Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
The Oslo Accords, signed in the early 1990s between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), aimed to lay the foundation for a negotiated Palestinian state and establish a framework for Palestinian self-governance. However, these agreements also led to the formal division of the West Bank into different areas with varying levels of control, significantly impacting Palestinian sovereignty and creating a complex system of dual governance. Under the Oslo II Accord of 1995, the West Bank was divided into three distinct administrative zones: Area A, Area B, and Area C. These divisions were originally intended to be temporary for a period of five years but remain the framework that currently exists.The West Bank is internationally recognized as territory occupied by Israel since 1967, although Israeli officials and some legal scholars characterize it as disputed territory whose final status was left unresolved under the Oslo Accords. More than three decades after those agreements, the territory’s permanent status remains unsettled, as the parties have not reached a negotiated resolution.
Israeli officials maintain that the military legal regime in the West Bank is grounded in ongoing security concerns arising from decades of armed conflict. They reference past waves of violence originating in the territory — including suicide bombings during the Second Intifada, armed attacks against civilians and soldiers, and more recent militant activity — as justification for retaining overriding security authority and movement restrictions. Critics contend, however, that the duration and institutionalization of these measures exceed immediate security imperatives and have evolved into longer-term governance structures affecting the broader civilian population.
The jurisdictional landscape of the West Bank is defined by a tiered system of control. Area A, comprising roughly 18 percent of the territory, is under the primary jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA). While the PA manages both civil and security matters within these urban centers, its autonomy is circumscribed by frequent Israeli military incursions for security operations. Furthermore, Israeli military law explicitly prohibits Israeli citizens from entering these zones. In Area B, which covers approximately 22 percent of the West Bank, governance is shared. The PA oversees civil administration, such as education and healthcare,while Israel retains overriding security control. This arrangement means that Palestinian police can manage local civil order, but the Israeli military maintains the authority to operate and conduct arrests at its discretion. The remaining 60 percent of the West Bank, designated as Area C, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Israeli Civil Administration. As a military body, this administration exercises total control over both security and civil affairs, including the critical sectors of planning, zoning, and infrastructure development, effectively making it the only contiguous zone in the territory. Under Military Order No. 1 (1967), the Israeli Area Commander holds exclusive legislative authority over the Palestinian population in the West Bank, enabling the military to issue and enforce directives related to media, publications, and movement without any democratic or legislative oversight. This authority grants the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) broad regulatory power over publications, movement, and public order across all three areas.
The fragmentation of the West Bank into over 160 separate Palestinian “zones” (Areas A and B) surrounded by an Israeli-controlled zone (Area C) means that the PA lacks territorial contiguity. Consequently, the ability of Palestinian people and goods to move is entirely dependent on Israeli military and administrative decisions at checkpoints and other barriers. By November 2025, the Israeli military was operating at least 877 checkpoints and roadblocks throughout various enclaves in the West Bank. Furthermore, Israel also controls the external perimeter of the West Bank (all international borders) and the internal movement between Areas A, B, and C. This access is governed by a tiered permit system managed by the Israeli office of Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT).
Despite the distinct electoral, legal, and administrative frameworks governing Areas A, B, and C, the West Bank is unified by systems of governance in which political authority is exercised without meaningful democratic participation by the Palestinian population. Since June 1967, Israel has administered the West Bank under a system of military law. Authority in the territory is exercised through the Israeli Area Commander, who holds consolidated legislative, executive, and judicial powers pursuant to military orders. This authority does not derive from legislation enacted by the Israeli parliament, but from a body of Military Orders issued following the 1967 war and amended over time. The promulgation of new military regulations occurs without approval from an elected legislative body, whether the Israeli Knesset or the Palestinian Legislative Council.
Civil administration in the West Bank is conducted by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a military body responsible for planning, infrastructure, permitting regimes (including building and movement), coordination with the PA, and oversight of military courts that adjudicate security and public order offenses. Over the decades, Israeli authorities have issued more than 1,800 Military Orders, which collectively constitute the governing legal framework of the West Bank. This framework places the Palestinian population under governing authorities in which they do not participate through Israeli electoral mechanisms and over which they have limited representative influence.
Area A
HRF classifies Area A as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
In the urban hubs of Area A under PA control, authoritarianism has evolved into internal consolidation. Since 2006, the indefinite postponement of PA elections has effectively dismantled a nascent electoral system, replacing it with a security-centric executive state. The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the PA’s unicameral legislature, has been dissolved, and governance has shifted toward a model of executive decree. In this environment, the systemic absence of legislative oversight permits the suppression of domestic rivals and the stifling of civil society through a combination of executive orders, administrative barriers, and arbitrary detentions. Freedom of dissent in PA urban centers is closely monitored by Palestinian Security Services (PSS). Activists and journalists often face harassment or detention under expansive cybercrime laws that equate political criticism with threats to national stability. Consequently, institutional accountability is severely weakened, as there is no functioning legislative body to oversee executive spending or policy decisions, leaving the judiciary vulnerable to political interference.
This internal consolidation is both a cause and a consequence of the deep-seated fragmentation between Fatah and Hamas. Since the 2007 schism, the PA has been reduced to a Fatah-exclusive entity in the West Bank, while Hamas maintains a separate governance structure in Gaza. By the end of 2025, this territorial and political rupture has prevented unified Palestinian governance, leaving the PLC marginalized and unable to convene for nearly two decades. Within this vacuum of accountability, PA President Mahmoud Abbas has remained in office beyond the expiration of his electoral mandate and has governed primarily through executive decree, with no national elections held since 2006.
The PA employs a multi-faceted strategy to suppress political dissent and maintain its authority, primarily driven by a need to stifle any criticism that might undermine its legitimacy. A central pillar of this repression is the systematic targeting of the media and its political opponents. For instance, between January and March 2025, the PA interrogated at least nine journalists regarding their ties to Al Jazeera, a network the PA banned for alleged incitement. This followed a restrictive 2024 period where 41 journalists were detained. Beyond the press, the PA has historically used its security apparatus to suppress political opposition, such as the detention and alleged torture of Hamas officials following the 2006 legislative elections, effectively preventing any meaningful challenge to the PA’s narrative of order. By the end of 2024, the Independent Commission for Human Rights, the national human rights institution tasked with protecting, promoting, and monitoring human rights within PA-controlled areas, received more than 241 complaints of arbitrary detention.
The PA continues to rely on penal code provisions originating in the Ottoman and British Mandate periods, including statutes criminalizing acts such as “insulting higher authorities” or “creating sectarian strife.” Human rights organizations argue that these broadly formulated provisions have been used to restrict political expression, both online and offline. Reported cases include the imprisonment of producer Abdul Rahman Zaher in Nablus in 2022 after he shared a Facebook post criticizing UAE–Israel normalization, and the 2013 sentencing of Mamdouh Hamamreh following his association with a caricature of the PA president on social media. The 2017 Electronic Crimes Law expanded regulatory authority over digital communications, granting the executive branch enhanced surveillance and enforcement powers. According to monitoring groups, its implementation led to more than 1,600 detentions between 2018 and 2019 and the closure of approximately 30 websites affiliated with political parties, opposition groups, and independent media outlets, including al-Quds Network.
