoff, Pellegrini won with 53.1% to Korčok’s 46.9%, and Pellegrini was sworn in as president.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. This is demonstrated by Slovakia’s history of genuinely competitive, multiparty elections and regularly changing governing coalitions across the political spectrum, which indicate that opposition parties are generally able to campaign without undue obstruction. For example, in observing the 2023 snap parliamentary elections, the OSCE concluded that “the contestants could compete on a level playing field with fundamental freedoms respected,” and that voters “were provided with ample information to ensure an informed vote,” as both public and private media provided coverage of all contestants and the campaign. At the same time, observers noted the weaknesses in campaign finance oversight.
In Slovakia, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country has a historically strong civil society, although recent legal measures introduced by the incumbent government risk placing burdens on and negatively affecting civic activity. Slovakia also maintains a pluralistic media environment, with several independent private outlets and active online journalism, despite government officials’ attempts to pressure critical media through hostile rhetoric and legal actions. Most private media remain independent, but recent reforms to public broadcasting have increased the risk of political influence. The government has generally allowed protests and public gatherings to take place without serious or unfair obstruction.
Although the government has not shut down independent, dissenting organizations, it has adopted measures that seriously intimidate and obstruct their work. Slovakia has a historically robust civil society, with tens of thousands of civil society organizations operating across the country in fields ranging from human rights and humanitarian assistance to education and culture. However, following Robert Fico’s return to power, the Slovak government has implemented measures that have aimed to restrict and obstruct their work. In April 2025, Slovakia’s parliament adopted Act No. 109/2025 Coll., amending the Act on Non-Governmental Organisations (Act No. 213/1997 Coll.) and related laws to strengthen financial transparency requirements for non-governmental and civil society organizations (CSOs). Observers, civil society groups, and international monitors have warned that these requirements can be selectively used to intimidate watchdogs and advocacy organisations, creating a chilling effect on dissent and civic engagement. Specifically, the Venice Commission, which evaluates laws for compatibility with democratic and human-rights standards, observed that “the extensive donor disclosure and transparency requirements [ . . . ] represent significant interferences with the rights to freedom of association and privacy,” concluding that the law “can be expected to have a deterring effect.” Taken together with Prime Minister Robert Fico’s declaration, after returning to power in 2023, that the “rule of political NGOs in Slovakia” was over, the measure can be seen as deliberately targeting civil society and intending to have a chilling effect on critical and independent organisations.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Slovakia has a pluralistic media landscape with a number of independent private outlets and active online journalism. Independent journalists and media organizations remain able to investigate and publish critical reporting. At the same time, Prime Minister Fico and his government have actively worked to discredit and marginalize critical media by branding news outlets as “enemies.” Government officials have further obstructed journalism through systematic intimidation, smear campaigns, and verbal attacks of critical journalists, with officials refusing to answer journalists’ questions and withholding interviews and information. These actions are reinforced by the government’s use of abusive lawsuits (SLAPPs), imposing legal and financial pressure on critical outlets, encouraging self-censorship, and weakening the ability of independent media to scrutinize those in power.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Slovakia has traditionally maintained a relatively free media environment, with major privately owned television channels, newspapers, and online outlets operating independently. Most media are not systematically aligned with specific political parties. At the same time, the incumbent government has laid the groundwork for greater political influence over public broadcasting by restructuring the main public broadcaster’s governance and leadership-selection system. This is demonstrated by the public-broadcasting reform law adopted by the Slovak parliament in 2024, which abolished Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS) and replaced it with a new entity, Slovak Television and Radio (STVR). The reform disbanded the RTVS board, terminated the mandate of the sitting director general before the end of his term, and established a new supervisory council whose members are appointed by parliament and the government. This council is responsible for appointing and dismissing the director general, thereby increasing political influence over the broadcaster’s leadership.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. This was evident after the 2018 murder of Ján Kuciak, an investigative journalist who had reported on alleged tax fraud and corruption linked to politically connected businessmen, when mass protests unfolded nationwide without undue police interference, which some observers described as the biggest protests since the collapse of Communism in 1989. Most recently, in February 2024, thousands of Slovaks gathered freely in front of Parliament to protest fast-tracked amendments to the penal code that would arguably hamper efforts to prosecute corruption. At the same time, the legal framework for assemblies was tightened in 2024, following an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico in May of that year. Act No. 166/2024 Coll. on measures to improve the security situation (the “Lex Assassination”), which entered into force on 15 July 2024, amended the Freedom of Assembly Act by banning protests within 50 metres of key state institutions. It also allows authorities to impose similar bans around other buildings used by these institutions on a case-by-case basis, and restricts assemblies near the residences of targeted officials and in certain housing areas, with limited exceptions such as public squares, parks, and marketplaces. Despite these new restrictions, large-scale protests continued largely unobstructed. From late December 2024 through 2025, nationwide large-scale demonstrations took place, beginning on 23 December 2024 and peaking in January and February 2025, when tens of thousands protested across Slovakia against Prime Minister Robert Fico’s policies. Further mass demonstrations were recorded on 9 May 2025, on 17 November 2025, and again in mid-December 2025.
