Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Nigeria as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Nigeria is a federal republic of 36 states with a presidential system of government. The Head of State, Bola Tinubu, was declared the winner of the flawed 2023 election. Legal challenges, protests, and calls for annulment, violence that killed more than 100 people, the disenfranchisement of over 1 million people, and evidence of irregularities and manipulation discredited the integrity of the polls. Since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, has grappled with ethno-political cleavages, which led to decades of political turmoil marked by a bloody civil war, a series of military coups, and secessionist and terrorist insurgencies. Since transitioning from military rule in 1999, Nigeria has experienced the longest period of elected civilian rule in its history, with seven consecutive elections and a peaceful transfer of power between a ruling and opposition party in 2015. However, successive governments have consolidated control over all branches of government. With no meaningful checks to executive power, and an endemic culture of corruption, clientelism, and impunity, the country remains mired in a degenerating, multidimensional insecurity and maladministration crisis.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the ruling party, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has an unlikely but realistic chance to win. Although national elections are competitive, the regime in power and aligned non-state actors hinder the real, mainstream opposition’s campaigning, engage in voting irregularities, undermine electoral oversight, and leverage advantages drawn from the power of incumbency to tip the electoral playing field in their favor.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent media, civil society leaders and organizations, and repressed dissenting protests against its most prominent and widely publicized policies
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition, repress criticism, or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The regime has seriously undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the regime are no longer brought or frequently dismissed. Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions systematically, frequently, and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. The regime has subjected judicial and legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness.
The electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the ruling party to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The regime hinders opposition parties’ electoral campaign, engages in voting irregularities, enjoys significant and unfair campaign advantages, and undermines independent electoral oversight.
The regime unfairly and significantly hinders opposition parties’ electoral campaigns. The ruling APC leveraged its allies in control of 21 state governments throughout the country to restrict the opposition’s campaigning. These restrictions include limited access to venues and state media, as well as the imposition of excessively high fees for organizing rallies or placing billboards. For instance, in Zamfara State, the governor prohibited a political rally organized by the opposition party, the PDP, citing security concerns. Despite the ban, the PDP proceeded with the rally. In response, the governor ordered the closure of broadcast media organizations that covered the event, claiming they had violated government orders. Similarly, opposition parties in Kaduna State accused the state government of denying them the right to erect billboards. In Ebonyi State, the police dispersed a rally organized by Labour Party presidential candidate Peter Obi, claiming that he had not paid the required venue fees, even though Nigerian law does not require a police permit or payment before peaceful rallies or protests can be held.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, have systematically contributed to the hindrance of a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. In the months ahead of the 2023 election–amid widespread political thuggery and violence involving non-state actors aligned with both ruling and opposition parties—organized violent gangs and official vigilante groups aligned with the APC attacked opposition party rallies and supporters across several states, such as Borno, Lagos, Rivers, Katsina, Kogi, Kaduna, and Ogun. For example, in November 2022, armed thugs attacked Abubakar’s convoy during a campaign stop in Maiduguri and clashed with his supporters, resulting in scores of injuries. In Borno, in September 2022, APC politicians mobilized members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)—a civilian vigilante group formed to fight Boko Haram terrorists– to harass PDP supporters. In November 2022, gunmen assassinated Victoria Chintex, a grassroots mobilizer for Obi in Kaduna state. In December, unknown attackers kidnapped Helen Taiwo Augustine, a leader of an Obi supporters group in Edo state. In January 2023, thugs attacked a rally of the opposition New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) party in Ebonyi state, chasing supporters and vandalizing equipment. During the election in Lagos, masked gunmen opened fire at a polling station where many people said they intended to vote for Obi, and took away a ballot box. In a related incident in Lagos, a voter named Jennifer Efidi was attacked and stabbed by political thugs as she waited to cast her vote for Obi.