Israel maintains what it describes as an overriding security responsibility throughout the West Bank, including in Areas A and B, where the PA exercises civil control. Under this framework, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conduct security operations across all three areas when deemed necessary. Israeli authorities state that such operations are aimed at preventing militant activity and disrupting networks linked to designated organizations.
In December 2025, Israeli security forces conducted a raid on the Ramallah offices of the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), a Palestinian organization engaged in agricultural development and land advocacy. During the operation, equipment and documents were seized and several staff members were detained. Israeli authorities have previously designated UAWC under Israel’s counterterrorism legislation, citing alleged links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a group designated as terrorist by Israel, the United States, and the European Union. UAWC and a number of international donors have rejected these allegations and maintain that the organization’s work is humanitarian in nature. By the end of the month, at least eight employees remained in detention pending further legal proceedings.
A frequently cited case illustrating the intersection of security law and Palestinian political leadership involves Khalida Jarrar, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and former head of its Prisoners Committee. In March 2021, an Israeli military court sentenced Jarrar to two years in prison under a plea agreement that convicted her of belonging to an outlawed organization, while dropping more serious charges; she received credit for time already served. Prior to that sentence, Jarrar had been held without formal charge under administrative detention since October 2019, a practice that allows Israeli authorities to detain individuals without trial on security grounds for renewable periods. Israeli officials have linked her detention to her senior role within the PFLP, an organization designated as a terrorist by Israel and several Western governments, including the United States and the European Union. Jarrar was not publicly accused of participating in specific armed activity. Observers and human rights advocates have criticized extended administrative detention as a restrictive security tool that lacks ordinary judicial safeguards, while Israeli authorities maintain that it is a lawful preventative measure permitted under military law and applied in the context of ongoing security concerns. 
In September 2024, Walid Ahmed, a 17-year-old Palestinian minor, was arbitrarily detained by the IDF in Silwad, a Palestinian town northeast of Ramallah, and transferred to Megiddo Prison in Israel. In March 2025, he died in detention after being held for nearly six months in administrative detention. He was originally detained on a range of alleged offenses that took place between 2020 and 2023 that included throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. His family denied the accusations. In March 2025, he died in detention after approximately six months in custody. An autopsy observed by an Israeli physician reported severe malnutrition, extreme weight loss, and signs of untreated colitis and infection. Medical experts who reviewed the findings stated that prolonged malnutrition likely contributed significantly to his death. Israeli prison authorities announced that an internal investigation had been opened, while human rights organizations characterized the case as indicative of deteriorating detention conditions. By the end of 2025, at least 350 Palestinian minors were being indefinitely detained by the Israeli Prison Services (IPS), the majority of whom were arrested by the IDF in the West Bank.
Rather than acting in isolation, both authorities at times operate in parallel or sequential security actions under the coordination frameworks established by the Oslo Accords. A notable instance occurred in June 2023 at Birzeit University in the Ramallah Governorate, where students often face detention from both the PA and IDF due to their political activism. For example, one month after Abdul Majeed Hassan, an Islamic bloc candidate secured the presidency of the student council, he was forcibly removed from his residence by PA agents, assaulted, and placed in detention. In September 2023, the IDF stormed the same university campus, vandalized the student union offices, and arbitrarily detained Hasan along with 7 other student union members.
While the IDF regularly suppresses protests in Area A using specialized military units and locally-recruited informants, the PA has recurrently relied on the Palestinian Security Services (PSS), which is primarily divided into internal security, national security, and general intelligence branches, instead of a regular military force since Israel bars the PA from operating one. These units are regularly used to crackdown on protesters. In the wake of the October 2023 Hamas attacks and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza, residents in Area A and other parts of the West Bank took to the streets to call for an end to the conflict and voice their frustration with President Abbas’s perceived inaction. These assemblies were met with aggressive crackdowns by PSS forces, who utilized violent measures to forcibly break up the crowds and stifle public grievance. The violence resulted in the killing of 12-year-old Razan Nasrallah during demonstrations in Jenin. This pattern was evident even before the Israel-Hamas conflict. For instance, in July 2021, PSS agents violently dispersed a demonstrator at a peaceful rally in Ramallah, an UN rights monitor was among those who were attacked with pepper spray while PSS agents attempted to snatch phones being used to document the rally. In June 2018 West Bank civil society activists organised large protests in Ramallah calling on the PA to lift its sanctions against Gaza. These were met with a violent crackdown by PSS and “loyalists” who fired tear gas and sound grenades, and attacked protesters and arrested journalists and other activists.
In December 2025, following a raid on the UAWC offices in Ramallah, the IDF responded to the ensuing protest at the time of the incident with the use of live ammunition, resulting in the deaths of at least two Palestinian protesters, while scores of others suffered life-altering injuries from high-velocity rounds and severe respiratory distress from gas inhalation. This served as a precursor to a wider security sweep, culminating in the mass arrest of over 20 individuals throughout the immediate vicinity of the UAWC offices. In November 2025, at least 15 Palestinians protesters were injured when the IDF fired live bullets and tear gas shells at a peaceful protest in Tulkarm. The protests were held against the construction of a new illegal settlement outpost east of the city.
The absence of effective PA-administered accountability mechanisms in Area A has raised concerns regarding institutional oversight. These concerns intensified following the 2019 forced retirement of 52 senior judges and the establishment of a Transitional High Judicial Council composed of presidential appointees. Judicial amendments adopted between 2020 and 2021 further consolidated executive influence by granting the PA President authority to appoint the leadership of both the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the Supreme Court.
During the period between January 2018 and March 2019, the PA reported receiving 346 complaints alleging arbitrary arrest and mistreatment, the majority involving police conduct. Official statements indicated that all complaints were reviewed; however, wrongdoing was formally acknowledged in 48 cases, with 28 resulting in administrative sanctions such as warnings or salary deferments. Of the 20 cases referred for prosecution, one officer was convicted and received a ten-day custodial sentence. Observers and monitoring organizations have argued that this rate of prosecution and conviction raises questions about the judiciary’s capacity to function as an independent check on police misconduct.
Area B
HRF classifies Area B as ruled by fully authoritarian governing authorities.
In this area, the population is caught between two competing and overlapping security apparatuses that, while often at odds politically, share a common interest in suppressing grassroots mobilization, dissent and unsanctioned political activity. This is characterized by a revolving door of arrests where activists may be detained by the PSS for civil dissent and subsequently by the IDF for security reasons. Freedom of dissent is further chilled by the fact that the PA lacks the security mandate to protect its own citizens from external military interventions, leading to a vacuum where neither authority accepts responsibility for the protection of civil liberties. Like in Area A, the duality of control in Area B is heavily skewed in the favor of the IDF, who maintain the power to review and veto PA legislation, even when operating in a PA-controlled sector of Area B.