The Slovak institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the governing authority. The judiciary is formally protected by constitutional rules and institutional safeguards, but recent government involvement in appointing and leading members of the Judicial Council has increased political pressure on the courts. Judges whose decisions go against government interests have sometimes been publicly criticized or verbally attacked. At the same time, the government has weakened key anti-corruption and oversight bodies, reducing the ability of institutions to hold senior officials accountable. Despite this, some investigations, prosecutions, and court decisions involving public figures are still taking place.
Courts in Slovakia have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to undermine electoral competition. International observers assess that, despite institutional weaknesses in electoral cases, such as the absence of deadlines for adjudicating complaints, the courts generally check attempts to unfairly skew the electoral playing field. Since Slovakia formally criminalized vote-buying in 2011, the courts have convicted more than a dozen perpetrators, including at least one public official. In 2017, Miroslav Michalka, the mayor of a small town, received a one-year suspended prison sentence and a five-year ban on running for office after trying to buy votes of the local Roma community in the upcoming mayoral election. However, as explained below, the country’s historically independent judiciary has, since 2023, become increasingly fragile and vulnerable to political influence.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness, but it has introduced practices that exert pressure on the judiciary with the aim of undermining its independence in practice. Judicial independence is enforced by the institutional arrangements, namely, the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic (“Súdna rada Slovenskej republiky”), an 18-member constitutional body with 9 judges elected by judges and 9 members chosen by the Government, Parliament, and the President, three each. The Council handles judicial appointments, vetting, and disciplinary matters. However, observers, including the European Commission, note that the Slovak legal framework lacks crucial safeguards, including independence regarding the dismissal of members of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic. As a result, after the change of government in 2023, the Government, Parliament, and the President all dismissed their respective nominees before the end of their mandates and replaced them with new members, without any legally defined grounds or procedures. The dismissed members lodged constitutional complaints, which were rejected by the Constitutional Court. As a result, in April 2024, the Council, with the support of newly appointed government-nominated members, dismissed its own President, and further dismissals followed by Parliament and the President. In light of these attempts to fill the Judicial Council with government-aligned appointees and thereby influence judicial independence, Slovakia’s historically independent judicial system has become increasingly fragile and vulnerable to political influence.
Members of the judicial branch in Slovakia who rule contrary to government interests have faced, on occasion, retaliation in the form of rhetorical attacks and implications that judges are acting politically or should resign. After the parliament adopted extensive amendments to the Slovak Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code in February 2024 through a legally contested fast-track procedure, the Constitutional Court suspended the key parts of the reform while it examined the amendments’ constitutionality. These amendments were widely seen as controversial because they abolished the anti-corruption body, the Special Prosecutor’s Office, reduced penalties for corruption and other serious crimes, shortened statutes of limitations for many offenses, and raised the financial thresholds that determine whether conduct constitutes a crime. Following this suspension decision, Prime Minister Robert Fico publicly demanded the resignation of the President of the Constitutional Court, suggesting that he should be removed if he did not step down. Ultimately, the Court largely sided with the government, holding that even though the fast-track adoption of the amendments violated parliamentary procedural law, this illegality did not rise to the level of unconstitutionality, and the Court showed strong deference to the legislature.
