Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies the Republic of Congo as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Republic of Congo functions as a republic with a semi-presidential system of government. Denis Sassou-Nguesso is the current head of state, having been declared the winner of the controversial 2021 presidential election. This election was marred by the death of his main rival on election day, the disqualification of key opposition candidates, widespread irregularities—including an internet shutdown—and the dismissal of legal challenges by the opposition. Since gaining independence in 1960, the Republic of Congo has experienced only one democratic transition in 1992, which was short-lived due to Sassou-Nguesso’s return to power following the civil war in 1997. Since then, he has maintained an uninterrupted grip on leadership, creating an uneven electoral playing field that favors his regime in every presidential election. To further strengthen his power, he pushed through a constitutional amendment in 2015 that removed term limits, allowing him to run indefinitely. Sassou-Nguesso’s regime relies on a complex patronage system in which oil revenues are redistributed among a clan-based and military elite, leading to widespread corruption and depriving the general population of essential services. His hold on power is sustained through systematic repression: the regime bans demonstrations, harasses or imprisons dissenters within civil society, and routinely manipulates electoral processes to ensure the ruling party remains in control.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The Sassou-Nguesso regime has secured its victory in every presidential election since 2002 by systematically undermining the opposition through judicial harassment and prosecution. This often leads candidates to boycott the elections in protest against the unequal electoral playing field they face. Additionally, the regime engages in widespread electoral irregularities, which sometimes include shutting down the internet on election day.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Political leaders who criticize the regime are subjected to arbitrary arrests and imprisonment. Local human rights organizations are often targeted by state intelligence services, leading to break-ins at their offices, theft of materials, and interference with their investigations by regime officials. Additionally, the regime systematically censors any discourse that criticizes the president, senior officials, or addresses the mismanagement of the country. Finally, peaceful demonstrations are suppressed through denial of permits, use of force, and arrests of protesters.
Institutions largely fail to act as independent checks on the regime. In electoral matters, courts systematically side with the regime, validating election results despite widespread reports of irregularities and denying the opposition’s attempts to file legal challenges. Regime officials engage in human rights violations and embezzlement but do not face legal repercussions from state institutions, leading to a culture of impunity. Additionally, legislative institutions lack independence from the executive branch, as they are dominated by the ruling party’s representatives.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime bars high-profile opposition candidates from competing in elections and engages in widespread irregularities. Additionally, the opposition regularly boycotts elections as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition.
The regime unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Since ascending to power as a militia leader following a four-month civil war in 1997, President Sassou-Nguesso and his party, the Congolese Labor Party (PCT), have systematically marginalized major opposition figures through judicial harassment and prosecution, and, to a lesser extent, through administrative restrictions. In 2021, the regime secured over 88 percent of the vote, largely due to the absence of prominent opposition leaders from the electoral process. Jean-Marie Mokoko, an independent candidate who placed third in the 2016 elections, was arrested immediately after contesting the results and sentenced to 20 years in prison for “undermining state security,” a sentence that rendered him ineligible to run in the 2021 elections. Similarly, André Okombi Salissa of the Initiative for Democracy in Congo (IDC), a former minister who joined the opposition, received a 20-year sentence of hard labor in 2019 for politically motivated charges of undermining the internal security of the state and illegal possession of weapons and ammunition of war. In the 2009 elections, Sassou-Nguesso won 78.61 percent of the votes cast after successfully weakening attempts by the opposition to unify; this alliance comprised 20 parties forming the Front of Congolese Opposition Parties (FPOC). The regime disqualified four opposition candidates, including Ange Edouard Poungui, the leader of the largest opposition party in the National Assembly, the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS). He was disqualified on the grounds that he had not continuously resided in the country for the past two years, a decision Poungui described as politically motivated.
The regime engaged in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. This includes ballot stuffing, vote buying, incorrect voter lists, and internet shutdowns on Election Day. In the 2021 presidential election, the PCT was involved in ballot box stuffing during and after the voting, particularly in the Poto-Poto and Mpila neighborhoods of Brazzaville. Observers reported instances where a representative from the PCT paid individuals to vote at a local polling station. The reported irregularities during that election included polling officials allowing and encouraging multiple voting and instructing voters to vote only for the incumbent. Additionally, polling and security officials refused entry to accredited international observers, and ruling party loyalists impersonated representatives of other candidates. On Election Day and for three days afterward, authorities shut down the internet, preventing people from seeking information about their candidates and complicating the work of journalists and observers reporting on the elections.
