Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies the Philippines as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
For two decades until the 1980s, the Philippines was ruled by the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. His eventual ouster in 1986 kick-started the country’s democratic transition, and a new constitution was adopted in 1987 to limit executive powers, improve overall checks and balances, and strengthen basic freedoms. In 2022, Marcos’ son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., was elected president, bringing an end to the rule of his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte – who has become notorious for his “war on drugs,” described as “the worst human rights crisis in the country post-Martial Law.” His running mate and current vice president is Sara Duterte, the daughter of Rodrigo Duterte – indicating that Philippine politics remains dominated by dynasties, with the Marcos and Duterte families shifting between alliances and rivalries.
National elections are largely free and fair. They allow for incumbent turnover, and winners typically lead with narrow margins. However, the elections continue to be dominated by wealthy and influential political clans who benefit from vast patronage networks. Disinformation campaigns propagated by both Rodrigo Duterte and Marcos Jr. during their respective presidential bids undermined the integrity of the electoral process.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize the government. The Duterte administration that exited in 2022 oversaw a marked escalation in attacks against critics. There have been isolated improvements in the civic space since Marcos Jr. assumed power, but Duterte’s legacy of repression – including the red-tagging of dissidents, assaults on press freedom, repressive legal frameworks, and impunity for police brutality and gross rights violations – is largely unaddressed. The Philippines still boasts a resilient civil society and media landscape despite shortcomings.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Courts have increasingly sided with dissidents in salient cases since a new Chief Justice was appointed in early 2021 and the subsequent presidential succession. The direct encroachment on judicial powers emblematic of the Duterte era has largely subsided. Under Marcos Jr., however, courts remain hesitant to hold individuals affiliated with the regime accountable for graft and human rights abuses. Independent bodies also remain vulnerable to political appointments that raise concerns about their independence.
National elections are largely free and fair. Mainstream candidates across the political spectrum can contest without substantial hindrances. Fraud and voting irregularities are rare. Regardless, the elections are marked by the systematic exclusion of challengers to the traditional elite, entrenched patronage, and recurrent disinformation.
The regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The Philippine elections have led to regular turnover of incumbents. Those elected typically win with less than a majority, except for Marcos Jr. and his running mate, Sara Duterte, who won with 59% and 61.5% of the votes, respectively, in the 2022 polls. Progressive groups representing marginalized sectors, such as workers, farmers, women, and the urban poor, remain a minor political force, although they are vocal in their resistance to the traditional elite. These groups are often accused of being communist fronts and face disqualification, putting them at a disadvantage and perpetuating elite capture of the electoral system. The 2025 midterms – in which all 317 seats to the House of Representatives, half of the Senate, and around 18,000 local offices were contested – similarly reflected high levels of competition. A total of 21 national parties, 16 regional parties, and 156 party-lists participated. Following the Marcos-Duterte feud, many mainstream politicians were either aligned with the Marcos or the Duterte clan. While the Marcos coalition retained its dominance in the House, senatorial results were highly fragmented, with no single bloc securing a clear majority. There were notable gains with respect to minor and emerging political forces. Akbayan, a moderately progressive party-list led by prominent human rights lawyer Jose Manuel “Chel” Diokno, topped the party-list race. Ex-senator Leila de Lima, who was jailed for almost seven years under Rodrigo Duterte for her criticism of Duterte’s war on drugs, also made a political comeback by winning a House seat as a nominee of the Mamamayang Liberal party-list that represents marginalized groups.
Further, the regime has not undermined independent electoral oversight. The election management body, COMELEC, comprises seven commissioners appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, a congressional body composed of senators and House members elected proportionally to their seat representation in Congress. This mechanism largely mitigates the risk of political interference in COMELEC’s functioning. However, observers have noted that COMELEC is riddled with clientelistic appointments. The current Chief Commissioner, George Garcia, for example, is Marcos Jr.’s former election lawyer. Citizen election watchdogs, such as Lente, Kontra Daya, and the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), actively participate in pushing for electoral reforms and play a critical role in complementing the COMELEC’s work.
