Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Niger as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Niger gained its independence from France in 1960. Although it adopted a democratic constitution in 1992 and held multiparty elections the following year, the country has continued to experience significant political instability since then, including four military coups and recurrent ethnic rebellions. The latest coup took place in July 2023, when a faction of the country’s armed forces overthrew the elected government of President Mohamed Bazoum and established military rule under the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CSNP). General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the leader of the coup, was declared the transitional president in March 2025.
National elections are absent in Niger, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. After toppling Bazoum’s government and establishing military rule, the junta led by Tchiani dissolved all institutions and permanently banned political parties. A new transitional charter declared General Tchiani as president of the transition and postponed constitutional rule to 2030.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The CSNP has extended control over major media outlets and suspended most humanitarian organizations working across the country. International media have also encountered restrictions, particularly following coverage of the 2023 coup and other security developments. Members and supporters of the former government have been arrested or stripped of their citizenship, while increased state surveillance and harsher penalties have further suppressed dissent. The junta has also targeted regular citizens who criticized the government by ordering their suspension or dismissal from professional roles.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The military authorities have consolidated control over judicial appointments and expanded their sanctioning powers. They have also retaliated against magistrates and unions that voiced opposition to the junta’s most prominent policies, while directing politically relevant cases to courts under their influence. In addition to this, the CSNP has claimed for itself both legislative and executive powers for the entire duration of the transition. Anti-corruption institutions have likewise been brought under the control of the ruling junta.
National elections are absent, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Following the establishment of military rule in 2023, the junta in power dissolved all institutions and permanently banned political parties. A new transitional charter declared General Tchiani as transitional president and postponed constitutional rule to 2030.
In July 2023, members of the presidential guard, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, ousted democratically elected President Bazoum and his government. The coup leaders detained Bazoum and his family, suspended the constitution as well as all state institutions, and closed the country’s borders. Bazoum had won the 2021 presidential election with 55.75% of the valid national votes, succeeding Mahamadou Issoufou from the same ruling Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS-Tarayya) in what marked Niger’s first-ever handover of power between two elected leaders. Following the coup, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) was established as the principal decision-making body of the junta, and General Tchiani proclaimed himself ad interim president. In August, the CNSP announced Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine as prime minister, and a new government, made up of both civilian and military members, was formed to oversee the transition process.
The military regime has systematically and unfairly barred political parties. In an early move, the CNSP suspended all political party activities, a measure that was made permanent in March 2025 when President Tchiani signed an ordinance banning all political parties across the country. The decision was taken following Tchiani’s official swearing-in as transitional president and the adoption of a new Charter of the Refoundation, which formalized a five-year transition plan, postponing a return to constitutional rule until 2030, contingent on security conditions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime led by Tchiani and his CSNP has increased scrutiny over the media and suspended the activities of most humanitarian organizations working across the country. International media outlets have also faced repeated restrictions, especially after reporting on the 2023 coup and other security-related developments. Members and supporters of the ousted government have been arrested or lost their citizenship, while increased state surveillance and harsher penalties have stifled dissent. Finally, people criticizing the government have faced suspension or removal from their professional positions.
Under President Tchiani, the regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Since taking power, the junta has increased scrutiny over major media and humanitarian organizations and suspended the activities of most of them. In late January 2025, Niger’s interior minister signed a decree suspending the activities of Maison de la Presse, an umbrella organization representing all local press groups in the country, and mandated the establishment of a new management committee headed by the minister’s secretary general. The suspension came months after the government barred the Maison de la Presse from organizing a general assembly to elect a new Board of Directors and publicly reprimanded its chairman for raising false alarms about press freedom violations in the country. In February 2025, the junta set up a Technical Committee to monitor the activities of civil society organizations (CSOs) and development organizations active in the country. This move followed the government’s earlier decision in November 2024 to revoke the operating licences of two aid groups, the French Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) and its Nigerien partner Action for Well-Being (APBE), without providing justification. In 2025, the junta further ordered, in February, the suspension of activities by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the repatriation of its foreign staff. In November, it suspended hundreds of domestic and foreign CSOs for allegedly failing to comply with the new transparency regulations introduced in early February, effectively authorising only about 100 organizations out of more than 4,000 previously operating in Niger.