The real, mainstream opposition threaten to or ultimately boycott the elections, as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition. In the Republic of Congo, opposition parties have frequently called for boycotts or opted out of the electoral process due to concerns about unfair practices, with many believing that election results are often predetermined in favor of the ruling regime. The 2022 legislative elections were marked by low voter turnout, as several opposition parties boycotted the elections, claiming they were organized in total disrespect of the law. These parties urged the regime to engage in inclusive dialogue to address the country’s pressing issues and to release political opponents from jail. In 2021, UPADS, the only opposition party with representation in the National Assembly, decided to boycott the presidential election. UPADS, which had won the country’s first multiparty elections for both the presidency and the legislature in 1992 against Sassou-Nguesso, argued that the conditions were not conducive to fair elections. They maintained that proceeding with the election would lead to further divisions in the country and proposed a transitional period with new elections in 2023, excluding long-serving Nguesso from the ballot. Historically, the opposition has used boycotts to contest the ruling party’s mishandling of the electoral process. In 2009, six of the original 16 opposition candidates withdrew from the election in response to what they perceived as electoral conditions that favored only the incumbent. In 2002, Nguesso was re-elected President of the Republic of Congo with 89.41% of the vote, facing only six minor candidates. His main opponent, former Prime Minister André Milongo, withdrew two days before the election in protest of electoral irregularities, leaving Nguesso largely unchallenged.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime seriously intimidates political leaders and civil society organizations, systematically represses peaceful protests, and engages in censorship of dissenting speech.
The ruling PCT seriously intimidated political leaders and civil society leaders, organizations, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. It has done so through harassment, temporary suspension, arbitrary arrests, and prosecution. In 2025, individuals from the Central Intelligence and Documentation Agency (CID), the state intelligence service, arrested and detained lawyer Bob Kaben Massouka during a raid on his home. He was targeted for supporting a group of young activists planning a peaceful demonstration against the country’s declining socio-economic conditions. Massouka’s arrest prompted the Bar Association to go on strike, demanding his release. Two weeks after his detention, the courts sent Massouka and six other individuals to the Brazzaville Detention Center, charging them with criminal conspiracy and attempted breach of state security. In March 2024, Member of Parliament Hydevert Mouagni, from the presidential majority, was arrested and unlawfully detained at the Central Intelligence and Documentation Center (CID) for criticizing the functioning of state institutions and blaming several officials, including the Minister of the Interior. The National Assembly later revoked Mouagni’s parliamentary immunity, as he faced charges of undermining state security and disclosing confidential information. Additionally, former presidential candidate General Mokoko and former minister Salissa have been serving 20-year prison sentences since 2017 for peacefully opposing the victory of President Sassou-Nguesso. Despite calls for their release from the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), the regime has refused to comply. In September 2022, two local human rights organizations, the Congolese Observatory of Human Rights (OCDH) and the Forum for Governance and Human Rights (FGDH), reported that their offices were broken into, and computers containing sensitive information were stolen. The organizations believe that state security officers were responsible, as traces of military boots were found on the floors and doors.
