Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Oman as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Al Said dynasty of absolute monarchs, known as sultans, has ruled Oman since the mid-18th century. The present ruler, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, inherited the throne in 2020 with the passing of former ruler Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said. The reign of Sultan Qaboos lasted from Oman’s independence from Britain in 1970 until 2020 and was characterized by a lack of formal institutions, a reliance on patronage networks and repression, and a uniquely personalistic and arbitrary style of rule. Upon assuming power, Sultan Haitham initiated a series of institutionalizing and decentralizing reforms that gave the appearance of relinquishing his personal grip on power to civil institutions, such as ceding the formerly royal titles of supreme commander of the armed forces, minister of defense, minister of finance, minister of foreign affairs, and chairman of the Central Bank of Oman to civilian ministers in 2020, and introducing a formal line of succession to the throne in 2021. However, governance in Oman remains solely at the behest of the sultan, who promulgates laws by royal decree and maintains a tight grip over citizens.
Meaningful national elections are absent, and there is no democratic transition of power at any level of government in Oman. While citizens regularly elect 90 members to the lower chamber of the bicameral Oman Council, known as the Shura Council, the body has no authority to legislate and is only mandated to offer non-binding advisory opinions on a limited number of economic and social issues. The sultan appoints all 86 members to the more powerful upper chamber, known as the State Council, and can dissolve the entire Oman Council at will. The sultan has taken systematic measures to prevent the rise of viable opposition candidates and platforms, including a total ban on political parties. Under the Nationality Law of 2014, the regime can revoke the citizenship of anyone found to participate in political organizations such as parties or found guilty of any crime deemed “against the security of the country.”
Independent media, political figures, civil society leaders, organizations, and the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime abuses an expansive web of strict laws that allow for arbitrary arrests and sentencing, and other royal decrees that harshly punish dissent and mitigate the formation of viable mainstream opposition to the absolute power of the sultan. The regime prohibits media and civil society organizations from operating independently of the state and systematically uses vague laws to persecute and intimidate individuals into self-censorship. The regime’s primary coercive apparatus, the Internal Security Service (ISS), regularly surveils citizens and online spaces, disperses protests with violence, commits enforced disappearances of critics, and tortures dissidents.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The sultan rules with ultimate authority and passes legislation directly by royal decree and indirectly by ministerial decisions through the cabinet of ministers, who are all appointed by the sultan. He also chairs the Supreme Judicial Council, which has the authority to review and amend all judicial decisions. Judges sometimes acquit dissidents prosecuted on bogus charges brought by the ISS, but in general, the courts enforce and uphold the regime’s constellation of arbitrary and repressive legal statutes that criminalize many forms of expression, including criticism of the sultan, improper discussions of history and religion, and other vague violations of “public order and morals.”
Meaningful national elections are absent, and there is no democratic transition of power at any level of government in Oman. Citizens participate in regular elections for an advisory council with limited powers. However, the regime takes measures to interfere in campaigns for these elections and to prevent the formation of a formal opposition in the country.
The sultan in Oman, always a male descendant of Sultan Turki bin Said per the Basic Statute, personally holds all executive, legislative, and judicial power, and rules by decree with little formal influence from institutions or individuals. Prior to 2021, the sultan had the sole power to secretly appoint his heir without interference from powerful members of the royal family. Since Haitham came to power, the royal succession has been governed by the principle of primogeniture, wherein the title of Crown Prince is formally granted to the sitting sultan’s oldest son or closest male relative. Despite this absolute control over governance, the regime does hold regular elections for 90 seats in the Shura Council, the lower chamber of the Oman Council. However, the Shura Council, also known as the Majlis ash-Shura, or the Advisory Council, is only mandated to confer non-binding advisory opinions, present draft social and economic legislation, and question appointed ministers without the ability to enforce its decisions. The sultan personally appoints an additional 86 members to the upper chamber of the Oman Council, known as Majlis ad-Dawla, or the State Council, who must approve all advisory opinions or draft legislation originating in the lower house before they are sent to the relevant ministry. The sultan can dissolve the entire Oman Council at will.