Furthermore, the government has subjected executive institutions to reforms that abolish their operational effectiveness. Specifically, the SMER-SD-led parliament moved to dissolve the Special Prosecutor’s Office (USP) and dismiss its head, Daniel Lipšic, in 2024. Founded in 2004, the USP investigated high-profile cases involving political elites, business people, the judiciary, and law enforcement members. These cases included several politicians linked to SMER-SD and its former governing networks, including former finance minister and current central bank governor Peter Kažimír, who was accused of paying a bribe in exchange for delaying tax audits while in office. Secondly, the aforementioned amendments to the Penal Code significantly reduced penalties and statutes of limitations for corruption, financial wrongdoing, and crime, changes that, put together, seriously weakened the accountability of public officials.
As a result, Slovakia’s judicial and executive institutions have recently failed to hold government officials accountable in multiple cases. Now that the USP no longer exists, the General Prosecution, whose leadership has previously used controversial legal powers to terminate sensitive investigations. For instance, in 2022, investigators accused two-time SMER-SD Interior Minister Robert Kaliňák of organizing a criminal group with then-opposition leader Robert Fico. Despite implicating evidence, the Prosecutor-General’s Office annulled the charges in November 2022 under the legal provision that empowers the Prosecutor-General’s Office to drop charges in case of minor procedural violations during the investigation, a prerogative that has been abused in practice to shield officials from accountability more than once during SMER’s tenure. Separately, in August 2023, Deputy Prosecutor General Jozef Sedlák dismissed bribery charges against Kaliňák in another case and returned the matter to investigators. At the same time, the dismantling of the USP and increasing political influence over judicial decision-making did not result in the automatic dismissal of all pending cases against public officials, as some proceedings have continued through the courts. Accordingly, in 2025, the Specialised Criminal Court fined former finance minister and central bank governor Peter Kažimír €200,000 (approx. $230,000) for bribery, demonstrating that limited accountability still persists.
HRF classifies Slovakia as democratic.
Slovakia is a unitary parliamentary republic in Central Europe that emerged as an independent democratic state on 1 January 1993 following the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia after the 1989 Velvet Revolution and the collapse of communist rule. The country consolidated its post-communist transition through constitutional reforms in the 1990s and European integration, joining NATO and the European Union in 2004. Slovakia operates under a parliamentary system in which executive authority is exercised by the government led by the prime minister, while a directly elected president serves as head of state with largely ceremonial and limited constitutional powers; legislative authority rests with the 150-member unicameral National Council elected by proportional representation. In the September 2023 parliamentary elections, the populist left-wing party SMER–SD returned to power at the head of a coalition with Voice – Social Democracy (Hlas-SD) and the nationalist SNS, bringing Robert Fico back as prime minister. Since 2024, the presidency has been held by Hlas-SD’s Peter Pellegrini, leaving Slovakia under a Fico-led coalition.
In Slovakia, national elections are largely free and fair. Multiple mainstream parties and candidates can participate and compete under broadly equal conditions in a competitive political environment. Opposition parties and candidates are generally able to campaign without significant obstruction.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to criticize and challenge the government. The country maintains a strong civil society and a pluralistic media environment with independent private outlets, despite government efforts to pressure critical voices through rhetoric, legal actions, and recent measures that risk burdening civic activity. Most private media remain independent, though reforms to public broadcasting have increased the risk of political influence. Protests and public gatherings have generally been allowed to take place without serious or unfair obstruction.
Slovak institutions are somewhat independent but are increasingly constrained by the governing authorities. The judiciary remains formally protected by constitutional and institutional safeguards, although recent government involvement in the composition and leadership of the Judicial Council has increased political pressure on the nation’s courts, and some judges have faced public criticism from officials over decisions contrary to government interests. Moreover, the incumbent government has weakened key anti-corruption and oversight bodies, reducing the capacity to hold senior officials accountable, even though some investigations and proceedings involving public figures continue.