The regime seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. This repression includes the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators, the detention of protesters, and the outright banning of demonstrations by denying permits to protest organizers. Several local human rights organizations have reported that the Prefecture of Brazzaville rarely issues authorizations for marches, except for those that support the regime. The Center for Development Action (CAD), a local civil society organization (CSO), reported that in 2024, ten demonstrations and meetings were repressed, sometimes violently. They called on the authorities to abolish the system of prior authorization imposed on peaceful gatherings by Ordinance 62-28 of October 23, 1962. In March 2023, the Prefecture of Brazzaville issued a decree prohibiting the opposition party, the Republican Movement, from holding a gathering to pay tribute to the late Kolelas, the main opposition leader who died during the March 2021 presidential election. The prefect threatened to arrest the organizers if they did not comply, claiming to have evidence that “demonstrates that the meeting was likely to damage the social fabric and disturb public peace.” In April 2022, police forcefully dispersed protesters who had occupied the area around the Congo Electric Power Company in Brazzaville. They physically assaulted and arrested the protest organizer, activist Armel de l’eau Loemba, who was taken to the General Directorate of the Police before being released. The protest aimed to denounce ongoing electricity cuts and low voltage issues, but it had been banned two days earlier by the prefect, who cited “compelling reasons of public order.” In December 2021, dozens of individuals affected by the 2012 explosion of a military ammunition depot in the Mpila neighborhood of Brazzaville attempted to demonstrate to demand the reconstruction of their homes, which were destroyed in the blast. They faced a heavy police presence and were dispersed with tear gas.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. This includes banning content that is critical of the government’s management of the country and corruption cases involving high-ranking officials. In July 2024, two journalists—Juste Atsa, head of the sports department at Radio-Congo, and Cauchet Ngoulou, head of the sports department at Télé-Congo—were dismissed from their positions after publicly criticizing the Ministry of Sports during a broadcast for failing to provide adequate resources for Congolese sports. In response, the regime prohibited both Radio-Congo and Télé-Congo, which are public media outlets, from broadcasting any activities related to the Congolese Soccer Federation (FECOFOOT) “until further notice.” In January 2022, authorities suspended the newspaper Sel-Piment for six months for republishing content about alleged corruption by a regime official and the country’s economic mismanagement. The original content was published by Congo-Liberty.com, a website based outside the country that advocates for political change. Additionally, in 2019, the media outlet Manager Horizon published a series of articles on the alleged mismanagement of funds by the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC). The High Council for Freedom of Communication (CSLC), the media regulatory body, summoned the newspaper twice for questioning about these articles, demanding that it reveal its sources or cease further publication on the topic. The media regulator threatened to “shut down the newspaper” and issued a formal warning if it refused to present evidence to support the claims made in the articles.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Courts enable the Sassou-Nguesso regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. State institutions fail to hold regime officials accountable, entrenching a culture of impunity in the country. The parliament is controlled by the presidential majority and therefore fails to serve as an institution independent from the executive branch.
Courts frequently and unfairly enabled the regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. This includes validating election results while systematically denying opposition petitions, rejecting high-profile opposition candidates from the electoral list, and rubber-stamping controversial constitutional reforms that benefit the regime. In the 2021 elections, the Constitutional Court confirmed President Sassou-N’Guesso’s re-election to a fourth term and rejected opposition petitions against the results as unfounded. This decision came amid reports of irregularities and the death of the regime’s main challenger, Kolélas, who passed away from COVID-19 on the day of the vote. The opposition condemned the regime’s failure to postpone the election, which would have been legally required in the event of a candidate’s death. Despite this, the Constitutional Court validated the vote. In April 2016, the Constitutional Court proclaimed the incumbent, Sassou-N’Guesso, the winner of the 2016 presidential election with 60 percent of the vote. Various actors, including local CSOs, opposition candidates, and the international community, questioned the validity of the results due to widespread reports of irregularities. Opposition candidate Kolélas, who came in second, filed an appeal with the Constitutional Court claiming he had evidence of numerous irregularities. However, the Court rejected Kolélas’ appeal, stating it had not been filed in time. The confirmation of President Sassou-N’Guesso’s controversial victory followed another contentious decision by the Court. In 2015, the Constitutional Court approved a constitutional amendment removing age and term limits on the presidency, allowing President Sassou-N’Guesso to run for a third term in 2016. The results of the constitutional referendum, which reportedly showed 92 percent of votes in favor, were marred by intimidation, violence, and an opposition boycott. Consequently, the Constitutional Court’s confirmation of the referendum results was widely viewed as a rubber-stamp approval of Sassou-N’Guesso’s efforts to remain in power.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions frequently and unfairly failed to hold governing authority officials accountable. Despite numerous reports of systemic corruption involving high-ranking state officials, including the president and his family, and extreme violence committed by state security forces during peaceful protests in the Republic of Congo, senior political and military figures are largely protected from legal challenges. In some cases, these officials even target individuals who publicly criticize their actions. This lack of accountability has led to an entrenched culture of impunity. A notable example is the “ill-gotten gains” incident, which illustrates how the Congolese president and his family illegally seized significant amounts of state funds for personal enrichment. Although international investigations revealed that the president’s son misappropriated substantial state resources—specifically, $50 million from the country’s treasury—no national-level investigations have been conducted, despite the High Authority for the Fight against Corruption (HALC) being the national body responsible for addressing these issues.