Despite the lack of power granted to popularly elected members of the Shura Council, the regime in Oman has taken systematic measures to disrupt the formation of organized opposition. A total ban on political parties includes provisions to revoke the citizenship of anyone found guilty of joining an organization, such as a political party, that is designated as “harmful to national interests” under the Nationality Law of 2014. Furthermore, candidates–who are thus forced to run independently from a political party–are also prohibited from collaborating or campaigning alongside other candidates, from criticizing the sultan, and from discussing general topics such as the role of religion in society or the organization of the state.
In addition to strict prohibitions on political organizing, the regime targets and regularly bars independent candidates who have expressed criticism of its policies from competing in elections. For example, during the 2023 Shura Council elections, the regime disqualified at least four candidates, including former Shura Council member Ahmed Al-Hadabi, under the pretext of maintaining security. Similarly, a few days before the 2019 Shura Council elections, the public prosecutor’s office charged candidate Basma Mubarak, a popular lawyer from Muscat governorate whom the regime had already sentenced to six months in prison in August 2012 for her participation in protests that called for reforms, with “disrupting public order” during her campaign and effectively banned her from running in elections. The regime also takes measures to disrupt local elections, such as during Oman’s first nationwide municipal elections in 2012, when the regime-appointed election committee rejected at least 50 candidate applications submitted by individuals who took part in the 2011 Arab Spring protests “on security grounds.”
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime maintains tight control over political expression in the country by manipulating the media, interfering in the work of civil society organizations, and curtailing protest activity through the criminalization of collective action. Citizens who protest or speak out against the sultan are subject to legal persecution, intrusive surveillance, and violent retaliation under the regime’s framework of national security and defamation laws.
The regime heavily manipulates media coverage and takes measures to shut down major independent organizations. The Ministry of Information authorizes permits for journalists based on “proper morals” and takes legal action against publications it deems “politically, culturally, or sexually offensive” under the restrictive Press and Publications Law of 1984. In late 2024, the regime issued a new media law with further content restrictions that prohibit the publication of information that “conflicts with public morals” or “aims to mislead the public” in print media or online. The law also permits the Ministry of Information to revoke media licenses without reason and to retaliate against social media users who share or comment on news developments. After the forced closure of independent newspaper Al-Zaman in 2016 for implicating high-ranking regime officials in reports on corruption and regime pressure on other publications such as Al-Balad and Muwatin, only four Arabic and three English dailies remain approved to operate within the country as of 2023 due to regime pressure. The Ministry of Information censors all domestic and foreign media–including through review of every headline–frequently suspends private broadcasts, and maintains influence over the press through government subsidies and intimidation of journalists. In December 2021, the regime temporarily suspended the popular “All Questions” talk show on the private radio station Hala FM after Oman Council member Muhammad Al Zadjali criticized the council’s president in an interview. Although the Ministry of Information reversed its suspension, as of December 2025, “All Questions” host Kholoud Al-Alawi faces another investigation for a 2023 interview that was ongoing as of December 2025. In response to the 2021 incident, the Ministry of Information announced that all media outlets hosting Shura Council members require prior approval from the regime.
Omanis face penalties under the Penal Code and the Citizenship Law of 2014, including three to ten years in prison or revocation of citizenship, if found to be involved in establishing, organizing, managing, or financing organizations deemed “inimical to the social order,” “harmful to national interests,” or otherwise seen to challenge the “political, economic, social, or security principles of the state.” As such, all organizations, their bylaws, and fundraising activities must be approved by the Ministry of Social Development, which forbids the formation of associations on the basis of political work.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses dissenting protests. Participation in peaceful public gatherings of ten or more people that are deemed to “endanger the public security or order” or “influence the function of authorities” is punishable by three months to three years in prison and a fine of 100-500 Omani rials (approximately $260-$1,300) or 1,000 Omani rials (approximately $2,600) if the protest was deemed violent. Security officials regularly disperse peaceful protests with teargas and violence, as was seen in the 2021 demonstrations against worsening economic conditions that coincided with the enactment of Oman Council Law No. 7/2021, which further diminished the powers of the Shura Council by allocating the body’s previously autonomous oversight authority to regime-run supervisory bodies. Security officials also met the significant protest movements of 2011, 2018, and 2019 with violence and arbitrary arrests.