The regime has not unfairly and significantly hindered the mainstream opposition campaigns. However, challenges in the campaign environment remain. For example, disinformation is a recurring issue in Philippine elections, undermining electoral integrity. Both Rodrigo Duterte and Marcos Jr. relied on vast networks of volunteers, bots, and internet trolls to engage in systematic disinformation against their political opponents. In the 2022 general election, the Marcos Jr. camp launched a coordinated disinformation campaign against the main opposition candidate, Leni Robredo, that spread dozens of bogus claims about her, including claims that she was a communist – a term that carries sensitive connotations in the country – as well as unintelligent and corrupt. Robredo was nevertheless able to mount a vigorous campaign of her own. Sharply progressive groups such as the Makabayan and Kabataan blocs – whose platforms typically involve explicit calls to dismantle elite rule – remain vulnerable to red-tagging and disqualification attempts. These patterns persisted in the 2025 midterms, where the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC), an anti-communist task force under the President’s Office, made public attacks on progressive candidates, including Kabataan representative and youth activist Raoul Manuel. In addition, Philippine elections are dominated by political dynasties and often marred by episodes of violence. Ninety-nine percent of the Senate and 67% of the House belong to political families. Recent years have also seen the emergence of ‘fat dynasties’, where many members of the same family hold government positions. The Marcos and Duterte families are examples of this. The phenomenon has often sidelined new players and their opportunity to enter mainstream politics. Political dynasties are also frequently associated with electoral violence at local levels. Between 2018 and 2022, ACLED documented 716 acts of violence against local officials, with incidents concentrated in rural areas with active conflict. Dynastic politicians habitually employ contract assailants to commit such attacks. In November 2025, Akbayan representatives filed an anti-political dynasty bill in Congress.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the government. Marcos Jr. has continued many of the repressive practices observed under Rodrigo Duterte, particularly the “red-tagging” of dissidents, which involves accusing them of being communist sympathizers. Much like the Duterte era, assaults on press freedom are pervasive, with journalists routinely facing threats of violence and physical assaults. Under Marcos Jr., repressive anti-terrorism and criminal libel laws frequently wielded against critics remain operative, and there have been no significant efforts to repeal them. Impunity for police brutality and gross human rights abuses has continued. There has been isolated progress in the civic space that distinguishes the Marcos Jr. regime from that of his predecessor.
The regime has somewhat systematically and seriously intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. Under Marcos Jr., the Philippine regime has adopted a pro-West stance that contrasts with Rodrigo Duterte’s close alliance with China. This outlook has encouraged some reversals of certain trends of repression observed during Duterte’s reign. For example, the Duterte regime pursued a dozen administrative and criminal cases against Rappler, an independent and critical media outlet, as well as its board of directors and its founder, American-Filipino journalist Maria Ressa. By June 2025, with Marcos Jr. at the helm, most charges against Ressa had been dismissed, and the Supreme Court had allowed Rappler to continue operating. Similarly, ex-Senator Leila de Lima, who faced a series of bogus drug charges during Duterte’s presidency over her criticism of the latter’s infamous war on drugs, was released on bail in November 2023 and allowed to run – and win – legislative elections. A trial judge also acquitted her of her last remaining charges in June 2025.
While there have been noteworthy developments, Marcos Jr. has largely fallen short of rehabilitating the Philippine civic space. A total of 84 attacks on the press were documented within the first year of the Marcos Jr administration, a 42% increase compared to Duterte’s first 13 months in office. Student press bodies that actively report on government corruption have reported administrative censorship and state surveillance. The College Editors Guild of the Philippines, the national union of student publications, documented 206 incidents of campus press freedom violations in 2024 alone. One such incident involved the student publication of Ateneo de Davao University, Atenews, which reported facing red-tagging and surveillance following its publication of a statement supporting the arrest of former President Duterte. A draft campus press freedom bill aimed at addressing this issue has been pending in Congress for more than 13 years. Additionally, the NTF-ELCAC regularly publishes warnings against the alleged involvement of youth organizations in spreading communist propaganda on its Facebook page. In a post dated April 24, 2024, the task force announced that it was scrutinizing organizations such as the League of Filipino Students (LFS), the National Union of Students in the Philippines (NSUP), College Editors Guild of the Philippines, and Kabataan, among others, for their role in radicalizing youth and association with Kabataang Makabayan, a designated terrorist group. These posts form part of a broader pattern of state-perpetrated online intimidation and red-tagging, a trend that saw its peak during the Duterte administration but has continued under Marcos Jr.
The Marcos Jr. administration has also been unresponsive to international calls to decriminalize cyber libel, an offense that was used to charge and convict Maria Ressa in 2020. Civil society groups recorded 11 libel cases filed against journalists in the first year of the Marcos Jr. presidency alone. A 2023 study by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) also shows that cyber libel cases against journalists are most commonly filed by local politicians. Another law frequently wielded to repress dissent, the Anti-Terrorism Act 2020 (ATA), also remains operative under Marcos Jr. Philippine officials have continued to use this law to red-tag and file spurious charges against activists, journalists, and labor unionists accused of being affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA). Workers and labor unions in the country have continued to be prevented from advocating their fundamental rights, as many labor rights groups are erroneously associated with the NPA. There have been reports of the NFT-ELCAC making surprise visits to union members’ homes and warning them against mobilizing. Some unionists have gone into hiding due to fear for their safety. Journalists are similarly targeted. As of September 2025, red-tagged investigative journalist French Mae Cumpio – who frequently covered police and military abuses in her work – has been imprisoned for more than five years on terrorism and possession of illegal arms charges.
Moreover, the regime has killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. At least four killings of unionists, possibly linked to local officials, have taken place under Marcos Jr, and all have gone uninvestigated. In September 2023, police shot labor leader Jude Thaddeus Fernandez at his home in Rizal province in the east of Manila, claiming he resisted arrest. The regime has not responded to calls for an independent investigation as of October 2025. The Philippines also has the highest number of alleged abductions of human rights activists in Asia between 2023 and 2024, according to one civil society finding. Among the 32 activists abducted throughout the year were youth environmental advocates Jonila Castro and Jhed Tamano, who were red-tagged and abducted by masked men believed to be the military in September 2023. They were released at a regime-organized press conference and portrayed as “rebel returnees” following international pressure, and a criminal libel case filed against them by an army commander was thrown out in June 2025.