Both the PA and the IDF frequently raid and shutdown dissenting organizations located in Area B, labeling them “unlawful associations” based on alleged ties to militant groups, a claim frequently disputed by international observers. These coordinated efforts often appear to target those same organizations. For instance, after repeated shutdowns and targeted actions by both the IDF and the PSS, the IDF issued a final closure order for the J-Media agency in late 2023. The agency was instrumental in providing footage and media services to several other broadcasters and covered Palestinian news. While the agency was headquartered in Area A, their field units and satellite equipment in Area B zones were confiscated. In October 2025, the IDF ordered the closure of the Islamic Charitable Society, an organization that provides care and support for more than 6,000 orphans in the city of Hebron. No public explanation for the decision was issued at the time of the closure, and staff members reported receiving no indication regarding the expected duration of the order.
Both the PSS and IDF actively and violently suppress dissenting protests. In August 2024, IDF agents opened fire at peaceful protesters in Beita, a Palestinian village near the town of Nablus, injuring at least five protesters, including Daniel Santiago, a Filipino American community organizer taking part in the demonstration against the annexation of Palestinian lands by settlers. In June 2021, when residents of the Area B village of Beita protested the establishment of the Evyatar outpost on Mount Sabih, the IDF used live ammunition, skunk water, and tear gas to suppress these weekly rallies. Several Palestinian residents were killed as a result, and hundreds were injured or arrested, with the IDF citing the need to prevent riots near settlement infrastructure.
Similar to Area A, the PA and the IDF maintain a highly synchronized system of repression against independent media, political dissidents, civil society actors and even ordinary people. For instance, although the city of Hebron is governed by the Hebron Protocol which divide the city into a H1 and H2, rather than the standard Oslo Area A, B, and C designations, it nonetheless serves as a stark example of the level of coordinated suppression of dissidents in mixed control areas. The case of Nizar Banat, who was violently kidnapped and killed by PSS agents, reveals a coordinated effort to silence critics and prevent accountability. In June 2021, Banat, a former Fatah member turned prominent PA critic, was severely beaten and kidnapped from his house in IDF controlled part of the city of Hebron (Al-Khalil) in the southern West Bank by 14 PSS agents who were given IDF permission to enter the IDF controlled-H2 area, without an arrest warrant. Twenty minutes later, their military vehicle arrived at the Hebron government hospital, a facility managed by the PA Ministry of Health, located in the PA-controlled Area H1,but Banat was already dead. His autopsy revealed that Banat died after suffering at least 42 injuries inflicted with metal pipes. Neither the Israeli military nor the PA disclosed the findings of any investigations into his death. Nizar Banat’s family has faced harassment as a reprisal for continuing to seek justice. A number of Banat’s vocal relatives have faced recurring cycles of baseless imprisonment and have been stripped of their public sector jobs as a form of retaliation.
Institutional accountability mechanisms in Area B are highly constrained. The PA struggles to provide consistent services due to movement restrictions, and the IDF relies on military courts, restricts civic engagement, and enforces strict military orders that are not transparent to the local Palestinian population. In this theoretically mixed area of control, the Palestinian judicial system functions as a subordinate to the Israeli military establishment, with courts primarily serving to legitimize the actions and security objectives of the Israeli military authority rather than acting as independent judicial bodies. Israeli military courts prioritize security and enforcement over impartial justice, with definitions of crimes that are broad and vague. These courts also enable prolonged arbitrary detention, including administrative detention, which allows the Israeli military to indefinitely postpone trials, without formal charge, or based on secret evidence. These courts have jurisdiction over residents of the entire West Bank, including areas over which partial control was transferred to the PA. When Palestinians do face military trials, nearly all cases result in convictions, highlighting the system’s focus on security over justice. The conviction rate for Palestinians is reported to be 99.7 percent, while the conviction rate for reported Israeli attacks on Palestinians is about 1.8 percent.
Israel’s use of military courts for minors in the West Bank during peacetime has drawn criticism from international legal observers. Israeli military rule frequently subjects youth, including minors, to irregular periods of imprisonment or places them in administrative detention—detention without charge or trial, often based on secret evidence. In February 2025, Mohammed Ibrahim, a 16-year-old Palestinian-American minor, was arrested by the masked IDF personnel during a predawn raid at his home in Beitin without providing his parents with a court order, citing a vague charge of throwing stones at Israeli settlers, which he and his parents denied. He was then transferred to a detention facility inside Israel and held without charge for nine months before being subsequently released without charges after mounting pressure from the American embassy and US Congress.
Area C
HRF classifies Area C as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
In the IDF-administered Area C, governance is exercised primarily through a system of military administration rather than an elected civilian authority. The governing power is vested in a military hierarchy that exercises broad control over land use, movement, planning, and security, while Palestinian residents do not participate in the political institutions that determine these policies. Area C is home to more than 390,000 Palestinians living alongside approximately 440,000 Israeli settlers across more than 250 settlements. An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 of these settlers reside in outposts that are considered illegal under Israeli law.
Israeli settlers in Area C are generally not subject to Israeli military orders and instead fall under Israeli civil and criminal law, including the right to trial in civilian courts inside Israel. Palestinian residents, by contrast, are governed by Israeli military law, tried in military courts, and subject to a regulatory framework defined by military orders. They do not have meaningful opportunities for electoral participation in the authorities that govern their daily lives and have limited access to civilian mechanisms of institutional accountability.
Since 2023, members of Israel’s governing coalition have advanced measures that shift elements of Area C administration from military to civilian control within Israeli government ministries. Critics argue that this process further integrates Area C into Israel’s civilian governance framework in practice, while supporters describe it as an administrative adjustment. In either case, the change deepens existing disparities in legal status and political rights between Israeli settlers and Palestinian residents in the area.
Area C reflects a significant divergence in political rights based on citizenship and legal status. Israeli citizens residing in West Bank settlements participate fully in Israel’s national elections for the Israeli Knesset and in municipal elections within their settlements. Like Israeli citizens living within Israel’s internationally recognized borders, they may vote and run for national office, and polling stations operate within the settlements.
Palestinian residents of Area C, who are not Israeli citizens, do not participate in Israeli elections. Instead, when Palestinian Legislative Council elections have been held, voting has taken place in Areas A and B under Palestinian Authority administration. Access to those polling stations has, at times, required movement through areas controlled by Israeli security forces, including the need for permits or coordination in certain cases. Critics argue that these mobility constraints have complicated electoral participation for some residents of Area C, while Israeli authorities maintain that such measures reflect security requirements rather than political exclusion.
In the absence of electoral representation within the governing authorities that administer the West Bank, Palestinian residents have limited avenues for formal political participation. Political activity, including demonstrations, publications, and organizational work, is regulated under Israeli military law, which criminalizes a broad range of actions defined as security-related offenses, including incitement. Since 1967, Israeli authorities have issued military orders prohibiting more than 400 organizations operating in the West Bank. These bans have included major Palestinian political movements, media outlets, and civil society organizations. Israeli authorities justify such measures primarily on security grounds, while critics argue that the scope of these prohibitions restricts ordinary political expression and civic organizing.
