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HRF classifies Romania as democratic.
Romania is a semi-presidential republic that democratized in 1989, after nearly 41 years of Communist rule. During that time, strongman Nicolae Ceaușescu (in power 1965 -1989) consolidated one of the most repressive regimes on the continent, characterized by mass surveillance, rampant human rights abuses, and a cult of personality.
Since 1990, the country has held free and fair elections and consolidated its democratic institutions, despite enduring endemic corruption and lapses in the rule of law. Romania has a dynamic multi-party system. A bicameral legislature, comprising a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate, exercises legislative power and oversees the cabinet. The president nominates the Prime Minister (typically the leader of the largest party in parliament) and can influence foreign policy, veto laws, and sign certain decrees.
National elections are largely free and fair. The National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Social Democrats (PSD) have been dominant since Romania democratized in 1989, but neither party has governed single-handedly for extended periods. Coalition governments supported by smaller parliamentary parties are the norm. While electoral competition is robust overall, the inequitable distribution and insufficient regulation of state subsidies to political parties threaten to skew the playing field in favor of large established parties, such as the PNL and PSD, to the detriment of emerging contenders. Serious campaign financing violations by one candidate also undermined the integrity of the 2024 presidential election, precipitating an unprecedented re-run in 2025.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. However, a recent influx of political advertising and the government’s inefficient response to harassment against critical journalists have prompted concerns about media independence. Civil society is vibrant in Romania, and freedom of assembly is generally upheld in practice. Nonetheless, legislative changes in 2015 that allowed political parties to directly commission services from media outlets have undermined the editorial independence of major outlets and led to an influx of political advertising not clearly identified as such. Domestic and international watchdogs have also criticized the government’s presumed involvement in or ineffective responses to smear campaigns and online harassment of critical journalists. Civil society is vibrant in Romania, and freedom of assembly is generally upheld in practice.
Romanian institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority. Despite some outstanding reforms and implementation gaps, the judiciary has held officials accountable for electoral fraud and generally upheld the freedom of dissent. Independent oversight bodies have also generally performed their functions effectively, but remain plagued by staffing challenges and political influence.
In Romania, national elections are largely free and fair, and parties across the political spectrum can campaign effectively. However, established parties have systematically benefited from the unequal allocation of public party subsidies, the generally weak oversight of party financing, and biased media coverage of campaigns. The controversial 2024 presidential election underscored the dilemma between effectively countering foreign interference and following constitutional precedent, while the subsequent re-run was also assessed as free and fair.
The two largest parties have enjoyed some unfair campaign advantages at the expense of smaller or emerging political actors. Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have noted that the current allocation of state subsidies to political parties and the limited powers of the Permanent Election Authority (PEA) to regulate campaign finance risk eroding political pluralism in the long term. Amendments to the Electoral Code in 2018 and 2020 significantly increased the limit on public funding for parties — from 0.04% of state revenues to 0.04% of GDP, nearly doubling the maximum — and allowed the unrestricted use of state subsidies for electoral campaigns. Importantly, only parties represented in Parliament are entitled to these subsidies, in proportion to the votes won in the last election – contrary to prior OSCE and Venice Commission recommendations to extend financial support to smaller parties as well. As a result, the PSD and the PNL, as the largest parties, received the largest share of these subsidies. In 2023, they received approximately 21.2 and 18.8 million USD, respectively, out of a total of about 56 million USD. The remainder was divided among the Save Romania Union (9.6 million USD), the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (4.5 million USD), the Popular Movement Party (1 million USD), and the Pro Romania (780,000 USD) parties. As discussed further under the Freedom of Dissent pillar, parties have disproportionately used these funds to secure favorable media coverage, which is not clearly labeled as political advertising.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the government has directly obstructed the mainstream opposition’s electoral campaigns. While the PNL and the PSD have dominated the political scene since Romania democratized in 1989, various political parties, such as the center-right Save Romania Union (USR), the conservative Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), campaign on a relatively equal footing and typically win seats in Parliament. As no single party claimed a majority of the popular vote or seats in parliament in the last three parliamentary elections (2016, 2020, and 2024), Romania was governed by coalitions, which proved prone to instability. For instance, in 2019, the PSD-led government, supported by the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE), that came to power following the 2016 parliamentary elections, lost a no-confidence vote in Parliament after controversial reforms that would have significantly diminished sanctions for high-level corruption sparked sustained popular protests. In the December 2024 parliamentary elections, the PSD (21.96%) and the PNL (13.2%) gained fewer seats than they did four years prior, losing their joint majority. Following negotiations, they narrowly formed a government with UMDR support.
