Middle East and North Africa

Palestinian Territories – Gaza

Gaza City

Fully Authoritarian

0.02%

World’s Population

2,050,000

Population

Evolving Situation: Following a two-year conflict between Hamas and Israel, the first phase of the most recent multi-phase ceasefire, brokered by the United States, came into effect on October 10, 2025. The first phase focused on a temporary cessation of hostilities, a surge in humanitarian aid, and the exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, but did not require Hamas to immediately disband or relinquish political authority. This summary was written during this phase.

While acknowledging the complex control dynamics and the fluid situation on the ground in the Palestinian Territories, this summary examines Hamas as the de facto governing authority in Gaza from June 2007 to December 2025. During this period, Hamas established de facto control over Gaza’s internal governance systems, despite the Israeli military blockade and restrictions around Gaza’s perimeter and intermittent military control within the territory.

HRF classifies the Palestinian Territories – Gaza as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.

Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed de facto control of Gaza in June 2007, establishing a de facto fully authoritarian governing authority. Prior to Hamas’s takeover, Gaza had been under Israeli military authority for approximately 38 years, until their withdrawal in 2005. After the withdrawal, the Palestinian Authority (PA) initially assumed control of Gaza’s internal administration until the Hamas-Fatah conflict in 2007. According to the United Nations (UN), although Israel dismantled its settlements and withdrew its permanent military presence in Gaza during the 2005 disengagement, it maintains control over Gaza’s borders, airspace, and maritime access, as well as periodic military operations within the territory. By late 2025, the Israeli military maintained operational control over significant portions of Gaza, including expanded buffer zones and areas of active military presence.

Hamas initially won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, defeating the Fatah party, which is affiliated with the PA. However, Fatah refused to fully recognize Hamas’s electoral victory due to irreconcilable ideological differences between the two groups and the threat of international isolation. Rising tensions between Hamas and Fatah culminated in a brief civil war in Gaza in June 2007. Following the conflict, Hamas consolidated full authority over Gaza, while the Fatah-led PA continued to govern the Palestinian Territories – West Bank. In response to Hamas’s seizure of power, PA President Mahmoud Abbas, who belongs to Fatah, dissolved the Hamas-led national unity government, declared a state of emergency, and appointed an emergency government based in the West Bank. Hamas did not recognize the dismissal and continued to rule Gaza as an effectively separate governing authority, independent from the PA. Since Hamas assumed control over Gaza, there have been multiple wars with Israel, including those in 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2023-2025.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas carried out an attack on Israel, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,200 Israelis and the taking of 251 Israeli hostages. This escalation marked the beginning of the 2023-2025 Israel-Hamas conflict, during which the UN reported that at least 59,000 Palestinians had been killed and 140,000 injured, including 246 journalists. By the end of 2025, Israeli officials disputed these figures, but had not released a comprehensive alternative casualty count by the end of 2025. The conflict also caused widespread displacement. Israeli military evacuation orders led to repeated relocations of large portions of Gaza’s population, with UN sources indicating that by early 2025, residents were confined to approximately 12 percent of the territory. On October 13, 2023, the Israeli military ordered approximately 1.1 million residents of northern Gaza to evacuate to the south within 24 hours.

National-level elections are absent, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Until October 2025, Hamas continued to govern Gaza despite that the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the unicameral legislature elected in 2006, had been inactive since a political split between Fatah and Hamas in 2007. The PLC was subsequently dissolved by a Palestinian Constitutional Court ruling in December 2018. Hamas has restricted internal dissent, limited freedoms of assembly and association, and prevented the emergence of organized political opposition. Since consolidating control in 2007, Hamas has undertaken systematic repression of Fatah members and supporters. As a result, Fatah, Hamas’s main political rival, has no effective organization or presence in Gaza that could challenge Hamas.

Hamas has historically used its conflict with Israel to consolidate its authority within Gaza and justify the suppression of internal dissent and the elimination of political rivals, particularly members and supporters of Fatah. For instance, Hamas leveraged its 50-day war with Israel in 2014 to carry out the summary executions of detainees, actions widely condemned by human rights organizations as unlawful—many of whom were political opponents already in jail—under the justification of fighting Israel collaborators. Atta Najjar, a former PA police officer who had a mental disability, was serving a 15-year prison term imposed by a Hamas military court in 2009. On August 22, 2014, he was dragged out of the prison and publicly executed. At least 15 others were executed in a similar manner despite awaiting the outcome of their trials. By the conclusion of the 2014 Gaza-Israel conflict, which Hamas called the “Strangling Necks” campaign, at least 23 Palestinians—primarily members of Fatah—had been executed. These actions significantly weakened political opposition in Gaza and further consolidated Hamas’s control. Human rights organizations argue that labeling political rivals as collaborators has enabled the bypassing of ordinary legal safeguards and discouraged internal dissent.

