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HRF classifies Papua New Guinea as democratic.
Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy that attained full independence from Australia in 1975, although it remains a part of the commonwealth. The first parliamentary elections were held shortly thereafter, in 1977. Members of the parliament (118-member unicameral legislature) are elected every five years from 96 single-member electorates and 22 regional electorates. James Marape was made prime minister in 2019 following the resignation of former Prime Minister Peter O’Neill. Marape served as the finance minister under O’Neill’s administration before leading a series of defections that prompted the latter’s resignation. The high-level defections include dissatisfaction with O’Neill’s leadership and, in particular, his unilateral handling of a multibillion-dollar gas deal that opponents said was a poor outcome for PNG. Marape then went on to win the leadership vote with over 90 per cent of PNG’s Parliament voting for him as the successor. In the 2022 elections, Marape won the popular vote to be reelected as the prime minister through the Pangu party in coalition with the United Resource Party, the National Alliance Party, and others.
National elections in PNG are largely free and fair. The largest political parties are able to run, compete, and win in elections without significant barriers, with a regular and peaceful transfer of power. Coalition governments are the norm across PNG, with frequent switches in political alliances, often leading to weakened opposition. Independent electoral oversight is somewhat undermined by minor incidents of voter irregularities, fraud, and electoral violence.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the PNG government. There is a vibrant public debate, with many diverse critical voices expressing challenges to the government. Minor hindrances to the freedom to dissent exist through certain restrictive laws and government interference with independent media.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Rule of law largely prevails in the country where institutions operate autonomously to uphold democratic principles and act as reliable safeguards against the abuse of power, ensuring accountability, transparency, and adherence to constitutional norms.
In Papua New Guinea, general elections are largely free and fair, where major political parties compete in elections on equal footing without significant barriers. The elections are competitive, although frequent changes occur in coalition politics that impact the political opposition. Voter irregularities exist due to certain undermining of electoral independent oversight.
In PNG, the Pangu-led government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The national elections are largely free and fair. PNG has 53 registered political parties. The largest among them, including the People’s National Congress (PNC) and the Pangu Party, alternately win elections. Due to intense competition and party fragmentation, coalition governments are the norm. For example, in the 2022 general election, the Pangu Party – Papua New Guinea’s oldest political party – secured only 39 of the 60 seats needed for a majority. Similarly, the PNC, which won the 2012 and 2017 elections, managed only 27 and 28 seats, respectively, and had to rule in broad coalitions as a result. However, these coalitions are often fragile. Politicians frequently switch parties to increase their electoral prospects or pursue shifting political interests. Toward the end of the O’Neill administration, for instance, then-Finance Minister James Marape left both the PNC and the Cabinet to join the opposition. Since the 2022 election, Marape’s own coalition has weakened due to mass defections of government lawmakers to the opposition to avoid being outnumbered in a planned no-confidence vote. Many of these lawmakers have since returned to the government bloc. These shifts blur the lines between government and opposition and contribute to the political instability Papua New Guinea suffers. Since independence in 1975, only two of the country’s eight prime ministers have completed full five-year terms. The rest were removed through no-confidence votes, resigned to avoid them, or were ousted by court rulings. While this reflects a weak and volatile party system, it also prevents any single incumbent from remaining in power long enough to manipulate the electoral system to their advantage.
The current government has not undermined independent electoral oversight; however, the Electoral Commission lacks statutory independence and has faced widespread criticism for its poor handling of elections. In 2017 and 2022, the Commission decentralized many of its core responsibilities – such as updating voter rolls, scheduling polls, and securing sensitive election materials – to local officials it does not directly supervise. This led to serious violations of electoral rules: both elections were marred by violence and voting irregularities, including the theft and destruction of ballot boxes, voter intimidation, as well as underage, collective, and proxy voting, most of which went unaddressed. In some areas, especially the conflict-prone Highlands, local election officials were villagers with allegiances to specific candidates. Delays in updating the voter roll and the Electoral Commission’s general inability to curb election-related violence resulted in roughly half of the electorate disenfranchised in both elections.