While the government has refrained from overtly and systematically skewing the playing field in its favor (as indicated by the political dynamic sketched above), credible allegations of foreign interference and illicit political financing marred the December 2024 presidential elections. Călin Georgescu, a previously obscure independent candidate, unexpectedly claimed victory in the first round, ahead of candidates favored in recent opinion polls. Shortly after the Constitutional Court certified the results, the Romanian intelligence services declassified documents showing suspect online activity favoring Georgescu: two weeks before the vote, more than 25,000 previously inactive TikTok accounts began promoting an “ideal” presidential candidate who, albeit not explicitly identified, closely matched Georgescu’s profile. At the same time, Georgescu and his team reported spending zero on online campaign activities in their mandatory reporting to the electoral oversight bodies. While the declassified evidence did not demonstrate foreign involvement beyond a reasonable doubt, experts assess these tactics closely resembled Russia’s efforts to influence elections in Moldova and Ukraine and pointed to Kremlin interference. In response to the revelations, the Constitutional Court annulled the results – an unprecedented decision that further polarized the country. The ruling also prompted jurisprudential controversy due to its heavy reliance on previously classified evidence. Citing the court’s decision, the Central Election Commission (CEC) banned Georgescu from participating in the subsequent re-run, which took place in May 2025. In a highly contested election, assessed as free and fair by international observers, Bucharest mayor Nicusor Dan narrowly defeated nationalist George Simion.
Since Romania democratized, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public have been largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The loose regulation of political advertising and media ownership has enabled undue editorial interference, while political elites’ harassment of some critical journalists risked creating a chilling effect. On the other hand, civil society remains robust, with thousands of active CSOs and regular peaceful demonstrations that proceed largely unobstructed by law enforcement.
Despite the generally diverse media landscape, an influx of political advertising since 2015, when legislative changes made it possible for political parties to commission media services, has allowed parties to skew media coverage in their favor. These provisions, coupled with gaps in campaign spending regulations, have effectively allowed them to pay for political advertising that is not clearly indicated as such, blurring the line between paid promotion and objective editorial coverage. The extent of the issue is difficult to ascertain, as most contracts between political entities and media outlets are protected by non-disclosure agreements. Still, local watchdogs estimate that in 2022 alone the two biggest parties, PSD and PNL, spent close to 19 million USD on political advertising, accounting for nearly 3% of the entire advertising market in Romania. In addition, local experts have indicated that political parties have, in all likelihood, sponsored smear campaigns targeting critical journalists. In 2022, private pictures of investigative journalist Emilia Șercan were circulated online, along with articles that discredited her reputation. It later transpired that Green Pixel International, an advertising agency connected to the PNL, had driven the promotion of the content on social media. Shortly before, Șercan had revealed that acting Prime Minister Nicolae Ciucă plagiarized his doctoral dissertation in the early 2000s, triggering a copyright infringement investigation against Ciucă by the Prosecutor’s Office. Despite the potential chilling effect of such harassment tactics, media pluralism has remained robust: Romania has a relatively diverse media landscape, in which big international corporations, such as Ringier, PPT Group, and Dogan Media International, coexist with smaller local providers, such as Intact Media Group, RCS&RDS, and Hotnews.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. With more than 120,000 CSOs registered, as of 2023, Romania has a robust civil society. International observers have assessed the legal framework for the founding and management of CSOs as sound overall, while noting limited instances of public officials obstructing CSOs working on sensitive issues, such as environmental protection and LGBTQ+ rights.