In Nigeria, the regime systematically enjoys campaign advantages that undermine opposition parties’ ability to compete. With the ruling APC in control of the federal government and APC politicians serving as governors of 21 states, the ruling party went into the 2023 presidential election with significant incumbency advantages of nationally distributed power and control of public resources. The APC leveraged these advantages to tip the electoral campaigning field against political opponents. In October 2022, Rivers State Governor Nyesom Wike conditioned the use of public school facilities for political rallies on the approval of the state and imposed a fee for their use. Wike also encouraged local government executives to restrict political gatherings in their areas on the basis of vague security concerns. In January 2023, the Signage and Advertising Agency of Anambra state removed the Labour Party presidential candidate Obi’s campaign posters, citing failure to pay exorbitant fees imposed by the state on political advertising.
The regime has engaged in systematic and significant voting irregularities. Despite substantial investments and deployment of human and material resources (including over 1 million election officials, over 100,000 vehicles) and new technology for voter verification and electronic transmission of results forms, the Buhari-appointed Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) uploaded photo evidence of 2023 presidential vote counts with delay and released vote tallies with discrepancies and altered figures. The election was done with an unaudited voter registry, which included deceased, emigrated, migrated, and underage people and constituencies based on outdated census data from 2006. The irregularities observed under the ruling APC have also been present during previous governments in Nigeria, indicating a persistent systemic issue.
In Nigeria, the regime systematically and seriously undermines independent electoral oversight. The Constitution mandates INEC with the authority of organizing and supervising elections, registering eligible voters and political parties, and overseeing electoral spending. The President of Nigeria is mandated to appoint non-partisan members following due consultation with the Council of State, an advisory body chaired by the President, and confirmation by the Senate. Tinubu’s regime has continued the Buhari practice of stacking INEC with allies. In November 2023, Tinubu and the APC-dominated Senate appointed partisan allies in strategic INEC positions in which they have oversight over the agency’s operations in various states. He also controversially increased the regional representation of the North West in the commission. Successive administrations have carried out controversial appointments of partisan commissioners into INEC ahead of elections. In June 2021, Buhari controversially nominated his aide and APC party member Lauretta Onochie as INEC Commissioner—a nomination so controversial that the Senate rejected her nomination. Ahead of the 2019 election, Buhari-appointed INEC chair Mahmood Yakubu put Amina Zakari, a lifelong friend and relative of Buhari, in charge of the national collation centre for elections, where official results would be announced. The executive, through the Ministry of Finance, controls the national budget allocations to INEC, further undermining its operational independence.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime intimidates and obstructs independent media, civil society leaders, and organizations while suppressing dissenting protests and censoring dissenting speech.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. While the private media landscape is rich and diverse, including hundreds of broadcasters and 13 major daily newspapers where a plurality of views are expressed, both federal and state authorities systematically intimidate independent journalists and news outlets with physical violence, arbitrary detentions, regulatory censorship, and lawfare. In August 2024, security forces assaulted and detained at least 56 journalists while they were covering nationwide pro-democracy protests in the country. Between 2015 and 2024, authorities used the 2015 Cybercrime Act to prosecute at least 25 journalists for critical reporting. In the eight months ahead of the 2023 election, at least 17 journalists were detained or interrogated for critical commentary on politically sensitive topics, according to the EU election observation team. In at least 20 states, journalists abstained from critical reporting in fear of retribution.
Federal and state authorities systematically intimidate ordinary citizens in retaliation for public criticism. In November 2024, Sokoto state authorities charged 18-year-old Hamdiyya Sidi Shariff with inciting disturbance or using abusive or insulting language over her viral TikTok video criticizing Sokoto state Governor Ahmad Aliyu’s handling of rising insecurity. With the trial pending, she was abducted and beaten by state-sponsored political thugs and the target of state-sponsored online smear campaigns. In March 2025, a National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) Local Governor Inspector summoned NYSC member Ushie Rita Uguamaye over her viral TikTok video calling Tinubu a “terrible president” over his handling of economic hardships. For refusing to delete the video, she faced administrative retaliation with a withholding of her certificate and a two-month extension of her service after refusing to delete a TikTok criticizing Tinubu’s economic policies.
