Hybrid Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Sierra Leone as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Sierra Leone is a presidential republic. Head of state Julius Maada Bio, a former coup leader and one-time brief military transitional ruler, was first democratically elected in 2018. Since gaining independence in 1961, the country has gone through periods of multi-party democracy, interrupted by several attempted and successful military coups, one-party rule, and 11 years of brutal civil war (1991-2002). Post-war Sierra Leone has seen the longest uninterrupted period of formal multipartism in the country’s history, with two dominant political parties alternating in power: the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the All Peoples Congress (APC). However, since taking power in 2018, Bio’s SLPP regime has steered towards authoritarian consolidation through legal and constitutional manipulation, institutional capture, and repression.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the ruling party, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The regime has hindered the mainstream opposition’s campaign, engaged in significant electoral law manipulation and voting irregularities, benefited from unfair campaign advantages, and undermined independent electoral oversight.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Although citizens regularly demonstrate, authorities unfairly repress protests or gatherings through excessive use of force, broad curfews, communication shutdowns, denial of protest permits, and the targeting of protest organizers. The regime and its affiliated non-state actors have intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, and members of the general public and unfairly obstructed their work to the extent that the overall ability to openly criticize the authorities has been notably hindered, though not completely eliminated.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime in a way that enables it to repress criticism and significantly undermine electoral competition. The judiciary remains vulnerable to executive influence as the president appoints both judges and the members of the Judicial Service Commission that recommends them. It is a recurrent practice in Sierra Leone for a new administration, upon taking office, to replace key judicial and legal figures, especially the Chief Justice, Attorney General, and, at times, senior judges.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the ruling party, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. Since the end of the civil war, the country has held five national electoral cycles with two handovers of power between the SLPP and the APC parties. Since winning the 2018 elections—the most narrowly contested presidential polls in the country’s history—the regime of President Bio of the SLPP has obstructed the main opposition party’s campaign, engaged in significant electoral law manipulation and voting irregularities, benefited from unfair campaign advantages, and undermined independent electoral oversight.
The regime has engaged in significant electoral law manipulation and voting irregularities. Statistical inconsistencies, opacity, and non-adherence to procedures surrounding tabulation of results flawed the June 2023 general elections. ECSL declared Bio the winner of the June 2023 presidential election—crediting him with a 15-point margin of victory (56% to 41% of the votes) over the APC’s Samura Kamara— when tabulation was still underway in some districts. The Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone (ECSL) further did not publish the disaggregated results per polling station. While an independent, non-partisan parallel count confirmed that Bio received more votes, both local and international observers decried statistical discrepancies that inflated the incumbent’s recorded votes relative to those independently observed. The elections were so flawed that in September 2023, the U.S. State Department announced its intent to impose visa restrictions on persons responsible for undermining the democratic process “in the lead-up to, during, and following Sierra Leone’s 2023 elections,” including those involved in “manipulating or rigging the electoral process, intimidating voters, election observers, or civil society organizations through threats or acts of physical violence.”
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight and intimidated independent observers. In October 2022, Bio controversially invoked a constitutional clause reserved for exceptional circumstances to instruct the ECSL to change the voting system for the 2023 parliamentary election. Instead of the traditional system based on constituencies where voters choose individual candidates, Bio ordered the use of a district-based proportional representation voting system where voters select their preferred political parties instead of directly voting for individual candidates. The constitution restricted the use of the latter system, which favors the two major parties, to exceptional circumstances, and it was historically used temporarily to mitigate population displacements as a result of the civil war. Civil society and the opposition unsuccessfully challenged the legal basis of the directive.
In addition, Bio has often subverted the constitutional process, subjecting presidential appointments of the commissioners of the two electoral oversight bodies – the ECSL and the Political Parties Regulation Commission (PPRC) – to consultation with political parties and parliamentary approval. Over the years, civil society organizations have raised concerns about the regime’s pattern of stacking the ECSL and PPRC with commissioners aligned with the SLPP.