Authorities generally respect the freedom of assembly and have not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings, with a few exceptions. In 2017, at the height of the protests denouncing the PSD’s proposed amendments to the Criminal Code, law enforcement briefly detained about two dozen peaceful demonstrators, who were released the following day. During mass anti-corruption protests the following year, which saw more than 100,000 people gather in Bucharest, there were multiple instances of police brutality, with about 700 citizens pressing charges against members of law enforcement and the gendarmerie. While the Prosecutor’s Office opened multiple criminal investigations as a result, there has been limited accountability for perpetrators as of 2024.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority, as recent governments have largely abided by Romania’s commitments as an EU member-state to continue reforming its judiciary, improving the public administration, and tackling corruption. Nonetheless, appointment procedures for key judicial oversight bodies and other monitoring agencies remain susceptible to political influence and arguably hamper their effectiveness.
While the previous PSD-led government pursued some controversial reforms that could seriously weaken the independence and operational effectiveness of judicial institutions between 2017 and 2019, the coalitions that came into office afterwards have reversed course, bringing Romania broadly in line with EU rule-of-law standards. In 2018, the former PSD-led government established a new disciplinary judicial organ, the Section to Investigate Offenses in the Judiciary (SIIJ), ostensibly to tackle corruption among judges and prosecutors. The SIIJ proved controversial, however. On the one hand, it was ineffective, resolving less than a quarter of the cases it opened between 2018 and 2022, with even fewer resulting in an indictment. On the other hand, there was little oversight for SIIJ procedures or decisions, enabling the potential of the SIIJ being abused for intimidation and harassment of critical judges. Since the PSD lost power in 2020, subsequent governments have reversed at least some of these reforms and attempted to mitigate the resulting erosion of judicial independence. The SIIJ was abolished by a 2022 parliamentary vote. Nonetheless, other judicial bodies, such as the Superior Council of the Magistracy (SCM) and the Office of the Chief Judicial Inspector, retain considerable power to retaliate against critical judges and have done so in some cases. For instance, in December 2021, the SCM dismissed Judge Cristi Danilet for “social media misconduct” after he posted videos of himself practicing martial arts and gardening on TikTok. The dismissal prompted a public outcry, with local watchdogs arguing that Danilet was removed for his vocal opposition to the 2017-2018 reforms of the PSD that, if adopted, would have reduced sanctions for various forms of corruption. In February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Danilet’s dismissal violated Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Further, the ECHR found that the domestic courts that had adjudicated on Danilet’s appeal of his dismissal had failed to consider the potential chilling effect of the sanction. The case also cast doubt on the functional independence of the SCM, the main organ responsible for appointing, transferring, and promoting judges and prosecutors, despite its generally apolitical appointment, in which 14 of its 19 members are selected by fellow magistrates.
The courts have neither unfairly failed to check nor enabled the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition, and international observers, such as the OSCE, have assessed Romania’s electoral dispute-resolution mechanisms as sound. To illustrate, the judiciary has previously held high-ranking public officials accountable for electoral fraud. In 2016, the High Court of Cassation found PSD leader Liviu Dragnea and a number of other party officials guilty of rigging a 2012 referendum on the impeachment of then-President and main political rival Traian Băsescu. At Dragnea’s behest, Dragnea loyalists had bribed people to vote and even cast fake ballots, in an attempt to push turnout above 60%, the threshold required for the referendum to become legally binding. Dragnea got a 1-year suspended sentence and was barred from holding public office.