Media coverage has been systematically and heavily manipulated by the incumbent regime. This has been reflected in repeated restrictions of international media outlets, particularly those reporting on the 2023 coup or other security-related developments. In December 2024, the junta suspended the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) radio programs for three months after they reported on an extremist attack in the Tillabéri region, causing several civilian and military deaths. The communications minister justified the suspension on the grounds that the BBC broadcasts purposefully exacerbated intercommunity tensions and demoralized the troops deployed in the region. Radio France Internationale (RFI) also reported on the same event, prompting the Nigerien government to announce a complaint against the French state-owned radio network. RFI had already been forced to suspend activities in August 2023, a month after the military seized control of the country, along with another popular French broadcaster, France 24. In August 2024, Niger announced a joint plan with the leaders of Mali and Burkina Faso to establish a new web television with the aim of fighting against disinformation campaigns and enhancing the credibility of the Sahel states at the international level. The new Web TV was officially launched on December 31, 2024.
The CSNP has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent journalists and political opponents. This has involved mass arrests, revocations of citizenship, increased state surveillance, and harsher penalties to silence dissenters. Since July 2023, the junta has arbitrarily arrested several members of the ousted government, along with senior members and supporters of Bazoum’s party. Although approximately 50 detainees were released in April 2025, prominent opposition figures remain in detention as of December 2025, including Bazoum himself. In October 2024, the CSNP provisionally revoked the citizenship of nine individuals accused of disturbing public peace and plotting against state authority. The decree, targeting, among others, Bazoum’s former advisor and the former head of the presidential guard, was issued pursuant to a prior ordinance signed by President Tchiani in August, which established a new database of persons suspected of terrorism. The ordinance set vaguely defined grounds for inclusion in the database, including the dissemination of comments deemed likely to disturb public order, and denies those listed due process, effectively becoming a tool of repression disguised as counterterrorism.
Journalists have also faced an increasingly stringent environment, especially after the regime amended in June 2024 the 2019 Cybercrime Law to reinstate prison sentences for defamation and the online dissemination of information likely to disturb public order. In September 2024, Ali Soumana, editor at Le Courrier, was arrested and charged with defamation in relation to an article he wrote on a corruption scandal involving the prime minister. In November 2024, six journalists were also arrested under the same law for sharing an invitation to a state-sponsored press briefing on social media.
Finally, dissenting speech has been seriously and unfairly censored. There have been reported cases where people criticizing the government faced suspension or removal from their professional positions. In January 2025, Niger’s Ministry of Communication announced the temporary suspension of one of the country’s leading private TV channels, Canal 3, and its journalist, Seyni Amadou, after the channel broadcast a story commenting on the performance of government ministers. However, three days after the initial decision, the government rescinded the suspension of Canal 3, and Seyni Amadou was released from police custody. In August 2023, Tchiani ordered the removal of seven academics and state officials from their positions. Just days before their dismissal, these individuals had signed a petition opposing the official stance of the National Union of Higher Education Teachers and Researchers (SNECS), which had expressed support for the CSNP. Despite these incidents, academic freedom remains largely unconstrained.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The ruling junta has restructured the judicial system to consolidate control over judicial appointments and to expand its sanctioning powers. It has also retaliated against magistrates and judicial sector unions that voiced opposition to its decisions, while directing politically relevant cases to courts under its influence. In addition to this, the junta has claimed to exercise both legislative and executive authority for the entire duration of the transition. Anti-corruption institutions have likewise been brought under the control of the military authorities.
The military regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish their independence and operational effectiveness. These have guaranteed more political influence over judicial appointments and new sanctioning powers to increase compliance among judges. In July 2023, the CSNP issued a decree to dissolve two high courts, the Court of Cassation and the State Council, replacing them with a new State Court. As the highest judicial and administrative authority of the land, the new court has the power to rule on criminal, social, and customary matters, as well as on cases of abuse of power and the interpretation of administrative acts. The members of the court are nominated by decree by the president of the CSNP, who appoints them after consultation with the minister of justice. In November 2023, the regime enacted seven presidential decrees to nominate the president and over 20 other members of the State Court, and subsequent reshuffles of judges have occurred on a regular basis since then. In August 2025, a new decree further extended the discretionary power of the head of state by granting him the authority to directly sanction magistrates, through any measure he deems appropriate, for alleged misconduct or behavior considered prejudicial to state institutions, with retroactive effect. Beyond violating the principle of separation of powers, this measure provides the executive with a powerful instrument to increase compliance among judges by intimidating or retaliating against those who openly criticize the regime’s policies.