Central to this framework is the use of counterterrorism legislation, including the 2016 Counter-Terrorism Law and the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which authorize the Israeli Minister of Defense to designate organizations as terrorist entities. These designations may apply even where organizations engage in activities that are otherwise lawful, such as advocacy, research, or humanitarian assistance. Human rights organizations and journalists have argued that the broad and flexible definitions within these laws create significant discretion, allowing for their application against routine political activity and media work. Israeli authorities reject this characterization and maintain that designations are based on classified intelligence.
The reach of this framework became particularly visible in October 2021, when Israeli authorities designated six prominent Palestinian civil society organizations as terrorist organizations. These included human rights, legal aid, research, and agricultural groups that play central roles in Palestinian civic life. Israeli officials declined to publicly disclose the evidence supporting the designations, citing security concerns. Several European governments and international bodies stated that they had not been presented with sufficient proof to substantiate the claims and announced that they would continue funding the affected organizations.
Restrictions on political and civil activity are reinforced through the declaration of “closed military zones” (CMZs), which authorize the removal or arrest of individuals present in designated areas, including on private land. Israeli authorities describe CMZs as temporary security measures, while critics argue they are used selectively and have contributed to the displacement of Palestinian communities. The area of Masafer Yatta in the southern Hebron Hills illustrates this dynamic. In the early 1980s, approximately 3,000 hectares were designated as a military firing zone. Palestinian residents contested the designation for decades, arguing that their communities predated the military presence and that international law prohibits forcible transfer. In May 2022, the Israeli High Court rejected these claims, ruling that the military designation was lawful. By mid-2025, multiple Israeli settler outposts had been established in the same area.
Closed military zone designations have also been applied during large-scale security operations. In early 2025, Israeli forces declared parts of Jenin, Tulkarem, and the Nur Shams refugee camp closed military zones during operations that resulted in widespread displacement, home demolitions, and infrastructure damage.
International organizations and foreign nationals have also been affected by these measures. In late 2025, Israeli authorities barred dozens of international civil society organizations from operating in the West Bank and imposed entry bans on foreign activists accused of violating CMZ restrictions. Israeli officials have described these steps as necessary to maintain security and public order, while international organizations have criticized them as disproportionate and punitive.
Settler activity constitutes a distinct feature of governance in Area C. Israeli settlers are subject to Israeli civil and criminal law, while Palestinians fall under military jurisdiction. Settler groups frequently operate in proximity to Israeli security forces, and numerous incidents have been documented in which settlers attacked Palestinian residents while receiving protection or non-intervention from Israeli troops. Between October 2023 and October 2025, monitoring groups recorded thousands of settler-related attacks across the West Bank, particularly in Area C. Israeli authorities state that such violence is unlawful and condemn it, yet accountability remains limited. An analysis by an Israeli human rights organization found that the vast majority of investigations into settler violence over a twenty-year period ended without indictments.
Journalists, observers, and human rights defenders have also faced detention or removal under military orders. Several cases involving foreign reporters and Palestinian activists have drawn attention to the discretionary use of arrest powers, particularly where documentation of military activity or settler violence is involved. Israeli authorities have defended such detentions as lawful responses to alleged security violations, while critics argue they function to deter monitoring and reporting.
A core structural feature underpinning these dynamics is the existence of two parallel legal systems in the same territory. Israeli settlers accused of crimes are investigated by Israeli police and tried in civilian courts inside Israel, with access to full procedural protections and appellate review. Palestinians accused of similar offenses are tried in military courts, where rules of evidence, detention standards, and procedural safeguards differ significantly. International bodies have repeatedly criticized this dual legal regime as discriminatory. Israeli courts, including the Supreme Court, have generally upheld the system on the basis of security necessity and the legal framework governing the territory.
International civil society organizations (CSOs) and foreign volunteers have also faced operational restrictions in the West Bank. In December 2025, Israeli authorities issued a regulation barring 37 international CSOs from operating in the territory. In November 2025, two American volunteers were banned from entering Israel for ten years after entering a CMZ in Burin to assist Palestinian farmers during the olive harvest. In October 2025, at least 32 foreign activists engaged in similar activities were deported on the grounds that they had violated CMZ restrictions. Israeli authorities describe such measures as necessary to maintain security and public order, while affected organizations characterize them as disproportionate constraints on humanitarian and monitoring activities.
Settler activity represents a distinct dynamic within Area C. Israeli settlers are subject to Israeli civil and criminal law, whereas Palestinians fall under military jurisdiction. Monitoring groups have documented numerous incidents in which settlers carried out attacks against Palestinian residents, particularly in Area C. Between October 2023 and October 2025, civil society organizations recorded approximately 3,000 settler-related incidents across the West Bank. Israeli officials have stated that such violence is unlawful and condemnable. However, accountability rates remain low. A 2024 report by the Israeli human rights organization Yesh Din found that 93.8 percent of police investigations into settler violence over a twenty-year period ended without an indictment. Critics argue this reflects structural enforcement disparities, while Israeli authorities maintain that evidentiary limitations often constrain prosecutions.
The detentions of journalists, observers, and activists have also drawn scrutiny. In March 2025, German journalist Christian Meier of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was detained in Al-Tuwani on suspicion of assaulting a settler during an incident involving reported harassment of Palestinian shepherds. Video footage circulated by activists suggested conflicting accounts of the confrontation. Meier was released after signing a temporary order restricting his return to the West Bank. In July 2021, human rights defender Farid Al-Atrash was detained at an Israeli checkpoint following participation in a protest critical of both Palestinian Authority governance and Israeli–PA security coordination. In 2018, Palestinian activist Abdullah Abu Rahma was sentenced by a military court to 110 days of imprisonment in connection with participation in a protest in Bil’in two years earlier.
A central structural feature of governance in Area C is the existence of parallel legal systems. Israeli settlers accused of crimes are investigated by Israeli police and tried in Israeli civilian courts, with full access to procedural protections under Israeli law, including civilian trial rights and appellate review up to the Supreme Court. The IDF does not prosecute Israeli citizens. Palestinians accused of similar offenses are investigated under military authority and tried in military courts operating in the West Bank. Military court procedures differ from civilian courts in evidentiary rules, detention standards, and due process safeguards. International bodies have criticized this dual legal structure as discriminatory, while Israeli courts have upheld it on the basis of security considerations and the legal framework governing the territory.
Under military law, minors as young as 12 may be prosecuted in military courts. Regulations also permit delays in parental notification under certain circumstances. Human rights organizations argue that these provisions raise due process concerns, particularly regarding interrogation practices. Israeli authorities maintain that the military court system incorporates judicial oversight and operates within applicable legal norms.
The Israeli Supreme Court has generally deferred to the military’s assessment of security necessity in cases involving the West Bank. Supporters view this deference as recognition of operational realities. Critics argue that it limits external accountability. The result is an enduring debate over the adequacy of institutional safeguards within the current legal framework.