While authorities have not always promptly investigated harassment and threats against journalists, the courts have generally checked political elites’ attempts to silence criticism. Illustrating that impunity for such attacks on independent journalism persists in some instances, the Office of the Prosecutor at the Bucharest Court of Appeal abruptly discontinued its investigation into the smear campaign and the online threats journalist Emilia Șercan suffered after reporting in 2022 on academic plagiarism committed by government figures. International watchdogs, such as the International Press Institute and the Committee to Protect Journalists, decried the Prosecution’s decision, arguing it was a deliberate attempt to shield the perpetrators from accountability. On the other hand, the courts have generally safeguarded critical media’s freedom to openly criticize political and business elites, as indicated by the exceedingly low conviction rate for critical journalists and outlets targeted with strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) or other forms of legal harassment. In a 2020 case that drew international attention, the District Mayor of Bucharest, Daniel Băluță, elected in 2016, filed more than a dozen lawsuits against two investigative journalists from the popular daily newspaper Libertatea. He claimed that articles in the newspaper alleging mismanagement of the local police under his leadership were defamatory. While addressing these suits placed a significant burden on Libertatea, none were successful in court.
The government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. That said, leadership appointments to a few key monitoring bodies have raised doubts about the effectiveness of these institutions. For instance, Parliament appoints the president of the highest electoral oversight body, the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), allowing dominant political parties disproportionate influence in the AEP’s management. To illustrate, the appointment of Toni Greblă, a former Constitutional Court judge who was indicted and subsequently acquitted for influence peddling, as PEA president in 2023 raised concerns about the Authority’s integrity. Greblă was subsequently dismissed from his post in a 2025 parliamentary vote, after it transpired that he had manipulated official data to illegally increase his own salary (which is tied to the national minimum wage). National anti-corruption watchdogs and economic regulators have sparked similar controversies. Frequent leadership turnover and allegations of protecting certain political elites have plagued the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), which was restructured to its current form in 2006 as part of Romania’s EU accession negotiations. International observers have repeatedly noted that the DNA has pursued predominantly minor cases rather than investigating high-level corruption in line with its mandate. In 2024, the government established the Agency for Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Enterprises (AMEPIP), tasked with overseeing state-owned enterprise (SOE) performance and corporate governance. However, the similarly politicized process of selecting the AMEPIP’s members and the high compensation for leadership have also prompted concerns about the body’s impartiality and effectiveness.
HRF classifies Romania as democratic.
Romania is a semi-presidential republic that democratized in 1989, after nearly 41 years of Communist rule. During that time, strongman Nicolae Ceaușescu (in power 1965 -1989) consolidated one of the most repressive regimes on the continent, characterized by mass surveillance, rampant human rights abuses, and a cult of personality.
Since 1990, the country has held free and fair elections and consolidated its democratic institutions, despite enduring endemic corruption and lapses in the rule of law. Romania has a dynamic multi-party system. A bicameral legislature, comprising a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate, exercises legislative power and oversees the cabinet. The president nominates the Prime Minister (typically the leader of the largest party in parliament) and can influence foreign policy, veto laws, and sign certain decrees.
National elections are largely free and fair. The National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Social Democrats (PSD) have been dominant since Romania democratized in 1989, but neither party has governed single-handedly for extended periods. Coalition governments supported by smaller parliamentary parties are the norm. While electoral competition is robust overall, the inequitable distribution and insufficient regulation of state subsidies to political parties threaten to skew the playing field in favor of large established parties, such as the PNL and PSD, to the detriment of emerging contenders. Serious campaign financing violations by one candidate also undermined the integrity of the 2024 presidential election, precipitating an unprecedented re-run in 2025.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. However, a recent influx of political advertising and the government’s inefficient response to harassment against critical journalists have prompted concerns about media independence. Civil society is vibrant in Romania, and freedom of assembly is generally upheld in practice. Nonetheless, legislative changes in 2015 that allowed political parties to directly commission services from media outlets have undermined the editorial independence of major outlets and led to an influx of political advertising not clearly identified as such. Domestic and international watchdogs have also criticized the government’s presumed involvement in or ineffective responses to smear campaigns and online harassment of critical journalists. Civil society is vibrant in Romania, and freedom of assembly is generally upheld in practice.
Romanian institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority. Despite some outstanding reforms and implementation gaps, the judiciary has held officials accountable for electoral fraud and generally upheld the freedom of dissent. Independent oversight bodies have also generally performed their functions effectively, but remain plagued by staffing challenges and political influence.