Members of the judicial branch who are perceived as a threat to the regime have faced systematic retaliation. The junta has targeted magistrates and judicial sector unions that expressed negative views of its decisions. In August 2025, President Tchiani issued a decree removing Abdoul-Nasser Bagna Abdourahamane, former secretary general of the Autonomous Union of Magistrates of Niger (SAMAN), from the judiciary. Bagna had publicly denounced the decision of the minister of the interior, taken a week earlier, to formally dissolve SAMAN and four other major justice-sector unions, which had strongly criticized government interference in judicial appointments and investigations. The minister justified the dissolution on the grounds that the union had allegedly privileged personal interests over the correct functioning of the public justice sector. The day following Bagna’s dismissal, President Tchiani removed Moussa Mahamodou, deputy secretary general at SAMAN, who had signed a statement denouncing the dismissal of his superior and calling for a general strike. In July 2024, the regime also removed two public prosecutors at Tillabéri and Konni regional courts and demoted them to positions within the Ministry of Justice, after their decisions conflicted with regime interests. In both cases, the prosecutors initiated legal investigations that were later halted by regime officials or the police.
The junta has systematically directed politically sensitive cases to regime-controlled courts. It has accused members of the ousted government in front of the State Court and military courts. In June 2024, Niger’s State Court, whose composition is entirely controlled by the head of state, lifted the presidential immunity of Mohamed Bazoum, thus opening the possibility of his prosecution. The ousted president, who has been in arbitrary detention since the 2023 military takeover, was accused by the military authorities of high treason, conspiracy to undermine state security, and advocacy of terrorism. Observers reported a series of irregularities in Bazoum’s proceeding before the court, including violations of the defendant’s right to present defense evidence and to communicate with his lawyers. Previously, in September 2023, several officials from the ousted government were charged by the regime authorities with threatening state security before a military court, despite their civilian status, thus in violation of due process guarantees. The junta, however, released some of the detainees in April 2025.
The military regime has systematically subjected legislative and executive institutions to reforms that abolish their independence and operational effectiveness. In accordance with the Charter of the Refoundation, the CSNP exercises both legislative and executive powers for the entire duration of the transition. In April 2025, the CSNP issued a decree establishing the Advisory Council for the Refoundation (CCR), a transitional body tasked with giving recommendations to the junta. In contrast with the previous National Assembly, the unicameral body dissolved after the coup, the council does not hold legislative power, which is, instead, a prerogative of the CSNP in its quality of “supreme body guiding the policy of the nation.” The head of state retains the power to nominate and remove by decree the members of the CCR. In May, Tchiani nominated 194 individuals to the council, both civilians and military officers, as well as its board members. For the duration of the transition, the CSNP is also the repository of executive power, while the prime minister, nominated by the head of state, is tasked with coordinating the actions of the government according to the CSNP’s directives.
Finally, oversight bodies have also been systematically subjected to reforms that abolish their independence and operational effectiveness. Despite publicly pledging to combat corruption in a post-coup speech, President Tchiani ordered the creation of a new anti-corruption commission that is entirely controlled by the junta and barred from scrutinizing the military’s economic activities. The Commission for Combating Economic, Financial, and Tax Crime (CoLDEFF) was established through presidential decree in September 2023. The commission is tasked, among other things, with investigating cases of economic, financial, and fiscal crimes. Its composition includes military and police officers, judges, and civil society actors. In practice, however, the commission lacks autonomy, as all its members are directly appointed by the ruling CSNP. In addition to this, a presidential decree signed in February 2024 exempted military budgeting and expenditures from oversight and taxation, significantly weakening transparency mechanisms governing an area of public spending that is central to the military and where Niger has long faced problems of corruption and fund mismanagement.