Armed groups, including those affiliated with Hamas, exert control over the daily lives of residents. Hamas maintains three internal security organizations, which are the General Security Service, Military Intelligence, and the Internal Security Service. The General Security Service is officially part of Hamas’s political arm and monitors and suppresses dissent. In the months following the Gaza takeover, Hamas agents repeatedly attacked and detained journalists covering Fatah-related gatherings. For example, in September 2007, the Executive Force (Tanfithiya)—a security body largely staffed by members of Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades—reportedly detained and assaulted journalists covering a Fatah-affiliated gathering and used force against Fatah supporters attending a prayer meeting. Such incidents illustrate the use of coercive mechanisms to limit organized political opposition and constrain public dissent.

Hamas has shut down or restricted major independent and opposition-aligned organizations. Independent news outlets in Gaza are heavily restricted, enabling the group to consolidate its power, control the flow of information, suppress dissent, and maintain a tight grip on public discourse within the territory. Hamas has established its own media outlets, such as the al-Aqsa television channel, which disseminates pro-Hamas content that is aligned with its ideology. Following its consolidation of control in 2007, Hamas authorities closed the state-run Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation and prohibited the distribution of pro-Fatah newspapers such as Al-Hayat Al-Jadida and Al-Ayyam. Afterward, it implemented a media accreditation framework regulating telecommunications companies, internet service providers, broadcast media, and news agencies operating in Gaza. In August 2013, Hamas security authorities shut down local offices used by Al Arabiya and the Maan News Agency, accusing them of disseminating false or fabricated reporting about Hamas and its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Hamas restricts and deters independent media, political leaders, civil society actors, and members of the public. This obstruction often takes the form of extrajudicial arrests, detention, physical assault, threats, and censorship. In July 2020, Hamas issued a directive banning all journalists in Gaza from appearing on Al-Arabiya and Al-Hadath news networks, due to political differences between Hamas and the Saudi regime. This came after Al-Arabiya reported that 16 members of the Izz Al-Din al-Qassam Brigades had been arrested by the Ministry of the Interior in Gaza, on charges of collaborating with Israel. During the “Bidna Na’ish” protests across Gaza in March 2019, a movement triggered by the rising cost of living and deteriorating economic conditions under the Hamas de facto rule, and which translates to “We Want to Live” in Arabic, Hamas agents arbitrarily arrested at least 17 local journalists and six human rights defenders, including representatives of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, Al Dameer Association for Human Rights in Gaza, and Amnesty International. In September 2016, Hamas agents detained journalist Mohammed Othman for publishing a leaked document showing how a former prime minister of Gaza was continuing to make executive decisions. In August 2016, Journalist Hajar Harb was falsely charged with slander in relation to an investigative piece she wrote alleging corruption in the Hamas-run Health Ministry in Gaza. In January 2016, Ayman al-Aloul worked as a journalist for Iraqi and Gulf-based television stations, was arbitrarily arrested, subjected to inhumane treatment, and forced to sign a commitment to not deviate from Hamas’ expected norms prior to release.

Violations against journalists persisted during the 2023-2025 Israel-Hamas conflict. In May 2025, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) detailed several acts of intimidation, threats, and assaults faced by journalists in Gaza from Hamas-affiliated agents. In December 2024, journalist Ibrahim Muhareb was beaten unconscious by armed men who identified themselves as being from the Hamas police investigations department, who told him that a spy and the journalist are one and the same. Another journalist, Mohammed Abu Aoun, was beaten by the Internal Security Force after interviewing a woman who allegedly insulted Hamas leaders in 2024. Journalists like Tawfiq Abu Jarad received phone calls from Hamas security agents warning them not to cover the April 2025 anti-war protests, under threat of being accused of spying for Israel, with warnings extending to his wife. In addition to the threat of being targeted by Hamas, approximately 246 journalists were killed as a result of Israeli military action during the 2023-2025 Hamas-Israel conflict, according to the UN.