In Romania, national elections are largely free and fair, and parties across the political spectrum can campaign effectively. However, established parties have systematically benefited from the unequal allocation of public party subsidies, the generally weak oversight of party financing, and biased media coverage of campaigns. The controversial 2024 presidential election underscored the dilemma between effectively countering foreign interference and following constitutional precedent, while the subsequent re-run was also assessed as free and fair.
The two largest parties have enjoyed some unfair campaign advantages at the expense of smaller or emerging political actors. Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have noted that the current allocation of state subsidies to political parties and the limited powers of the Permanent Election Authority (PEA) to regulate campaign finance risk eroding political pluralism in the long term. Amendments to the Electoral Code in 2018 and 2020 significantly increased the limit on public funding for parties — from 0.04% of state revenues to 0.04% of GDP, nearly doubling the maximum — and allowed the unrestricted use of state subsidies for electoral campaigns. Importantly, only parties represented in Parliament are entitled to these subsidies, in proportion to the votes won in the last election – contrary to prior OSCE and Venice Commission recommendations to extend financial support to smaller parties as well. As a result, the PSD and the PNL, as the largest parties, received the largest share of these subsidies. In 2023, they received approximately 21.2 and 18.8 million USD, respectively, out of a total of about 56 million USD. The remainder was divided among the Save Romania Union (9.6 million USD), the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (4.5 million USD), the Popular Movement Party (1 million USD), and the Pro Romania (780,000 USD) parties. As discussed further under the Freedom of Dissent pillar, parties have disproportionately used these funds to secure favorable media coverage, which is not clearly labeled as political advertising.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the government has directly obstructed the mainstream opposition’s electoral campaigns. While the PNL and the PSD have dominated the political scene since Romania democratized in 1989, various political parties, such as the center-right Save Romania Union (USR), the conservative Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), campaign on a relatively equal footing and typically win seats in Parliament. As no single party claimed a majority of the popular vote or seats in parliament in the last three parliamentary elections (2016, 2020, and 2024), Romania was governed by coalitions, which proved prone to instability. For instance, in 2019, the PSD-led government, supported by the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE), that came to power following the 2016 parliamentary elections, lost a no-confidence vote in Parliament after controversial reforms that would have significantly diminished sanctions for high-level corruption sparked sustained popular protests. In the December 2024 parliamentary elections, the PSD (21.96%) and the PNL (13.2%) gained fewer seats than they did four years prior, losing their joint majority. Following negotiations, they narrowly formed a government with UMDR support.
While the government has refrained from overtly and systematically skewing the playing field in its favor (as indicated by the political dynamic sketched above), credible allegations of foreign interference and illicit political financing marred the December 2024 presidential elections. Călin Georgescu, a previously obscure independent candidate, unexpectedly claimed victory in the first round, ahead of candidates favored in recent opinion polls. Shortly after the Constitutional Court certified the results, the Romanian intelligence services declassified documents showing suspect online activity favoring Georgescu: two weeks before the vote, more than 25,000 previously inactive TikTok accounts began promoting an “ideal” presidential candidate who, albeit not explicitly identified, closely matched Georgescu’s profile. At the same time, Georgescu and his team reported spending zero on online campaign activities in their mandatory reporting to the electoral oversight bodies. While the declassified evidence did not demonstrate foreign involvement beyond a reasonable doubt, experts assess these tactics closely resembled Russia’s efforts to influence elections in Moldova and Ukraine and pointed to Kremlin interference. In response to the revelations, the Constitutional Court annulled the results – an unprecedented decision that further polarized the country. The ruling also prompted jurisprudential controversy due to its heavy reliance on previously classified evidence. Citing the court’s decision, the Central Election Commission (CEC) banned Georgescu from participating in the subsequent re-run, which took place in May 2025. In a highly contested election, assessed as free and fair by international observers, Bucharest mayor Nicusor Dan narrowly defeated nationalist George Simion.
