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HRF classifies the Netherlands as democratic.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of government, in which the monarch (currently King Willem-Alexander) is the formal head of state with largely ceremonial duties, while executive power is exercised by the cabinet led in practice by the prime minister. Legislative authority is shared between the government and the bicameral States General, comprising the directly elected House of Representatives (“Tweede Kamer,” 150 seats), which can initiate and amend legislation and holds the cabinet to account, and the indirectly elected Senate (“Eerste Kamer,” 75 seats), which primarily reviews legislation. Dutch politics is defined by proportional representation, a highly fragmented multiparty system, and a strong tradition of consensus-building that makes coalition governments the norm. Following the October 2025 parliamentary elections, the dispersion of seats once again necessitated prolonged coalition negotiations, which concluded in January 2026 with the formation of a rare minority government led by Prime Minister Rob Jetten.
In the Netherlands, national elections are largely free and fair. The nation has a competitive, inclusive electoral system whose proportional representation rules produce a fragmented multiparty landscape that requires coalition governments. Elections in 2023 and 2025 illustrated the openness and competitiveness of the system, with all 150 parliamentary seats distributed across a wide range of parties.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society, and members of the general public are largely free to criticize the Dutch government. The state has not unfairly shut down dissenting organizations or censored media, and press freedom is protected by strong constitutional and institutional safeguards. At the same time, journalists face growing harassment from third parties, although the government has taken legislative and practical steps to address these risks. Protests generally occur without undue restrictions.
Dutch institutions function independently and provide effective checks on the governing authority. The judiciary operates without government interference, enjoys high public confidence, and continues to rule on cases challenging the state without facing retaliation. Beyond the courts, executive and oversight bodies retain operational independence, supporting effective accountability through autonomous prosecution and established enforcement mechanisms.
In the Netherlands, national elections are largely free and fair. The nation has a competitive, inclusive electoral system whose proportional representation rules produce a fragmented multiparty landscape that requires coalition governments. The government does not significantly hinder opposition campaigning and operates within a credible electoral framework supported by regulated campaign financing, pluralistic media access, and professional, independent election administration. Elections in 2023 and 2025 illustrated the openness and competitiveness of the system, with all 150 parliamentary seats distributed across a wide range of parties.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The country uses a nationwide system of proportional representation, meaning that seats in parliament are allocated in proportion to each party’s share of the national vote. Because the electoral threshold is low, many parties are able to win seats without facing significant barriers. This results in a highly fragmented multiparty system in which coalition governments are necessary and political decision-making is shaped by negotiation and compromise. To illustrate, in the October 2025 Dutch general election, voters distributed all 150 seats in the House of Representatives across a wide range of parties, producing a fragmented outcome in which no single party came close to a majority (76 seats). Democrats 66 (D66) finished first by a razor-thin margin with 16.9% of the vote and 26 seats, essentially tied with the Party for Freedom (PVV), which won 16.7% and also secured 26 seats. The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) followed with 14.2% of the vote and 22 seats, while the GroenLinks-PvdA alliance took 12.79% and 20 seats, and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) rebounded with 11.7% and 18 seats. Smaller parties, such as JA21 (5.9%, 9 seats), Forum for Democracy (4.5%, 7 seats), and the Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB) (2.6%, 4 seats), also gained representation, along with several parties that each won three seats (DENK, SGP, PvdD, CU, and SP). In addition, 50PLUS returned to parliament with two seats, and Volt secured one seat. This broad dispersion of seats ensured that post-election coalition negotiations were again required to form a government. In fact, negotiations lasted more than three months and culminated in January 2026 in a rare minority coalition among D66, CDA, and VVD, totaling just 66 seats, with D66 leader Rob Jetten becoming prime minister and displacing the PVV-led governing arrangement that had collapsed earlier in the year.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign, nor has it undermined independent electoral oversight. International observers, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have assessed the Netherlands’ legal framework as conducive to electoral integrity. The country imposes limits on campaign donations and restrictions on contributions from foreign sources. Moreover, the media landscape in the Netherlands is pluralistic, with equitable access for election participants supported by constitutional protections for media freedom and by the Media Act 2008, which requires public broadcasters to allocate coverage to political parties in proportion to their electoral representation. Electoral oversight in the Netherlands is also efficient and credible. The election administration comprises several institutions, including the Ministry of Interior, the Electoral Commission (“Kiesraad”), District Election Commissions, and municipal authorities, all working collectively to ensure elections’ impartial administration.