Hybrid Authoritarian
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Population
HRF classifies Singapore as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Singapore is a parliamentary republic in maritime Southeast Asia with a president as its head of state and a prime minister as the head of government. While Singapore operates as a multiparty system with regular elections, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has led the country since independence. The PAP has, on multiple occasions, expressed its intention to usher Singapore closer to becoming a one-party state, a governance model that the ruling party has primarily justified on the grounds of economic growth and stability. The current prime minister, Lawrence Wong, assumed office in May 2024 and is the fourth PAP figure to lead Singapore.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance to win. The PAP has ruled uninterrupted since Singapore became independent in 1965, winning every single one of Singapore’s 14 parliamentary elections with overwhelming majorities. The more recent Lee Hsien Loong and Lawrence Wong administrations have abandoned the overt repression of political opponents practiced by their predecessors, and opposition parties have been gaining ground. The PAP nonetheless continues to enjoy unfair and significant advantages over its political opponents, including vast control over the election management and oversight mechanisms, and the ability to modify election laws with ease to afford itself an upper hand.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. In recent years, the regime has shut down major independent media outlets, tightened restrictions on peaceful assembly, and censored dissenting views online through a newly enacted speech law. Nevertheless, there remains space for critical discourses on government affairs.
Institutions frequently and unfairly side with the regime when reviewing challenges to its policies or interests. While Singapore courts are generally lauded for their efficiency and regularly hold regime officials accountable, courts very rarely decide against regime interests in cases with strong political undertones. The courts have upheld the constitutionality of laws widely regarded as repressive by human rights groups and have delivered criminal convictions that led to the disqualification of opposition politicians from contesting elections. The Prime Minister wields substantial influence over key bodies responsible for elections, combating corruption, and overseeing media conduct.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance to win. The PAP’s durability is sustained by a combination of overt repression of political opposition and manipulated electoral rules that span multiple administrations. Election oversight is exercised by a body that is beholden to the executive. Opposition parties can still compete and have increasingly won broader support despite significant constraints.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally wins elections with a very high vote share. The PAP has won every election since independence in 1965, with over 60 percent of the popular vote, and has never dipped below 80 percent in its seat share in parliament. Various features of the electoral system contribute to the PAP’s monopoly on leadership. In 1988, the regime introduced the Group Representation Constituencies (GRC) system. It allows the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee (EBRC) – the body tasked with drawing electoral maps – to designate a set number of constituencies in which voters, instead of voting for individual candidates, vote for a team of candidates that includes at least one ethnic minority member. The system was created ostensibly to ensure better ethnic representation in parliament, but the regime has misused it to manipulate election outcomes. Over the years, the regime has inflated the number of GRCs and the number of candidates who may run in them, making it difficult for opposition parties, many of them underresourced, to find enough qualified candidates with the correct ethnic composition to contest. In 1988, each GRC could have up to 3 MPs, and GRCs accounted for only half of the seats up for election to parliament. As of April 2025, each GRC may have up to six MPs, and, in the 2020 general election, as many as 79 seats were winnable through GRCs, out of a total of 93. Redrawn maps announced by the EBRC ahead of the 2025 general election dissolve Bukit Batok, a single-member constituency where the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) had seen significant support, and redistrict West Coast GRC, another key seat where the PAP had narrowly won against a candidate from the Progress Singapore Party (PSP). It also reduces the number of polling districts in Aljunied GRC, a seat that has not been changed since 2011 and now belongs to the main opposition Workers’ Party (WP) led by Pritam Singh. Singh described the changes as “one of the most radical redrawing of boundaries Singapore has seen in recent memory.” Other opposition representatives have expressed concern that the revised boundaries may undermine opposition gains. In March 2025, The Straits Times, Singapore’s largest newspaper, published an article featuring expert commentaries suggesting that the new boundaries appear to be drawn in ways that disproportionately benefit the PAP. The PAP has won nearly all GRCs since its inception, and it has won many GRCs unopposed. GRCs are hotspots for PAP “walkovers,” a term commonly used in Singapore to describe unopposed wins.