The regime heavily surveils and persecutes any speech it deems dissent. The sultan abuses his power to enact laws that cast all dissenting speech as defamation, terrorism, or a threat to national security, such as in the case of Royal Decree No. 17/2025 that introduced a new Nationality Law permitting the regime to revoke the citizenship of any citizen who commits “by word or deed an insult against the Sultanate of Oman or the person of the Sultan.” Online speech is especially subject to surveillance, as the ISS runs its own Cyber Defense Center under Royal Decree No. 64/2020, which operates in conjunction with the 2011 Cyber Crime Law to surveil online speech and private messages for critique of the regime and its policies. In a prominent case from June 2022, Maryam Al-Nuaimi and Ali Al-Ghafri received three and five-year sentences, respectively, for their digital conversations advocating for freedom of thought and religion over private WhatsApp messages and in an online chat room known as “Ghaith Spaces.” Maryam Al-Nuaimi was released by royal pardon in April 2023, but in August 2023, Omani officials began a retrial of Al-Ghafri, Al-Nuaimi, and two other individuals. In a similar case from June 2020, the Court of First Instance in Muscat issued both Shura Council member Salem Al-Awfi and journalist Adel Al-Kasbi a one-year prison sentence for “using information technology to spread harm to public order” in response to social media posts on Twitter that criticized regime officials and members of the Shura Council.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The sultan rules with ultimate executive and legislative authority, passing laws through royal decree and appointing all members of the cabinet of ministers, who sometimes issue ministerial decrees with royal permission. The regime also eliminates judicial autonomy with the sultan presiding over the Supreme Judicial Council, enabling direct political oversight of judicial appointments, dismissals, and decisions.
The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Governing authority in Oman is held solely by the sultan, who holds absolute power to rule by decree and faces no constitutional or institutional checks on his power. In addition to control over all executive and legislative functions in the country, the sultan in Oman chairs the Supreme Judicial Council, which has authority over all judicial appointments and dismissals, and the power to review all judicial decisions, fully subordinating the judiciary to the sultan. As such, the courts uphold and enforce myriad vague statutes in laws such as the Penal Code, Cyber Crime Law, and the Anti-Terrorism Law that undermine electoral competition, repress criticism, and retaliate against those who express open opposition to the regime’s policies. The prominent “Ghaith Spaces” case exemplifies the judiciary upholding vague legal statutes. In 2022, the courts sentenced Maryam Al-Nuaimi and Ali Al-Ghafri under the Cyber Crime Law for “using the Internet and information technology means to produce content that would prejudice religious values and public order” and “inviting people to participate in a meeting to oppose the Islamic religion and defame its foundations” while discussing the freedom of religion in an online forum known as Ghaith Spaces.
Courts in Oman frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable and regularly retaliate against citizens and journalists for violating gag orders and calling attention to the malfeasance and corruption of regime officials. In one of the highest-profile legal cases in Oman’s history, the Supreme Court of Oman ordered the permanent shutdown of Al-Zaman, a popular independent newspaper, in 2017 for publishing reports that accused top government officials of pressuring the judiciary to change a ruling in an inheritance case in their favor. The permanent closure of Al-Zaman by the Supreme Court rescinded the decision of the Court of Appeals to sentence the journalists to prison and overturned the initial shutdown that was ordered by the Court of First Instance in 2016. No ruling was issued on the alleged corruption within the judiciary and the government; rather, Ebrahim Al-Mamari, editor-in-chief of Al-Zaman, received a six-month sentence, and Yousuf Al-Haj, an editor at the paper, was given a one-year sentence for “disturbing public order,” “undermining the prestige of the state,” and “misusing the internet.” In another case from 2021, citizens accused the deputy chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council and former governor of Dhofar Governorate, Mohammed bin Sultan Al-Busaidi, of unlawfully distributing lands to influential elites in Dhofar. The governorate’s Administrative Court dismissed the case in 2022 while digital activists such as Ahmad Al-Kathiri faced arbitrary incommunicado detention and bogus charges for criticizing the ruling on social media.