The Oslo Accords, signed in the early 1990s between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), aimed to lay the foundation for a negotiated Palestinian state and establish a framework for Palestinian self-governance. However, these agreements also led to the formal division of the West Bank into different areas with varying levels of control, significantly impacting Palestinian sovereignty and creating a complex system of dual governance. Under the Oslo II Accord of 1995, the West Bank was divided into three distinct administrative zones: Area A, Area B, and Area C. These divisions were originally intended to be temporary for a period of five years but remain the framework that currently exists.The West Bank is internationally recognized as territory occupied by Israel since 1967, although Israeli officials and some legal scholars characterize it as disputed territory whose final status was left unresolved under the Oslo Accords. More than three decades after those agreements, the territory’s permanent status remains unsettled, as the parties have not reached a negotiated resolution.
Israeli officials maintain that the military legal regime in the West Bank is grounded in ongoing security concerns arising from decades of armed conflict. They reference past waves of violence originating in the territory — including suicide bombings during the Second Intifada, armed attacks against civilians and soldiers, and more recent militant activity — as justification for retaining overriding security authority and movement restrictions. Critics contend, however, that the duration and institutionalization of these measures exceed immediate security imperatives and have evolved into longer-term governance structures affecting the broader civilian population.
The jurisdictional landscape of the West Bank is defined by a tiered system of control. Area A, comprising roughly 18 percent of the territory, is under the primary jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA). While the PA manages both civil and security matters within these urban centers, its autonomy is circumscribed by frequent Israeli military incursions for security operations. Furthermore, Israeli military law explicitly prohibits Israeli citizens from entering these zones. In Area B, which covers approximately 22 percent of the West Bank, governance is shared. The PA oversees civil administration, such as education and healthcare,while Israel retains overriding security control. This arrangement means that Palestinian police can manage local civil order, but the Israeli military maintains the authority to operate and conduct arrests at its discretion. The remaining 60 percent of the West Bank, designated as Area C, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Israeli Civil Administration. As a military body, this administration exercises total control over both security and civil affairs, including the critical sectors of planning, zoning, and infrastructure development, effectively making it the only contiguous zone in the territory. Under Military Order No. 1 (1967), the Israeli Area Commander holds exclusive legislative authority over the Palestinian population in the West Bank, enabling the military to issue and enforce directives related to media, publications, and movement without any democratic or legislative oversight. This authority grants the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) broad regulatory power over publications, movement, and public order across all three areas.
The fragmentation of the West Bank into over 160 separate Palestinian “zones” (Areas A and B) surrounded by an Israeli-controlled zone (Area C) means that the PA lacks territorial contiguity. Consequently, the ability of Palestinian people and goods to move is entirely dependent on Israeli military and administrative decisions at checkpoints and other barriers. By November 2025, the Israeli military was operating at least 877 checkpoints and roadblocks throughout various enclaves in the West Bank. Furthermore, Israel also controls the external perimeter of the West Bank (all international borders) and the internal movement between Areas A, B, and C. This access is governed by a tiered permit system managed by the Israeli office of Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT).
Despite the distinct electoral, legal, and administrative frameworks governing Areas A, B, and C, the West Bank is unified by systems of governance in which political authority is exercised without meaningful democratic participation by the Palestinian population. Since June 1967, Israel has administered the West Bank under a system of military law. Authority in the territory is exercised through the Israeli Area Commander, who holds consolidated legislative, executive, and judicial powers pursuant to military orders. This authority does not derive from legislation enacted by the Israeli parliament, but from a body of Military Orders issued following the 1967 war and amended over time. The promulgation of new military regulations occurs without approval from an elected legislative body, whether the Israeli Knesset or the Palestinian Legislative Council.
Civil administration in the West Bank is conducted by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a military body responsible for planning, infrastructure, permitting regimes (including building and movement), coordination with the PA, and oversight of military courts that adjudicate security and public order offenses. Over the decades, Israeli authorities have issued more than 1,800 Military Orders, which collectively constitute the governing legal framework of the West Bank. This framework places the Palestinian population under governing authorities in which they do not participate through Israeli electoral mechanisms and over which they have limited representative influence.
Area A
HRF classifies Area A as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
In the urban hubs of Area A under PA control, authoritarianism has evolved into internal consolidation. Since 2006, the indefinite postponement of PA elections has effectively dismantled a nascent electoral system, replacing it with a security-centric executive state. The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the PA’s unicameral legislature, has been dissolved, and governance has shifted toward a model of executive decree. In this environment, the systemic absence of legislative oversight permits the suppression of domestic rivals and the stifling of civil society through a combination of executive orders, administrative barriers, and arbitrary detentions. Freedom of dissent in PA urban centers is closely monitored by Palestinian Security Services (PSS). Activists and journalists often face harassment or detention under expansive cybercrime laws that equate political criticism with threats to national stability. Consequently, institutional accountability is severely weakened, as there is no functioning legislative body to oversee executive spending or policy decisions, leaving the judiciary vulnerable to political interference.
This internal consolidation is both a cause and a consequence of the deep-seated fragmentation between Fatah and Hamas. Since the 2007 schism, the PA has been reduced to a Fatah-exclusive entity in the West Bank, while Hamas maintains a separate governance structure in Gaza. By the end of 2025, this territorial and political rupture has prevented unified Palestinian governance, leaving the PLC marginalized and unable to convene for nearly two decades. Within this vacuum of accountability, PA President Mahmoud Abbas has remained in office beyond the expiration of his electoral mandate and has governed primarily through executive decree, with no national elections held since 2006.
The PA employs a multi-faceted strategy to suppress political dissent and maintain its authority, primarily driven by a need to stifle any criticism that might undermine its legitimacy. A central pillar of this repression is the systematic targeting of the media and its political opponents. For instance, between January and March 2025, the PA interrogated at least nine journalists regarding their ties to Al Jazeera, a network the PA banned for alleged incitement. This followed a restrictive 2024 period where 41 journalists were detained. Beyond the press, the PA has historically used its security apparatus to suppress political opposition, such as the detention and alleged torture of Hamas officials following the 2006 legislative elections, effectively preventing any meaningful challenge to the PA’s narrative of order. By the end of 2024, the Independent Commission for Human Rights, the national human rights institution tasked with protecting, promoting, and monitoring human rights within PA-controlled areas, received more than 241 complaints of arbitrary detention.
The PA continues to rely on penal code provisions originating in the Ottoman and British Mandate periods, including statutes criminalizing acts such as “insulting higher authorities” or “creating sectarian strife.” Human rights organizations argue that these broadly formulated provisions have been used to restrict political expression, both online and offline. Reported cases include the imprisonment of producer Abdul Rahman Zaher in Nablus in 2022 after he shared a Facebook post criticizing UAE–Israel normalization, and the 2013 sentencing of Mamdouh Hamamreh following his association with a caricature of the PA president on social media. The 2017 Electronic Crimes Law expanded regulatory authority over digital communications, granting the executive branch enhanced surveillance and enforcement powers. According to monitoring groups, its implementation led to more than 1,600 detentions between 2018 and 2019 and the closure of approximately 30 websites affiliated with political parties, opposition groups, and independent media outlets, including al-Quds Network.
