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HRF classifies Paraguay as democratic.
Paraguay transitioned to democracy after the fall of General Alfredo Stroessner’s military dictatorship in 1989, ending 35 years of authoritarian rule. Stroessner’s ousting marked the beginning of a democratization process and set the stage for the adoption of a new democratic constitution in 1992, which established the separation of powers, civil liberties, and electoral rights. However, residual effects of centralized rule from the military dictatorship linger in the form of deeply rooted patronage networks, a highly politicized judiciary, and the continued dominance of the Colorado Party, which has governed almost uninterruptedly since the transition. Although Paraguay has experienced regular elections and peaceful transfers of power, governance remains marked by institutional fragility, elite factionalism, and recurring concerns about corruption and undue influence over public institutions. Non-state actors like narcotrafficking and organized crime groups operate in the country. While they do not exercise full territorial control in the areas where they are present, they have managed to influence the judiciary through corruption and intimidation, securing impunity in key cases.
National elections in Paraguay are largely free and fair. The country’s political landscape has traditionally been dominated by a two-party system, centered around the Republican National Association (ANR) and the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA) — known as the Colorado Party and the Liberal Party, respectively. The Colorado Party has held power for all but five years of the past seven decades, including throughout the Stroessner dictatorship, while the PLRA has served as the main opposition force. Despite the emergence of smaller parties and coalitions in recent decades, including leftist and anti-systemic movements, national politics remains largely shaped by the competition and shifting alliances between these two historic parties, often reinforced by patronage networks and internal factionalism rather than ideological divisions. There is no presidential reelection in Paraguay.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to criticize or challenge the government, despite some localized pressures or moments of institutional overreach. While the government has occasionally resorted to legalistic tactics to pressure independent media and critics — such as defamation lawsuits or misusing anti-discrimination laws — these actions are sporadic rather than systemic, and have not led to a broad suppression of free expression. Media concentration and political influence over some outlets do limit pluralism, but critical voices remain visible and active in the public sphere.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Impunity in Paraguay is widespread, and cases challenging political figures with ties to the government or organized crime are frequently dismissed. The Colorado Party holds a majority in both legislative chambers and, therefore, influences appointments in the judiciary and other accountability institutions, such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Council of the Magistracy, responsible for nominating judicial candidates, and the Jury for the Prosecution of Magistrates (JEM), which oversees the discipline of judges, with the power to remove them. In practice, a mix of loyalists in key posts, manipulation of procedures, and selective enforcement of rules ensures that cases against figures with strong political ties are neutralized.
Elections in Paraguay are largely free and fair. Despite the decades-long ruling of the Colorado Party, opposition forces have remained competitive, with Fernando Lugo’s 2008 victory and the near win of a Liberal-led coalition in 2018 illustrating real openings. Divisions, such as the rise of outsider Paraguayo Cubas in 2023, have repeatedly fractured their chances. Meanwhile, fierce rivalries between the Colorado Party’s internal factions have often functioned as opposition with alternations in power.
The government has not barred opposition candidates or otherwise significantly hindered their electoral campaigns. Although the Colorado Party has long held a dominant position in Paraguayan politics, opposition parties still have a likely and realistic chance to win power through elections. Fernando Lugo of the center-left Guasu Front, backed by the Liberal Party, won the presidency in 2008 partly due to a fracture within the Colorado party, while a Liberal-led alliance lost by only half a percentage point in 2018. Ahead of the 2023 elections, the Liberal Party led a new big-tent coalition known as the Concertación aimed to capitalize on growing public dissatisfaction to challenge the Colorado Party, which is largely perceived as corrupt. The coalition brought together 23 small parties and movements. However, the emergence of outsider candidate Paraguayo Cubas, who ran on an anti-establishment platform and received 23% of the vote, fractured the opposition vote and weakened the Concertación chances. In the end, Santiago Peña of the Colorado Party won the presidency with 43% of the vote, defeating Concertación candidate Efraín Alegre, who received 27% of the vote.