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight by subjugating its election management body, the Elections Department (ELD), to the Prime Minister’s Office. The body reports directly to the Prime Minister. The Electoral Boundary Review Committee (EBRC), an arm of the Department tasked with drawing electoral maps, is appointed entirely by the Prime Minister and typically comprises senior civil servants from various ministries and statutory boards. There is no requirement for new electoral maps to be debated publicly, or for the EBRC to give sufficient advance notice to candidates regarding electoral divisions. The government approves all redrawn maps, and the Prime Minister is fully in charge of naming new constituencies. The procedure for this exercise, which occurs every election, is not publicly disclosed. A new EBRC formed for the 2025 general election is chaired by Tan Kee Yong, secretary to Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. Its members are Low Hsien Yang Colin from the Ministry of Law and Koh Eng Chuan from the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Nevertheless, Singaporean elections are generally free of fraud and other voting irregularities. Mainstream opposition candidates and parties have been able to register for elections without significant barriers, although the subsequent competition remains unequal. Eleven opposition parties and a record-breaking total of 211 candidates participated in the latest 2025 election. Overt repression tactics seen under the first two PAP administrations were largely abandoned by the Loong administration (2004-2025). There are also indications that the PAP has shifted away from outright exclusion of political opponents. For example, a previous iteration of the Constitution prohibited anyone convicted of an offense from contesting parliamentary elections if sentenced to at least one year’s imprisonment or a fine of at least SGD 2,000 (approximately $1,481). A constitutional amendment passed in 2022 raised the fine quantum from SGD 2,000 to SGD 10,000 (approximately $7,407 at the time). This change became critical in 2021, when opposition leader Pritam Singh was charged with two counts of perjury before a parliamentary committee and risked disqualification from the 2025 parliamentary race. A court convicted him in February 2025, imposing a fine of SGD 5,500 (approximately $5,220) for each count. Given the constitutional amendment, Singh would remain eligible for re-election. Singapore’s elections have become more competitive in recent years with loosened restrictions and a general appetite for political alternatives among the electorate. Currently, the opposition controls 10 of 97 elected seats in parliament, far from a significant figure but a historic feat in the context of Singaporean electoral politics.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Independent media have faced shutdowns, lawsuits, and operational restrictions. Overbroad laws such as the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) 2019 are repeatedly used to stifle criticism by opposition politicians, civil society groups, academics, and the media. Public protest is tightly regulated, with permits often denied. Simultaneously, limited opposition activity, alternative media, and some civil society organizations continue to operate.
The regime has taken measures that led to the shutdown of a major, independent dissenting organization. While there is a limited but growing number of independent media outlets operating in Singapore, those that have been most critical of the regime have either ceased operations under regime pressure or are operating under stringent restrictions, such as those prescribed by the regime’s laws on fake news, sedition, and foreign funding. In October 2021, for instance, The Online Citizen (TOC), one of Singapore’s prominent independent news sites, was forced to close after the regime revoked its license for alleged failure to disclose its funding sources. The outlet had a substantial history of criticizing the regime and had faced two defamation lawsuits filed by former PM Lee Hsien Loong, which resulted in its chief editor, Terry Xu, being required to pay a total of SGD 236,000 ($172,252) in damages and legal costs. Today, TOC operates out of Taiwan, where its chief editor resides in self-exile.
The regime has seriously intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Overbroad laws such as POFMA 2019, for instance, are frequently used to label publications critical of the regime as false and, as such, compel their censorship by publishers, including independent media and bloggers, and hurt their credibility. Under the law, too, the regime has designated websites or pages critical of the regime as a “declared online location” (DOL), at which point it will no longer be allowed to profit from its operations on the online location. On July 16, 2023, online magazine Jom was issued POFMA 2019 orders in relation to two published articles regarding government corruption and censorship. In September 2023, the Ministry of Communications and Information sent a warning to Dominic Ziegler, chief of the Singapore bureau of The Economist Magazine. In a public endorsement of the publication Jom, Ziegler, a British national, had implied that Singapore is an “illiberal state” where the state holds the media captive. In July 2024, Kenneth Jeyaretnam, an opposition politician, received his eighth POFMA correction order over a Facebook post in which he claimed that the regime inflates land prices and questions the transparency of the regime’s endowment funds. Among the previous POFMA correction orders previously issued against him was one instructed by then-Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. Of the 27 POFMA correction orders issued between July and December 2024, seven were directed at Transformative Justice Collective, a civil society group and online publication advocating for the abolition of the death penalty in Singapore. Under incumbent Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, the weaponization of POFMA 2019 has continued, with the regime having issued correction orders against Australia-based academic website East Asia Forum, and independent media TOC, The Edge Singapore, and The Independent Singapore.