The regime has obstructed the work of civil society leaders and organizations. In September 2024, the Department of State Security (DSS) detained Joe Ajero, the president of Nigeria’s largest union, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), just after he criticized the regime for a 39% increase in gasoline prices and threatened to organize a strike if the decision was not reversed. This followed Ajero’s brief detention during a November 2023 police raid on the NLC office in Imo State. In May 2025, the regime invoked vague security concerns to close down the international humanitarian aid group INSO. The measure followed the temporary ban in 2019 of two other international aid groups on similar vague grounds: MercyCorps and Action Against Hunger.
Both federal and state authorities have systematically, seriously, and unfairly suppressed dissenting protests. In April 2025, DSS detained activist Kola Edokpayi for a week after he announced a solidarity rally in support of Burkina Faso’s military regime, which was at odds with the Nigerian regime. In August 2024, police violently suppressed nationwide #EndBadGovernance protests, with tear gas, water cannon, and live bullets, resulting in at least 24 casualties. Security forces detained nearly two hundred protesters, including minors, as well as citizens who had produced, sold, distributed, or waved Russian flags during the protests. 76 protesters in Kano were charged with sedition, and 119 others in Abuja with treason. They were all eventually released after months of detention. In October 2024, police violently dispersed a peaceful gathering commemorating the 2020 Lekki Tollgate killings of protesters, beating and detaining over 20 people.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, have contributed to systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressing dissenting protests. Violent gangs mobilized by ruling politicians and commonly referred to as political thugs systematically suppress unsanctioned dissenting protests with little or no response from security forces. For example, in December 2025, thugs attacked women protesting kidnappings in front of the Kwara Government House. In June 2025, armed thugs in Akure, Ondo State, attacked and disrupted a peaceful protest organized by the #TakeItBack movement against economic hardship and unemployment. During the August 2024 #EndBadGovernanceProtests, violent groups of thugs attacked protesters and ordinary citizens, and vandalized, looted, and destroyed public and private property. In November 2023, armed hoodlums in Owerri attacked a NLC labor union gathering planning a strike to protest Imo State’s treatment of workers.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech. In August 2024, the DSS arbitrarily detained activist Adaramoye Michael Lenin for two months after he called for nationwide protests against bad governance. DSS also detained Dr. Abubakar Alkali, a lecturer from Baze University in Abuja, for three weeks for publicly expressing support for the protests. In August 2025, the DSS detained Omoyele Sowore, a pro-democracy activist and former presidential candidate, for two days over social media posts in which he called Tinubu “a criminal” over his policies. In December 2024, police detained activist Abiodun Olamide Thomas for a month and charged her with cyberbullying and threatening officials over a video she posted on social media in which she criticized police brutality. In April 2025, the regime’s National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) prohibited broadcasters from playing the song “Tell Your Papa” by artist Eedris Abdulkareem, which criticizes Tinubu in light of the hardships, insecurity, and hunger faced by the population. NBC labeled the song as inappropriate and containing objectionable content.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Courts fail to check the regime’s attempts to skew the electoral process in its favor and repress criticism or retaliate against opposition to its widely publicized policies. The regime has undermined institutional independence, leading to cases challenging it being frequently dismissed. Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions often fail to hold regime officials accountable. Systematic reforms have abolished or seriously weakened the independence and effectiveness of judicial and legislative institutions.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Since 2003, the country’s highest courts have systematically dismissed petitions challenging official results of presidential elections, frequently delivering the rulings with significant delay, long after the polls. The courts have consistently dismissed legal challenges on grounds of admissibility or form, without reviewing their merits and substance. For example, in September 2023, the Supreme Court dismissed opposition candidates Abubakar and Obi’s petitions, nearly three months after Tinubu was sworn into office. In 2019, the Court rejected dozens of petitions challenging Buhari’s electoral victory and his eligibility as a candidate seven months after the election.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Despite a March 2022 ruling of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, which outlawed the government’s use of the criminal offense of “cyberstalking” against dissenters, judges continue to arraign regime critics on such charges. For example, in December 2025, a Federal High Court judge in Abuja sent to trial activist Omoyele Sowore on a cyberstalking charge over social media posts calling Tinubu “a criminal.”