National elections in Slovakia are largely free and fair. Multiple mainstream parties and candidates are able to participate and compete on broadly equal terms in a competitive political environment. Opposition parties and candidates generally campaign without significant obstruction, although some weaknesses remain, particularly in campaign finance oversight.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In Slovakia, various parties across the political spectrum compete on an equal playing field. To illustrate, recent national elections have produced genuinely competitive, multi-party outcomes. In the snap parliamentary election in 2023 (triggered after the government lost a no-confidence vote), no party came close to the 76 seats needed for a majority in the 150-seat National Council: Robert Fico’s SMER-SD finished first with about 23% of the vote and 42 seats, but pro-European Progressive Slovakia (PS), led by Michal Šimečka, placed second with roughly 18% and 32 seats, and Peter Pellegrini’s Hlas-SD followed with about 15% and 27 seats, alongside several other parties that cleared the threshold, including Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) and allies (16 seats), KDH (12), SaS (11), and SNS (10). Because the results required coalition bargaining. SMER-SD ultimately formed a governing coalition together with two parties (Hlas-SD and SNS), inaugurating Robert Fico’s fourth term as prime minister. This outcome marked a change from the previous electoral cycle, as it replaced the fragmented, anti-SMER coalition led by OĽaNO and restored SMER-SD to government after three years in opposition. In its assessment of the parliamentary elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has concluded that they “were competitive and pluralistic, with fundamental rights and freedom respected.” Similarly, Slovakia’s direct presidential election in 2024 featured open, two-round competition: independent candidate Ivan Korčok led the first round with 42.5% of the vote, ahead of Peter Pellegrini of Hlas-SD with 37.0%. In the runoff, Pellegrini won with 53.1% to Korčok’s 46.9%, and Pellegrini was sworn in as president.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. This is demonstrated by Slovakia’s history of genuinely competitive, multiparty elections and regularly changing governing coalitions across the political spectrum, which indicate that opposition parties are generally able to campaign without undue obstruction. For example, in observing the 2023 snap parliamentary elections, the OSCE concluded that “the contestants could compete on a level playing field with fundamental freedoms respected,” and that voters “were provided with ample information to ensure an informed vote,” as both public and private media provided coverage of all contestants and the campaign. At the same time, observers noted the weaknesses in campaign finance oversight.
In Slovakia, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country has a historically strong civil society, although recent legal measures introduced by the incumbent government risk placing burdens on and negatively affecting civic activity. Slovakia also maintains a pluralistic media environment, with several independent private outlets and active online journalism, despite government officials’ attempts to pressure critical media through hostile rhetoric and legal actions. Most private media remain independent, but recent reforms to public broadcasting have increased the risk of political influence. The government has generally allowed protests and public gatherings to take place without serious or unfair obstruction.