The government has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Third-party observers consistently find Papua New Guinean elections to be competitive. Opposition parties and candidates are generally able to campaign without major restrictions. In 2022, a Commonwealth observation mission noted that candidates used a wide range of channels, including rallies, posters, billboards, and, increasingly, social media, to reach voters. However, violent clashes between rival supporters remain a serious threat to campaign activities, occasionally affecting even ruling party candidates.
Under the Pangu government, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. There is a vibrant public debate with peaceful protests and dissent against the government. There is no censorship imposed by the government, although restrictive laws exist to stifle criticism. The current government does not manipulate media coverage in its favour, and has not obstructed the work of independent media in a few instances.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Peaceful and dissenting protests are common. In April 2023, activists from a grassroots civil society organization in the mining township of Porgera rallied against the reopening of a controversial gold mine ahead of the annual general meeting of the Toronto-based company Barrick Gold. In May 2023, hundreds of students nationwide organized protests on school campuses concerning minimal transparency around the government’s bilateral defense cooperation pact with the US. That same month, students of the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) marched to the Parliament House in the capital, Port Moresby, after Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko made derogatory comments about those who criticized his daughter’s lavish lifestyle. The government had previously faced staunch criticism for its failure to meaningfully address the use of disproportionate force against peaceful protesters in two exceptional cases. For example, in August 2022, security forces shot dead at least five people and wounded 15 others who protested against the conduct of the elections the month prior by blocking a highway in a province. Eight policemen were identified as suspects in the ensuing investigations, but no further action against them was known to have been taken.
While the Marape government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech, certain laws could be misconstrued to stifle criticism. One of those laws is the Cybercrime Act 2016, which debars a broad range of online activities, including the publication of defamatory content. This criminal defamation provision carries a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to PGK 1 million (approximately $13,800). There have been isolated instances of the provision being unfairly invoked against legitimate forms of speech. Among them is the arrest of Hennah Joku, a journalist and gender-based violence survivor, who was arrested in November 2024 after she posted her response to the acquittal of her abuser on social media. She was released on a PGK 5,000 (approximately $1,162) bail after being questioned for a few hours. In December 2024, police also invoked the Cybercrime Act 2016 to arrest environmental activist Eddie Tanago for reposting a photo of a government official, allegedly without the official’s consent.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor, although cases in which journalists and media workers are intimidated for their work have increased. The media landscape is small and underdeveloped, with ownership primarily split between foreign corporations and emerging local media companies. The leading TV station that provides investigative journalism, EMTV, is controlled by a state-owned entity. Since 2018, the outlet has terminated four of its staff members for engaging in reporting deemed sensitive to the government. The latest of those terminations took place in May 2025, when two journalists – one working for EMTV and another for FM100, a radio station also controlled by EMTV’s parent company – were removed from their positions after interviewing an opposition lawmaker in the aftermath of a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Marape.
The Marape government has not obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. However, there are certain issues worth monitoring. In 2022, the Prime Minister announced that he would no longer accept direct communications from journalists and threatened further restrictions, including a potential ban on press conferences, if these terms were not adhered to. In February 2023, the Minister for Communications proposed a national media development policy aimed at establishing a licensing mechanism for media outlets and journalists, overseen by a commission whose membership includes a government advisor. The policy also seeks to create other agencies to manage the distribution of “official government information” and monitor national news coverage. It is pending parliamentary deliberation as of May 2025. These measures are symptomatic of eroding media freedom and merit continued monitoring.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government. The judiciary largely serves as a check on the government. However, Courts suffer from a high volume of backlogged proceedings, but are generally capable of preserving the integrity of elections and freedom of dissent, and checking government powers. The frequent use of no-confidence votes by sitting lawmakers remains a contentious issue with repercussions on political stability and government accountability. Slow institutional reforms similarly limit accountability.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled the Manape government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The courts have indicated an overall ability to maintain the integrity of elections. For example, in 2022, Peter O’Neill, whose prime ministership at the time was disputed due to his resignation and subsequent renomination, unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court to delay elections scheduled that year until by-elections in all constituencies across the country were concluded. Had the delay been granted, it would have hindered Parliament from affirming O’Neill’s succession by opposition leader James Marape. Courts have nevertheless faced criticism for being slow in handling election-related disputes.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enable the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Convictions of dissidents are rare. The above-mentioned case concerning Laken Aigilo represents one of the recent examples of the courts’ ability to protect dissent. In December 2023, the National Court – whose jurisdiction resembles the high court in other countries – acquitted Aigilo of all charges. In April 2025, a district court dismissed the charges brought against environmental activist Eddie Tanago over his repost of a photo of a government official online, further demonstrating the judiciary’s ability to curb attempts at stifling free speech. In a ruling delivered in August 2024, however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Cybercrime Act 2016, which was used against Tanago and other individuals over the years, despite the law imposing a maximum sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment against defamation.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests or who are perceived as a threat to the government, have not faced retaliation. While in the early years of the O’Neill administration, there had been attempts to intimidate judges, which culminated in the arrest of the Chief Justice and another Supreme Court judge opposed to the Prime Minister, these instances have ceased under Prime Minister James Marape. In 2012, former Chief Justice Sir Salamo Injia was charged with obstructing a police investigation into his management of the court where he presided over a court ruling that ordered a reinstatement of Sir Michael Somare as the prime minister amid an ongoing tussle for the prime minister’s job with Peter O’Neill.