Finally, the regime has pressured and intimidated local election observers. During the June 2023 elections, the National Election Watch (NEW), a coalition of civic and nongovernment organizations, deployed 6,000 observers and conducted a parallel vote count. Following NEW’s publication of parallel vote tallies showing discrepancies in the official ECSL results, the Office of National Security (ONS) qualified the publication as anti-constitutional, seeking to provoke undue tension. The NEW leadership subsequently fled the country in fear of arrest.
Non-state actors aligned with the regime have also hindered the electoral campaign of the mainstream opposition. For example, in June 2023, violent groups of ruling SLPP supporters carried out violence and intimidation against the opposition in seven southeastern districts, which are strongholds of the ruling party. The violence included the burning of APC offices in Bo, vandalism of other APC offices in Kailahun and Pujehun, and attacks on the caravan of the APC presidential candidate, Samura Kamara.
Moreover, the ruling party enjoyed unfair campaign advantages derived from the incumbent’s control over state resources and public office. For example, well ahead of the official campaign period for the June 2023 election, the President exploited appearances at the launch of government projects to promote his re-election. During the campaign, the regime published partisan campaign messaging on official government websites and social media accounts, and used military trucks to transport SLPP campaign materials. The ruling SLPP party also received over 90% of primetime coverage from the national public broadcaster Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC).
In Sierra Leone, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime unfairly represses protests, censors dissenting speech, and somewhat manipulates media coverage in its favor.
Although Sierra Leoneans regularly demonstrate, the regime enforces the 1965 Public Order Act, subjecting protests to police approval. Police frequently suppress unauthorized demonstrations with heavy-handed and lethal retaliation. For example, on June 21, 2023, police fired live ammunition and tear gas at APC supporters marching peacefully to the ECSL headquarters in Freetown to protest against electoral policies. The shooting killed one protester. In July 2020, security forces killed at least six protesters and injured many while violently dispersing a protest against the regime’s decision to relocate a standby thermal generator from Makeni to Lungi. During a peaceful women-led “Black Monday” protest in Freetown in July 2022, authorities arrested activist Femi Claudius-Cole, raided her home and office, and detained Dennis Bright for organizing the protest. In August 2022, during a nationwide protest over the rising cost of living, security forces again used excessive force, resulting in the deaths of at least 21 civilians and six police officers. In the aftermath, the regime imposed a nationwide curfew, shut down the internet, and arrested more than 500 protesters.
The regime has intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, and members of the general public and unfairly obstructed their work. Tactics include physical intimidation and the application of repressive laws such as the Cyber Security and Crime Act. Journalists face intimidation. In 2024, the state broadcaster SBLS terminated the contract of freelancer Umu Thoronka after she posted a video on TikTok documenting a citizen’s criticism of Bio’s performance. She later fled the country following visits to her home by unidentified individuals, and online smear attacks and death threats. In January 2025, the Speaker of Parliament, Segepoh Solomon Thomas, indefinitely banned journalist Melvin Tejan Mansaray from the parliament chamber in retaliation for critical coverage of the legislature. In September 2022, the broadcast media regulator, the National Telecommunications Commission, yanked Star television and radio stations off the air for two weeks in retaliation for airing a talk show in which participants blamed the regime for causing violence during a nationwide protest.
The regime has targeted political opponents as well. In May 2022, APC MP and former Minister of Transport and Aviation Kemoh Sesay was detained and charged with cyberbullying President Bio over a viral social media video of a speech in which Sesay called Bio a killer and a thief. In July 2022, police detained opposition politicians Femi Claudius Cole and Dennis Bright for four days on accusations of inciting a group of women planning to stage a peaceful protest against the rising cost of living. In February 2023, security forces attached to the President’s Office attacked a convoy with senior leaders of the opposition APC headed for the party’s National Delegates’ Conference. Security forces brutalized APC National Secretary General Lansana Dumbuya and others, including Mayor of Freetown Yvonne Aki-Sawyerr. In June 2023, security forces fired live ammunition and tear gas at the APC headquarters in Freetown, while the party’s presidential candidate, Samura Kamara, was inside, killing one person.