The regime has seriously undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the regime are no longer brought or frequently dismissed. In response to a longstanding culture of impunity for Nigerian officials accused of human rights abuses, individuals and organizations have bypassed national courts and filed their complaints directly with the supranational ECOWAS Court of Justice. In several instances, the Court has ruled against the Nigerian government and ordered compensation for the plaintiffs, but the Nigerian authorities have neither complied nor enforced the rulings. For example, In December 2025, the ECOWAS court issued a writ of execution ordering the Nigerian government to implement an April 2025 ruling calling for authorities to amend or repeal blasphemy laws enforced by Kano State to prosecute critics of Islam. In December 2024, the ECOWAS Court ordered the Nigerian government to pay 5 million Naira (approximately $3,436) to Oluwatimilehin Adebayo, a Nigerian citizen, for torture he endured in police custody in Ogun State. Additionally, in July 2024, the regional court found the Nigerian government guilty of human rights abuses in its repression of the 2020 #EndSARS protests and ordered the authorities to pay 2 million Naira (approximately $1,200) in compensation to each victim named in the lawsuit.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. The regime’s institutional capture of all branches of government and key oversight institutions has effectively negated constitutional separations of powers and democratic checks and balances. As a result, there is no meaningful check on the power of Tinubu and the ruling APC. For example, the Supreme Court validated Tinubu’s eligibility for the presidential ballot despite evidence indicating that the educational credentials that he submitted to INEC did not meet the eligibility requirements. The office of Nigeria’s Attorney-General, which doubles as the cabinet minister of justice, has not prosecuted a single member of the security forces involved in the violent suppression of August 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests, with the police dismissing any responsibility for the reported killings of at least 24 people. This is part of a longstanding pattern of official impunity that the Tinubu regime is extending. For example, the Tinubu regime has followed the Buhari regime’s refusal to act on various official investigative panels recommending, for instance, the prosecution of 33 SARS officers for human rights abuses or Nigerian army personnel responsible for the 2015 killings of 349 members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) group.
Both the legislature and judiciary failed to hold Tinubu accountable for his controversial March 2025 imposition of a state of emergency in Rivers state, a measure issued on constitutionally questionable grounds, which involved the 6-month suspension of the Rivers State governor and state legislature and the appointment of a military administrator to oversee the state’s affairs. The legislature approved the measure on a voice vote in contravention of the constitutional requirement for a formal vote of two-thirds of the chamber on a joint resolution. The Supreme Court received petitions challenging the measure but took nine months to issue a ruling on the matter, well beyond the expiration of the emergency measure. Finally, the ruling fell short of adjudicating the substance of the case, with a 6-1 majority of justices affirming the general principle of the president’s prerogative to declare a state of emergency and the limits of that power without any determination.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The constitution confers on the President the power of appointment of a Chief Justice based on a recommendation from the National Judicial Council (NJC), an executive institution overseeing the composition and conduct of the judiciary, and after confirmation by the Senate. However, the executive controls funding allocations of the NJC, and with the APC’s dominance of the legislature, the regime and its patronage network hold pervasive and disproportionate political influence over judicial appointments. The lack of accountability and transparency over judicial appointments has degenerated into an increasing trend of dynastic nepotism, with Chief Justices and senior judicial officers facilitating the appointment of their children or other family members on the bench.
The regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. In December 2025, the executive illegally inserted unapproved alterations to tax bills, setting up the regulatory frameworks of new tax agencies. The alterations weakened legislative oversight over the public revenue management agencies.