The current Manape government has not subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. However, successive governments over the years have attempted to restrict the use of no-confidence votes, an important tool to hold the government accountable, on the reasoning that it contributes to political instability. Some Prime Ministers have also suspended Parliament to avoid a no-confidence vote. Incumbent Prime Minister Marape did so in December 2020. However, within days, the Supreme Court intervened and compelled Parliament to reconvene. In November 2024, the Supreme Court warned a parliamentary committee of overstepping its mandate by blocking a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Marape, and promptly ordered Parliament to debate another such motion.
The Manape government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. However, institutional reforms in Papua New Guinea are notably slow. The country did not have an independent anti-corruption commission until 2020, when it established the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). ICAC only became fully operational in 2024 due to limited resources, funding, and personnel. It has also been facing infighting among its commissioners since becoming operative, and is being investigated for alleged misconduct and improper spending based on a report by one of its commissioners as of June 2025.
HRF classifies Papua New Guinea as democratic.
Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy that attained full independence from Australia in 1975, although it remains a part of the commonwealth. The first parliamentary elections were held shortly thereafter, in 1977. Members of the parliament (118-member unicameral legislature) are elected every five years from 96 single-member electorates and 22 regional electorates. James Marape was made prime minister in 2019 following the resignation of former Prime Minister Peter O’Neill. Marape served as the finance minister under O’Neill’s administration before leading a series of defections that prompted the latter’s resignation. The high-level defections include dissatisfaction with O’Neill’s leadership and, in particular, his unilateral handling of a multibillion-dollar gas deal that opponents said was a poor outcome for PNG. Marape then went on to win the leadership vote with over 90 per cent of PNG’s Parliament voting for him as the successor. In the 2022 elections, Marape won the popular vote to be reelected as the prime minister through the Pangu party in coalition with the United Resource Party, the National Alliance Party, and others.
National elections in PNG are largely free and fair. The largest political parties are able to run, compete, and win in elections without significant barriers, with a regular and peaceful transfer of power. Coalition governments are the norm across PNG, with frequent switches in political alliances, often leading to weakened opposition. Independent electoral oversight is somewhat undermined by minor incidents of voter irregularities, fraud, and electoral violence.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the PNG government. There is a vibrant public debate, with many diverse critical voices expressing challenges to the government. Minor hindrances to the freedom to dissent exist through certain restrictive laws and government interference with independent media.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Rule of law largely prevails in the country where institutions operate autonomously to uphold democratic principles and act as reliable safeguards against the abuse of power, ensuring accountability, transparency, and adherence to constitutional norms.
In Papua New Guinea, general elections are largely free and fair, where major political parties compete in elections on equal footing without significant barriers. The elections are competitive, although frequent changes occur in coalition politics that impact the political opposition. Voter irregularities exist due to certain undermining of electoral independent oversight.