Israel maintains what it describes as an overriding security responsibility throughout the West Bank, including in Areas A and B, where the PA exercises civil control. Under this framework, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conduct security operations across all three areas when deemed necessary. Israeli authorities state that such operations are aimed at preventing militant activity and disrupting networks linked to designated organizations.
In December 2025, Israeli security forces conducted a raid on the Ramallah offices of the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), a Palestinian organization engaged in agricultural development and land advocacy. During the operation, equipment and documents were seized and several staff members were detained. Israeli authorities have previously designated UAWC under Israel’s counterterrorism legislation, citing alleged links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a group designated as terrorist by Israel, the United States, and the European Union. UAWC and a number of international donors have rejected these allegations and maintain that the organization’s work is humanitarian in nature. By the end of the month, at least eight employees remained in detention pending further legal proceedings.
A frequently cited case illustrating the intersection of security law and Palestinian political leadership involves Khalida Jarrar, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and former head of its Prisoners Committee. In March 2021, an Israeli military court sentenced Jarrar to two years in prison under a plea agreement that convicted her of belonging to an outlawed organization, while dropping more serious charges; she received credit for time already served. Prior to that sentence, Jarrar had been held without formal charge under administrative detention since October 2019, a practice that allows Israeli authorities to detain individuals without trial on security grounds for renewable periods. Israeli officials have linked her detention to her senior role within the PFLP, an organization designated as a terrorist by Israel and several Western governments, including the United States and the European Union. Jarrar was not publicly accused of participating in specific armed activity. Observers and human rights advocates have criticized extended administrative detention as a restrictive security tool that lacks ordinary judicial safeguards, while Israeli authorities maintain that it is a lawful preventative measure permitted under military law and applied in the context of ongoing security concerns. 
In September 2024, Walid Ahmed, a 17-year-old Palestinian minor, was arbitrarily detained by the IDF in Silwad, a Palestinian town northeast of Ramallah, and transferred to Megiddo Prison in Israel. In March 2025, he died in detention after being held for nearly six months in administrative detention. He was originally detained on a range of alleged offenses that took place between 2020 and 2023 that included throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. His family denied the accusations. In March 2025, he died in detention after approximately six months in custody. An autopsy observed by an Israeli physician reported severe malnutrition, extreme weight loss, and signs of untreated colitis and infection. Medical experts who reviewed the findings stated that prolonged malnutrition likely contributed significantly to his death. Israeli prison authorities announced that an internal investigation had been opened, while human rights organizations characterized the case as indicative of deteriorating detention conditions. By the end of 2025, at least 350 Palestinian minors were being indefinitely detained by the Israeli Prison Services (IPS), the majority of whom were arrested by the IDF in the West Bank.
Rather than acting in isolation, both authorities at times operate in parallel or sequential security actions under the coordination frameworks established by the Oslo Accords. A notable instance occurred in June 2023 at Birzeit University in the Ramallah Governorate, where students often face detention from both the PA and IDF due to their political activism. For example, one month after Abdul Majeed Hassan, an Islamic bloc candidate secured the presidency of the student council, he was forcibly removed from his residence by PA agents, assaulted, and placed in detention. In September 2023, the IDF stormed the same university campus, vandalized the student union offices, and arbitrarily detained Hasan along with 7 other student union members.
While the IDF regularly suppresses protests in Area A using specialized military units and locally-recruited informants, the PA has recurrently relied on the Palestinian Security Services (PSS), which is primarily divided into internal security, national security, and general intelligence branches, instead of a regular military force since Israel bars the PA from operating one. These units are regularly used to crackdown on protesters. In the wake of the October 2023 Hamas attacks and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza, residents in Area A and other parts of the West Bank took to the streets to call for an end to the conflict and voice their frustration with President Abbas’s perceived inaction. These assemblies were met with aggressive crackdowns by PSS forces, who utilized violent measures to forcibly break up the crowds and stifle public grievance. The violence resulted in the killing of 12-year-old Razan Nasrallah during demonstrations in Jenin. This pattern was evident even before the Israel-Hamas conflict. For instance, in July 2021, PSS agents violently dispersed a demonstrator at a peaceful rally in Ramallah, an UN rights monitor was among those who were attacked with pepper spray while PSS agents attempted to snatch phones being used to document the rally. In June 2018 West Bank civil society activists organised large protests in Ramallah calling on the PA to lift its sanctions against Gaza. These were met with a violent crackdown by PSS and “loyalists” who fired tear gas and sound grenades, and attacked protesters and arrested journalists and other activists.
In December 2025, following a raid on the UAWC offices in Ramallah, the IDF responded to the ensuing protest at the time of the incident with the use of live ammunition, resulting in the deaths of at least two Palestinian protesters, while scores of others suffered life-altering injuries from high-velocity rounds and severe respiratory distress from gas inhalation. This served as a precursor to a wider security sweep, culminating in the mass arrest of over 20 individuals throughout the immediate vicinity of the UAWC offices. In November 2025, at least 15 Palestinians protesters were injured when the IDF fired live bullets and tear gas shells at a peaceful protest in Tulkarm. The protests were held against the construction of a new illegal settlement outpost east of the city.
The absence of effective PA-administered accountability mechanisms in Area A has raised concerns regarding institutional oversight. These concerns intensified following the 2019 forced retirement of 52 senior judges and the establishment of a Transitional High Judicial Council composed of presidential appointees. Judicial amendments adopted between 2020 and 2021 further consolidated executive influence by granting the PA President authority to appoint the leadership of both the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the Supreme Court.
During the period between January 2018 and March 2019, the PA reported receiving 346 complaints alleging arbitrary arrest and mistreatment, the majority involving police conduct. Official statements indicated that all complaints were reviewed; however, wrongdoing was formally acknowledged in 48 cases, with 28 resulting in administrative sanctions such as warnings or salary deferments. Of the 20 cases referred for prosecution, one officer was convicted and received a ten-day custodial sentence. Observers and monitoring organizations have argued that this rate of prosecution and conviction raises questions about the judiciary’s capacity to function as an independent check on police misconduct.
Area B
HRF classifies Area B as ruled by fully authoritarian governing authorities.
In this area, the population is caught between two competing and overlapping security apparatuses that, while often at odds politically, share a common interest in suppressing grassroots mobilization, dissent and unsanctioned political activity. This is characterized by a revolving door of arrests where activists may be detained by the PSS for civil dissent and subsequently by the IDF for security reasons. Freedom of dissent is further chilled by the fact that the PA lacks the security mandate to protect its own citizens from external military interventions, leading to a vacuum where neither authority accepts responsibility for the protection of civil liberties. Like in Area A, the duality of control in Area B is heavily skewed in the favor of the IDF, who maintain the power to review and veto PA legislation, even when operating in a PA-controlled sector of Area B.