HRF classifies Nigeria as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Nigeria is a federal republic of 36 states with a presidential system of government. The Head of State, Bola Tinubu, was declared the winner of the flawed 2023 election. Legal challenges, protests, and calls for annulment, violence that killed more than 100 people, the disenfranchisement of over 1 million people, and evidence of irregularities and manipulation discredited the integrity of the polls. Since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, has grappled with ethno-political cleavages, which led to decades of political turmoil marked by a bloody civil war, a series of military coups, and secessionist and terrorist insurgencies. Since transitioning from military rule in 1999, Nigeria has experienced the longest period of elected civilian rule in its history, with seven consecutive elections and a peaceful transfer of power between a ruling and opposition party in 2015. However, successive governments have consolidated control over all branches of government. With no meaningful checks to executive power, and an endemic culture of corruption, clientelism, and impunity, the country remains mired in a degenerating, multidimensional insecurity and maladministration crisis.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the ruling party, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has an unlikely but realistic chance to win. Although national elections are competitive, the regime in power and aligned non-state actors hinder the real, mainstream opposition’s campaigning, engage in voting irregularities, undermine electoral oversight, and leverage advantages drawn from the power of incumbency to tip the electoral playing field in their favor.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent media, civil society leaders and organizations, and repressed dissenting protests against its most prominent and widely publicized policies
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition, repress criticism, or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The regime has seriously undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the regime are no longer brought or frequently dismissed. Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions systematically, frequently, and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. The regime has subjected judicial and legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness.
The electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the ruling party to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The regime hinders opposition parties’ electoral campaign, engages in voting irregularities, enjoys significant and unfair campaign advantages, and undermines independent electoral oversight.
The regime unfairly and significantly hinders opposition parties’ electoral campaigns. The ruling APC leveraged its allies in control of 21 state governments throughout the country to restrict the opposition’s campaigning. These restrictions include limited access to venues and state media, as well as the imposition of excessively high fees for organizing rallies or placing billboards. For instance, in Zamfara State, the governor prohibited a political rally organized by the opposition party, the PDP, citing security concerns. Despite the ban, the PDP proceeded with the rally. In response, the governor ordered the closure of broadcast media organizations that covered the event, claiming they had violated government orders. Similarly, opposition parties in Kaduna State accused the state government of denying them the right to erect billboards. In Ebonyi State, the police dispersed a rally organized by Labour Party presidential candidate Peter Obi, claiming that he had not paid the required venue fees, even though Nigerian law does not require a police permit or payment before peaceful rallies or protests can be held.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, have systematically contributed to the hindrance of a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. In the months ahead of the 2023 election–amid widespread political thuggery and violence involving non-state actors aligned with both ruling and opposition parties—organized violent gangs and official vigilante groups aligned with the APC attacked opposition party rallies and supporters across several states, such as Borno, Lagos, Rivers, Katsina, Kogi, Kaduna, and Ogun. For example, in November 2022, armed thugs attacked Abubakar’s convoy during a campaign stop in Maiduguri and clashed with his supporters, resulting in scores of injuries. In Borno, in September 2022, APC politicians mobilized members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)—a civilian vigilante group formed to fight Boko Haram terrorists– to harass PDP supporters. In November 2022, gunmen assassinated Victoria Chintex, a grassroots mobilizer for Obi in Kaduna state. In December, unknown attackers kidnapped Helen Taiwo Augustine, a leader of an Obi supporters group in Edo state. In January 2023, thugs attacked a rally of the opposition New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) party in Ebonyi state, chasing supporters and vandalizing equipment. During the election in Lagos, masked gunmen opened fire at a polling station where many people said they intended to vote for Obi, and took away a ballot box. In a related incident in Lagos, a voter named Jennifer Efidi was attacked and stabbed by political thugs as she waited to cast her vote for Obi.