Finally, the regime has somewhat seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Police brutality against protesters is pervasive and well-documented under both Duterte and Marcos Jr. Most recent incidents include the May 2022 violent dispersal of a peaceful protest in Quezon City against the election of Marcos Jr., where participants were hit with sticks and sprayed with water cannons by police in full anti-riot gear. On February 3, 2023, the police also forcefully dispersed a barricade set up by residents of Sibuyan Island in protest of exploitative mining practices on the island by ramming through it, injuring two. Allegations of police brutality also surfaced during nationwide anti-corruption protests that erupted in September 2025, which saw an estimated 100,000 participants. A stray bullet fired by the police in these protests killed a 35-year-old construction worker. The police also made more than 200 arrests, which human rights groups reported as “violent and excessive.” There have been reports of minors and protesters with disabilities facing abuse in detention.
Despite serious issues remaining, the Philippine civic space has proven resilient. Civil society boasts an estimated 500,000 non-governmental organizations. Independent and critical media are embattled, yet they continue to retain broad viewership. These include ABS-CBN, which, since the forced shutdown of its broadcasting activities under Duterte, has shifted most of its reporting and claimed a strengthening presence online. Similarly, although police brutality against protesters is well-documented, protests are still common. Most of the peaceful demonstrations that erupted following Marcos Jr.’s election victory in 2022, for instance, were carried out with minimal disruption. Many reported incidents of attacks on critics also involve non-state actors whose links to the regime cannot be clearly established. The acquittal of high-profile figures such as Ressa and de Lima signals an improvement in the dissent environment, although observers, including the UN Special Rapporteur, have expressed concerns regarding the sustainability of such a positive trajectory.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The direct encroachment on judicial powers emblematic of the Duterte era, such as the removal of disobedient judges, has subsided under Marcos Jr. High-profile acquittals of dissidents also indicate progress in the justice system. However, courts remain hesitant to uphold accountability in cases involving individuals affiliated with the regime and gross human rights abuses, indicating a pattern of selective justice that casts doubt on judicial independence. Independent bodies are vulnerable to political appointments that expose them to undue influence.
Courts have somewhat frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism. Courts have checked individual attempts to silence critics, but have failed to address more systemic abuses that impact how Filipinos exercise their freedom of dissent. The acquittals of Rappler, Maria Ressa, and Leila de Lima exemplify how courts have been more inclined to reverse spurious convictions of dissidents since the final months of the Duterte administration. Since 2021, for example, Leila de Lima has been acquitted in all three drug-related cases filed against her. The most recent acquittal came in June 2025 from a regional trial court. In August 2024, the Court of Appeals overturned the Securities and Exchange Commission’s ban on Rappler over the tax evasion charges it faced and restored the outlet’s license. In June 2025, a Pasig court also acquitted Ressa and five other Rappler executives of violating laws on foreign ownership of media. As of 2025, Rappler has been cleared of all charges, while Ressa and her colleague Reynaldo Santos still face a cyber libel case under appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has also issued two key rulings on red-tagging and the ATA. In December 2021, it struck down two sections of the ATA for being overbroad, including one that allowed a presidentially appointed council to label individuals and groups as terrorists at the request of foreign entities. Despite this, the Court upheld much of the law, including provisions permitting the detention of suspected terrorists for up to 24 days without charge. In February 2024, the Court further ruled that red-tagging poses a serious threat to “life, liberty, and security.” However, this judgment has had limited, if any, impact. Red-tagging has persisted, and by October 2025, there has been a notable surge in unfounded terrorism-financing charges against activists, civil society groups, and even ordinary citizens. While many of these cases have failed in court due to a lack of evidence, they illustrate the insufficiency of existing judicial intervention in curbing the abuse of the ATA and red-tagging practices.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Many high-profile politicians linked to the regime have escaped accountability for various offenses, including graft and human rights abuses. On October 4, 2024, for example, the Sandiganbayan – the Philippines’ anti-corruption court – acquitted Ponce Enrile, Chief Legal Counsel to Marcos Jr., of plunder in a PHP713 million (approximately US$2.9 million) pork barrel scheme – selective spending of public funds for political gain – from more than a decade ago. In June 2025, the court dismissed an appeal against that acquittal. Another high-profile politician involved in the pork barrel scheme, Jinggoy Estrada, was granted bail in 2017, which enabled him to run for Senate twice, and eventually win a seat in 2022 as part of the Marcos Jr.-Duterte alliance senatorial slate. In 2018, the Sandiganbayan found Imelda Marcos, mother to Marcos Jr., guilty of seven counts of graft for creating offshore private foundations that enabled her family to amass public funds, exposing her to a minimum of 42 years’ imprisonment. She has not served any of her sentence, however, as her appeal has remained pending at the Supreme Court since. Meanwhile, suits to recover ill-gotten assets linked to Marcos-era corruption continue to be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed several dismissals of such suits in 2023 and 2024, and on February 24, 2025, the Sandiganbayan dismissed another civil case for prosecutorial inaction.