Hamas seriously and unfairly represses dissenting protests, using both repressive measures and subtle tactics to discourage dissenting protests against its authority. In March 2019, Hamas security agents launched a large-scale security crackdown involving mass arrests and reported beatings against the “Bidna Na’ish” protesters. Up to 1,000 people were arbitrarily arrested in the crackdown, with many being left beaten or forced into hiding. Hamas security agents also carried out a wide-scale house raid campaign. In a raid against local journalist Osamah Al-Kaholout’s home, agents also beat and confiscated the phones of Jamil Sarhan, the Director of the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), and ICHR lawyer Baker Al-Turkmani, causing them to be hospitalized. Both human rights workers had been monitoring the protests. This type of repression has been part of a pattern since Hamas’s consolidation of power. For instance, after seizing control of Gaza in June 2007, Hamas violently cracked down on protests organized by Fatah. In November of that year, Hamas security agents opened fire on a large pro-Fatah demonstration, killing seven Palestinians and wounding over 90 others.

The political landscape in Gaza is marked by the absence of effective institutional constraints on the governing authority. Since 2007, Hamas has maintained power largely through executive decree and has systematically dismantled or subverted the formal institutions of the PA. Hamas officials and their security apparatus hold all key executive and security positions, and operate with limited external oversight and accountability mechanisms.

The governing authority directs all politically sensitive cases to separate, Hamas-controlled courts, such as Revolutionary Courts. Judges and prosecutors at these courts are often controlled by Hamas security forces or appointed based on loyalty, raising concerns regarding their ability to independently review executive decisions. Security agents often bypass civil courts by arresting civilians and presenting them before Gaza’s military judiciary, even for non-military offenses. Between 2007 and 2016, Hamas carried out at least 84 judicial execution warrants, primarily against political opponents—all carried out without ratification of the Palestinian President and in violation of Palestinian law. At the same time, Hamas is also known to carry out extrajudicial executions. For instance, in October 2025, Hamas agents executed several men in a public square in the Sabra neighborhood in Gaza City—a move believed to be a show of force to reassert Hamas’s dominance over local clans, militias, and gangs that oppose it.

Country Context

Evolving Situation: Following a two-year conflict between Hamas and Israel, the first phase of the most recent multi-phase ceasefire, brokered by the United States, came into effect on October 10, 2025. The first phase focused on a temporary cessation of hostilities, a surge in humanitarian aid, and the exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, but did not require Hamas to immediately disband or relinquish political authority. This summary was written during this phase.

While acknowledging the complex control dynamics and the fluid situation on the ground in the Palestinian Territories, this summary examines Hamas as the de facto governing authority in Gaza from June 2007 to December 2025. During this period, Hamas established de facto control over Gaza’s internal governance systems, despite the Israeli military blockade and restrictions around Gaza’s perimeter and intermittent military control within the territory.

HRF classifies the Palestinian Territories – Gaza as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.

Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed de facto control of Gaza in June 2007, establishing a de facto fully authoritarian governing authority. Prior to Hamas’s takeover, Gaza had been under Israeli military authority for approximately 38 years, until their withdrawal in 2005. After the withdrawal, the Palestinian Authority (PA) initially assumed control of Gaza’s internal administration until the Hamas-Fatah conflict in 2007. According to the United Nations (UN), although Israel dismantled its settlements and withdrew its permanent military presence in Gaza during the 2005 disengagement, it maintains control over Gaza’s borders, airspace, and maritime access, as well as periodic military operations within the territory. By late 2025, the Israeli military maintained operational control over significant portions of Gaza, including expanded buffer zones and areas of active military presence.