In Nigeria, the regime systematically enjoys campaign advantages that undermine opposition parties’ ability to compete. With the ruling APC in control of the federal government and APC politicians serving as governors of 21 states, the ruling party went into the 2023 presidential election with significant incumbency advantages of nationally distributed power and control of public resources. The APC leveraged these advantages to tip the electoral campaigning field against political opponents. In October 2022, Rivers State Governor Nyesom Wike conditioned the use of public school facilities for political rallies on the approval of the state and imposed a fee for their use. Wike also encouraged local government executives to restrict political gatherings in their areas on the basis of vague security concerns. In January 2023, the Signage and Advertising Agency of Anambra state removed the Labour Party presidential candidate Obi’s campaign posters, citing failure to pay exorbitant fees imposed by the state on political advertising.
The regime has engaged in systematic and significant voting irregularities. Despite substantial investments and deployment of human and material resources (including over 1 million election officials, over 100,000 vehicles) and new technology for voter verification and electronic transmission of results forms, the Buhari-appointed Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) uploaded photo evidence of 2023 presidential vote counts with delay and released vote tallies with discrepancies and altered figures. The election was done with an unaudited voter registry, which included deceased, emigrated, migrated, and underage people and constituencies based on outdated census data from 2006. The irregularities observed under the ruling APC have also been present during previous governments in Nigeria, indicating a persistent systemic issue.
In Nigeria, the regime systematically and seriously undermines independent electoral oversight. The Constitution mandates INEC with the authority of organizing and supervising elections, registering eligible voters and political parties, and overseeing electoral spending. The President of Nigeria is mandated to appoint non-partisan members following due consultation with the Council of State, an advisory body chaired by the President, and confirmation by the Senate. Tinubu’s regime has continued the Buhari practice of stacking INEC with allies. In November 2023, Tinubu and the APC-dominated Senate appointed partisan allies in strategic INEC positions in which they have oversight over the agency’s operations in various states. He also controversially increased the regional representation of the North West in the commission. Successive administrations have carried out controversial appointments of partisan commissioners into INEC ahead of elections. In June 2021, Buhari controversially nominated his aide and APC party member Lauretta Onochie as INEC Commissioner—a nomination so controversial that the Senate rejected her nomination. Ahead of the 2019 election, Buhari-appointed INEC chair Mahmood Yakubu put Amina Zakari, a lifelong friend and relative of Buhari, in charge of the national collation centre for elections, where official results would be announced. The executive, through the Ministry of Finance, controls the national budget allocations to INEC, further undermining its operational independence.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime intimidates and obstructs independent media, civil society leaders, and organizations while suppressing dissenting protests and censoring dissenting speech.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. While the private media landscape is rich and diverse, including hundreds of broadcasters and 13 major daily newspapers where a plurality of views are expressed, both federal and state authorities systematically intimidate independent journalists and news outlets with physical violence, arbitrary detentions, regulatory censorship, and lawfare. In August 2024, security forces assaulted and detained at least 56 journalists while they were covering nationwide pro-democracy protests in the country. Between 2015 and 2024, authorities used the 2015 Cybercrime Act to prosecute at least 25 journalists for critical reporting. In the eight months ahead of the 2023 election, at least 17 journalists were detained or interrogated for critical commentary on politically sensitive topics, according to the EU election observation team. In at least 20 states, journalists abstained from critical reporting in fear of retribution.
Federal and state authorities systematically intimidate ordinary citizens in retaliation for public criticism. In November 2024, Sokoto state authorities charged 18-year-old Hamdiyya Sidi Shariff with inciting disturbance or using abusive or insulting language over her viral TikTok video criticizing Sokoto state Governor Ahmad Aliyu’s handling of rising insecurity. With the trial pending, she was abducted and beaten by state-sponsored political thugs and the target of state-sponsored online smear campaigns. In March 2025, a National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) Local Governor Inspector summoned NYSC member Ushie Rita Uguamaye over her viral TikTok video calling Tinubu a “terrible president” over his handling of economic hardships. For refusing to delete the video, she faced administrative retaliation with a withholding of her certificate and a two-month extension of her service after refusing to delete a TikTok criticizing Tinubu’s economic policies.