Although the government has not shut down independent, dissenting organizations, it has adopted measures that seriously intimidate and obstruct their work. Slovakia has a historically robust civil society, with tens of thousands of civil society organizations operating across the country in fields ranging from human rights and humanitarian assistance to education and culture. However, following Robert Fico’s return to power, the Slovak government has implemented measures that have aimed to restrict and obstruct their work. In April 2025, Slovakia’s parliament adopted Act No. 109/2025 Coll., amending the Act on Non-Governmental Organisations (Act No. 213/1997 Coll.) and related laws to strengthen financial transparency requirements for non-governmental and civil society organizations (CSOs). Observers, civil society groups, and international monitors have warned that these requirements can be selectively used to intimidate watchdogs and advocacy organisations, creating a chilling effect on dissent and civic engagement. Specifically, the Venice Commission, which evaluates laws for compatibility with democratic and human-rights standards, observed that “the extensive donor disclosure and transparency requirements [ . . . ] represent significant interferences with the rights to freedom of association and privacy,” concluding that the law “can be expected to have a deterring effect.” Taken together with Prime Minister Robert Fico’s declaration, after returning to power in 2023, that the “rule of political NGOs in Slovakia” was over, the measure can be seen as deliberately targeting civil society and intending to have a chilling effect on critical and independent organisations.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Slovakia has a pluralistic media landscape with a number of independent private outlets and active online journalism. Independent journalists and media organizations remain able to investigate and publish critical reporting. At the same time, Prime Minister Fico and his government have actively worked to discredit and marginalize critical media by branding news outlets as “enemies.” Government officials have further obstructed journalism through systematic intimidation, smear campaigns, and verbal attacks of critical journalists, with officials refusing to answer journalists’ questions and withholding interviews and information. These actions are reinforced by the government’s use of abusive lawsuits (SLAPPs), imposing legal and financial pressure on critical outlets, encouraging self-censorship, and weakening the ability of independent media to scrutinize those in power.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Slovakia has traditionally maintained a relatively free media environment, with major privately owned television channels, newspapers, and online outlets operating independently. Most media are not systematically aligned with specific political parties. At the same time, the incumbent government has laid the groundwork for greater political influence over public broadcasting by restructuring the main public broadcaster’s governance and leadership-selection system. This is demonstrated by the public-broadcasting reform law adopted by the Slovak parliament in 2024, which abolished Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS) and replaced it with a new entity, Slovak Television and Radio (STVR). The reform disbanded the RTVS board, terminated the mandate of the sitting director general before the end of his term, and established a new supervisory council whose members are appointed by parliament and the government. This council is responsible for appointing and dismissing the director general, thereby increasing political influence over the broadcaster’s leadership.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. This was evident after the 2018 murder of Ján Kuciak, an investigative journalist who had reported on alleged tax fraud and corruption linked to politically connected businessmen, when mass protests unfolded nationwide without undue police interference, which some observers described as the biggest protests since the collapse of Communism in 1989. Most recently, in February 2024, thousands of Slovaks gathered freely in front of Parliament to protest fast-tracked amendments to the penal code that would arguably hamper efforts to prosecute corruption. At the same time, the legal framework for assemblies was tightened in 2024, following an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico in May of that year. Act No. 166/2024 Coll. on measures to improve the security situation (the “Lex Assassination”), which entered into force on 15 July 2024, amended the Freedom of Assembly Act by banning protests within 50 metres of key state institutions. It also allows authorities to impose similar bans around other buildings used by these institutions on a case-by-case basis, and restricts assemblies near the residences of targeted officials and in certain housing areas, with limited exceptions such as public squares, parks, and marketplaces. Despite these new restrictions, large-scale protests continued largely unobstructed. From late December 2024 through 2025, nationwide large-scale demonstrations took place, beginning on 23 December 2024 and peaking in January and February 2025, when tens of thousands protested across Slovakia against Prime Minister Robert Fico’s policies. Further mass demonstrations were recorded on 9 May 2025, on 17 November 2025, and again in mid-December 2025.
The Slovak institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the governing authority. The judiciary is formally protected by constitutional rules and institutional safeguards, but recent government involvement in appointing and leading members of the Judicial Council has increased political pressure on the courts. Judges whose decisions go against government interests have sometimes been publicly criticized or verbally attacked. At the same time, the government has weakened key anti-corruption and oversight bodies, reducing the ability of institutions to hold senior officials accountable. Despite this, some investigations, prosecutions, and court decisions involving public figures are still taking place.