Weak accountability mechanisms can also be observed from the handling of Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs”, which led to the extrajudicial killings of as many as 20,000 Filipinos. While allied with the Dutertes, Marcos Jr. notably refused to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to probe the illegal killings. His stance shifted in late 2024 when the Marcos-Duterte alliance unravelled, leading to Duterte’s arrest by the National Police and Interpol, and the former President’s handover to the ICC, in March 2025. Observers have criticized this move as a masked attempt to undermine the Duterte dynasty as opposed to a genuine accountability pursuit. While the Marcos Jr. presidency has established a task force to investigate war on drugs abuses under the auspices of the Department of Justice, such investigations, as well as resulting prosecutions, have been piecemeal and mostly limited to police officers at localities who aided the killings. The Marcos Jr. presidency has continued to avoid prosecuting Rodrigo Duterte domestically. The war on drugs has also persisted under Marcos Jr., with one University of Manila researcher finding that there were more drug war killings throughout Marcos Jr’s first year in office than in the final year of Duterte’s presidency.
Additionally, the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte demonstrate the misuse of existing accountability mechanisms for partisan ends, which undermine their effectiveness and contribute to democratic backsliding. On July 27, 2025, the Supreme Court voided the impeachment proceedings and declared them unconstitutional, further intensifying debate about institutional failure to uphold accountability. Of the 13 Supreme Court justices who voted on this case, 11 were appointed by former President Rodrigo Duterte, and have had a history of siding with those affiliated with his administration. The Court’s decision followed months of political turmoil: between December 2024 and February 2025, the Marcos-aligned House of Representatives had filed four formal complaints against Sara Duterte, citing over two dozen charges ranging from graft and misuse of public funds to betrayal of public trust and an alleged assassination threat against the Marcos family. Although some opposition lawmakers supported the impeachment, it was mostly lawmakers from the Marcos Jr. camp that led the charge on the proceedings. The House, led by Speaker Martin Romualdez (Marcos Jr.’s cousin) and joined by Marcos Jr.’s son Rep. Sandro Marcos, voted to impeach Duterte in February 2025. However, in June 2025, the Senate, which is constitutionally mandated to sit as an impeachment court, returned the articles of impeachment to the House without trial, a move widely criticized by legal scholars as lacking a constitutional basis.
Weak accountability is also evident in the legislative branch as a result of long-standing weaknesses in the Philippines’ party system. Political parties often lack clear ideological foundations and instead operate as vehicles for elite interests. While elections have remained competitive, they are also rife characterized by elite capture. Party-switching and coalition-building around the sitting administration is common practice. In the 2022 election and subsequent congressional terms, many politicians moved toward Marcos Jr.’s Partido Federal ng Pilipinas (PFP) and allied parties to secure access to state resources and influence. As of late 2025, the opposition bloc is small and in flux, a situation partly driven by the Marcos-Duterte split, which has prompted politicians affiliated with the latter clan to behave like the opposition despite being formally part of the ruling coalition. Duterte’s shift against Marcos Jr. has also been criticized as opportunistic rather than a sustained break with the government, given her announced 2028 presidential bid. Weak opposition and elite dominance have been associated with low checks and balances in the legislative process and weak oversight over the executive.
The regime has somewhat subjected independent institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. While the Marcos Jr. presidency has not enacted explicit legal reforms that directly compromise the independence of constitutional bodies, it has engaged in practices that de facto weaken their independence and operational effectiveness. Such measures include political appointments and the introduction of new accountability mechanisms under false pretenses. As stated, Marcos Jr. named his former election lawyer George Garcia as COMELEC chair, raising questions about impartiality in election administration. Amid the Duterte-Marcos feud, COMELEC cancelled the registration of the Duterte Youth, a party-list group that had previously secured significant support while it was widely believed that the group was created only to advance the Duterte family’s political interests, target progressive youth organizations, and did not genuinely represent youth sectors. The regime has also obstructed international investigative mandates into Duterte’s war on drugs. Marcos Jr. also appointed Gamaliel Cordoba – known for his role in the shutdown of the nation’s largest broadcaster ABS-CBN under Rodrigo Duterte – as chair of the Commission on Audit, a body in charge of auditing all public funding. In October 2025, Marcos Jr. appointed Crispin Remulla, whose family was instrumental in Marcos Jr.’s electoral campaign, as Ombudsman, putting him in charge of reviewing complaints against high-ranking officials. The Remullas and persons affiliated with the dynasty also occupy positions within the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Interior and Interior and Local Government (DILG), which are both in charge of investigating allegations of corruption in flood control measures under the Marcos Jr. administration. These instances exemplify a pattern of control over major agencies consolidated through the influence of allies. In May 2024, Marcos Jr. established a Special Committee on Human Rights Coordination aimed at enhancing human rights protection in the country. Critics have described the Special Committee as “toothless,” and ostensibly created to shore up the regime’s bid for a seat at the UN Security Council. It comprises entirely of executive representatives, including those from the Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior and Local Government. The Special Committee was also established without input from relevant stakeholders, such as civil society and the constitutionally mandated Commission on Human Rights.