In PNG, the Pangu-led government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The national elections are largely free and fair. PNG has 53 registered political parties. The largest among them, including the People’s National Congress (PNC) and the Pangu Party, alternately win elections. Due to intense competition and party fragmentation, coalition governments are the norm. For example, in the 2022 general election, the Pangu Party – Papua New Guinea’s oldest political party – secured only 39 of the 60 seats needed for a majority. Similarly, the PNC, which won the 2012 and 2017 elections, managed only 27 and 28 seats, respectively, and had to rule in broad coalitions as a result. However, these coalitions are often fragile. Politicians frequently switch parties to increase their electoral prospects or pursue shifting political interests. Toward the end of the O’Neill administration, for instance, then-Finance Minister James Marape left both the PNC and the Cabinet to join the opposition. Since the 2022 election, Marape’s own coalition has weakened due to mass defections of government lawmakers to the opposition to avoid being outnumbered in a planned no-confidence vote. Many of these lawmakers have since returned to the government bloc. These shifts blur the lines between government and opposition and contribute to the political instability Papua New Guinea suffers. Since independence in 1975, only two of the country’s eight prime ministers have completed full five-year terms. The rest were removed through no-confidence votes, resigned to avoid them, or were ousted by court rulings. While this reflects a weak and volatile party system, it also prevents any single incumbent from remaining in power long enough to manipulate the electoral system to their advantage.
The current government has not undermined independent electoral oversight; however, the Electoral Commission lacks statutory independence and has faced widespread criticism for its poor handling of elections. In 2017 and 2022, the Commission decentralized many of its core responsibilities – such as updating voter rolls, scheduling polls, and securing sensitive election materials – to local officials it does not directly supervise. This led to serious violations of electoral rules: both elections were marred by violence and voting irregularities, including the theft and destruction of ballot boxes, voter intimidation, as well as underage, collective, and proxy voting, most of which went unaddressed. In some areas, especially the conflict-prone Highlands, local election officials were villagers with allegiances to specific candidates. Delays in updating the voter roll and the Electoral Commission’s general inability to curb election-related violence resulted in roughly half of the electorate disenfranchised in both elections.
The government has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Third-party observers consistently find Papua New Guinean elections to be competitive. Opposition parties and candidates are generally able to campaign without major restrictions. In 2022, a Commonwealth observation mission noted that candidates used a wide range of channels, including rallies, posters, billboards, and, increasingly, social media, to reach voters. However, violent clashes between rival supporters remain a serious threat to campaign activities, occasionally affecting even ruling party candidates.
Under the Pangu government, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. There is a vibrant public debate with peaceful protests and dissent against the government. There is no censorship imposed by the government, although restrictive laws exist to stifle criticism. The current government does not manipulate media coverage in its favour, and has not obstructed the work of independent media in a few instances.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Peaceful and dissenting protests are common. In April 2023, activists from a grassroots civil society organization in the mining township of Porgera rallied against the reopening of a controversial gold mine ahead of the annual general meeting of the Toronto-based company Barrick Gold. In May 2023, hundreds of students nationwide organized protests on school campuses concerning minimal transparency around the government’s bilateral defense cooperation pact with the US. That same month, students of the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) marched to the Parliament House in the capital, Port Moresby, after Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko made derogatory comments about those who criticized his daughter’s lavish lifestyle. The government had previously faced staunch criticism for its failure to meaningfully address the use of disproportionate force against peaceful protesters in two exceptional cases. For example, in August 2022, security forces shot dead at least five people and wounded 15 others who protested against the conduct of the elections the month prior by blocking a highway in a province. Eight policemen were identified as suspects in the ensuing investigations, but no further action against them was known to have been taken.