HRF classifies Niger as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Niger gained its independence from France in 1960. Although it adopted a democratic constitution in 1992 and held multiparty elections the following year, the country has continued to experience significant political instability since then, including four military coups and recurrent ethnic rebellions. The latest coup took place in July 2023, when a faction of the country’s armed forces overthrew the elected government of President Mohamed Bazoum and established military rule under the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CSNP). General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the leader of the coup, was declared the transitional president in March 2025.
National elections are absent in Niger, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. After toppling Bazoum’s government and establishing military rule, the junta led by Tchiani dissolved all institutions and permanently banned political parties. A new transitional charter declared General Tchiani as president of the transition and postponed constitutional rule to 2030.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The CSNP has extended control over major media outlets and suspended most humanitarian organizations working across the country. International media have also encountered restrictions, particularly following coverage of the 2023 coup and other security developments. Members and supporters of the former government have been arrested or stripped of their citizenship, while increased state surveillance and harsher penalties have further suppressed dissent. The junta has also targeted regular citizens who criticized the government by ordering their suspension or dismissal from professional roles.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The military authorities have consolidated control over judicial appointments and expanded their sanctioning powers. They have also retaliated against magistrates and unions that voiced opposition to the junta’s most prominent policies, while directing politically relevant cases to courts under their influence. In addition to this, the CSNP has claimed for itself both legislative and executive powers for the entire duration of the transition. Anti-corruption institutions have likewise been brought under the control of the ruling junta.
National elections are absent, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Following the establishment of military rule in 2023, the junta in power dissolved all institutions and permanently banned political parties. A new transitional charter declared General Tchiani as transitional president and postponed constitutional rule to 2030.
In July 2023, members of the presidential guard, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, ousted democratically elected President Bazoum and his government. The coup leaders detained Bazoum and his family, suspended the constitution as well as all state institutions, and closed the country’s borders. Bazoum had won the 2021 presidential election with 55.75% of the valid national votes, succeeding Mahamadou Issoufou from the same ruling Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS-Tarayya) in what marked Niger’s first-ever handover of power between two elected leaders. Following the coup, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) was established as the principal decision-making body of the junta, and General Tchiani proclaimed himself ad interim president. In August, the CNSP announced Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine as prime minister, and a new government, made up of both civilian and military members, was formed to oversee the transition process.
The military regime has systematically and unfairly barred political parties. In an early move, the CNSP suspended all political party activities, a measure that was made permanent in March 2025 when President Tchiani signed an ordinance banning all political parties across the country. The decision was taken following Tchiani’s official swearing-in as transitional president and the adoption of a new Charter of the Refoundation, which formalized a five-year transition plan, postponing a return to constitutional rule until 2030, contingent on security conditions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime led by Tchiani and his CSNP has increased scrutiny over the media and suspended the activities of most humanitarian organizations working across the country. International media outlets have also faced repeated restrictions, especially after reporting on the 2023 coup and other security-related developments. Members and supporters of the ousted government have been arrested or lost their citizenship, while increased state surveillance and harsher penalties have stifled dissent. Finally, people criticizing the government have faced suspension or removal from their professional positions.
Under President Tchiani, the regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Since taking power, the junta has increased scrutiny over major media and humanitarian organizations and suspended the activities of most of them. In late January 2025, Niger’s interior minister signed a decree suspending the activities of Maison de la Presse, an umbrella organization representing all local press groups in the country, and mandated the establishment of a new management committee headed by the minister’s secretary general. The suspension came months after the government barred the Maison de la Presse from organizing a general assembly to elect a new Board of Directors and publicly reprimanded its chairman for raising false alarms about press freedom violations in the country. In February 2025, the junta set up a Technical Committee to monitor the activities of civil society organizations (CSOs) and development organizations active in the country. This move followed the government’s earlier decision in November 2024 to revoke the operating licences of two aid groups, the French Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) and its Nigerien partner Action for Well-Being (APBE), without providing justification. In 2025, the junta further ordered, in February, the suspension of activities by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the repatriation of its foreign staff. In November, it suspended hundreds of domestic and foreign CSOs for allegedly failing to comply with the new transparency regulations introduced in early February, effectively authorising only about 100 organizations out of more than 4,000 previously operating in Niger.