In addition, the regime seriously and unfairly censors dissenting speech. Despite the repeal of the Criminal and Seditious Libel Law in 2020, regime critics have been arbitrarily detained or intimidated for online criticism vaguely deemed to constitute “cyberbullying,” “incitement,” or “spreading false information.” For example, in June 2024, police raided the office of lawyer Joy Precious Baryoh and detained her on charges of cyber stalking and bullying over a comment she posted on President Bio’s X official account referencing the flawed elections through which Bio came to power. In December 2024, social media influencer Hawa Hunt was arrested live on television for posting a critical video about President Bio and his wife, and charged with “insulting messages.” She was detained for two months without bail before being acquitted in March 2025. In September 2025, Bio suspended Justice Allan Halloway, a Supreme Court judge, just weeks after he authored a public complaint letter raising serious concerns about the abusive practices of the Chief Justice.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have seriously intimidated dissenters, unfairly obstructing their work. In October 2023, violent groups affiliated with the ruling party attacked Hope Radio in the opposition stronghold of Makeni, pressuring it to shut down. They destroyed equipment and injured at least five journalists. Also, in July 2022, violent thugs aligned with the ruling party stormed Parliament and attacked opposition legislators with little or no police intervention. The attack occurred amid days of intense debate about the controversial Public Elections Act, a bill opposed by the APC. The attack left several APC lawmakers seriously injured.
In Sierra Leone, institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime in a way that enables it to repress criticism and significantly undermine electoral competition.
The constitution gives the President significant power and influence over the appointment of the members of the judiciary and other key oversight institutions, electoral and otherwise. Presidential appointments are subject to approval from parliament, which is majority-dominated by the ruling party. In this context, President Bio and the ruling SLPP have been able to stack courts and other oversight institutions with appointees aligned with the ruling party, weakening meaningful checks to executive power. For example, in June 2020, the SLPP used its narrow majority and alliances with other opposition parties in parliament to override the APC’s opposition to President Bio’s nominations of High Court justices Komba Kamanda and Alhaji Momojah Stevens to the Court of Appeals. Kamanda and Stevens had presided over politically-charged cases against the APC.
The courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process skewed in its favor. They often dismiss opposition petitions, delay urgent electoral cases, and legitimize partisan reforms. For example, in January 2023, the Supreme Court unanimously validated President Bio’s controversial instruction to the ECSL to shift to a proportional representation system for the June 2023 parliamentary elections. In 2019, the High Court controversially nullified 10 APC parliamentary seats based on SLPP petitions alleging electoral irregularities–even though the APC MPs’ elections had been previously certified and they had already completed over a year of serving their elected terms. The regime orchestrated the immediate takeover of Nine of the seats by the ruling party candidates, overturning the opposition’s majority in parliament. The opposition appealed to the Court of Appeals, which did not hear the case within the four-month constitutional limit. In another case, in April 2022, the Supreme Court upheld a legal challenge filed in 2018 against a police ban on vehicles during the general elections that year, which had been enforced.
Furthermore, courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism. In January 2023, a High Court convicted civil society activist Edmond Abu Jr. on contempt of court charges and sentenced him to 21 days in prison for urging citizens to show support for a class action lawsuit he led on behalf of consumers against the government’s national telecommunications commission (NATCOM) and two leading mobile companies over high mobile tariffs. Judges have imposed maximum penalties on peaceful protesters, often based on uncorroborated police testimony. For example, in October 2022, 14 individuals were sentenced to a maximum jail term of 18 months after being convicted of “riotous conduct” and “disorderly behavior” for participating in August 10 demonstrations, even though some were merely at their places of business during the events. Hawa Hunt was detained for two months without bail and was only acquitted in March 2025, shortly after First Lady Fatima Bio’s public intervention, which highlighted the political overtones of her arrest and release, as well as the vulnerability of the judiciary to political influence.