HRF classifies the Philippines as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
For two decades until the 1980s, the Philippines was ruled by the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. His eventual ouster in 1986 kick-started the country’s democratic transition, and a new constitution was adopted in 1987 to limit executive powers, improve overall checks and balances, and strengthen basic freedoms. In 2022, Marcos’ son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., was elected president, bringing an end to the rule of his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte – who has become notorious for his “war on drugs,” described as “the worst human rights crisis in the country post-Martial Law.” His running mate and current vice president is Sara Duterte, the daughter of Rodrigo Duterte – indicating that Philippine politics remains dominated by dynasties, with the Marcos and Duterte families shifting between alliances and rivalries.
National elections are largely free and fair. They allow for incumbent turnover, and winners typically lead with narrow margins. However, the elections continue to be dominated by wealthy and influential political clans who benefit from vast patronage networks. Disinformation campaigns propagated by both Rodrigo Duterte and Marcos Jr. during their respective presidential bids undermined the integrity of the electoral process.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize the government. The Duterte administration that exited in 2022 oversaw a marked escalation in attacks against critics. There have been isolated improvements in the civic space since Marcos Jr. assumed power, but Duterte’s legacy of repression – including the red-tagging of dissidents, assaults on press freedom, repressive legal frameworks, and impunity for police brutality and gross rights violations – is largely unaddressed. The Philippines still boasts a resilient civil society and media landscape despite shortcomings.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Courts have increasingly sided with dissidents in salient cases since a new Chief Justice was appointed in early 2021 and the subsequent presidential succession. The direct encroachment on judicial powers emblematic of the Duterte era has largely subsided. Under Marcos Jr., however, courts remain hesitant to hold individuals affiliated with the regime accountable for graft and human rights abuses. Independent bodies also remain vulnerable to political appointments that raise concerns about their independence.
National elections are largely free and fair. Mainstream candidates across the political spectrum can contest without substantial hindrances. Fraud and voting irregularities are rare. Regardless, the elections are marked by the systematic exclusion of challengers to the traditional elite, entrenched patronage, and recurrent disinformation.
The regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The Philippine elections have led to regular turnover of incumbents. Those elected typically win with less than a majority, except for Marcos Jr. and his running mate, Sara Duterte, who won with 59% and 61.5% of the votes, respectively, in the 2022 polls. Progressive groups representing marginalized sectors, such as workers, farmers, women, and the urban poor, remain a minor political force, although they are vocal in their resistance to the traditional elite. These groups are often accused of being communist fronts and face disqualification, putting them at a disadvantage and perpetuating elite capture of the electoral system. The 2025 midterms – in which all 317 seats to the House of Representatives, half of the Senate, and around 18,000 local offices were contested – similarly reflected high levels of competition. A total of 21 national parties, 16 regional parties, and 156 party-lists participated. Following the Marcos-Duterte feud, many mainstream politicians were either aligned with the Marcos or the Duterte clan. While the Marcos coalition retained its dominance in the House, senatorial results were highly fragmented, with no single bloc securing a clear majority. There were notable gains with respect to minor and emerging political forces. Akbayan, a moderately progressive party-list led by prominent human rights lawyer Jose Manuel “Chel” Diokno, topped the party-list race. Ex-senator Leila de Lima, who was jailed for almost seven years under Rodrigo Duterte for her criticism of Duterte’s war on drugs, also made a political comeback by winning a House seat as a nominee of the Mamamayang Liberal party-list that represents marginalized groups.
Further, the regime has not undermined independent electoral oversight. The election management body, COMELEC, comprises seven commissioners appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, a congressional body composed of senators and House members elected proportionally to their seat representation in Congress. This mechanism largely mitigates the risk of political interference in COMELEC’s functioning. However, observers have noted that COMELEC is riddled with clientelistic appointments. The current Chief Commissioner, George Garcia, for example, is Marcos Jr.’s former election lawyer. Citizen election watchdogs, such as Lente, Kontra Daya, and the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), actively participate in pushing for electoral reforms and play a critical role in complementing the COMELEC’s work.