HRF classifies the Republic of Congo as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Republic of Congo functions as a republic with a semi-presidential system of government. Denis Sassou-Nguesso is the current head of state, having been declared the winner of the controversial 2021 presidential election. This election was marred by the death of his main rival on election day, the disqualification of key opposition candidates, widespread irregularities—including an internet shutdown—and the dismissal of legal challenges by the opposition. Since gaining independence in 1960, the Republic of Congo has experienced only one democratic transition in 1992, which was short-lived due to Sassou-Nguesso’s return to power following the civil war in 1997. Since then, he has maintained an uninterrupted grip on leadership, creating an uneven electoral playing field that favors his regime in every presidential election. To further strengthen his power, he pushed through a constitutional amendment in 2015 that removed term limits, allowing him to run indefinitely. Sassou-Nguesso’s regime relies on a complex patronage system in which oil revenues are redistributed among a clan-based and military elite, leading to widespread corruption and depriving the general population of essential services. His hold on power is sustained through systematic repression: the regime bans demonstrations, harasses or imprisons dissenters within civil society, and routinely manipulates electoral processes to ensure the ruling party remains in control.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The Sassou-Nguesso regime has secured its victory in every presidential election since 2002 by systematically undermining the opposition through judicial harassment and prosecution. This often leads candidates to boycott the elections in protest against the unequal electoral playing field they face. Additionally, the regime engages in widespread electoral irregularities, which sometimes include shutting down the internet on election day.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Political leaders who criticize the regime are subjected to arbitrary arrests and imprisonment. Local human rights organizations are often targeted by state intelligence services, leading to break-ins at their offices, theft of materials, and interference with their investigations by regime officials. Additionally, the regime systematically censors any discourse that criticizes the president, senior officials, or addresses the mismanagement of the country. Finally, peaceful demonstrations are suppressed through denial of permits, use of force, and arrests of protesters.
Institutions largely fail to act as independent checks on the regime. In electoral matters, courts systematically side with the regime, validating election results despite widespread reports of irregularities and denying the opposition’s attempts to file legal challenges. Regime officials engage in human rights violations and embezzlement but do not face legal repercussions from state institutions, leading to a culture of impunity. Additionally, legislative institutions lack independence from the executive branch, as they are dominated by the ruling party’s representatives.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime bars high-profile opposition candidates from competing in elections and engages in widespread irregularities. Additionally, the opposition regularly boycotts elections as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition.
The regime unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Since ascending to power as a militia leader following a four-month civil war in 1997, President Sassou-Nguesso and his party, the Congolese Labor Party (PCT), have systematically marginalized major opposition figures through judicial harassment and prosecution, and, to a lesser extent, through administrative restrictions. In 2021, the regime secured over 88 percent of the vote, largely due to the absence of prominent opposition leaders from the electoral process. Jean-Marie Mokoko, an independent candidate who placed third in the 2016 elections, was arrested immediately after contesting the results and sentenced to 20 years in prison for “undermining state security,” a sentence that rendered him ineligible to run in the 2021 elections. Similarly, André Okombi Salissa of the Initiative for Democracy in Congo (IDC), a former minister who joined the opposition, received a 20-year sentence of hard labor in 2019 for politically motivated charges of undermining the internal security of the state and illegal possession of weapons and ammunition of war. In the 2009 elections, Sassou-Nguesso won 78.61 percent of the votes cast after successfully weakening attempts by the opposition to unify; this alliance comprised 20 parties forming the Front of Congolese Opposition Parties (FPOC). The regime disqualified four opposition candidates, including Ange Edouard Poungui, the leader of the largest opposition party in the National Assembly, the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS). He was disqualified on the grounds that he had not continuously resided in the country for the past two years, a decision Poungui described as politically motivated.
The regime engaged in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. This includes ballot stuffing, vote buying, incorrect voter lists, and internet shutdowns on Election Day. In the 2021 presidential election, the PCT was involved in ballot box stuffing during and after the voting, particularly in the Poto-Poto and Mpila neighborhoods of Brazzaville. Observers reported instances where a representative from the PCT paid individuals to vote at a local polling station. The reported irregularities during that election included polling officials allowing and encouraging multiple voting and instructing voters to vote only for the incumbent. Additionally, polling and security officials refused entry to accredited international observers, and ruling party loyalists impersonated representatives of other candidates. On Election Day and for three days afterward, authorities shut down the internet, preventing people from seeking information about their candidates and complicating the work of journalists and observers reporting on the elections.