HRF classifies Oman as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Al Said dynasty of absolute monarchs, known as sultans, has ruled Oman since the mid-18th century. The present ruler, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, inherited the throne in 2020 with the passing of former ruler Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said. The reign of Sultan Qaboos lasted from Oman’s independence from Britain in 1970 until 2020 and was characterized by a lack of formal institutions, a reliance on patronage networks and repression, and a uniquely personalistic and arbitrary style of rule. Upon assuming power, Sultan Haitham initiated a series of institutionalizing and decentralizing reforms that gave the appearance of relinquishing his personal grip on power to civil institutions, such as ceding the formerly royal titles of supreme commander of the armed forces, minister of defense, minister of finance, minister of foreign affairs, and chairman of the Central Bank of Oman to civilian ministers in 2020, and introducing a formal line of succession to the throne in 2021. However, governance in Oman remains solely at the behest of the sultan, who promulgates laws by royal decree and maintains a tight grip over citizens.
Meaningful national elections are absent, and there is no democratic transition of power at any level of government in Oman. While citizens regularly elect 90 members to the lower chamber of the bicameral Oman Council, known as the Shura Council, the body has no authority to legislate and is only mandated to offer non-binding advisory opinions on a limited number of economic and social issues. The sultan appoints all 86 members to the more powerful upper chamber, known as the State Council, and can dissolve the entire Oman Council at will. The sultan has taken systematic measures to prevent the rise of viable opposition candidates and platforms, including a total ban on political parties. Under the Nationality Law of 2014, the regime can revoke the citizenship of anyone found to participate in political organizations such as parties or found guilty of any crime deemed “against the security of the country.”
Independent media, political figures, civil society leaders, organizations, and the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime abuses an expansive web of strict laws that allow for arbitrary arrests and sentencing, and other royal decrees that harshly punish dissent and mitigate the formation of viable mainstream opposition to the absolute power of the sultan. The regime prohibits media and civil society organizations from operating independently of the state and systematically uses vague laws to persecute and intimidate individuals into self-censorship. The regime’s primary coercive apparatus, the Internal Security Service (ISS), regularly surveils citizens and online spaces, disperses protests with violence, commits enforced disappearances of critics, and tortures dissidents.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The sultan rules with ultimate authority and passes legislation directly by royal decree and indirectly by ministerial decisions through the cabinet of ministers, who are all appointed by the sultan. He also chairs the Supreme Judicial Council, which has the authority to review and amend all judicial decisions. Judges sometimes acquit dissidents prosecuted on bogus charges brought by the ISS, but in general, the courts enforce and uphold the regime’s constellation of arbitrary and repressive legal statutes that criminalize many forms of expression, including criticism of the sultan, improper discussions of history and religion, and other vague violations of “public order and morals.”
Meaningful national elections are absent, and there is no democratic transition of power at any level of government in Oman. Citizens participate in regular elections for an advisory council with limited powers. However, the regime takes measures to interfere in campaigns for these elections and to prevent the formation of a formal opposition in the country.
The sultan in Oman, always a male descendant of Sultan Turki bin Said per the Basic Statute, personally holds all executive, legislative, and judicial power, and rules by decree with little formal influence from institutions or individuals. Prior to 2021, the sultan had the sole power to secretly appoint his heir without interference from powerful members of the royal family. Since Haitham came to power, the royal succession has been governed by the principle of primogeniture, wherein the title of Crown Prince is formally granted to the sitting sultan’s oldest son or closest male relative. Despite this absolute control over governance, the regime does hold regular elections for 90 seats in the Shura Council, the lower chamber of the Oman Council. However, the Shura Council, also known as the Majlis ash-Shura, or the Advisory Council, is only mandated to confer non-binding advisory opinions, present draft social and economic legislation, and question appointed ministers without the ability to enforce its decisions. The sultan personally appoints an additional 86 members to the upper chamber of the Oman Council, known as Majlis ad-Dawla, or the State Council, who must approve all advisory opinions or draft legislation originating in the lower house before they are sent to the relevant ministry. The sultan can dissolve the entire Oman Council at will.