The regime has not unfairly and significantly hindered the mainstream opposition campaigns. However, challenges in the campaign environment remain. For example, disinformation is a recurring issue in Philippine elections, undermining electoral integrity. Both Rodrigo Duterte and Marcos Jr. relied on vast networks of volunteers, bots, and internet trolls to engage in systematic disinformation against their political opponents. In the 2022 general election, the Marcos Jr. camp launched a coordinated disinformation campaign against the main opposition candidate, Leni Robredo, that spread dozens of bogus claims about her, including claims that she was a communist – a term that carries sensitive connotations in the country – as well as unintelligent and corrupt. Robredo was nevertheless able to mount a vigorous campaign of her own. Sharply progressive groups such as the Makabayan and Kabataan blocs – whose platforms typically involve explicit calls to dismantle elite rule – remain vulnerable to red-tagging and disqualification attempts. These patterns persisted in the 2025 midterms, where the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC), an anti-communist task force under the President’s Office, made public attacks on progressive candidates, including Kabataan representative and youth activist Raoul Manuel. In addition, Philippine elections are dominated by political dynasties and often marred by episodes of violence. Ninety-nine percent of the Senate and 67% of the House belong to political families. Recent years have also seen the emergence of ‘fat dynasties’, where many members of the same family hold government positions. The Marcos and Duterte families are examples of this. The phenomenon has often sidelined new players and their opportunity to enter mainstream politics. Political dynasties are also frequently associated with electoral violence at local levels. Between 2018 and 2022, ACLED documented 716 acts of violence against local officials, with incidents concentrated in rural areas with active conflict. Dynastic politicians habitually employ contract assailants to commit such attacks. In November 2025, Akbayan representatives filed an anti-political dynasty bill in Congress.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the government. Marcos Jr. has continued many of the repressive practices observed under Rodrigo Duterte, particularly the “red-tagging” of dissidents, which involves accusing them of being communist sympathizers. Much like the Duterte era, assaults on press freedom are pervasive, with journalists routinely facing threats of violence and physical assaults. Under Marcos Jr., repressive anti-terrorism and criminal libel laws frequently wielded against critics remain operative, and there have been no significant efforts to repeal them. Impunity for police brutality and gross human rights abuses has continued. There has been isolated progress in the civic space that distinguishes the Marcos Jr. regime from that of his predecessor.
The regime has somewhat systematically and seriously intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. Under Marcos Jr., the Philippine regime has adopted a pro-West stance that contrasts with Rodrigo Duterte’s close alliance with China. This outlook has encouraged some reversals of certain trends of repression observed during Duterte’s reign. For example, the Duterte regime pursued a dozen administrative and criminal cases against Rappler, an independent and critical media outlet, as well as its board of directors and its founder, American-Filipino journalist Maria Ressa. By June 2025, with Marcos Jr. at the helm, most charges against Ressa had been dismissed, and the Supreme Court had allowed Rappler to continue operating. Similarly, ex-Senator Leila de Lima, who faced a series of bogus drug charges during Duterte’s presidency over her criticism of the latter’s infamous war on drugs, was released on bail in November 2023 and allowed to run – and win – legislative elections. A trial judge also acquitted her of her last remaining charges in June 2025.
While there have been noteworthy developments, Marcos Jr. has largely fallen short of rehabilitating the Philippine civic space. A total of 84 attacks on the press were documented within the first year of the Marcos Jr administration, a 42% increase compared to Duterte’s first 13 months in office. Student press bodies that actively report on government corruption have reported administrative censorship and state surveillance. The College Editors Guild of the Philippines, the national union of student publications, documented 206 incidents of campus press freedom violations in 2024 alone. One such incident involved the student publication of Ateneo de Davao University, Atenews, which reported facing red-tagging and surveillance following its publication of a statement supporting the arrest of former President Duterte. A draft campus press freedom bill aimed at addressing this issue has been pending in Congress for more than 13 years. Additionally, the NTF-ELCAC regularly publishes warnings against the alleged involvement of youth organizations in spreading communist propaganda on its Facebook page. In a post dated April 24, 2024, the task force announced that it was scrutinizing organizations such as the League of Filipino Students (LFS), the National Union of Students in the Philippines (NSUP), College Editors Guild of the Philippines, and Kabataan, among others, for their role in radicalizing youth and association with Kabataang Makabayan, a designated terrorist group. These posts form part of a broader pattern of state-perpetrated online intimidation and red-tagging, a trend that saw its peak during the Duterte administration but has continued under Marcos Jr.
The Marcos Jr. administration has also been unresponsive to international calls to decriminalize cyber libel, an offense that was used to charge and convict Maria Ressa in 2020. Civil society groups recorded 11 libel cases filed against journalists in the first year of the Marcos Jr. presidency alone. A 2023 study by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) also shows that cyber libel cases against journalists are most commonly filed by local politicians. Another law frequently wielded to repress dissent, the Anti-Terrorism Act 2020 (ATA), also remains operative under Marcos Jr. Philippine officials have continued to use this law to red-tag and file spurious charges against activists, journalists, and labor unionists accused of being affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA). Workers and labor unions in the country have continued to be prevented from advocating their fundamental rights, as many labor rights groups are erroneously associated with the NPA. There have been reports of the NFT-ELCAC making surprise visits to union members’ homes and warning them against mobilizing. Some unionists have gone into hiding due to fear for their safety. Journalists are similarly targeted. As of September 2025, red-tagged investigative journalist French Mae Cumpio – who frequently covered police and military abuses in her work – has been imprisoned for more than five years on terrorism and possession of illegal arms charges.
Moreover, the regime has killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. At least four killings of unionists, possibly linked to local officials, have taken place under Marcos Jr, and all have gone uninvestigated. In September 2023, police shot labor leader Jude Thaddeus Fernandez at his home in Rizal province in the east of Manila, claiming he resisted arrest. The regime has not responded to calls for an independent investigation as of October 2025. The Philippines also has the highest number of alleged abductions of human rights activists in Asia between 2023 and 2024, according to one civil society finding. Among the 32 activists abducted throughout the year were youth environmental advocates Jonila Castro and Jhed Tamano, who were red-tagged and abducted by masked men believed to be the military in September 2023. They were released at a regime-organized press conference and portrayed as “rebel returnees” following international pressure, and a criminal libel case filed against them by an army commander was thrown out in June 2025.