At the same time, internal factions within a party have alternated in power and fiercely competed against each other with smear campaigns in the media and threats of impeachment, effectively acting as opposition to a government of the same party. For example, the two main factions within the Colorado Party are Colorado Honor (HC), led by former President Horacio Cartes (2013-2018), and Añetete (which means “true” or “real” in Guaraní), led by former President Mario Abdo (2018-2023). These factions sometimes have to ally themselves with members of the PLRA and other smaller parties to gather support for their policy agenda. President Santiago Peña belongs to the HC faction, and Cartes currently serves as president of the Colorado Party.
Vote-buying and assisted voting have been an occasional feature of Paraguayan politics. This practice has been entrenched in the Paraguayan system for decades and is done by both the Colorado and PLRA parties, especially in rural areas. In the 2023 elections, the European Union’s Electoral Observation Mission witnessed five incidents of vote-buying and seven incidents of indication of vote-buying, but their final report and that of the Organization of American States’ Electoral Observation Mission deemed these as isolated cases that did not significantly alter the results and described the electoral process as transparent. After the results were published, Paraguayo Cubas and his supporters called the election fraudulent and took to the streets in violent protests. International observers reported no indication of fraud.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the governing authority, although challenges remain. While Paraguay maintains a pluralistic civic space, the 2024 “NGO law,” occasional legal harassment of critical media outlets, and the infiltration of organized crime into institutions pose risks to independent media and civil society. Episodes of violent protests and forceful police responses have generated casualties and arrests, but these incidents reflect reactive crackdowns rather than a systematic repression of dissent.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations, but the passage of Law 7363/24, also known as the “NGO law,” in November 2024 poses a threat to civil society. The law introduces vague and broad regulations on the financing and operation of non-governmental organizations, including mandatory registration and extensive government oversight. It also grants the executive branch discretionary powers to dissolve organizations deemed non-compliant, raising alarms among human rights groups about potential misuse to intimidate or silence dissenting organizations. The law has been enacted but not yet regulated, meaning it formally exists but cannot be fully implemented until the executive issues the necessary regulatory decrees outlining the specific steps the NGOs must take to comply with the law, the timeline for such steps, and the punishments when they fail to undertake them. In December 2025, a group of local NGOs challenged the constitutionality of the law, and a decision by the courts is pending.
Paraguay’s media environment is dominated by four major media conglomerates that collectively control most television, radio, and daily print circulation. Most notably, Grupo Cartes, owned by former President and current Colorado Party leader Horacio Cartes, is especially influential and has been accused of tilting coverage in favor of pro-government actors while marginalizing critical voices. Yet independent media, regional community radios, and civil society outlets continue to operate and are widely read, regularly publishing investigative work.
Despite this pluralism, the government has intimidated and obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media. Critical media outlets often face legal harassment, including defamation lawsuits and abuse of gender anti-discrimination laws. For example, in November 2022, ABC Color director Natalia Zuccolillo and journalist Juan Carlos Lezcano were convicted of defamation in a lawsuit filed by former Undersecretary of Taxation Marta González, over reports alleging irregularities in a state contract process, and were fined a combined amount of approximately $68,000. However, two years later, in July 2024, a higher court acquitted them, recognizing they had published matters of public interest and that typical elements of defamation were absent. Additionally, the misuse of Paraguay’s gender-based anti-discrimination laws — originally intended to protect women’s rights — by local officials and some national legislators has been documented in a handful of cases against reporters covering corruption cases.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Yet, incidents of violent clashes between protesters and security forces have occurred in the context of several recent protests in Paraguay that have escalated. For example, in 2017, under then-President Horacio Cartes, a political crisis erupted after his allies in the Senate approved a controversial constitutional amendment to allow presidential reelection in a secret session that excluded the opposition. Massive protests followed, culminating in the burning of part of the Congress building. Police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets, resulting in the death of a PLRA activist. In the wake of the unrest, the amendment was ultimately overturned. Similarly, the large March 2021 protests against pandemic mismanagement began peacefully but escalated, including attempts to torch public buildings and calls for President Abdo’s impeachment.