Media coverage has been systematically and heavily manipulated by the incumbent regime. This has been reflected in repeated restrictions of international media outlets, particularly those reporting on the 2023 coup or other security-related developments. In December 2024, the junta suspended the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) radio programs for three months after they reported on an extremist attack in the Tillabéri region, causing several civilian and military deaths. The communications minister justified the suspension on the grounds that the BBC broadcasts purposefully exacerbated intercommunity tensions and demoralized the troops deployed in the region. Radio France Internationale (RFI) also reported on the same event, prompting the Nigerien government to announce a complaint against the French state-owned radio network. RFI had already been forced to suspend activities in August 2023, a month after the military seized control of the country, along with another popular French broadcaster, France 24. In August 2024, Niger announced a joint plan with the leaders of Mali and Burkina Faso to establish a new web television with the aim of fighting against disinformation campaigns and enhancing the credibility of the Sahel states at the international level. The new Web TV was officially launched on December 31, 2024.
The CSNP has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent journalists and political opponents. This has involved mass arrests, revocations of citizenship, increased state surveillance, and harsher penalties to silence dissenters. Since July 2023, the junta has arbitrarily arrested several members of the ousted government, along with senior members and supporters of Bazoum’s party. Although approximately 50 detainees were released in April 2025, prominent opposition figures remain in detention as of December 2025, including Bazoum himself. In October 2024, the CSNP provisionally revoked the citizenship of nine individuals accused of disturbing public peace and plotting against state authority. The decree, targeting, among others, Bazoum’s former advisor and the former head of the presidential guard, was issued pursuant to a prior ordinance signed by President Tchiani in August, which established a new database of persons suspected of terrorism. The ordinance set vaguely defined grounds for inclusion in the database, including the dissemination of comments deemed likely to disturb public order, and denies those listed due process, effectively becoming a tool of repression disguised as counterterrorism.
Journalists have also faced an increasingly stringent environment, especially after the regime amended in June 2024 the 2019 Cybercrime Law to reinstate prison sentences for defamation and the online dissemination of information likely to disturb public order. In September 2024, Ali Soumana, editor at Le Courrier, was arrested and charged with defamation in relation to an article he wrote on a corruption scandal involving the prime minister. In November 2024, six journalists were also arrested under the same law for sharing an invitation to a state-sponsored press briefing on social media.
Finally, dissenting speech has been seriously and unfairly censored. There have been reported cases where people criticizing the government faced suspension or removal from their professional positions. In January 2025, Niger’s Ministry of Communication announced the temporary suspension of one of the country’s leading private TV channels, Canal 3, and its journalist, Seyni Amadou, after the channel broadcast a story commenting on the performance of government ministers. However, three days after the initial decision, the government rescinded the suspension of Canal 3, and Seyni Amadou was released from police custody. In August 2023, Tchiani ordered the removal of seven academics and state officials from their positions. Just days before their dismissal, these individuals had signed a petition opposing the official stance of the National Union of Higher Education Teachers and Researchers (SNECS), which had expressed support for the CSNP. Despite these incidents, academic freedom remains largely unconstrained.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The ruling junta has restructured the judicial system to consolidate control over judicial appointments and to expand its sanctioning powers. It has also retaliated against magistrates and judicial sector unions that voiced opposition to its decisions, while directing politically relevant cases to courts under its influence. In addition to this, the junta has claimed to exercise both legislative and executive authority for the entire duration of the transition. Anti-corruption institutions have likewise been brought under the control of the military authorities.
The military regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish their independence and operational effectiveness. These have guaranteed more political influence over judicial appointments and new sanctioning powers to increase compliance among judges. In July 2023, the CSNP issued a decree to dissolve two high courts, the Court of Cassation and the State Council, replacing them with a new State Court. As the highest judicial and administrative authority of the land, the new court has the power to rule on criminal, social, and customary matters, as well as on cases of abuse of power and the interpretation of administrative acts. The members of the court are nominated by decree by the president of the CSNP, who appoints them after consultation with the minister of justice. In November 2023, the regime enacted seven presidential decrees to nominate the president and over 20 other members of the State Court, and subsequent reshuffles of judges have occurred on a regular basis since then. In August 2025, a new decree further extended the discretionary power of the head of state by granting him the authority to directly sanction magistrates, through any measure he deems appropriate, for alleged misconduct or behavior considered prejudicial to state institutions, with retroactive effect. Beyond violating the principle of separation of powers, this measure provides the executive with a powerful instrument to increase compliance among judges by intimidating or retaliating against those who openly criticize the regime’s policies.