The real, mainstream opposition threaten to or ultimately boycott the elections, as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition. In the Republic of Congo, opposition parties have frequently called for boycotts or opted out of the electoral process due to concerns about unfair practices, with many believing that election results are often predetermined in favor of the ruling regime. The 2022 legislative elections were marked by low voter turnout, as several opposition parties boycotted the elections, claiming they were organized in total disrespect of the law. These parties urged the regime to engage in inclusive dialogue to address the country’s pressing issues and to release political opponents from jail. In 2021, UPADS, the only opposition party with representation in the National Assembly, decided to boycott the presidential election. UPADS, which had won the country’s first multiparty elections for both the presidency and the legislature in 1992 against Sassou-Nguesso, argued that the conditions were not conducive to fair elections. They maintained that proceeding with the election would lead to further divisions in the country and proposed a transitional period with new elections in 2023, excluding long-serving Nguesso from the ballot. Historically, the opposition has used boycotts to contest the ruling party’s mishandling of the electoral process. In 2009, six of the original 16 opposition candidates withdrew from the election in response to what they perceived as electoral conditions that favored only the incumbent. In 2002, Nguesso was re-elected President of the Republic of Congo with 89.41% of the vote, facing only six minor candidates. His main opponent, former Prime Minister André Milongo, withdrew two days before the election in protest of electoral irregularities, leaving Nguesso largely unchallenged.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime seriously intimidates political leaders and civil society organizations, systematically represses peaceful protests, and engages in censorship of dissenting speech.
The ruling PCT seriously intimidated political leaders and civil society leaders, organizations, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. It has done so through harassment, temporary suspension, arbitrary arrests, and prosecution. In 2025, individuals from the Central Intelligence and Documentation Agency (CID), the state intelligence service, arrested and detained lawyer Bob Kaben Massouka during a raid on his home. He was targeted for supporting a group of young activists planning a peaceful demonstration against the country’s declining socio-economic conditions. Massouka’s arrest prompted the Bar Association to go on strike, demanding his release. Two weeks after his detention, the courts sent Massouka and six other individuals to the Brazzaville Detention Center, charging them with criminal conspiracy and attempted breach of state security. In March 2024, Member of Parliament Hydevert Mouagni, from the presidential majority, was arrested and unlawfully detained at the Central Intelligence and Documentation Center (CID) for criticizing the functioning of state institutions and blaming several officials, including the Minister of the Interior. The National Assembly later revoked Mouagni’s parliamentary immunity, as he faced charges of undermining state security and disclosing confidential information. Additionally, former presidential candidate General Mokoko and former minister Salissa have been serving 20-year prison sentences since 2017 for peacefully opposing the victory of President Sassou-Nguesso. Despite calls for their release from the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), the regime has refused to comply. In September 2022, two local human rights organizations, the Congolese Observatory of Human Rights (OCDH) and the Forum for Governance and Human Rights (FGDH), reported that their offices were broken into, and computers containing sensitive information were stolen. The organizations believe that state security officers were responsible, as traces of military boots were found on the floors and doors.