Most recently, in 2023, post-election protests led by outsider candidate Paraguayo Cubas, who garnered nearly 23% of the vote, turned violent following his unfounded claims of electoral fraud. Supporters blocked roads, clashed with police, and attempted to storm government buildings, particularly in the vicinity of the Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice (TSJE). Cubas was arrested on May 5, facing charges including disturbing public peace, attempted coercion of state bodies, and attempting to obstruct the election process. Over 200 people were detained, and at least one protester died during the unrest. After initially being held under house arrest, Cubas was later granted liberty under judicial supervision with conditions. His trial began in March 2025 and remains ongoing as of the end of 2025. While law enforcement used significant force in response to the 2023 unrest, these actions were largely reactive rather than systematically repressive, and do not reflect a consistent pattern of unfair protest repression.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Paraguay’s judiciary is heavily influenced by the governing Colorado Party, which often shields powerful figures and enables politically motivated actions like the 2024 expulsion of opposition senator Kattya González. Corruption further undermines accountability, leaving major narcotrafficking and corruption cases in impunity. However, higher courts have acted as a check on the government in cases that targeted the press.
The government has undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the government are frequently dismissed. This is done by placing loyalists in key posts that dismiss or delay cases against figures with strong political ties, as seen in the examples of key Colorado Party figures, such as Horacio Cartes and Eulalio “Lalo” Gomes. The Council of the Magistracy is the body that nominates judicial and prosecutorial candidates, while the Jury for the Prosecution of Magistrates (JEM) is responsible for disciplining and removing judges and prosecutors. Both bodies include representatives from multiple branches and sectors, including legislators, the judiciary, legal associations, and the executive. However, in practice, the Partido Colorado’s dominance in the executive and legislature means it typically controls a majority of these seats, giving it significant sway over both the appointment and sanctioning of judicial actors.
To illustrate, Cartes, a former president (2013–2018) and current party leader, faced repeated formal complaints before the Public Prosecutor’s office ever acted, including a 2022 complaint by then–Interior Minister Arnaldo Giuzzio and sanctions from the US government for involvement in “significant corruption” in 2022. Yet it was only in 2023, after US pressure, that prosecutors formally opened a case, only to dismiss all proceedings by June 2025, effectively eliminating scrutiny. In turn, Gomes, a Colorado deputy long suspected of links to narcotrafficking, also had multiple complaints filed against him as early as 2017 by a businessman supported by BBVA Paraguay, as well as alerts from Seprelad (Paraguay’s financial intelligence unit) in 2021 and a complaint from the Public Ministry’s office itself in 2022. Yet no serious investigation began until 2023, shortly before his death during a police raid at his home. Evidence later recovered from his phone revealed systematic collusion with judges and prosecutors. In December 2025, a former lawmaker and two former judges were indicted for accepting bribes in connection with the corruption investigation into Gomes’ network.
Courts have also frequently and unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. A clear example is the expulsion of opposition senator Kattya González in February 2024, after she became one of the most vocal critics of the Cartes faction of the Colorado Party –– also known as cartismo –– and of corruption. The Senate, controlled by the Colorado Party, carried out her removal in a rushed and irregular vote, disregarding its own rules that had, only three months earlier, raised the threshold for expulsions to a two-thirds majority (30 out of 45). Instead, the ruling party reverted to the previous rule requiring only a simple majority. González was expelled by 23 votes in favor and 15 against, a result invalid under the two-thirds requirement but sufficient under the outdated simple majority standard. Civil society groups and international observers denounced the move as political retaliation intended to silence an opposition leader. While González challenged the expulsion before the Supreme Court, the case was stalled for over a year after the Senate sought the recusal of two Constitutional Chamber judges assigned to her case in June 2025. This move effectively paralyzed the chamber, since without a quorum, it could not advance with the constitutional review. In November 2025, however, the Supreme Court rejected the recusals, confirmed the composition of the Chamber, and formally cleared the way for substantive review of González’s constitutional challenge. As of the end of 2025, the case remains pending a decision, but judicial proceedings have resumed after prolonged legislative obstruction.
However, higher judicial authorities can sometimes act as a corrective. In 2022, Natalia Zuccolillo, director of ABC Color, one of Paraguay’s most influential newspapers, and ABC reporter Juan Carlos Lezcano were sued for defamation by former Undersecretary of Taxation Marta González, over reports alleging irregularities in a state contract process. Lower courts initially convicted them, raising concerns about judicial complicity in political retaliation against independent media. However, in 2024, the Court of Appeals dismissed the charges, effectively clearing Zuccolillo and Lezcano of liability.