The regime has obstructed the work of civil society leaders and organizations. In September 2024, the Department of State Security (DSS) detained Joe Ajero, the president of Nigeria’s largest union, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), just after he criticized the regime for a 39% increase in gasoline prices and threatened to organize a strike if the decision was not reversed. This followed Ajero’s brief detention during a November 2023 police raid on the NLC office in Imo State. In May 2025, the regime invoked vague security concerns to close down the international humanitarian aid group INSO. The measure followed the temporary ban in 2019 of two other international aid groups on similar vague grounds: MercyCorps and Action Against Hunger.
Both federal and state authorities have systematically, seriously, and unfairly suppressed dissenting protests. In April 2025, DSS detained activist Kola Edokpayi for a week after he announced a solidarity rally in support of Burkina Faso’s military regime, which was at odds with the Nigerian regime. In August 2024, police violently suppressed nationwide #EndBadGovernance protests, with tear gas, water cannon, and live bullets, resulting in at least 24 casualties. Security forces detained nearly two hundred protesters, including minors, as well as citizens who had produced, sold, distributed, or waved Russian flags during the protests. 76 protesters in Kano were charged with sedition, and 119 others in Abuja with treason. They were all eventually released after months of detention. In October 2024, police violently dispersed a peaceful gathering commemorating the 2020 Lekki Tollgate killings of protesters, beating and detaining over 20 people.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, have contributed to systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressing dissenting protests. Violent gangs mobilized by ruling politicians and commonly referred to as political thugs systematically suppress unsanctioned dissenting protests with little or no response from security forces. For example, in December 2025, thugs attacked women protesting kidnappings in front of the Kwara Government House. In June 2025, armed thugs in Akure, Ondo State, attacked and disrupted a peaceful protest organized by the #TakeItBack movement against economic hardship and unemployment. During the August 2024 #EndBadGovernanceProtests, violent groups of thugs attacked protesters and ordinary citizens, and vandalized, looted, and destroyed public and private property. In November 2023, armed hoodlums in Owerri attacked a NLC labor union gathering planning a strike to protest Imo State’s treatment of workers.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech. In August 2024, the DSS arbitrarily detained activist Adaramoye Michael Lenin for two months after he called for nationwide protests against bad governance. DSS also detained Dr. Abubakar Alkali, a lecturer from Baze University in Abuja, for three weeks for publicly expressing support for the protests. In August 2025, the DSS detained Omoyele Sowore, a pro-democracy activist and former presidential candidate, for two days over social media posts in which he called Tinubu “a criminal” over his policies. In December 2024, police detained activist Abiodun Olamide Thomas for a month and charged her with cyberbullying and threatening officials over a video she posted on social media in which she criticized police brutality. In April 2025, the regime’s National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) prohibited broadcasters from playing the song “Tell Your Papa” by artist Eedris Abdulkareem, which criticizes Tinubu in light of the hardships, insecurity, and hunger faced by the population. NBC labeled the song as inappropriate and containing objectionable content.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Courts fail to check the regime’s attempts to skew the electoral process in its favor and repress criticism or retaliate against opposition to its widely publicized policies. The regime has undermined institutional independence, leading to cases challenging it being frequently dismissed. Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions often fail to hold regime officials accountable. Systematic reforms have abolished or seriously weakened the independence and effectiveness of judicial and legislative institutions.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Since 2003, the country’s highest courts have systematically dismissed petitions challenging official results of presidential elections, frequently delivering the rulings with significant delay, long after the polls. The courts have consistently dismissed legal challenges on grounds of admissibility or form, without reviewing their merits and substance. For example, in September 2023, the Supreme Court dismissed opposition candidates Abubakar and Obi’s petitions, nearly three months after Tinubu was sworn into office. In 2019, the Court rejected dozens of petitions challenging Buhari’s electoral victory and his eligibility as a candidate seven months after the election.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Despite a March 2022 ruling of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, which outlawed the government’s use of the criminal offense of “cyberstalking” against dissenters, judges continue to arraign regime critics on such charges. For example, in December 2025, a Federal High Court judge in Abuja sent to trial activist Omoyele Sowore on a cyberstalking charge over social media posts calling Tinubu “a criminal.”