Hamas initially won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, defeating the Fatah party, which is affiliated with the PA. However, Fatah refused to fully recognize Hamas’s electoral victory due to irreconcilable ideological differences between the two groups and the threat of international isolation. Rising tensions between Hamas and Fatah culminated in a brief civil war in Gaza in June 2007. Following the conflict, Hamas consolidated full authority over Gaza, while the Fatah-led PA continued to govern the Palestinian Territories – West Bank. In response to Hamas’s seizure of power, PA President Mahmoud Abbas, who belongs to Fatah, dissolved the Hamas-led national unity government, declared a state of emergency, and appointed an emergency government based in the West Bank. Hamas did not recognize the dismissal and continued to rule Gaza as an effectively separate governing authority, independent from the PA. Since Hamas assumed control over Gaza, there have been multiple wars with Israel, including those in 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2023-2025.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas carried out an attack on Israel, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,200 Israelis and the taking of 251 Israeli hostages. This escalation marked the beginning of the 2023-2025 Israel-Hamas conflict, during which the UN reported that at least 59,000 Palestinians had been killed and 140,000 injured, including 246 journalists. By the end of 2025, Israeli officials disputed these figures, but had not released a comprehensive alternative casualty count by the end of 2025. The conflict also caused widespread displacement. Israeli military evacuation orders led to repeated relocations of large portions of Gaza’s population, with UN sources indicating that by early 2025, residents were confined to approximately 12 percent of the territory. On October 13, 2023, the Israeli military ordered approximately 1.1 million residents of northern Gaza to evacuate to the south within 24 hours.

National-level elections are absent, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Until October 2025, Hamas continued to govern Gaza despite that the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the unicameral legislature elected in 2006, had been inactive since a political split between Fatah and Hamas in 2007. The PLC was subsequently dissolved by a Palestinian Constitutional Court ruling in December 2018. Hamas has restricted internal dissent, limited freedoms of assembly and association, and prevented the emergence of organized political opposition. Since consolidating control in 2007, Hamas has undertaken systematic repression of Fatah members and supporters. As a result, Fatah, Hamas’s main political rival, has no effective organization or presence in Gaza that could challenge Hamas.

Hamas has historically used its conflict with Israel to consolidate its authority within Gaza and justify the suppression of internal dissent and the elimination of political rivals, particularly members and supporters of Fatah. For instance, Hamas leveraged its 50-day war with Israel in 2014 to carry out the summary executions of detainees, actions widely condemned by human rights organizations as unlawful—many of whom were political opponents already in jail—under the justification of fighting Israel collaborators. Atta Najjar, a former PA police officer who had a mental disability, was serving a 15-year prison term imposed by a Hamas military court in 2009. On August 22, 2014, he was dragged out of the prison and publicly executed. At least 15 others were executed in a similar manner despite awaiting the outcome of their trials. By the conclusion of the 2014 Gaza-Israel conflict, which Hamas called the “Strangling Necks” campaign, at least 23 Palestinians—primarily members of Fatah—had been executed. These actions significantly weakened political opposition in Gaza and further consolidated Hamas’s control. Human rights organizations argue that labeling political rivals as collaborators has enabled the bypassing of ordinary legal safeguards and discouraged internal dissent.

Armed groups, including those affiliated with Hamas, exert control over the daily lives of residents. Hamas maintains three internal security organizations, which are the General Security Service, Military Intelligence, and the Internal Security Service. The General Security Service is officially part of Hamas’s political arm and monitors and suppresses dissent. In the months following the Gaza takeover, Hamas agents repeatedly attacked and detained journalists covering Fatah-related gatherings. For example, in September 2007, the Executive Force (Tanfithiya)—a security body largely staffed by members of Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades—reportedly detained and assaulted journalists covering a Fatah-affiliated gathering and used force against Fatah supporters attending a prayer meeting. Such incidents illustrate the use of coercive mechanisms to limit organized political opposition and constrain public dissent.