HRF classifies Paraguay as democratic.
Paraguay transitioned to democracy after the fall of General Alfredo Stroessner’s military dictatorship in 1989, ending 35 years of authoritarian rule. Stroessner’s ousting marked the beginning of a democratization process and set the stage for the adoption of a new democratic constitution in 1992, which established the separation of powers, civil liberties, and electoral rights. However, residual effects of centralized rule from the military dictatorship linger in the form of deeply rooted patronage networks, a highly politicized judiciary, and the continued dominance of the Colorado Party, which has governed almost uninterruptedly since the transition. Although Paraguay has experienced regular elections and peaceful transfers of power, governance remains marked by institutional fragility, elite factionalism, and recurring concerns about corruption and undue influence over public institutions. Non-state actors like narcotrafficking and organized crime groups operate in the country. While they do not exercise full territorial control in the areas where they are present, they have managed to influence the judiciary through corruption and intimidation, securing impunity in key cases.
National elections in Paraguay are largely free and fair. The country’s political landscape has traditionally been dominated by a two-party system, centered around the Republican National Association (ANR) and the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA) — known as the Colorado Party and the Liberal Party, respectively. The Colorado Party has held power for all but five years of the past seven decades, including throughout the Stroessner dictatorship, while the PLRA has served as the main opposition force. Despite the emergence of smaller parties and coalitions in recent decades, including leftist and anti-systemic movements, national politics remains largely shaped by the competition and shifting alliances between these two historic parties, often reinforced by patronage networks and internal factionalism rather than ideological divisions. There is no presidential reelection in Paraguay.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to criticize or challenge the government, despite some localized pressures or moments of institutional overreach. While the government has occasionally resorted to legalistic tactics to pressure independent media and critics — such as defamation lawsuits or misusing anti-discrimination laws — these actions are sporadic rather than systemic, and have not led to a broad suppression of free expression. Media concentration and political influence over some outlets do limit pluralism, but critical voices remain visible and active in the public sphere.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Impunity in Paraguay is widespread, and cases challenging political figures with ties to the government or organized crime are frequently dismissed. The Colorado Party holds a majority in both legislative chambers and, therefore, influences appointments in the judiciary and other accountability institutions, such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Council of the Magistracy, responsible for nominating judicial candidates, and the Jury for the Prosecution of Magistrates (JEM), which oversees the discipline of judges, with the power to remove them. In practice, a mix of loyalists in key posts, manipulation of procedures, and selective enforcement of rules ensures that cases against figures with strong political ties are neutralized.
Elections in Paraguay are largely free and fair. Despite the decades-long ruling of the Colorado Party, opposition forces have remained competitive, with Fernando Lugo’s 2008 victory and the near win of a Liberal-led coalition in 2018 illustrating real openings. Divisions, such as the rise of outsider Paraguayo Cubas in 2023, have repeatedly fractured their chances. Meanwhile, fierce rivalries between the Colorado Party’s internal factions have often functioned as opposition with alternations in power.
The government has not barred opposition candidates or otherwise significantly hindered their electoral campaigns. Although the Colorado Party has long held a dominant position in Paraguayan politics, opposition parties still have a likely and realistic chance to win power through elections. Fernando Lugo of the center-left Guasu Front, backed by the Liberal Party, won the presidency in 2008 partly due to a fracture within the Colorado party, while a Liberal-led alliance lost by only half a percentage point in 2018. Ahead of the 2023 elections, the Liberal Party led a new big-tent coalition known as the Concertación aimed to capitalize on growing public dissatisfaction to challenge the Colorado Party, which is largely perceived as corrupt. The coalition brought together 23 small parties and movements. However, the emergence of outsider candidate Paraguayo Cubas, who ran on an anti-establishment platform and received 23% of the vote, fractured the opposition vote and weakened the Concertación chances. In the end, Santiago Peña of the Colorado Party won the presidency with 43% of the vote, defeating Concertación candidate Efraín Alegre, who received 27% of the vote.