The regime has undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Following the courts’ consistent dismissals of its legal petitions, the main opposition APC party publicly announced in 2023 that it would no longer seek remedies in court, citing its recurring bad experience with a judiciary that it believes lacks impartiality. As a result, most electoral complaints are not brought before the courts. For example, the APC declined to litigate the contested 2023 election results.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Impunity for the regime’s human rights violations has led various citizens and groups to turn to the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to seek justice. In August 2022, survivors of the July 2020 police deadly shooting of a protest in Makeni took the regime to court. In September 2025, former SLBS journalist Umu Thoronka sued the regime before the ECOWAS Court over her unfair dismissal from SLBS in retaliation for sharing a video critical of President Bio and official inaction in response to her formal complaints on the grounds of wrongful dismissal.
The regime has subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. Upon taking power in 2018, President Bio controversially sacked all members of the Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission before the expiration of their terms and in violation of constitutional procedures requiring a tribunal hearing for their dismissal. Since then, Bio has been accused of filling the Commission with commissioners from his tribe. In November 2022, President Bio signed a constitutional amendment changing the composition of the PPRC in a manner that favors him. The amendment removed the requirement that the chair be a senior judge, thus giving the President unfettered discretion in choosing the Chair. The amendment also increased the number of commissioners from four to five, giving the President and the SLPP majority in Parliament one more appointee on the Commission. In July 2024, President Bio ordered the removal from office of Auditor General Lara Taylor-Pearce, whose office is an autonomous body established by Parliament. Bio had controversially suspended Taylor-Pearce without following the legal procedure in 2021, ahead of the release of an Auditor-General’s Report scathing towards the government. In June 2018, Bio similarly and controversially replaced the Commissioner for the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC).
HRF classifies Sierra Leone as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Sierra Leone is a presidential republic. Head of state Julius Maada Bio, a former coup leader and one-time brief military transitional ruler, was first democratically elected in 2018. Since gaining independence in 1961, the country has gone through periods of multi-party democracy, interrupted by several attempted and successful military coups, one-party rule, and 11 years of brutal civil war (1991-2002). Post-war Sierra Leone has seen the longest uninterrupted period of formal multipartism in the country’s history, with two dominant political parties alternating in power: the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the All Peoples Congress (APC). However, since taking power in 2018, Bio’s SLPP regime has steered towards authoritarian consolidation through legal and constitutional manipulation, institutional capture, and repression.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the ruling party, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The regime has hindered the mainstream opposition’s campaign, engaged in significant electoral law manipulation and voting irregularities, benefited from unfair campaign advantages, and undermined independent electoral oversight.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Although citizens regularly demonstrate, authorities unfairly repress protests or gatherings through excessive use of force, broad curfews, communication shutdowns, denial of protest permits, and the targeting of protest organizers. The regime and its affiliated non-state actors have intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, and members of the general public and unfairly obstructed their work to the extent that the overall ability to openly criticize the authorities has been notably hindered, though not completely eliminated.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime in a way that enables it to repress criticism and significantly undermine electoral competition. The judiciary remains vulnerable to executive influence as the president appoints both judges and the members of the Judicial Service Commission that recommends them. It is a recurrent practice in Sierra Leone for a new administration, upon taking office, to replace key judicial and legal figures, especially the Chief Justice, Attorney General, and, at times, senior judges.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the ruling party, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. Since the end of the civil war, the country has held five national electoral cycles with two handovers of power between the SLPP and the APC parties. Since winning the 2018 elections—the most narrowly contested presidential polls in the country’s history—the regime of President Bio of the SLPP has obstructed the main opposition party’s campaign, engaged in significant electoral law manipulation and voting irregularities, benefited from unfair campaign advantages, and undermined independent electoral oversight.