Both the PA and the IDF frequently raid and shutdown dissenting organizations located in Area B, labeling them “unlawful associations” based on alleged ties to militant groups, a claim frequently disputed by international observers. These coordinated efforts often appear to target those same organizations. For instance, after repeated shutdowns and targeted actions by both the IDF and the PSS, the IDF issued a final closure order for the J-Media agency in late 2023. The agency was instrumental in providing footage and media services to several other broadcasters and covered Palestinian news. While the agency was headquartered in Area A, their field units and satellite equipment in Area B zones were confiscated. In October 2025, the IDF ordered the closure of the Islamic Charitable Society, an organization that provides care and support for more than 6,000 orphans in the city of Hebron. No public explanation for the decision was issued at the time of the closure, and staff members reported receiving no indication regarding the expected duration of the order.
Both the PSS and IDF actively and violently suppress dissenting protests. In August 2024, IDF agents opened fire at peaceful protesters in Beita, a Palestinian village near the town of Nablus, injuring at least five protesters, including Daniel Santiago, a Filipino American community organizer taking part in the demonstration against the annexation of Palestinian lands by settlers. In June 2021, when residents of the Area B village of Beita protested the establishment of the Evyatar outpost on Mount Sabih, the IDF used live ammunition, skunk water, and tear gas to suppress these weekly rallies. Several Palestinian residents were killed as a result, and hundreds were injured or arrested, with the IDF citing the need to prevent riots near settlement infrastructure.
Similar to Area A, the PA and the IDF maintain a highly synchronized system of repression against independent media, political dissidents, civil society actors and even ordinary people. For instance, although the city of Hebron is governed by the Hebron Protocol which divide the city into a H1 and H2, rather than the standard Oslo Area A, B, and C designations, it nonetheless serves as a stark example of the level of coordinated suppression of dissidents in mixed control areas. The case of Nizar Banat, who was violently kidnapped and killed by PSS agents, reveals a coordinated effort to silence critics and prevent accountability. In June 2021, Banat, a former Fatah member turned prominent PA critic, was severely beaten and kidnapped from his house in IDF controlled part of the city of Hebron (Al-Khalil) in the southern West Bank by 14 PSS agents who were given IDF permission to enter the IDF controlled-H2 area, without an arrest warrant. Twenty minutes later, their military vehicle arrived at the Hebron government hospital, a facility managed by the PA Ministry of Health, located in the PA-controlled Area H1,but Banat was already dead. His autopsy revealed that Banat died after suffering at least 42 injuries inflicted with metal pipes. Neither the Israeli military nor the PA disclosed the findings of any investigations into his death. Nizar Banat’s family has faced harassment as a reprisal for continuing to seek justice. A number of Banat’s vocal relatives have faced recurring cycles of baseless imprisonment and have been stripped of their public sector jobs as a form of retaliation.
Institutional accountability mechanisms in Area B are highly constrained. The PA struggles to provide consistent services due to movement restrictions, and the IDF relies on military courts, restricts civic engagement, and enforces strict military orders that are not transparent to the local Palestinian population. In this theoretically mixed area of control, the Palestinian judicial system functions as a subordinate to the Israeli military establishment, with courts primarily serving to legitimize the actions and security objectives of the Israeli military authority rather than acting as independent judicial bodies. Israeli military courts prioritize security and enforcement over impartial justice, with definitions of crimes that are broad and vague. These courts also enable prolonged arbitrary detention, including administrative detention, which allows the Israeli military to indefinitely postpone trials, without formal charge, or based on secret evidence. These courts have jurisdiction over residents of the entire West Bank, including areas over which partial control was transferred to the PA. When Palestinians do face military trials, nearly all cases result in convictions, highlighting the system’s focus on security over justice. The conviction rate for Palestinians is reported to be 99.7 percent, while the conviction rate for reported Israeli attacks on Palestinians is about 1.8 percent.
Israel’s use of military courts for minors in the West Bank during peacetime has drawn criticism from international legal observers. Israeli military rule frequently subjects youth, including minors, to irregular periods of imprisonment or places them in administrative detention—detention without charge or trial, often based on secret evidence. In February 2025, Mohammed Ibrahim, a 16-year-old Palestinian-American minor, was arrested by the masked IDF personnel during a predawn raid at his home in Beitin without providing his parents with a court order, citing a vague charge of throwing stones at Israeli settlers, which he and his parents denied. He was then transferred to a detention facility inside Israel and held without charge for nine months before being subsequently released without charges after mounting pressure from the American embassy and US Congress.
Area C
HRF classifies Area C as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
In the IDF-administered Area C, governance is exercised primarily through a system of military administration rather than an elected civilian authority. The governing power is vested in a military hierarchy that exercises broad control over land use, movement, planning, and security, while Palestinian residents do not participate in the political institutions that determine these policies. Area C is home to more than 390,000 Palestinians living alongside approximately 440,000 Israeli settlers across more than 250 settlements. An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 of these settlers reside in outposts that are considered illegal under Israeli law.
Israeli settlers in Area C are generally not subject to Israeli military orders and instead fall under Israeli civil and criminal law, including the right to trial in civilian courts inside Israel. Palestinian residents, by contrast, are governed by Israeli military law, tried in military courts, and subject to a regulatory framework defined by military orders. They do not have meaningful opportunities for electoral participation in the authorities that govern their daily lives and have limited access to civilian mechanisms of institutional accountability.
Since 2023, members of Israel’s governing coalition have advanced measures that shift elements of Area C administration from military to civilian control within Israeli government ministries. Critics argue that this process further integrates Area C into Israel’s civilian governance framework in practice, while supporters describe it as an administrative adjustment. In either case, the change deepens existing disparities in legal status and political rights between Israeli settlers and Palestinian residents in the area.
Area C reflects a significant divergence in political rights based on citizenship and legal status. Israeli citizens residing in West Bank settlements participate fully in Israel’s national elections for the Israeli Knesset and in municipal elections within their settlements. Like Israeli citizens living within Israel’s internationally recognized borders, they may vote and run for national office, and polling stations operate within the settlements.
Palestinian residents of Area C, who are not Israeli citizens, do not participate in Israeli elections. Instead, when Palestinian Legislative Council elections have been held, voting has taken place in Areas A and B under Palestinian Authority administration. Access to those polling stations has, at times, required movement through areas controlled by Israeli security forces, including the need for permits or coordination in certain cases. Critics argue that these mobility constraints have complicated electoral participation for some residents of Area C, while Israeli authorities maintain that such measures reflect security requirements rather than political exclusion.
In the absence of electoral representation within the governing authorities that administer the West Bank, Palestinian residents have limited avenues for formal political participation. Political activity, including demonstrations, publications, and organizational work, is regulated under Israeli military law, which criminalizes a broad range of actions defined as security-related offenses, including incitement. Since 1967, Israeli authorities have issued military orders prohibiting more than 400 organizations operating in the West Bank. These bans have included major Palestinian political movements, media outlets, and civil society organizations. Israeli authorities justify such measures primarily on security grounds, while critics argue that the scope of these prohibitions restricts ordinary political expression and civic organizing.