Finally, the regime has somewhat seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Police brutality against protesters is pervasive and well-documented under both Duterte and Marcos Jr. Most recent incidents include the May 2022 violent dispersal of a peaceful protest in Quezon City against the election of Marcos Jr., where participants were hit with sticks and sprayed with water cannons by police in full anti-riot gear. On February 3, 2023, the police also forcefully dispersed a barricade set up by residents of Sibuyan Island in protest of exploitative mining practices on the island by ramming through it, injuring two. Allegations of police brutality also surfaced during nationwide anti-corruption protests that erupted in September 2025, which saw an estimated 100,000 participants. A stray bullet fired by the police in these protests killed a 35-year-old construction worker. The police also made more than 200 arrests, which human rights groups reported as “violent and excessive.” There have been reports of minors and protesters with disabilities facing abuse in detention.
Despite serious issues remaining, the Philippine civic space has proven resilient. Civil society boasts an estimated 500,000 non-governmental organizations. Independent and critical media are embattled, yet they continue to retain broad viewership. These include ABS-CBN, which, since the forced shutdown of its broadcasting activities under Duterte, has shifted most of its reporting and claimed a strengthening presence online. Similarly, although police brutality against protesters is well-documented, protests are still common. Most of the peaceful demonstrations that erupted following Marcos Jr.’s election victory in 2022, for instance, were carried out with minimal disruption. Many reported incidents of attacks on critics also involve non-state actors whose links to the regime cannot be clearly established. The acquittal of high-profile figures such as Ressa and de Lima signals an improvement in the dissent environment, although observers, including the UN Special Rapporteur, have expressed concerns regarding the sustainability of such a positive trajectory.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The direct encroachment on judicial powers emblematic of the Duterte era, such as the removal of disobedient judges, has subsided under Marcos Jr. High-profile acquittals of dissidents also indicate progress in the justice system. However, courts remain hesitant to uphold accountability in cases involving individuals affiliated with the regime and gross human rights abuses, indicating a pattern of selective justice that casts doubt on judicial independence. Independent bodies are vulnerable to political appointments that expose them to undue influence.
Courts have somewhat frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism. Courts have checked individual attempts to silence critics, but have failed to address more systemic abuses that impact how Filipinos exercise their freedom of dissent. The acquittals of Rappler, Maria Ressa, and Leila de Lima exemplify how courts have been more inclined to reverse spurious convictions of dissidents since the final months of the Duterte administration. Since 2021, for example, Leila de Lima has been acquitted in all three drug-related cases filed against her. The most recent acquittal came in June 2025 from a regional trial court. In August 2024, the Court of Appeals overturned the Securities and Exchange Commission’s ban on Rappler over the tax evasion charges it faced and restored the outlet’s license. In June 2025, a Pasig court also acquitted Ressa and five other Rappler executives of violating laws on foreign ownership of media. As of 2025, Rappler has been cleared of all charges, while Ressa and her colleague Reynaldo Santos still face a cyber libel case under appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has also issued two key rulings on red-tagging and the ATA. In December 2021, it struck down two sections of the ATA for being overbroad, including one that allowed a presidentially appointed council to label individuals and groups as terrorists at the request of foreign entities. Despite this, the Court upheld much of the law, including provisions permitting the detention of suspected terrorists for up to 24 days without charge. In February 2024, the Court further ruled that red-tagging poses a serious threat to “life, liberty, and security.” However, this judgment has had limited, if any, impact. Red-tagging has persisted, and by October 2025, there has been a notable surge in unfounded terrorism-financing charges against activists, civil society groups, and even ordinary citizens. While many of these cases have failed in court due to a lack of evidence, they illustrate the insufficiency of existing judicial intervention in curbing the abuse of the ATA and red-tagging practices.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Many high-profile politicians linked to the regime have escaped accountability for various offenses, including graft and human rights abuses. On October 4, 2024, for example, the Sandiganbayan – the Philippines’ anti-corruption court – acquitted Ponce Enrile, Chief Legal Counsel to Marcos Jr., of plunder in a PHP713 million (approximately US$2.9 million) pork barrel scheme – selective spending of public funds for political gain – from more than a decade ago. In June 2025, the court dismissed an appeal against that acquittal. Another high-profile politician involved in the pork barrel scheme, Jinggoy Estrada, was granted bail in 2017, which enabled him to run for Senate twice, and eventually win a seat in 2022 as part of the Marcos Jr.-Duterte alliance senatorial slate. In 2018, the Sandiganbayan found Imelda Marcos, mother to Marcos Jr., guilty of seven counts of graft for creating offshore private foundations that enabled her family to amass public funds, exposing her to a minimum of 42 years’ imprisonment. She has not served any of her sentence, however, as her appeal has remained pending at the Supreme Court since. Meanwhile, suits to recover ill-gotten assets linked to Marcos-era corruption continue to be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed several dismissals of such suits in 2023 and 2024, and on February 24, 2025, the Sandiganbayan dismissed another civil case for prosecutorial inaction.