At the same time, internal factions within a party have alternated in power and fiercely competed against each other with smear campaigns in the media and threats of impeachment, effectively acting as opposition to a government of the same party. For example, the two main factions within the Colorado Party are Colorado Honor (HC), led by former President Horacio Cartes (2013-2018), and Añetete (which means “true” or “real” in Guaraní), led by former President Mario Abdo (2018-2023). These factions sometimes have to ally themselves with members of the PLRA and other smaller parties to gather support for their policy agenda. President Santiago Peña belongs to the HC faction, and Cartes currently serves as president of the Colorado Party.
Vote-buying and assisted voting have been an occasional feature of Paraguayan politics. This practice has been entrenched in the Paraguayan system for decades and is done by both the Colorado and PLRA parties, especially in rural areas. In the 2023 elections, the European Union’s Electoral Observation Mission witnessed five incidents of vote-buying and seven incidents of indication of vote-buying, but their final report and that of the Organization of American States’ Electoral Observation Mission deemed these as isolated cases that did not significantly alter the results and described the electoral process as transparent. After the results were published, Paraguayo Cubas and his supporters called the election fraudulent and took to the streets in violent protests. International observers reported no indication of fraud.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the governing authority, although challenges remain. While Paraguay maintains a pluralistic civic space, the 2024 “NGO law,” occasional legal harassment of critical media outlets, and the infiltration of organized crime into institutions pose risks to independent media and civil society. Episodes of violent protests and forceful police responses have generated casualties and arrests, but these incidents reflect reactive crackdowns rather than a systematic repression of dissent.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations, but the passage of Law 7363/24, also known as the “NGO law,” in November 2024 poses a threat to civil society. The law introduces vague and broad regulations on the financing and operation of non-governmental organizations, including mandatory registration and extensive government oversight. It also grants the executive branch discretionary powers to dissolve organizations deemed non-compliant, raising alarms among human rights groups about potential misuse to intimidate or silence dissenting organizations. The law has been enacted but not yet regulated, meaning it formally exists but cannot be fully implemented until the executive issues the necessary regulatory decrees outlining the specific steps the NGOs must take to comply with the law, the timeline for such steps, and the punishments when they fail to undertake them. In December 2025, a group of local NGOs challenged the constitutionality of the law, and a decision by the courts is pending.
Paraguay’s media environment is dominated by four major media conglomerates that collectively control most television, radio, and daily print circulation. Most notably, Grupo Cartes, owned by former President and current Colorado Party leader Horacio Cartes, is especially influential and has been accused of tilting coverage in favor of pro-government actors while marginalizing critical voices. Yet independent media, regional community radios, and civil society outlets continue to operate and are widely read, regularly publishing investigative work.
Despite this pluralism, the government has intimidated and obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media. Critical media outlets often face legal harassment, including defamation lawsuits and abuse of gender anti-discrimination laws. For example, in November 2022, ABC Color director Natalia Zuccolillo and journalist Juan Carlos Lezcano were convicted of defamation in a lawsuit filed by former Undersecretary of Taxation Marta González, over reports alleging irregularities in a state contract process, and were fined a combined amount of approximately $68,000. However, two years later, in July 2024, a higher court acquitted them, recognizing they had published matters of public interest and that typical elements of defamation were absent. Additionally, the misuse of Paraguay’s gender-based anti-discrimination laws — originally intended to protect women’s rights — by local officials and some national legislators has been documented in a handful of cases against reporters covering corruption cases.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Yet, incidents of violent clashes between protesters and security forces have occurred in the context of several recent protests in Paraguay that have escalated. For example, in 2017, under then-President Horacio Cartes, a political crisis erupted after his allies in the Senate approved a controversial constitutional amendment to allow presidential reelection in a secret session that excluded the opposition. Massive protests followed, culminating in the burning of part of the Congress building. Police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets, resulting in the death of a PLRA activist. In the wake of the unrest, the amendment was ultimately overturned. Similarly, the large March 2021 protests against pandemic mismanagement began peacefully but escalated, including attempts to torch public buildings and calls for President Abdo’s impeachment.