Since Romania democratized, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public have been largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The loose regulation of political advertising and media ownership has enabled undue editorial interference, while political elites’ harassment of some critical journalists risked creating a chilling effect. On the other hand, civil society remains robust, with thousands of active CSOs and regular peaceful demonstrations that proceed largely unobstructed by law enforcement.
Despite the generally diverse media landscape, an influx of political advertising since 2015, when legislative changes made it possible for political parties to commission media services, has allowed parties to skew media coverage in their favor. These provisions, coupled with gaps in campaign spending regulations, have effectively allowed them to pay for political advertising that is not clearly indicated as such, blurring the line between paid promotion and objective editorial coverage. The extent of the issue is difficult to ascertain, as most contracts between political entities and media outlets are protected by non-disclosure agreements. Still, local watchdogs estimate that in 2022 alone the two biggest parties, PSD and PNL, spent close to 19 million USD on political advertising, accounting for nearly 3% of the entire advertising market in Romania. In addition, local experts have indicated that political parties have, in all likelihood, sponsored smear campaigns targeting critical journalists. In 2022, private pictures of investigative journalist Emilia Șercan were circulated online, along with articles that discredited her reputation. It later transpired that Green Pixel International, an advertising agency connected to the PNL, had driven the promotion of the content on social media. Shortly before, Șercan had revealed that acting Prime Minister Nicolae Ciucă plagiarized his doctoral dissertation in the early 2000s, triggering a copyright infringement investigation against Ciucă by the Prosecutor’s Office. Despite the potential chilling effect of such harassment tactics, media pluralism has remained robust: Romania has a relatively diverse media landscape, in which big international corporations, such as Ringier, PPT Group, and Dogan Media International, coexist with smaller local providers, such as Intact Media Group, RCS&RDS, and Hotnews.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. With more than 120,000 CSOs registered, as of 2023, Romania has a robust civil society. International observers have assessed the legal framework for the founding and management of CSOs as sound overall, while noting limited instances of public officials obstructing CSOs working on sensitive issues, such as environmental protection and LGBTQ+ rights.
Authorities generally respect the freedom of assembly and have not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings, with a few exceptions. In 2017, at the height of the protests denouncing the PSD’s proposed amendments to the Criminal Code, law enforcement briefly detained about two dozen peaceful demonstrators, who were released the following day. During mass anti-corruption protests the following year, which saw more than 100,000 people gather in Bucharest, there were multiple instances of police brutality, with about 700 citizens pressing charges against members of law enforcement and the gendarmerie. While the Prosecutor’s Office opened multiple criminal investigations as a result, there has been limited accountability for perpetrators as of 2024.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority, as recent governments have largely abided by Romania’s commitments as an EU member-state to continue reforming its judiciary, improving the public administration, and tackling corruption. Nonetheless, appointment procedures for key judicial oversight bodies and other monitoring agencies remain susceptible to political influence and arguably hamper their effectiveness.
While the previous PSD-led government pursued some controversial reforms that could seriously weaken the independence and operational effectiveness of judicial institutions between 2017 and 2019, the coalitions that came into office afterwards have reversed course, bringing Romania broadly in line with EU rule-of-law standards. In 2018, the former PSD-led government established a new disciplinary judicial organ, the Section to Investigate Offenses in the Judiciary (SIIJ), ostensibly to tackle corruption among judges and prosecutors. The SIIJ proved controversial, however. On the one hand, it was ineffective, resolving less than a quarter of the cases it opened between 2018 and 2022, with even fewer resulting in an indictment. On the other hand, there was little oversight for SIIJ procedures or decisions, enabling the potential of the SIIJ being abused for intimidation and harassment of critical judges. Since the PSD lost power in 2020, subsequent governments have reversed at least some of these reforms and attempted to mitigate the resulting erosion of judicial independence. The SIIJ was abolished by a 2022 parliamentary vote. Nonetheless, other judicial bodies, such as the Superior Council of the Magistracy (SCM) and the Office of the Chief Judicial Inspector, retain considerable power to retaliate against critical judges and have done so in some cases. For instance, in December 2021, the SCM dismissed Judge Cristi Danilet for “social media misconduct” after he posted videos of himself practicing martial arts and gardening on TikTok. The dismissal prompted a public outcry, with local watchdogs arguing that Danilet was removed for his vocal opposition to the 2017-2018 reforms of the PSD that, if adopted, would have reduced sanctions for various forms of corruption. In February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Danilet’s dismissal violated Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Further, the ECHR found that the domestic courts that had adjudicated on Danilet’s appeal of his dismissal had failed to consider the potential chilling effect of the sanction. The case also cast doubt on the functional independence of the SCM, the main organ responsible for appointing, transferring, and promoting judges and prosecutors, despite its generally apolitical appointment, in which 14 of its 19 members are selected by fellow magistrates.