While the Marape government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech, certain laws could be misconstrued to stifle criticism. One of those laws is the Cybercrime Act 2016, which debars a broad range of online activities, including the publication of defamatory content. This criminal defamation provision carries a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to PGK 1 million (approximately $13,800). There have been isolated instances of the provision being unfairly invoked against legitimate forms of speech. Among them is the arrest of Hennah Joku, a journalist and gender-based violence survivor, who was arrested in November 2024 after she posted her response to the acquittal of her abuser on social media. She was released on a PGK 5,000 (approximately $1,162) bail after being questioned for a few hours. In December 2024, police also invoked the Cybercrime Act 2016 to arrest environmental activist Eddie Tanago for reposting a photo of a government official, allegedly without the official’s consent.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor, although cases in which journalists and media workers are intimidated for their work have increased. The media landscape is small and underdeveloped, with ownership primarily split between foreign corporations and emerging local media companies. The leading TV station that provides investigative journalism, EMTV, is controlled by a state-owned entity. Since 2018, the outlet has terminated four of its staff members for engaging in reporting deemed sensitive to the government. The latest of those terminations took place in May 2025, when two journalists – one working for EMTV and another for FM100, a radio station also controlled by EMTV’s parent company – were removed from their positions after interviewing an opposition lawmaker in the aftermath of a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Marape.
The Marape government has not obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. However, there are certain issues worth monitoring. In 2022, the Prime Minister announced that he would no longer accept direct communications from journalists and threatened further restrictions, including a potential ban on press conferences, if these terms were not adhered to. In February 2023, the Minister for Communications proposed a national media development policy aimed at establishing a licensing mechanism for media outlets and journalists, overseen by a commission whose membership includes a government advisor. The policy also seeks to create other agencies to manage the distribution of “official government information” and monitor national news coverage. It is pending parliamentary deliberation as of May 2025. These measures are symptomatic of eroding media freedom and merit continued monitoring.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the government. The judiciary largely serves as a check on the government. However, Courts suffer from a high volume of backlogged proceedings, but are generally capable of preserving the integrity of elections and freedom of dissent, and checking government powers. The frequent use of no-confidence votes by sitting lawmakers remains a contentious issue with repercussions on political stability and government accountability. Slow institutional reforms similarly limit accountability.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled the Manape government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The courts have indicated an overall ability to maintain the integrity of elections. For example, in 2022, Peter O’Neill, whose prime ministership at the time was disputed due to his resignation and subsequent renomination, unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court to delay elections scheduled that year until by-elections in all constituencies across the country were concluded. Had the delay been granted, it would have hindered Parliament from affirming O’Neill’s succession by opposition leader James Marape. Courts have nevertheless faced criticism for being slow in handling election-related disputes.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enable the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Convictions of dissidents are rare. The above-mentioned case concerning Laken Aigilo represents one of the recent examples of the courts’ ability to protect dissent. In December 2023, the National Court – whose jurisdiction resembles the high court in other countries – acquitted Aigilo of all charges. In April 2025, a district court dismissed the charges brought against environmental activist Eddie Tanago over his repost of a photo of a government official online, further demonstrating the judiciary’s ability to curb attempts at stifling free speech. In a ruling delivered in August 2024, however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Cybercrime Act 2016, which was used against Tanago and other individuals over the years, despite the law imposing a maximum sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment against defamation.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests or who are perceived as a threat to the government, have not faced retaliation. While in the early years of the O’Neill administration, there had been attempts to intimidate judges, which culminated in the arrest of the Chief Justice and another Supreme Court judge opposed to the Prime Minister, these instances have ceased under Prime Minister James Marape. In 2012, former Chief Justice Sir Salamo Injia was charged with obstructing a police investigation into his management of the court where he presided over a court ruling that ordered a reinstatement of Sir Michael Somare as the prime minister amid an ongoing tussle for the prime minister’s job with Peter O’Neill.
The current Manape government has not subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. However, successive governments over the years have attempted to restrict the use of no-confidence votes, an important tool to hold the government accountable, on the reasoning that it contributes to political instability. Some Prime Ministers have also suspended Parliament to avoid a no-confidence vote. Incumbent Prime Minister Marape did so in December 2020. However, within days, the Supreme Court intervened and compelled Parliament to reconvene. In November 2024, the Supreme Court warned a parliamentary committee of overstepping its mandate by blocking a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Marape, and promptly ordered Parliament to debate another such motion.
The Manape government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. However, institutional reforms in Papua New Guinea are notably slow. The country did not have an independent anti-corruption commission until 2020, when it established the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). ICAC only became fully operational in 2024 due to limited resources, funding, and personnel. It has also been facing infighting among its commissioners since becoming operative, and is being investigated for alleged misconduct and improper spending based on a report by one of its commissioners as of June 2025.