The regime has engaged in significant electoral law manipulation and voting irregularities. Statistical inconsistencies, opacity, and non-adherence to procedures surrounding tabulation of results flawed the June 2023 general elections. ECSL declared Bio the winner of the June 2023 presidential election—crediting him with a 15-point margin of victory (56% to 41% of the votes) over the APC’s Samura Kamara— when tabulation was still underway in some districts. The Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone (ECSL) further did not publish the disaggregated results per polling station. While an independent, non-partisan parallel count confirmed that Bio received more votes, both local and international observers decried statistical discrepancies that inflated the incumbent’s recorded votes relative to those independently observed. The elections were so flawed that in September 2023, the U.S. State Department announced its intent to impose visa restrictions on persons responsible for undermining the democratic process “in the lead-up to, during, and following Sierra Leone’s 2023 elections,” including those involved in “manipulating or rigging the electoral process, intimidating voters, election observers, or civil society organizations through threats or acts of physical violence.”
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight and intimidated independent observers. In October 2022, Bio controversially invoked a constitutional clause reserved for exceptional circumstances to instruct the ECSL to change the voting system for the 2023 parliamentary election. Instead of the traditional system based on constituencies where voters choose individual candidates, Bio ordered the use of a district-based proportional representation voting system where voters select their preferred political parties instead of directly voting for individual candidates. The constitution restricted the use of the latter system, which favors the two major parties, to exceptional circumstances, and it was historically used temporarily to mitigate population displacements as a result of the civil war. Civil society and the opposition unsuccessfully challenged the legal basis of the directive.
In addition, Bio has often subverted the constitutional process, subjecting presidential appointments of the commissioners of the two electoral oversight bodies – the ECSL and the Political Parties Regulation Commission (PPRC) – to consultation with political parties and parliamentary approval. Over the years, civil society organizations have raised concerns about the regime’s pattern of stacking the ECSL and PPRC with commissioners aligned with the SLPP.
Finally, the regime has pressured and intimidated local election observers. During the June 2023 elections, the National Election Watch (NEW), a coalition of civic and nongovernment organizations, deployed 6,000 observers and conducted a parallel vote count. Following NEW’s publication of parallel vote tallies showing discrepancies in the official ECSL results, the Office of National Security (ONS) qualified the publication as anti-constitutional, seeking to provoke undue tension. The NEW leadership subsequently fled the country in fear of arrest.
Non-state actors aligned with the regime have also hindered the electoral campaign of the mainstream opposition. For example, in June 2023, violent groups of ruling SLPP supporters carried out violence and intimidation against the opposition in seven southeastern districts, which are strongholds of the ruling party. The violence included the burning of APC offices in Bo, vandalism of other APC offices in Kailahun and Pujehun, and attacks on the caravan of the APC presidential candidate, Samura Kamara.
Moreover, the ruling party enjoyed unfair campaign advantages derived from the incumbent’s control over state resources and public office. For example, well ahead of the official campaign period for the June 2023 election, the President exploited appearances at the launch of government projects to promote his re-election. During the campaign, the regime published partisan campaign messaging on official government websites and social media accounts, and used military trucks to transport SLPP campaign materials. The ruling SLPP party also received over 90% of primetime coverage from the national public broadcaster Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC).
In Sierra Leone, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime unfairly represses protests, censors dissenting speech, and somewhat manipulates media coverage in its favor.