Hamas has shut down or restricted major independent and opposition-aligned organizations. Independent news outlets in Gaza are heavily restricted, enabling the group to consolidate its power, control the flow of information, suppress dissent, and maintain a tight grip on public discourse within the territory. Hamas has established its own media outlets, such as the al-Aqsa television channel, which disseminates pro-Hamas content that is aligned with its ideology. Following its consolidation of control in 2007, Hamas authorities closed the state-run Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation and prohibited the distribution of pro-Fatah newspapers such as Al-Hayat Al-Jadida and Al-Ayyam. Afterward, it implemented a media accreditation framework regulating telecommunications companies, internet service providers, broadcast media, and news agencies operating in Gaza. In August 2013, Hamas security authorities shut down local offices used by Al Arabiya and the Maan News Agency, accusing them of disseminating false or fabricated reporting about Hamas and its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Hamas restricts and deters independent media, political leaders, civil society actors, and members of the public. This obstruction often takes the form of extrajudicial arrests, detention, physical assault, threats, and censorship. In July 2020, Hamas issued a directive banning all journalists in Gaza from appearing on Al-Arabiya and Al-Hadath news networks, due to political differences between Hamas and the Saudi regime. This came after Al-Arabiya reported that 16 members of the Izz Al-Din al-Qassam Brigades had been arrested by the Ministry of the Interior in Gaza, on charges of collaborating with Israel. During the “Bidna Na’ish” protests across Gaza in March 2019, a movement triggered by the rising cost of living and deteriorating economic conditions under the Hamas de facto rule, and which translates to “We Want to Live” in Arabic, Hamas agents arbitrarily arrested at least 17 local journalists and six human rights defenders, including representatives of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, Al Dameer Association for Human Rights in Gaza, and Amnesty International. In September 2016, Hamas agents detained journalist Mohammed Othman for publishing a leaked document showing how a former prime minister of Gaza was continuing to make executive decisions. In August 2016, Journalist Hajar Harb was falsely charged with slander in relation to an investigative piece she wrote alleging corruption in the Hamas-run Health Ministry in Gaza. In January 2016, Ayman al-Aloul worked as a journalist for Iraqi and Gulf-based television stations, was arbitrarily arrested, subjected to inhumane treatment, and forced to sign a commitment to not deviate from Hamas’ expected norms prior to release.

Violations against journalists persisted during the 2023-2025 Israel-Hamas conflict. In May 2025, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) detailed several acts of intimidation, threats, and assaults faced by journalists in Gaza from Hamas-affiliated agents. In December 2024, journalist Ibrahim Muhareb was beaten unconscious by armed men who identified themselves as being from the Hamas police investigations department, who told him that a spy and the journalist are one and the same. Another journalist, Mohammed Abu Aoun, was beaten by the Internal Security Force after interviewing a woman who allegedly insulted Hamas leaders in 2024. Journalists like Tawfiq Abu Jarad received phone calls from Hamas security agents warning them not to cover the April 2025 anti-war protests, under threat of being accused of spying for Israel, with warnings extending to his wife. In addition to the threat of being targeted by Hamas, approximately 246 journalists were killed as a result of Israeli military action during the 2023-2025 Hamas-Israel conflict, according to the UN.

Hamas seriously and unfairly represses dissenting protests, using both repressive measures and subtle tactics to discourage dissenting protests against its authority. In March 2019, Hamas security agents launched a large-scale security crackdown involving mass arrests and reported beatings against the “Bidna Na’ish” protesters. Up to 1,000 people were arbitrarily arrested in the crackdown, with many being left beaten or forced into hiding. Hamas security agents also carried out a wide-scale house raid campaign. In a raid against local journalist Osamah Al-Kaholout’s home, agents also beat and confiscated the phones of Jamil Sarhan, the Director of the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), and ICHR lawyer Baker Al-Turkmani, causing them to be hospitalized. Both human rights workers had been monitoring the protests. This type of repression has been part of a pattern since Hamas’s consolidation of power. For instance, after seizing control of Gaza in June 2007, Hamas violently cracked down on protests organized by Fatah. In November of that year, Hamas security agents opened fire on a large pro-Fatah demonstration, killing seven Palestinians and wounding over 90 others.

The political landscape in Gaza is marked by the absence of effective institutional constraints on the governing authority. Since 2007, Hamas has maintained power largely through executive decree and has systematically dismantled or subverted the formal institutions of the PA. Hamas officials and their security apparatus hold all key executive and security positions, and operate with limited external oversight and accountability mechanisms.

The governing authority directs all politically sensitive cases to separate, Hamas-controlled courts, such as Revolutionary Courts. Judges and prosecutors at these courts are often controlled by Hamas security forces or appointed based on loyalty, raising concerns regarding their ability to independently review executive decisions. Security agents often bypass civil courts by arresting civilians and presenting them before Gaza’s military judiciary, even for non-military offenses. Between 2007 and 2016, Hamas carried out at least 84 judicial execution warrants, primarily against political opponents—all carried out without ratification of the Palestinian President and in violation of Palestinian law. At the same time, Hamas is also known to carry out extrajudicial executions. For instance, in October 2025, Hamas agents executed several men in a public square in the Sabra neighborhood in Gaza City—a move believed to be a show of force to reassert Hamas’s dominance over local clans, militias, and gangs that oppose it.

Key Highlights

Electoral Competition

Freedom of Dissent

Institutional Accountability