The regime has seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. In Singapore, all non-recreational assemblies – including all types of protests – must be accompanied by a police permit under the Public Order Act 2009. Regime officials often invoke the Act’s vague criteria to deny a permit to dissenting assemblies, including those organized by PAP’s political opponents, independent journalists, and activists. There is only one area in the entire city-state where such a permit is not required, called the “Speakers’ Corner.” However, this exception rarely applies, and the Speakers’ Corner is heavily monitored as the corner is equipped with CCTV cameras and a police station is installed nearby. It also does not apply when foreign participants are involved or if the assembly touches on religion or any other topic that “may cause feelings of enmity, hatred, ill will or hostility between racial or religious groups in Singapore.”
Although the regime unfairly hinders freedom of dissent, it has not overtly and systematically retaliated against dissidents as such. While state-controlled media remains the dominant source of information for Singaporeans, there is still a growing number of independent and alternative outlets that offer diverse perspectives on the regime. These include foreign media, such as CNN and BBC, and social media, including Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok. Similarly, despite significant barriers to holding assemblies, the regime has allowed opposition figures to rally during election times. This was the case in the 2020 election; the regime also allowed mainstream opposition parties, including WP, the Progress Singapore Party (PSP), and the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), to conduct online rallies in light of COVID-19 restrictions, which were then broadcast by state-controlled media. As of 2025, there is a small number of NGOs engaging in direct criticism of the regime, such as MARUAH and Think Centre. Despite this, they have noted the substantial difficulty faced by civil society in operating unhindered.
Institutions frequently and unfairly side with the regime when reviewing challenges to the regime’s policies or interests. Singapore courts have historically shown limited willingness to decide against the regime in politically sensitive cases, with judicial review applications concerning civil and political rights succeeding far less often than those involving economic matters. Draconian speech laws have been upheld through court rulings. However, the judiciary is generally regarded as efficient and professional, and recent reforms have, in part, addressed concerns about executive influence in judicial appointments, transfers, and discipline. The PAP has consistently maintained control over the legislative process and opposition representation in parliament. Independent oversight bodies are subordinated to the executive, limiting their autonomy.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check regime attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Research of court decisions spanning 1965 to 2012 revealed that judicial review applications concerning civil and political rights were only successful 10 percent of the time at the High Court, and 17 percent at the Court of Appeal, a stark contrast to the average success rate of 84 percent between the two courts for economically related cases that do not directly touch upon key regime interests. The success in that small fraction of cases was largely attributed to procedural errors on the regime’s part. In 2020 and 2021, the Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the controversial Public Order Act 2009 and POFMA 2019, respectively. As described under pillar two, both laws have been extensively used to stifle dissent. Courts have recently shown more appetite to decide against the regime in isolated instances. In 2017, for instance, the Court of Appeal ruled 2-1 in favor of TOC in a suit where the outlet was accused of publishing an article that denigrated the Minister of Defense.
The regime has not subjected judicial institutions to legal or procedural reforms that seriously weaken their operational effectiveness. On the contrary, Singaporean courts are generally regarded as efficient and professional. Critiques of the judicial system tend to highlight broader features of the political-legal framework, such as executive influence in appointments, limited scope for judicial review of certain executive decisions, and constraints on how aggressively courts may engage with public law claims. In 2022, the regime established the Chief Justice-led Judicial Service Commission, based on the input of opposition politicians, to be in charge of the appointment, transfer, and removal of subordinate judges. Previously, this authority rested with the Legal Service Commission, whose chairmanship was shared between the Chief Justice and the Attorney General and was therefore criticized as enabling the Attorney General’s interference with judicial functions. However, it remains to be seen how the Commission would improve judicial independence in practice, particularly as it lacks non-political or opposition members, as judicial commissions in democratic contexts would.