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organisations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticise or challenge the Dutch government. The government has not unfairly shut down independent or dissenting organizations, and the Netherlands continues to host a large and diverse civil society sector. Additionally, it has not seriously intimidated or censored independent media or dissenting voices, and the country benefits from a diverse media landscape protected by strong constitutional and statutory guarantees of press freedom. Similarly, the Dutch authorities have not manipulated media coverage in their favor. At the same time, despite strong formal protections, journalists increasingly face violence, intimidation, and legal and online harassment from third parties, but the government has implemented practical and legislative measures to address these concerns. Finally, the government has generally not repressed protests or gatherings, which continue to occur.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. The Netherlands has a robust civil society, with many thousands of civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in different spheres spanning from human rights and humanitarian assistance to health, education, and social services. The government has traditionally supported CSOs through public subsidies; however, major funding reductions announced by the PVV government in November 2024 are expected to significantly undermine such organizations, particularly those working on international development, human rights, and minority issues. Under the new policy framework for 2026-2030, the civil society subsidy budget is reduced from approximately €1.4 billion (around $1.5 billion) in the previous funding period to around €400-€500 million (around $430-$540 million). In addition, fundraising requirements for aid organizations have been tightened: CSOs must now independently raise at least 50% of their budgets to qualify for state subsidies, up from the previous requirement of 25%.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, nor has it censored dissenting speech. The country benefits from a diverse media landscape comprising independent national and regional newspapers, commercial broadcasters, and the independent public broadcaster Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS). In addition, the Netherlands has served as a safe haven for media in exile, including Russian outlets such as The Moscow Times and TV Dozhd. Press freedom in the Netherlands is protected by the Dutch Constitution, which protects freedom of expression and, under Article 7, explicitly requires that “[n]o one shall require prior permission to publish thoughts or opinions through the press.” These constitutional protections are operationalized through a detailed statutory framework, notably the Media Act 2008 and the Media Decree 2008, which legally safeguard the independence, quality, diversity, and accessibility of audiovisual media.
Media oversight is carried out by the Dutch Media Authority (“Commissariaat voor de Media”), which is functionally independent and operates under a statutory mandate designed to safeguard impartiality and media pluralism. It is led by a three-member Board of Commissioners appointed by the Minister of Primary and Secondary Education and Media, under procedures intended to ensure professional independence and impartiality (including fixed terms of office, statutory duties to act independently, and the prohibition on the minister directing or influencing their decisions in individual cases). The Authority licenses broadcasters, registers video-on-demand services, and monitors compliance. It does not exercise prior restraint and does not assess journalistic viewpoints or political content.
At the same time, independent journalists increasingly face a combination of physical violence, intimidation, legal pressure, and online harassment from third parties. The most notable attack on press freedom in the Netherlands was the assassination of crime journalist Peter R. de Vries in 2021 by hired criminals linked to organized crime networks. Although authorities stated he was targeted for his role as an adviser to a protected witness in a criminal trial, the killing was widely perceived as an attack on journalism and the rule of law and had a chilling effect, particularly on crime reporting. In response, the Dutch government adopted several measures to strengthen journalist protection. Doxing was criminalized in 2024, making the intentional public disclosure of personal data to intimidate or obstruct individuals a criminal offence, with aggravated penalties when journalists are targeted. In 2025, legislation was introduced to implement the EU Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation Directive, providing safeguards against abusive civil lawsuits intended to silence journalists and other public-interest actors. The government also provides structural funding to PersVeilig, a national initiative offering reporting mechanisms, legal support, and safety training for journalists, including in cases of online harassment.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Regarding the government-controlled media, public broadcasters in the Netherlands operate under the Media Act 2008, which, as mentioned above, establishes the legal framework for public broadcasting and safeguards editorial independence. Under this Act, the publicly funded foundation Netherlands Public Broadcasting (“Nederlandse Publieke Omroep”) coordinates government-allocated budgets, broadcasting schedules, and cooperation among the public broadcasting associations. Editorial responsibility for programme content remains with the individual broadcasters.