Courts in Slovakia have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to undermine electoral competition. International observers assess that, despite institutional weaknesses in electoral cases, such as the absence of deadlines for adjudicating complaints, the courts generally check attempts to unfairly skew the electoral playing field. Since Slovakia formally criminalized vote-buying in 2011, the courts have convicted more than a dozen perpetrators, including at least one public official. In 2017, Miroslav Michalka, the mayor of a small town, received a one-year suspended prison sentence and a five-year ban on running for office after trying to buy votes of the local Roma community in the upcoming mayoral election. However, as explained below, the country’s historically independent judiciary has, since 2023, become increasingly fragile and vulnerable to political influence.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness, but it has introduced practices that exert pressure on the judiciary with the aim of undermining its independence in practice. Judicial independence is enforced by the institutional arrangements, namely, the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic (“Súdna rada Slovenskej republiky”), an 18-member constitutional body with 9 judges elected by judges and 9 members chosen by the Government, Parliament, and the President, three each. The Council handles judicial appointments, vetting, and disciplinary matters. However, observers, including the European Commission, note that the Slovak legal framework lacks crucial safeguards, including independence regarding the dismissal of members of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic. As a result, after the change of government in 2023, the Government, Parliament, and the President all dismissed their respective nominees before the end of their mandates and replaced them with new members, without any legally defined grounds or procedures. The dismissed members lodged constitutional complaints, which were rejected by the Constitutional Court. As a result, in April 2024, the Council, with the support of newly appointed government-nominated members, dismissed its own President, and further dismissals followed by Parliament and the President. In light of these attempts to fill the Judicial Council with government-aligned appointees and thereby influence judicial independence, Slovakia’s historically independent judicial system has become increasingly fragile and vulnerable to political influence.
Members of the judicial branch in Slovakia who rule contrary to government interests have faced, on occasion, retaliation in the form of rhetorical attacks and implications that judges are acting politically or should resign. After the parliament adopted extensive amendments to the Slovak Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code in February 2024 through a legally contested fast-track procedure, the Constitutional Court suspended the key parts of the reform while it examined the amendments’ constitutionality. These amendments were widely seen as controversial because they abolished the anti-corruption body, the Special Prosecutor’s Office, reduced penalties for corruption and other serious crimes, shortened statutes of limitations for many offenses, and raised the financial thresholds that determine whether conduct constitutes a crime. Following this suspension decision, Prime Minister Robert Fico publicly demanded the resignation of the President of the Constitutional Court, suggesting that he should be removed if he did not step down. Ultimately, the Court largely sided with the government, holding that even though the fast-track adoption of the amendments violated parliamentary procedural law, this illegality did not rise to the level of unconstitutionality, and the Court showed strong deference to the legislature.
Furthermore, the government has subjected executive institutions to reforms that abolish their operational effectiveness. Specifically, the SMER-SD-led parliament moved to dissolve the Special Prosecutor’s Office (USP) and dismiss its head, Daniel Lipšic, in 2024. Founded in 2004, the USP investigated high-profile cases involving political elites, business people, the judiciary, and law enforcement members. These cases included several politicians linked to SMER-SD and its former governing networks, including former finance minister and current central bank governor Peter Kažimír, who was accused of paying a bribe in exchange for delaying tax audits while in office. Secondly, the aforementioned amendments to the Penal Code significantly reduced penalties and statutes of limitations for corruption, financial wrongdoing, and crime, changes that, put together, seriously weakened the accountability of public officials.
As a result, Slovakia’s judicial and executive institutions have recently failed to hold government officials accountable in multiple cases. Now that the USP no longer exists, the General Prosecution, whose leadership has previously used controversial legal powers to terminate sensitive investigations. For instance, in 2022, investigators accused two-time SMER-SD Interior Minister Robert Kaliňák of organizing a criminal group with then-opposition leader Robert Fico. Despite implicating evidence, the Prosecutor-General’s Office annulled the charges in November 2022 under the legal provision that empowers the Prosecutor-General’s Office to drop charges in case of minor procedural violations during the investigation, a prerogative that has been abused in practice to shield officials from accountability more than once during SMER’s tenure. Separately, in August 2023, Deputy Prosecutor General Jozef Sedlák dismissed bribery charges against Kaliňák in another case and returned the matter to investigators. At the same time, the dismantling of the USP and increasing political influence over judicial decision-making did not result in the automatic dismissal of all pending cases against public officials, as some proceedings have continued through the courts. Accordingly, in 2025, the Specialised Criminal Court fined former finance minister and central bank governor Peter Kažimír €200,000 (approx. $230,000) for bribery, demonstrating that limited accountability still persists.