Members of the judicial branch who are perceived as a threat to the regime have faced systematic retaliation. The junta has targeted magistrates and judicial sector unions that expressed negative views of its decisions. In August 2025, President Tchiani issued a decree removing Abdoul-Nasser Bagna Abdourahamane, former secretary general of the Autonomous Union of Magistrates of Niger (SAMAN), from the judiciary. Bagna had publicly denounced the decision of the minister of the interior, taken a week earlier, to formally dissolve SAMAN and four other major justice-sector unions, which had strongly criticized government interference in judicial appointments and investigations. The minister justified the dissolution on the grounds that the union had allegedly privileged personal interests over the correct functioning of the public justice sector. The day following Bagna’s dismissal, President Tchiani removed Moussa Mahamodou, deputy secretary general at SAMAN, who had signed a statement denouncing the dismissal of his superior and calling for a general strike. In July 2024, the regime also removed two public prosecutors at Tillabéri and Konni regional courts and demoted them to positions within the Ministry of Justice, after their decisions conflicted with regime interests. In both cases, the prosecutors initiated legal investigations that were later halted by regime officials or the police.
The junta has systematically directed politically sensitive cases to regime-controlled courts. It has accused members of the ousted government in front of the State Court and military courts. In June 2024, Niger’s State Court, whose composition is entirely controlled by the head of state, lifted the presidential immunity of Mohamed Bazoum, thus opening the possibility of his prosecution. The ousted president, who has been in arbitrary detention since the 2023 military takeover, was accused by the military authorities of high treason, conspiracy to undermine state security, and advocacy of terrorism. Observers reported a series of irregularities in Bazoum’s proceeding before the court, including violations of the defendant’s right to present defense evidence and to communicate with his lawyers. Previously, in September 2023, several officials from the ousted government were charged by the regime authorities with threatening state security before a military court, despite their civilian status, thus in violation of due process guarantees. The junta, however, released some of the detainees in April 2025.
The military regime has systematically subjected legislative and executive institutions to reforms that abolish their independence and operational effectiveness. In accordance with the Charter of the Refoundation, the CSNP exercises both legislative and executive powers for the entire duration of the transition. In April 2025, the CSNP issued a decree establishing the Advisory Council for the Refoundation (CCR), a transitional body tasked with giving recommendations to the junta. In contrast with the previous National Assembly, the unicameral body dissolved after the coup, the council does not hold legislative power, which is, instead, a prerogative of the CSNP in its quality of “supreme body guiding the policy of the nation.” The head of state retains the power to nominate and remove by decree the members of the CCR. In May, Tchiani nominated 194 individuals to the council, both civilians and military officers, as well as its board members. For the duration of the transition, the CSNP is also the repository of executive power, while the prime minister, nominated by the head of state, is tasked with coordinating the actions of the government according to the CSNP’s directives.
Finally, oversight bodies have also been systematically subjected to reforms that abolish their independence and operational effectiveness. Despite publicly pledging to combat corruption in a post-coup speech, President Tchiani ordered the creation of a new anti-corruption commission that is entirely controlled by the junta and barred from scrutinizing the military’s economic activities. The Commission for Combating Economic, Financial, and Tax Crime (CoLDEFF) was established through presidential decree in September 2023. The commission is tasked, among other things, with investigating cases of economic, financial, and fiscal crimes. Its composition includes military and police officers, judges, and civil society actors. In practice, however, the commission lacks autonomy, as all its members are directly appointed by the ruling CSNP. In addition to this, a presidential decree signed in February 2024 exempted military budgeting and expenditures from oversight and taxation, significantly weakening transparency mechanisms governing an area of public spending that is central to the military and where Niger has long faced problems of corruption and fund mismanagement.