Despite the lack of power granted to popularly elected members of the Shura Council, the regime in Oman has taken systematic measures to disrupt the formation of organized opposition. A total ban on political parties includes provisions to revoke the citizenship of anyone found guilty of joining an organization, such as a political party, that is designated as “harmful to national interests” under the Nationality Law of 2014. Furthermore, candidates–who are thus forced to run independently from a political party–are also prohibited from collaborating or campaigning alongside other candidates, from criticizing the sultan, and from discussing general topics such as the role of religion in society or the organization of the state.
In addition to strict prohibitions on political organizing, the regime targets and regularly bars independent candidates who have expressed criticism of its policies from competing in elections. For example, during the 2023 Shura Council elections, the regime disqualified at least four candidates, including former Shura Council member Ahmed Al-Hadabi, under the pretext of maintaining security. Similarly, a few days before the 2019 Shura Council elections, the public prosecutor’s office charged candidate Basma Mubarak, a popular lawyer from Muscat governorate whom the regime had already sentenced to six months in prison in August 2012 for her participation in protests that called for reforms, with “disrupting public order” during her campaign and effectively banned her from running in elections. The regime also takes measures to disrupt local elections, such as during Oman’s first nationwide municipal elections in 2012, when the regime-appointed election committee rejected at least 50 candidate applications submitted by individuals who took part in the 2011 Arab Spring protests “on security grounds.”
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime maintains tight control over political expression in the country by manipulating the media, interfering in the work of civil society organizations, and curtailing protest activity through the criminalization of collective action. Citizens who protest or speak out against the sultan are subject to legal persecution, intrusive surveillance, and violent retaliation under the regime’s framework of national security and defamation laws.
The regime heavily manipulates media coverage and takes measures to shut down major independent organizations. The Ministry of Information authorizes permits for journalists based on “proper morals” and takes legal action against publications it deems “politically, culturally, or sexually offensive” under the restrictive Press and Publications Law of 1984. In late 2024, the regime issued a new media law with further content restrictions that prohibit the publication of information that “conflicts with public morals” or “aims to mislead the public” in print media or online. The law also permits the Ministry of Information to revoke media licenses without reason and to retaliate against social media users who share or comment on news developments. After the forced closure of independent newspaper Al-Zaman in 2016 for implicating high-ranking regime officials in reports on corruption and regime pressure on other publications such as Al-Balad and Muwatin, only four Arabic and three English dailies remain approved to operate within the country as of 2023 due to regime pressure. The Ministry of Information censors all domestic and foreign media–including through review of every headline–frequently suspends private broadcasts, and maintains influence over the press through government subsidies and intimidation of journalists. In December 2021, the regime temporarily suspended the popular “All Questions” talk show on the private radio station Hala FM after Oman Council member Muhammad Al Zadjali criticized the council’s president in an interview. Although the Ministry of Information reversed its suspension, as of December 2025, “All Questions” host Kholoud Al-Alawi faces another investigation for a 2023 interview that was ongoing as of December 2025. In response to the 2021 incident, the Ministry of Information announced that all media outlets hosting Shura Council members require prior approval from the regime.
Omanis face penalties under the Penal Code and the Citizenship Law of 2014, including three to ten years in prison or revocation of citizenship, if found to be involved in establishing, organizing, managing, or financing organizations deemed “inimical to the social order,” “harmful to national interests,” or otherwise seen to challenge the “political, economic, social, or security principles of the state.” As such, all organizations, their bylaws, and fundraising activities must be approved by the Ministry of Social Development, which forbids the formation of associations on the basis of political work.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses dissenting protests. Participation in peaceful public gatherings of ten or more people that are deemed to “endanger the public security or order” or “influence the function of authorities” is punishable by three months to three years in prison and a fine of 100-500 Omani rials (approximately $260-$1,300) or 1,000 Omani rials (approximately $2,600) if the protest was deemed violent. Security officials regularly disperse peaceful protests with teargas and violence, as was seen in the 2021 demonstrations against worsening economic conditions that coincided with the enactment of Oman Council Law No. 7/2021, which further diminished the powers of the Shura Council by allocating the body’s previously autonomous oversight authority to regime-run supervisory bodies. Security officials also met the significant protest movements of 2011, 2018, and 2019 with violence and arbitrary arrests.