The regime seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. This repression includes the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators, the detention of protesters, and the outright banning of demonstrations by denying permits to protest organizers. Several local human rights organizations have reported that the Prefecture of Brazzaville rarely issues authorizations for marches, except for those that support the regime. The Center for Development Action (CAD), a local civil society organization (CSO), reported that in 2024, ten demonstrations and meetings were repressed, sometimes violently. They called on the authorities to abolish the system of prior authorization imposed on peaceful gatherings by Ordinance 62-28 of October 23, 1962. In March 2023, the Prefecture of Brazzaville issued a decree prohibiting the opposition party, the Republican Movement, from holding a gathering to pay tribute to the late Kolelas, the main opposition leader who died during the March 2021 presidential election. The prefect threatened to arrest the organizers if they did not comply, claiming to have evidence that “demonstrates that the meeting was likely to damage the social fabric and disturb public peace.” In April 2022, police forcefully dispersed protesters who had occupied the area around the Congo Electric Power Company in Brazzaville. They physically assaulted and arrested the protest organizer, activist Armel de l’eau Loemba, who was taken to the General Directorate of the Police before being released. The protest aimed to denounce ongoing electricity cuts and low voltage issues, but it had been banned two days earlier by the prefect, who cited “compelling reasons of public order.” In December 2021, dozens of individuals affected by the 2012 explosion of a military ammunition depot in the Mpila neighborhood of Brazzaville attempted to demonstrate to demand the reconstruction of their homes, which were destroyed in the blast. They faced a heavy police presence and were dispersed with tear gas.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. This includes banning content that is critical of the government’s management of the country and corruption cases involving high-ranking officials. In July 2024, two journalists—Juste Atsa, head of the sports department at Radio-Congo, and Cauchet Ngoulou, head of the sports department at Télé-Congo—were dismissed from their positions after publicly criticizing the Ministry of Sports during a broadcast for failing to provide adequate resources for Congolese sports. In response, the regime prohibited both Radio-Congo and Télé-Congo, which are public media outlets, from broadcasting any activities related to the Congolese Soccer Federation (FECOFOOT) “until further notice.” In January 2022, authorities suspended the newspaper Sel-Piment for six months for republishing content about alleged corruption by a regime official and the country’s economic mismanagement. The original content was published by Congo-Liberty.com, a website based outside the country that advocates for political change. Additionally, in 2019, the media outlet Manager Horizon published a series of articles on the alleged mismanagement of funds by the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC). The High Council for Freedom of Communication (CSLC), the media regulatory body, summoned the newspaper twice for questioning about these articles, demanding that it reveal its sources or cease further publication on the topic. The media regulator threatened to “shut down the newspaper” and issued a formal warning if it refused to present evidence to support the claims made in the articles.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Courts enable the Sassou-Nguesso regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. State institutions fail to hold regime officials accountable, entrenching a culture of impunity in the country. The parliament is controlled by the presidential majority and therefore fails to serve as an institution independent from the executive branch.
Courts frequently and unfairly enabled the regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. This includes validating election results while systematically denying opposition petitions, rejecting high-profile opposition candidates from the electoral list, and rubber-stamping controversial constitutional reforms that benefit the regime. In the 2021 elections, the Constitutional Court confirmed President Sassou-N’Guesso’s re-election to a fourth term and rejected opposition petitions against the results as unfounded. This decision came amid reports of irregularities and the death of the regime’s main challenger, Kolélas, who passed away from COVID-19 on the day of the vote. The opposition condemned the regime’s failure to postpone the election, which would have been legally required in the event of a candidate’s death. Despite this, the Constitutional Court validated the vote. In April 2016, the Constitutional Court proclaimed the incumbent, Sassou-N’Guesso, the winner of the 2016 presidential election with 60 percent of the vote. Various actors, including local CSOs, opposition candidates, and the international community, questioned the validity of the results due to widespread reports of irregularities. Opposition candidate Kolélas, who came in second, filed an appeal with the Constitutional Court claiming he had evidence of numerous irregularities. However, the Court rejected Kolélas’ appeal, stating it had not been filed in time. The confirmation of President Sassou-N’Guesso’s controversial victory followed another contentious decision by the Court. In 2015, the Constitutional Court approved a constitutional amendment removing age and term limits on the presidency, allowing President Sassou-N’Guesso to run for a third term in 2016. The results of the constitutional referendum, which reportedly showed 92 percent of votes in favor, were marred by intimidation, violence, and an opposition boycott. Consequently, the Constitutional Court’s confirmation of the referendum results was widely viewed as a rubber-stamp approval of Sassou-N’Guesso’s efforts to remain in power.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions frequently and unfairly failed to hold governing authority officials accountable. Despite numerous reports of systemic corruption involving high-ranking state officials, including the president and his family, and extreme violence committed by state security forces during peaceful protests in the Republic of Congo, senior political and military figures are largely protected from legal challenges. In some cases, these officials even target individuals who publicly criticize their actions. This lack of accountability has led to an entrenched culture of impunity. A notable example is the “ill-gotten gains” incident, which illustrates how the Congolese president and his family illegally seized significant amounts of state funds for personal enrichment. Although international investigations revealed that the president’s son misappropriated substantial state resources—specifically, $50 million from the country’s treasury—no national-level investigations have been conducted, despite the High Authority for the Fight against Corruption (HALC) being the national body responsible for addressing these issues.