The regime has not subjected legislative institutions to legal or procedural reforms that seriously weaken their operational effectiveness. However, a seriously skewed electoral playing field has allowed the PAP to consistently command a supermajority in parliament and substantial control over the passage of key laws. The regime habitually modifies legislative proposals put forth by the opposition to align with the government’s stance, or absorbs such proposals into government policy without crediting the opposition. In addition, the position of Leader of the Opposition is not constitutionally recognized. Instead, this role is designated by the Prime Minister by discretion. The Prime Minister also retains the authority to remove the Leader of the Opposition.
Unlike the judiciary and legislature, the regime has subjected independent oversight institutions to legal or procedural reforms that seriously weaken their operational effectiveness. As previously stated, the ELD and EBRC, both in charge of administering and overseeing elections, are effectively an arm of the executive branch. Similarly, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), an agency tasked with combating corruption in Singapore, is directly accountable to the Prime Minister. It plays an instrumental role in enforcing the regime’s zero-tolerance stance against corruption. Another body whose independence is seriously undermined is the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA), which is empowered to regulate the information, communications, and media industry in Singapore. The IMDA comprises between six and 20 members appointed exclusively by the Minister for Communications and Information. The IMDA’s constituent act explicitly provides that the Minister “may, at any time and without giving any reason,” remove a member from the body. The Minister is also entitled to access and retain all information within the IMDA’s possession. Ng Cher Pong, a former deputy in the Education Ministry, assumed leadership of the IMDA in September 2025. IMDA is responsible for ordering content takedowns and blocking access to critical websites, enforcing restrictions on foreign funding and foreign influence against domestic civil society organizations and media outlets, and banning films and books deemed offensive to the regime.
HRF classifies Singapore as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Singapore is a parliamentary republic in maritime Southeast Asia with a president as its head of state and a prime minister as the head of government. While Singapore operates as a multiparty system with regular elections, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has led the country since independence. The PAP has, on multiple occasions, expressed its intention to usher Singapore closer to becoming a one-party state, a governance model that the ruling party has primarily justified on the grounds of economic growth and stability. The current prime minister, Lawrence Wong, assumed office in May 2024 and is the fourth PAP figure to lead Singapore.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance to win. The PAP has ruled uninterrupted since Singapore became independent in 1965, winning every single one of Singapore’s 14 parliamentary elections with overwhelming majorities. The more recent Lee Hsien Loong and Lawrence Wong administrations have abandoned the overt repression of political opponents practiced by their predecessors, and opposition parties have been gaining ground. The PAP nonetheless continues to enjoy unfair and significant advantages over its political opponents, including vast control over the election management and oversight mechanisms, and the ability to modify election laws with ease to afford itself an upper hand.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. In recent years, the regime has shut down major independent media outlets, tightened restrictions on peaceful assembly, and censored dissenting views online through a newly enacted speech law. Nevertheless, there remains space for critical discourses on government affairs.