The courts have neither unfairly failed to check nor enabled the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition, and international observers, such as the OSCE, have assessed Romania’s electoral dispute-resolution mechanisms as sound. To illustrate, the judiciary has previously held high-ranking public officials accountable for electoral fraud. In 2016, the High Court of Cassation found PSD leader Liviu Dragnea and a number of other party officials guilty of rigging a 2012 referendum on the impeachment of then-President and main political rival Traian Băsescu. At Dragnea’s behest, Dragnea loyalists had bribed people to vote and even cast fake ballots, in an attempt to push turnout above 60%, the threshold required for the referendum to become legally binding. Dragnea got a 1-year suspended sentence and was barred from holding public office.
While authorities have not always promptly investigated harassment and threats against journalists, the courts have generally checked political elites’ attempts to silence criticism. Illustrating that impunity for such attacks on independent journalism persists in some instances, the Office of the Prosecutor at the Bucharest Court of Appeal abruptly discontinued its investigation into the smear campaign and the online threats journalist Emilia Șercan suffered after reporting in 2022 on academic plagiarism committed by government figures. International watchdogs, such as the International Press Institute and the Committee to Protect Journalists, decried the Prosecution’s decision, arguing it was a deliberate attempt to shield the perpetrators from accountability. On the other hand, the courts have generally safeguarded critical media’s freedom to openly criticize political and business elites, as indicated by the exceedingly low conviction rate for critical journalists and outlets targeted with strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) or other forms of legal harassment. In a 2020 case that drew international attention, the District Mayor of Bucharest, Daniel Băluță, elected in 2016, filed more than a dozen lawsuits against two investigative journalists from the popular daily newspaper Libertatea. He claimed that articles in the newspaper alleging mismanagement of the local police under his leadership were defamatory. While addressing these suits placed a significant burden on Libertatea, none were successful in court.
The government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. That said, leadership appointments to a few key monitoring bodies have raised doubts about the effectiveness of these institutions. For instance, Parliament appoints the president of the highest electoral oversight body, the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), allowing dominant political parties disproportionate influence in the AEP’s management. To illustrate, the appointment of Toni Greblă, a former Constitutional Court judge who was indicted and subsequently acquitted for influence peddling, as PEA president in 2023 raised concerns about the Authority’s integrity. Greblă was subsequently dismissed from his post in a 2025 parliamentary vote, after it transpired that he had manipulated official data to illegally increase his own salary (which is tied to the national minimum wage). National anti-corruption watchdogs and economic regulators have sparked similar controversies. Frequent leadership turnover and allegations of protecting certain political elites have plagued the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), which was restructured to its current form in 2006 as part of Romania’s EU accession negotiations. International observers have repeatedly noted that the DNA has pursued predominantly minor cases rather than investigating high-level corruption in line with its mandate. In 2024, the government established the Agency for Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Enterprises (AMEPIP), tasked with overseeing state-owned enterprise (SOE) performance and corporate governance. However, the similarly politicized process of selecting the AMEPIP’s members and the high compensation for leadership have also prompted concerns about the body’s impartiality and effectiveness.