Central to this framework is the use of counterterrorism legislation, including the 2016 Counter-Terrorism Law and the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which authorize the Israeli Minister of Defense to designate organizations as terrorist entities. These designations may apply even where organizations engage in activities that are otherwise lawful, such as advocacy, research, or humanitarian assistance. Human rights organizations and journalists have argued that the broad and flexible definitions within these laws create significant discretion, allowing for their application against routine political activity and media work. Israeli authorities reject this characterization and maintain that designations are based on classified intelligence.
The reach of this framework became particularly visible in October 2021, when Israeli authorities designated six prominent Palestinian civil society organizations as terrorist organizations. These included human rights, legal aid, research, and agricultural groups that play central roles in Palestinian civic life. Israeli officials declined to publicly disclose the evidence supporting the designations, citing security concerns. Several European governments and international bodies stated that they had not been presented with sufficient proof to substantiate the claims and announced that they would continue funding the affected organizations.
Restrictions on political and civil activity are reinforced through the declaration of “closed military zones” (CMZs), which authorize the removal or arrest of individuals present in designated areas, including on private land. Israeli authorities describe CMZs as temporary security measures, while critics argue they are used selectively and have contributed to the displacement of Palestinian communities. The area of Masafer Yatta in the southern Hebron Hills illustrates this dynamic. In the early 1980s, approximately 3,000 hectares were designated as a military firing zone. Palestinian residents contested the designation for decades, arguing that their communities predated the military presence and that international law prohibits forcible transfer. In May 2022, the Israeli High Court rejected these claims, ruling that the military designation was lawful. By mid-2025, multiple Israeli settler outposts had been established in the same area.
Closed military zone designations have also been applied during large-scale security operations. In early 2025, Israeli forces declared parts of Jenin, Tulkarem, and the Nur Shams refugee camp closed military zones during operations that resulted in widespread displacement, home demolitions, and infrastructure damage.
International organizations and foreign nationals have also been affected by these measures. In late 2025, Israeli authorities barred dozens of international civil society organizations from operating in the West Bank and imposed entry bans on foreign activists accused of violating CMZ restrictions. Israeli officials have described these steps as necessary to maintain security and public order, while international organizations have criticized them as disproportionate and punitive.
Settler activity constitutes a distinct feature of governance in Area C. Israeli settlers are subject to Israeli civil and criminal law, while Palestinians fall under military jurisdiction. Settler groups frequently operate in proximity to Israeli security forces, and numerous incidents have been documented in which settlers attacked Palestinian residents while receiving protection or non-intervention from Israeli troops. Between October 2023 and October 2025, monitoring groups recorded thousands of settler-related attacks across the West Bank, particularly in Area C. Israeli authorities state that such violence is unlawful and condemn it, yet accountability remains limited. An analysis by an Israeli human rights organization found that the vast majority of investigations into settler violence over a twenty-year period ended without indictments.
Journalists, observers, and human rights defenders have also faced detention or removal under military orders. Several cases involving foreign reporters and Palestinian activists have drawn attention to the discretionary use of arrest powers, particularly where documentation of military activity or settler violence is involved. Israeli authorities have defended such detentions as lawful responses to alleged security violations, while critics argue they function to deter monitoring and reporting.
A core structural feature underpinning these dynamics is the existence of two parallel legal systems in the same territory. Israeli settlers accused of crimes are investigated by Israeli police and tried in civilian courts inside Israel, with access to full procedural protections and appellate review. Palestinians accused of similar offenses are tried in military courts, where rules of evidence, detention standards, and procedural safeguards differ significantly. International bodies have repeatedly criticized this dual legal regime as discriminatory. Israeli courts, including the Supreme Court, have generally upheld the system on the basis of security necessity and the legal framework governing the territory.
International civil society organizations (CSOs) and foreign volunteers have also faced operational restrictions in the West Bank. In December 2025, Israeli authorities issued a regulation barring 37 international CSOs from operating in the territory. In November 2025, two American volunteers were banned from entering Israel for ten years after entering a CMZ in Burin to assist Palestinian farmers during the olive harvest. In October 2025, at least 32 foreign activists engaged in similar activities were deported on the grounds that they had violated CMZ restrictions. Israeli authorities describe such measures as necessary to maintain security and public order, while affected organizations characterize them as disproportionate constraints on humanitarian and monitoring activities.
Settler activity represents a distinct dynamic within Area C. Israeli settlers are subject to Israeli civil and criminal law, whereas Palestinians fall under military jurisdiction. Monitoring groups have documented numerous incidents in which settlers carried out attacks against Palestinian residents, particularly in Area C. Between October 2023 and October 2025, civil society organizations recorded approximately 3,000 settler-related incidents across the West Bank. Israeli officials have stated that such violence is unlawful and condemnable. However, accountability rates remain low. A 2024 report by the Israeli human rights organization Yesh Din found that 93.8 percent of police investigations into settler violence over a twenty-year period ended without an indictment. Critics argue this reflects structural enforcement disparities, while Israeli authorities maintain that evidentiary limitations often constrain prosecutions.
The detentions of journalists, observers, and activists have also drawn scrutiny. In March 2025, German journalist Christian Meier of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was detained in Al-Tuwani on suspicion of assaulting a settler during an incident involving reported harassment of Palestinian shepherds. Video footage circulated by activists suggested conflicting accounts of the confrontation. Meier was released after signing a temporary order restricting his return to the West Bank. In July 2021, human rights defender Farid Al-Atrash was detained at an Israeli checkpoint following participation in a protest critical of both Palestinian Authority governance and Israeli–PA security coordination. In 2018, Palestinian activist Abdullah Abu Rahma was sentenced by a military court to 110 days of imprisonment in connection with participation in a protest in Bil’in two years earlier.
A central structural feature of governance in Area C is the existence of parallel legal systems. Israeli settlers accused of crimes are investigated by Israeli police and tried in Israeli civilian courts, with full access to procedural protections under Israeli law, including civilian trial rights and appellate review up to the Supreme Court. The IDF does not prosecute Israeli citizens. Palestinians accused of similar offenses are investigated under military authority and tried in military courts operating in the West Bank. Military court procedures differ from civilian courts in evidentiary rules, detention standards, and due process safeguards. International bodies have criticized this dual legal structure as discriminatory, while Israeli courts have upheld it on the basis of security considerations and the legal framework governing the territory.
Under military law, minors as young as 12 may be prosecuted in military courts. Regulations also permit delays in parental notification under certain circumstances. Human rights organizations argue that these provisions raise due process concerns, particularly regarding interrogation practices. Israeli authorities maintain that the military court system incorporates judicial oversight and operates within applicable legal norms.
The Israeli Supreme Court has generally deferred to the military’s assessment of security necessity in cases involving the West Bank. Supporters view this deference as recognition of operational realities. Critics argue that it limits external accountability. The result is an enduring debate over the adequacy of institutional safeguards within the current legal framework.