Weak accountability mechanisms can also be observed from the handling of Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs”, which led to the extrajudicial killings of as many as 20,000 Filipinos. While allied with the Dutertes, Marcos Jr. notably refused to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to probe the illegal killings. His stance shifted in late 2024 when the Marcos-Duterte alliance unravelled, leading to Duterte’s arrest by the National Police and Interpol, and the former President’s handover to the ICC, in March 2025. Observers have criticized this move as a masked attempt to undermine the Duterte dynasty as opposed to a genuine accountability pursuit. While the Marcos Jr. presidency has established a task force to investigate war on drugs abuses under the auspices of the Department of Justice, such investigations, as well as resulting prosecutions, have been piecemeal and mostly limited to police officers at localities who aided the killings. The Marcos Jr. presidency has continued to avoid prosecuting Rodrigo Duterte domestically. The war on drugs has also persisted under Marcos Jr., with one University of Manila researcher finding that there were more drug war killings throughout Marcos Jr’s first year in office than in the final year of Duterte’s presidency.
Additionally, the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte demonstrate the misuse of existing accountability mechanisms for partisan ends, which undermine their effectiveness and contribute to democratic backsliding. On July 27, 2025, the Supreme Court voided the impeachment proceedings and declared them unconstitutional, further intensifying debate about institutional failure to uphold accountability. Of the 13 Supreme Court justices who voted on this case, 11 were appointed by former President Rodrigo Duterte, and have had a history of siding with those affiliated with his administration. The Court’s decision followed months of political turmoil: between December 2024 and February 2025, the Marcos-aligned House of Representatives had filed four formal complaints against Sara Duterte, citing over two dozen charges ranging from graft and misuse of public funds to betrayal of public trust and an alleged assassination threat against the Marcos family. Although some opposition lawmakers supported the impeachment, it was mostly lawmakers from the Marcos Jr. camp that led the charge on the proceedings. The House, led by Speaker Martin Romualdez (Marcos Jr.’s cousin) and joined by Marcos Jr.’s son Rep. Sandro Marcos, voted to impeach Duterte in February 2025. However, in June 2025, the Senate, which is constitutionally mandated to sit as an impeachment court, returned the articles of impeachment to the House without trial, a move widely criticized by legal scholars as lacking a constitutional basis.
Weak accountability is also evident in the legislative branch as a result of long-standing weaknesses in the Philippines’ party system. Political parties often lack clear ideological foundations and instead operate as vehicles for elite interests. While elections have remained competitive, they are also rife characterized by elite capture. Party-switching and coalition-building around the sitting administration is common practice. In the 2022 election and subsequent congressional terms, many politicians moved toward Marcos Jr.’s Partido Federal ng Pilipinas (PFP) and allied parties to secure access to state resources and influence. As of late 2025, the opposition bloc is small and in flux, a situation partly driven by the Marcos-Duterte split, which has prompted politicians affiliated with the latter clan to behave like the opposition despite being formally part of the ruling coalition. Duterte’s shift against Marcos Jr. has also been criticized as opportunistic rather than a sustained break with the government, given her announced 2028 presidential bid. Weak opposition and elite dominance have been associated with low checks and balances in the legislative process and weak oversight over the executive.
The regime has somewhat subjected independent institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. While the Marcos Jr. presidency has not enacted explicit legal reforms that directly compromise the independence of constitutional bodies, it has engaged in practices that de facto weaken their independence and operational effectiveness. Such measures include political appointments and the introduction of new accountability mechanisms under false pretenses. As stated, Marcos Jr. named his former election lawyer George Garcia as COMELEC chair, raising questions about impartiality in election administration. Amid the Duterte-Marcos feud, COMELEC cancelled the registration of the Duterte Youth, a party-list group that had previously secured significant support while it was widely believed that the group was created only to advance the Duterte family’s political interests, target progressive youth organizations, and did not genuinely represent youth sectors. The regime has also obstructed international investigative mandates into Duterte’s war on drugs. Marcos Jr. also appointed Gamaliel Cordoba – known for his role in the shutdown of the nation’s largest broadcaster ABS-CBN under Rodrigo Duterte – as chair of the Commission on Audit, a body in charge of auditing all public funding. In October 2025, Marcos Jr. appointed Crispin Remulla, whose family was instrumental in Marcos Jr.’s electoral campaign, as Ombudsman, putting him in charge of reviewing complaints against high-ranking officials. The Remullas and persons affiliated with the dynasty also occupy positions within the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Interior and Interior and Local Government (DILG), which are both in charge of investigating allegations of corruption in flood control measures under the Marcos Jr. administration. These instances exemplify a pattern of control over major agencies consolidated through the influence of allies. In May 2024, Marcos Jr. established a Special Committee on Human Rights Coordination aimed at enhancing human rights protection in the country. Critics have described the Special Committee as “toothless,” and ostensibly created to shore up the regime’s bid for a seat at the UN Security Council. It comprises entirely of executive representatives, including those from the Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior and Local Government. The Special Committee was also established without input from relevant stakeholders, such as civil society and the constitutionally mandated Commission on Human Rights.