The regime has seriously undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the regime are no longer brought or frequently dismissed. In response to a longstanding culture of impunity for Nigerian officials accused of human rights abuses, individuals and organizations have bypassed national courts and filed their complaints directly with the supranational ECOWAS Court of Justice. In several instances, the Court has ruled against the Nigerian government and ordered compensation for the plaintiffs, but the Nigerian authorities have neither complied nor enforced the rulings. For example, In December 2025, the ECOWAS court issued a writ of execution ordering the Nigerian government to implement an April 2025 ruling calling for authorities to amend or repeal blasphemy laws enforced by Kano State to prosecute critics of Islam. In December 2024, the ECOWAS Court ordered the Nigerian government to pay 5 million Naira (approximately $3,436) to Oluwatimilehin Adebayo, a Nigerian citizen, for torture he endured in police custody in Ogun State. Additionally, in July 2024, the regional court found the Nigerian government guilty of human rights abuses in its repression of the 2020 #EndSARS protests and ordered the authorities to pay 2 million Naira (approximately $1,200) in compensation to each victim named in the lawsuit.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. The regime’s institutional capture of all branches of government and key oversight institutions has effectively negated constitutional separations of powers and democratic checks and balances. As a result, there is no meaningful check on the power of Tinubu and the ruling APC. For example, the Supreme Court validated Tinubu’s eligibility for the presidential ballot despite evidence indicating that the educational credentials that he submitted to INEC did not meet the eligibility requirements. The office of Nigeria’s Attorney-General, which doubles as the cabinet minister of justice, has not prosecuted a single member of the security forces involved in the violent suppression of August 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests, with the police dismissing any responsibility for the reported killings of at least 24 people. This is part of a longstanding pattern of official impunity that the Tinubu regime is extending. For example, the Tinubu regime has followed the Buhari regime’s refusal to act on various official investigative panels recommending, for instance, the prosecution of 33 SARS officers for human rights abuses or Nigerian army personnel responsible for the 2015 killings of 349 members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) group.
Both the legislature and judiciary failed to hold Tinubu accountable for his controversial March 2025 imposition of a state of emergency in Rivers state, a measure issued on constitutionally questionable grounds, which involved the 6-month suspension of the Rivers State governor and state legislature and the appointment of a military administrator to oversee the state’s affairs. The legislature approved the measure on a voice vote in contravention of the constitutional requirement for a formal vote of two-thirds of the chamber on a joint resolution. The Supreme Court received petitions challenging the measure but took nine months to issue a ruling on the matter, well beyond the expiration of the emergency measure. Finally, the ruling fell short of adjudicating the substance of the case, with a 6-1 majority of justices affirming the general principle of the president’s prerogative to declare a state of emergency and the limits of that power without any determination.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The constitution confers on the President the power of appointment of a Chief Justice based on a recommendation from the National Judicial Council (NJC), an executive institution overseeing the composition and conduct of the judiciary, and after confirmation by the Senate. However, the executive controls funding allocations of the NJC, and with the APC’s dominance of the legislature, the regime and its patronage network hold pervasive and disproportionate political influence over judicial appointments. The lack of accountability and transparency over judicial appointments has degenerated into an increasing trend of dynastic nepotism, with Chief Justices and senior judicial officers facilitating the appointment of their children or other family members on the bench.
The regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. In December 2025, the executive illegally inserted unapproved alterations to tax bills, setting up the regulatory frameworks of new tax agencies. The alterations weakened legislative oversight over the public revenue management agencies.