Institutions frequently and unfairly side with the regime when reviewing challenges to its policies or interests. While Singapore courts are generally lauded for their efficiency and regularly hold regime officials accountable, courts very rarely decide against regime interests in cases with strong political undertones. The courts have upheld the constitutionality of laws widely regarded as repressive by human rights groups and have delivered criminal convictions that led to the disqualification of opposition politicians from contesting elections. The Prime Minister wields substantial influence over key bodies responsible for elections, combating corruption, and overseeing media conduct.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance to win. The PAP’s durability is sustained by a combination of overt repression of political opposition and manipulated electoral rules that span multiple administrations. Election oversight is exercised by a body that is beholden to the executive. Opposition parties can still compete and have increasingly won broader support despite significant constraints.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally wins elections with a very high vote share. The PAP has won every election since independence in 1965, with over 60 percent of the popular vote, and has never dipped below 80 percent in its seat share in parliament. Various features of the electoral system contribute to the PAP’s monopoly on leadership. In 1988, the regime introduced the Group Representation Constituencies (GRC) system. It allows the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee (EBRC) – the body tasked with drawing electoral maps – to designate a set number of constituencies in which voters, instead of voting for individual candidates, vote for a team of candidates that includes at least one ethnic minority member. The system was created ostensibly to ensure better ethnic representation in parliament, but the regime has misused it to manipulate election outcomes. Over the years, the regime has inflated the number of GRCs and the number of candidates who may run in them, making it difficult for opposition parties, many of them underresourced, to find enough qualified candidates with the correct ethnic composition to contest. In 1988, each GRC could have up to 3 MPs, and GRCs accounted for only half of the seats up for election to parliament. As of April 2025, each GRC may have up to six MPs, and, in the 2020 general election, as many as 79 seats were winnable through GRCs, out of a total of 93. Redrawn maps announced by the EBRC ahead of the 2025 general election dissolve Bukit Batok, a single-member constituency where the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) had seen significant support, and redistrict West Coast GRC, another key seat where the PAP had narrowly won against a candidate from the Progress Singapore Party (PSP). It also reduces the number of polling districts in Aljunied GRC, a seat that has not been changed since 2011 and now belongs to the main opposition Workers’ Party (WP) led by Pritam Singh. Singh described the changes as “one of the most radical redrawing of boundaries Singapore has seen in recent memory.” Other opposition representatives have expressed concern that the revised boundaries may undermine opposition gains. In March 2025, The Straits Times, Singapore’s largest newspaper, published an article featuring expert commentaries suggesting that the new boundaries appear to be drawn in ways that disproportionately benefit the PAP. The PAP has won nearly all GRCs since its inception, and it has won many GRCs unopposed. GRCs are hotspots for PAP “walkovers,” a term commonly used in Singapore to describe unopposed wins.
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight by subjugating its election management body, the Elections Department (ELD), to the Prime Minister’s Office. The body reports directly to the Prime Minister. The Electoral Boundary Review Committee (EBRC), an arm of the Department tasked with drawing electoral maps, is appointed entirely by the Prime Minister and typically comprises senior civil servants from various ministries and statutory boards. There is no requirement for new electoral maps to be debated publicly, or for the EBRC to give sufficient advance notice to candidates regarding electoral divisions. The government approves all redrawn maps, and the Prime Minister is fully in charge of naming new constituencies. The procedure for this exercise, which occurs every election, is not publicly disclosed. A new EBRC formed for the 2025 general election is chaired by Tan Kee Yong, secretary to Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. Its members are Low Hsien Yang Colin from the Ministry of Law and Koh Eng Chuan from the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Nevertheless, Singaporean elections are generally free of fraud and other voting irregularities. Mainstream opposition candidates and parties have been able to register for elections without significant barriers, although the subsequent competition remains unequal. Eleven opposition parties and a record-breaking total of 211 candidates participated in the latest 2025 election. Overt repression tactics seen under the first two PAP administrations were largely abandoned by the Loong administration (2004-2025). There are also indications that the PAP has shifted away from outright exclusion of political opponents. For example, a previous iteration of the Constitution prohibited anyone convicted of an offense from contesting parliamentary elections if sentenced to at least one year’s imprisonment or a fine of at least SGD 2,000 (approximately $1,481). A constitutional amendment passed in 2022 raised the fine quantum from SGD 2,000 to SGD 10,000 (approximately $7,407 at the time). This change became critical in 2021, when opposition leader Pritam Singh was charged with two counts of perjury before a parliamentary committee and risked disqualification from the 2025 parliamentary race. A court convicted him in February 2025, imposing a fine of SGD 5,500 (approximately $5,220) for each count. Given the constitutional amendment, Singh would remain eligible for re-election. Singapore’s elections have become more competitive in recent years with loosened restrictions and a general appetite for political alternatives among the electorate. Currently, the opposition controls 10 of 97 elected seats in parliament, far from a significant figure but a historic feat in the context of Singaporean electoral politics.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Independent media have faced shutdowns, lawsuits, and operational restrictions. Overbroad laws such as the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) 2019 are repeatedly used to stifle criticism by opposition politicians, civil society groups, academics, and the media. Public protest is tightly regulated, with permits often denied. Simultaneously, limited opposition activity, alternative media, and some civil society organizations continue to operate.