Most recently, in 2023, post-election protests led by outsider candidate Paraguayo Cubas, who garnered nearly 23% of the vote, turned violent following his unfounded claims of electoral fraud. Supporters blocked roads, clashed with police, and attempted to storm government buildings, particularly in the vicinity of the Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice (TSJE). Cubas was arrested on May 5, facing charges including disturbing public peace, attempted coercion of state bodies, and attempting to obstruct the election process. Over 200 people were detained, and at least one protester died during the unrest. After initially being held under house arrest, Cubas was later granted liberty under judicial supervision with conditions. His trial began in March 2025 and remains ongoing as of the end of 2025. While law enforcement used significant force in response to the 2023 unrest, these actions were largely reactive rather than systematically repressive, and do not reflect a consistent pattern of unfair protest repression.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Paraguay’s judiciary is heavily influenced by the governing Colorado Party, which often shields powerful figures and enables politically motivated actions like the 2024 expulsion of opposition senator Kattya González. Corruption further undermines accountability, leaving major narcotrafficking and corruption cases in impunity. However, higher courts have acted as a check on the government in cases that targeted the press.
The government has undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the government are frequently dismissed. This is done by placing loyalists in key posts that dismiss or delay cases against figures with strong political ties, as seen in the examples of key Colorado Party figures, such as Horacio Cartes and Eulalio “Lalo” Gomes. The Council of the Magistracy is the body that nominates judicial and prosecutorial candidates, while the Jury for the Prosecution of Magistrates (JEM) is responsible for disciplining and removing judges and prosecutors. Both bodies include representatives from multiple branches and sectors, including legislators, the judiciary, legal associations, and the executive. However, in practice, the Partido Colorado’s dominance in the executive and legislature means it typically controls a majority of these seats, giving it significant sway over both the appointment and sanctioning of judicial actors.
To illustrate, Cartes, a former president (2013–2018) and current party leader, faced repeated formal complaints before the Public Prosecutor’s office ever acted, including a 2022 complaint by then–Interior Minister Arnaldo Giuzzio and sanctions from the US government for involvement in “significant corruption” in 2022. Yet it was only in 2023, after US pressure, that prosecutors formally opened a case, only to dismiss all proceedings by June 2025, effectively eliminating scrutiny. In turn, Gomes, a Colorado deputy long suspected of links to narcotrafficking, also had multiple complaints filed against him as early as 2017 by a businessman supported by BBVA Paraguay, as well as alerts from Seprelad (Paraguay’s financial intelligence unit) in 2021 and a complaint from the Public Ministry’s office itself in 2022. Yet no serious investigation began until 2023, shortly before his death during a police raid at his home. Evidence later recovered from his phone revealed systematic collusion with judges and prosecutors. In December 2025, a former lawmaker and two former judges were indicted for accepting bribes in connection with the corruption investigation into Gomes’ network.
Courts have also frequently and unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. A clear example is the expulsion of opposition senator Kattya González in February 2024, after she became one of the most vocal critics of the Cartes faction of the Colorado Party –– also known as cartismo –– and of corruption. The Senate, controlled by the Colorado Party, carried out her removal in a rushed and irregular vote, disregarding its own rules that had, only three months earlier, raised the threshold for expulsions to a two-thirds majority (30 out of 45). Instead, the ruling party reverted to the previous rule requiring only a simple majority. González was expelled by 23 votes in favor and 15 against, a result invalid under the two-thirds requirement but sufficient under the outdated simple majority standard. Civil society groups and international observers denounced the move as political retaliation intended to silence an opposition leader. While González challenged the expulsion before the Supreme Court, the case was stalled for over a year after the Senate sought the recusal of two Constitutional Chamber judges assigned to her case in June 2025. This move effectively paralyzed the chamber, since without a quorum, it could not advance with the constitutional review. In November 2025, however, the Supreme Court rejected the recusals, confirmed the composition of the Chamber, and formally cleared the way for substantive review of González’s constitutional challenge. As of the end of 2025, the case remains pending a decision, but judicial proceedings have resumed after prolonged legislative obstruction.
However, higher judicial authorities can sometimes act as a corrective. In 2022, Natalia Zuccolillo, director of ABC Color, one of Paraguay’s most influential newspapers, and ABC reporter Juan Carlos Lezcano were sued for defamation by former Undersecretary of Taxation Marta González, over reports alleging irregularities in a state contract process. Lower courts initially convicted them, raising concerns about judicial complicity in political retaliation against independent media. However, in 2024, the Court of Appeals dismissed the charges, effectively clearing Zuccolillo and Lezcano of liability.