Although Sierra Leoneans regularly demonstrate, the regime enforces the 1965 Public Order Act, subjecting protests to police approval. Police frequently suppress unauthorized demonstrations with heavy-handed and lethal retaliation. For example, on June 21, 2023, police fired live ammunition and tear gas at APC supporters marching peacefully to the ECSL headquarters in Freetown to protest against electoral policies. The shooting killed one protester. In July 2020, security forces killed at least six protesters and injured many while violently dispersing a protest against the regime’s decision to relocate a standby thermal generator from Makeni to Lungi. During a peaceful women-led “Black Monday” protest in Freetown in July 2022, authorities arrested activist Femi Claudius-Cole, raided her home and office, and detained Dennis Bright for organizing the protest. In August 2022, during a nationwide protest over the rising cost of living, security forces again used excessive force, resulting in the deaths of at least 21 civilians and six police officers. In the aftermath, the regime imposed a nationwide curfew, shut down the internet, and arrested more than 500 protesters.
The regime has intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, and members of the general public and unfairly obstructed their work. Tactics include physical intimidation and the application of repressive laws such as the Cyber Security and Crime Act. Journalists face intimidation. In 2024, the state broadcaster SBLS terminated the contract of freelancer Umu Thoronka after she posted a video on TikTok documenting a citizen’s criticism of Bio’s performance. She later fled the country following visits to her home by unidentified individuals, and online smear attacks and death threats. In January 2025, the Speaker of Parliament, Segepoh Solomon Thomas, indefinitely banned journalist Melvin Tejan Mansaray from the parliament chamber in retaliation for critical coverage of the legislature. In September 2022, the broadcast media regulator, the National Telecommunications Commission, yanked Star television and radio stations off the air for two weeks in retaliation for airing a talk show in which participants blamed the regime for causing violence during a nationwide protest.
The regime has targeted political opponents as well. In May 2022, APC MP and former Minister of Transport and Aviation Kemoh Sesay was detained and charged with cyberbullying President Bio over a viral social media video of a speech in which Sesay called Bio a killer and a thief. In July 2022, police detained opposition politicians Femi Claudius Cole and Dennis Bright for four days on accusations of inciting a group of women planning to stage a peaceful protest against the rising cost of living. In February 2023, security forces attached to the President’s Office attacked a convoy with senior leaders of the opposition APC headed for the party’s National Delegates’ Conference. Security forces brutalized APC National Secretary General Lansana Dumbuya and others, including Mayor of Freetown Yvonne Aki-Sawyerr. In June 2023, security forces fired live ammunition and tear gas at the APC headquarters in Freetown, while the party’s presidential candidate, Samura Kamara, was inside, killing one person.
In addition, the regime seriously and unfairly censors dissenting speech. Despite the repeal of the Criminal and Seditious Libel Law in 2020, regime critics have been arbitrarily detained or intimidated for online criticism vaguely deemed to constitute “cyberbullying,” “incitement,” or “spreading false information.” For example, in June 2024, police raided the office of lawyer Joy Precious Baryoh and detained her on charges of cyber stalking and bullying over a comment she posted on President Bio’s X official account referencing the flawed elections through which Bio came to power. In December 2024, social media influencer Hawa Hunt was arrested live on television for posting a critical video about President Bio and his wife, and charged with “insulting messages.” She was detained for two months without bail before being acquitted in March 2025. In September 2025, Bio suspended Justice Allan Halloway, a Supreme Court judge, just weeks after he authored a public complaint letter raising serious concerns about the abusive practices of the Chief Justice.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have seriously intimidated dissenters, unfairly obstructing their work. In October 2023, violent groups affiliated with the ruling party attacked Hope Radio in the opposition stronghold of Makeni, pressuring it to shut down. They destroyed equipment and injured at least five journalists. Also, in July 2022, violent thugs aligned with the ruling party stormed Parliament and attacked opposition legislators with little or no police intervention. The attack occurred amid days of intense debate about the controversial Public Elections Act, a bill opposed by the APC. The attack left several APC lawmakers seriously injured.
In Sierra Leone, institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime in a way that enables it to repress criticism and significantly undermine electoral competition.