The regime has taken measures that led to the shutdown of a major, independent dissenting organization. While there is a limited but growing number of independent media outlets operating in Singapore, those that have been most critical of the regime have either ceased operations under regime pressure or are operating under stringent restrictions, such as those prescribed by the regime’s laws on fake news, sedition, and foreign funding. In October 2021, for instance, The Online Citizen (TOC), one of Singapore’s prominent independent news sites, was forced to close after the regime revoked its license for alleged failure to disclose its funding sources. The outlet had a substantial history of criticizing the regime and had faced two defamation lawsuits filed by former PM Lee Hsien Loong, which resulted in its chief editor, Terry Xu, being required to pay a total of SGD 236,000 ($172,252) in damages and legal costs. Today, TOC operates out of Taiwan, where its chief editor resides in self-exile.
The regime has seriously intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Overbroad laws such as POFMA 2019, for instance, are frequently used to label publications critical of the regime as false and, as such, compel their censorship by publishers, including independent media and bloggers, and hurt their credibility. Under the law, too, the regime has designated websites or pages critical of the regime as a “declared online location” (DOL), at which point it will no longer be allowed to profit from its operations on the online location. On July 16, 2023, online magazine Jom was issued POFMA 2019 orders in relation to two published articles regarding government corruption and censorship. In September 2023, the Ministry of Communications and Information sent a warning to Dominic Ziegler, chief of the Singapore bureau of The Economist Magazine. In a public endorsement of the publication Jom, Ziegler, a British national, had implied that Singapore is an “illiberal state” where the state holds the media captive. In July 2024, Kenneth Jeyaretnam, an opposition politician, received his eighth POFMA correction order over a Facebook post in which he claimed that the regime inflates land prices and questions the transparency of the regime’s endowment funds. Among the previous POFMA correction orders previously issued against him was one instructed by then-Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. Of the 27 POFMA correction orders issued between July and December 2024, seven were directed at Transformative Justice Collective, a civil society group and online publication advocating for the abolition of the death penalty in Singapore. Under incumbent Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, the weaponization of POFMA 2019 has continued, with the regime having issued correction orders against Australia-based academic website East Asia Forum, and independent media TOC, The Edge Singapore, and The Independent Singapore.
The regime has seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. In Singapore, all non-recreational assemblies – including all types of protests – must be accompanied by a police permit under the Public Order Act 2009. Regime officials often invoke the Act’s vague criteria to deny a permit to dissenting assemblies, including those organized by PAP’s political opponents, independent journalists, and activists. There is only one area in the entire city-state where such a permit is not required, called the “Speakers’ Corner.” However, this exception rarely applies, and the Speakers’ Corner is heavily monitored as the corner is equipped with CCTV cameras and a police station is installed nearby. It also does not apply when foreign participants are involved or if the assembly touches on religion or any other topic that “may cause feelings of enmity, hatred, ill will or hostility between racial or religious groups in Singapore.”
Although the regime unfairly hinders freedom of dissent, it has not overtly and systematically retaliated against dissidents as such. While state-controlled media remains the dominant source of information for Singaporeans, there is still a growing number of independent and alternative outlets that offer diverse perspectives on the regime. These include foreign media, such as CNN and BBC, and social media, including Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok. Similarly, despite significant barriers to holding assemblies, the regime has allowed opposition figures to rally during election times. This was the case in the 2020 election; the regime also allowed mainstream opposition parties, including WP, the Progress Singapore Party (PSP), and the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), to conduct online rallies in light of COVID-19 restrictions, which were then broadcast by state-controlled media. As of 2025, there is a small number of NGOs engaging in direct criticism of the regime, such as MARUAH and Think Centre. Despite this, they have noted the substantial difficulty faced by civil society in operating unhindered.