The regime heavily surveils and persecutes any speech it deems dissent. The sultan abuses his power to enact laws that cast all dissenting speech as defamation, terrorism, or a threat to national security, such as in the case of Royal Decree No. 17/2025 that introduced a new Nationality Law permitting the regime to revoke the citizenship of any citizen who commits “by word or deed an insult against the Sultanate of Oman or the person of the Sultan.” Online speech is especially subject to surveillance, as the ISS runs its own Cyber Defense Center under Royal Decree No. 64/2020, which operates in conjunction with the 2011 Cyber Crime Law to surveil online speech and private messages for critique of the regime and its policies. In a prominent case from June 2022, Maryam Al-Nuaimi and Ali Al-Ghafri received three and five-year sentences, respectively, for their digital conversations advocating for freedom of thought and religion over private WhatsApp messages and in an online chat room known as “Ghaith Spaces.” Maryam Al-Nuaimi was released by royal pardon in April 2023, but in August 2023, Omani officials began a retrial of Al-Ghafri, Al-Nuaimi, and two other individuals. In a similar case from June 2020, the Court of First Instance in Muscat issued both Shura Council member Salem Al-Awfi and journalist Adel Al-Kasbi a one-year prison sentence for “using information technology to spread harm to public order” in response to social media posts on Twitter that criticized regime officials and members of the Shura Council.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The sultan rules with ultimate executive and legislative authority, passing laws through royal decree and appointing all members of the cabinet of ministers, who sometimes issue ministerial decrees with royal permission. The regime also eliminates judicial autonomy with the sultan presiding over the Supreme Judicial Council, enabling direct political oversight of judicial appointments, dismissals, and decisions.
The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Governing authority in Oman is held solely by the sultan, who holds absolute power to rule by decree and faces no constitutional or institutional checks on his power. In addition to control over all executive and legislative functions in the country, the sultan in Oman chairs the Supreme Judicial Council, which has authority over all judicial appointments and dismissals, and the power to review all judicial decisions, fully subordinating the judiciary to the sultan. As such, the courts uphold and enforce myriad vague statutes in laws such as the Penal Code, Cyber Crime Law, and the Anti-Terrorism Law that undermine electoral competition, repress criticism, and retaliate against those who express open opposition to the regime’s policies. The prominent “Ghaith Spaces” case exemplifies the judiciary upholding vague legal statutes. In 2022, the courts sentenced Maryam Al-Nuaimi and Ali Al-Ghafri under the Cyber Crime Law for “using the Internet and information technology means to produce content that would prejudice religious values and public order” and “inviting people to participate in a meeting to oppose the Islamic religion and defame its foundations” while discussing the freedom of religion in an online forum known as Ghaith Spaces.
Courts in Oman frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable and regularly retaliate against citizens and journalists for violating gag orders and calling attention to the malfeasance and corruption of regime officials. In one of the highest-profile legal cases in Oman’s history, the Supreme Court of Oman ordered the permanent shutdown of Al-Zaman, a popular independent newspaper, in 2017 for publishing reports that accused top government officials of pressuring the judiciary to change a ruling in an inheritance case in their favor. The permanent closure of Al-Zaman by the Supreme Court rescinded the decision of the Court of Appeals to sentence the journalists to prison and overturned the initial shutdown that was ordered by the Court of First Instance in 2016. No ruling was issued on the alleged corruption within the judiciary and the government; rather, Ebrahim Al-Mamari, editor-in-chief of Al-Zaman, received a six-month sentence, and Yousuf Al-Haj, an editor at the paper, was given a one-year sentence for “disturbing public order,” “undermining the prestige of the state,” and “misusing the internet.” In another case from 2021, citizens accused the deputy chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council and former governor of Dhofar Governorate, Mohammed bin Sultan Al-Busaidi, of unlawfully distributing lands to influential elites in Dhofar. The governorate’s Administrative Court dismissed the case in 2022 while digital activists such as Ahmad Al-Kathiri faced arbitrary incommunicado detention and bogus charges for criticizing the ruling on social media.