The constitution gives the President significant power and influence over the appointment of the members of the judiciary and other key oversight institutions, electoral and otherwise. Presidential appointments are subject to approval from parliament, which is majority-dominated by the ruling party. In this context, President Bio and the ruling SLPP have been able to stack courts and other oversight institutions with appointees aligned with the ruling party, weakening meaningful checks to executive power. For example, in June 2020, the SLPP used its narrow majority and alliances with other opposition parties in parliament to override the APC’s opposition to President Bio’s nominations of High Court justices Komba Kamanda and Alhaji Momojah Stevens to the Court of Appeals. Kamanda and Stevens had presided over politically-charged cases against the APC.
The courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process skewed in its favor. They often dismiss opposition petitions, delay urgent electoral cases, and legitimize partisan reforms. For example, in January 2023, the Supreme Court unanimously validated President Bio’s controversial instruction to the ECSL to shift to a proportional representation system for the June 2023 parliamentary elections. In 2019, the High Court controversially nullified 10 APC parliamentary seats based on SLPP petitions alleging electoral irregularities–even though the APC MPs’ elections had been previously certified and they had already completed over a year of serving their elected terms. The regime orchestrated the immediate takeover of Nine of the seats by the ruling party candidates, overturning the opposition’s majority in parliament. The opposition appealed to the Court of Appeals, which did not hear the case within the four-month constitutional limit. In another case, in April 2022, the Supreme Court upheld a legal challenge filed in 2018 against a police ban on vehicles during the general elections that year, which had been enforced.
Furthermore, courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism. In January 2023, a High Court convicted civil society activist Edmond Abu Jr. on contempt of court charges and sentenced him to 21 days in prison for urging citizens to show support for a class action lawsuit he led on behalf of consumers against the government’s national telecommunications commission (NATCOM) and two leading mobile companies over high mobile tariffs. Judges have imposed maximum penalties on peaceful protesters, often based on uncorroborated police testimony. For example, in October 2022, 14 individuals were sentenced to a maximum jail term of 18 months after being convicted of “riotous conduct” and “disorderly behavior” for participating in August 10 demonstrations, even though some were merely at their places of business during the events. Hawa Hunt was detained for two months without bail and was only acquitted in March 2025, shortly after First Lady Fatima Bio’s public intervention, which highlighted the political overtones of her arrest and release, as well as the vulnerability of the judiciary to political influence.
The regime has undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Following the courts’ consistent dismissals of its legal petitions, the main opposition APC party publicly announced in 2023 that it would no longer seek remedies in court, citing its recurring bad experience with a judiciary that it believes lacks impartiality. As a result, most electoral complaints are not brought before the courts. For example, the APC declined to litigate the contested 2023 election results.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Impunity for the regime’s human rights violations has led various citizens and groups to turn to the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to seek justice. In August 2022, survivors of the July 2020 police deadly shooting of a protest in Makeni took the regime to court. In September 2025, former SLBS journalist Umu Thoronka sued the regime before the ECOWAS Court over her unfair dismissal from SLBS in retaliation for sharing a video critical of President Bio and official inaction in response to her formal complaints on the grounds of wrongful dismissal.
The regime has subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. Upon taking power in 2018, President Bio controversially sacked all members of the Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission before the expiration of their terms and in violation of constitutional procedures requiring a tribunal hearing for their dismissal. Since then, Bio has been accused of filling the Commission with commissioners from his tribe. In November 2022, President Bio signed a constitutional amendment changing the composition of the PPRC in a manner that favors him. The amendment removed the requirement that the chair be a senior judge, thus giving the President unfettered discretion in choosing the Chair. The amendment also increased the number of commissioners from four to five, giving the President and the SLPP majority in Parliament one more appointee on the Commission. In July 2024, President Bio ordered the removal from office of Auditor General Lara Taylor-Pearce, whose office is an autonomous body established by Parliament. Bio had controversially suspended Taylor-Pearce without following the legal procedure in 2021, ahead of the release of an Auditor-General’s Report scathing towards the government. In June 2018, Bio similarly and controversially replaced the Commissioner for the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC).