Institutions frequently and unfairly side with the regime when reviewing challenges to the regime’s policies or interests. Singapore courts have historically shown limited willingness to decide against the regime in politically sensitive cases, with judicial review applications concerning civil and political rights succeeding far less often than those involving economic matters. Draconian speech laws have been upheld through court rulings. However, the judiciary is generally regarded as efficient and professional, and recent reforms have, in part, addressed concerns about executive influence in judicial appointments, transfers, and discipline. The PAP has consistently maintained control over the legislative process and opposition representation in parliament. Independent oversight bodies are subordinated to the executive, limiting their autonomy.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check regime attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Research of court decisions spanning 1965 to 2012 revealed that judicial review applications concerning civil and political rights were only successful 10 percent of the time at the High Court, and 17 percent at the Court of Appeal, a stark contrast to the average success rate of 84 percent between the two courts for economically related cases that do not directly touch upon key regime interests. The success in that small fraction of cases was largely attributed to procedural errors on the regime’s part. In 2020 and 2021, the Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the controversial Public Order Act 2009 and POFMA 2019, respectively. As described under pillar two, both laws have been extensively used to stifle dissent. Courts have recently shown more appetite to decide against the regime in isolated instances. In 2017, for instance, the Court of Appeal ruled 2-1 in favor of TOC in a suit where the outlet was accused of publishing an article that denigrated the Minister of Defense.
The regime has not subjected judicial institutions to legal or procedural reforms that seriously weaken their operational effectiveness. On the contrary, Singaporean courts are generally regarded as efficient and professional. Critiques of the judicial system tend to highlight broader features of the political-legal framework, such as executive influence in appointments, limited scope for judicial review of certain executive decisions, and constraints on how aggressively courts may engage with public law claims. In 2022, the regime established the Chief Justice-led Judicial Service Commission, based on the input of opposition politicians, to be in charge of the appointment, transfer, and removal of subordinate judges. Previously, this authority rested with the Legal Service Commission, whose chairmanship was shared between the Chief Justice and the Attorney General and was therefore criticized as enabling the Attorney General’s interference with judicial functions. However, it remains to be seen how the Commission would improve judicial independence in practice, particularly as it lacks non-political or opposition members, as judicial commissions in democratic contexts would.
The regime has not subjected legislative institutions to legal or procedural reforms that seriously weaken their operational effectiveness. However, a seriously skewed electoral playing field has allowed the PAP to consistently command a supermajority in parliament and substantial control over the passage of key laws. The regime habitually modifies legislative proposals put forth by the opposition to align with the government’s stance, or absorbs such proposals into government policy without crediting the opposition. In addition, the position of Leader of the Opposition is not constitutionally recognized. Instead, this role is designated by the Prime Minister by discretion. The Prime Minister also retains the authority to remove the Leader of the Opposition.
Unlike the judiciary and legislature, the regime has subjected independent oversight institutions to legal or procedural reforms that seriously weaken their operational effectiveness. As previously stated, the ELD and EBRC, both in charge of administering and overseeing elections, are effectively an arm of the executive branch. Similarly, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), an agency tasked with combating corruption in Singapore, is directly accountable to the Prime Minister. It plays an instrumental role in enforcing the regime’s zero-tolerance stance against corruption. Another body whose independence is seriously undermined is the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA), which is empowered to regulate the information, communications, and media industry in Singapore. The IMDA comprises between six and 20 members appointed exclusively by the Minister for Communications and Information. The IMDA’s constituent act explicitly provides that the Minister “may, at any time and without giving any reason,” remove a member from the body. The Minister is also entitled to access and retain all information within the IMDA’s possession. Ng Cher Pong, a former deputy in the Education Ministry, assumed leadership of the IMDA in September 2025. IMDA is responsible for ordering content takedowns and blocking access to critical websites, enforcing restrictions on foreign funding and foreign influence against domestic civil society organizations and media outlets, and banning films and books deemed offensive to the regime.