With regard to independent media, the government refrained from influencing editorial decisions. There have been concerns about media concentration following the 2011 expiry of the Temporary Act on Media Ownership, which introduced more robust antitrust regulations (including an absolute 35% market share cap). Currently, the top four broadcasting companies control between 69% and 91% of the market, according to different expert estimates. At the same time, monitoring by local watchdogs doesn’t suggest that political or business elites exert disproportionate control over programming, personnel, or editorial policies. Dutch media has a long tradition of self-regulation in the sphere of journalistic ethics and editorial standards, with professional associations, such as the Union of Journalists and the Society of Chief Editors, participating in appointing the independent Press Council. The Council, in turn, investigates violations of good journalistic practice and helps maintain ethical standards.
Finally, the Dutch government has not systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Authorities generally respect the freedom of assembly, although specific provisions in the Public Assemblies Act have prompted criticism by watchdogs such as Amnesty International. The Act allows mayors to restrict, ban, or disperse assemblies in instances in which international human rights law would not, such as where assemblies are restricted or sanctioned solely due to failure to provide prior notification or comply with imposed conditions (for example, location, route, or time requirements). In some cases, authorities have arbitrarily dispersed peaceful environmental and pro-Palestinian demonstrations, using tactics such as mass detentions and water cannons. These instances prompted the CIVICUS monitor to downgrade the Netherlands’ civic space rating from “Open” (the highest category) to “Narrowed” (the second-highest) in 2024. This classification indicates that while the freedoms of assembly and association are generally upheld, isolated yet notable exceptions occur.
The Dutch institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority. The judiciary operates in practice without governmental interference and enjoys high public confidence. As a result, courts continue to hear and decide cases challenging the government without facing retaliation. Beyond the judiciary, the Dutch government has preserved the independence and operational capacity of executive and oversight institutions, enabling effective accountability through well-defined ministerial responsibilities, autonomous prosecutorial bodies, and a proven record of holding public officials accountable.
The Dutch government has not undermined judicial independence. Article 117(1)-(3) of the Constitution provides the core personal guarantees of independence by stating that “[m]embers of the judiciary responsible for the administration of justice [. . .] shall be appointed for life by Royal Decree” and that they “may be suspended or dismissed” only “[i]n cases laid down by Act of Parliament [. . .] by a court that is part of the judiciary and designated by Act of Parliament.” These constitutional standards are effectively operationalised through the judiciary’s institutional organization. The Netherlands’ Council for the Judiciary (“Raad voor de rechtspraak”) is responsible for the allocation of budgets to courts, supervision of financial management, review of applications for vacant positions in the judiciary, and submission of recommendations to the Crown for formal approval. It consists of four members (two former judges and two non-judicial members with senior administrative experience) appointed by Royal Decree upon nomination by the Minister of Justice and Security. It forms part of the judiciary and is not subordinate to the Minister. Furthermore, under the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, each court is governed by a collegial court board (“gerechtsbestuur”) responsible for integral management and day-to-day operations.
As a result, the government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Instead, Dutch courts are willing to rule against the state. For example, in January 2025, the District Court of The Hague held that the government had acted unlawfully by failing to comply with legally mandated nitrogen-emissions reduction targets designed to protect environmentally sensitive areas. The court ordered the state to meet those targets by 2030 and attached a potential financial penalty for non-compliance. The decision demonstrates the judiciary’s readiness to impose concrete legal obligations on the executive even in politically contentious cases.
Similarly, the government has not subjected executive or independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence, ensuring that systems are able to hold government officials accountable. Operational accountability is ensured by the independent Public Prosecution Service (“Openbaar Ministerie”), which autonomously decides on investigations and prosecutions and is supported by the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (“Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst”), and the national police. The robustness of these institutions, together with the effectiveness of public accountability, is reflected in the independent anti-corruption assessments, including by Transparency International, which has historically positioned the Netherlands among the leaders of anti-corruption action. This reputation is supported by concrete instances in which public officials have been investigated, prosecuted, and sanctioned. For example, between 2012 and 2016, long-serving politician and former member of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, Jozef Franciscus Bernard (“Jos”) van Rey, was investigated and prosecuted for corruption-related offenses, including bribery and breach of official secrecy. In 2016, he was sentenced to a one-year suspended prison term and a two-year disqualification from holding public office, demonstrating the practical enforcement of accountability mechanisms regardless of political status.
HRF classifies the Netherlands as democratic.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of government, in which the monarch (currently King Willem-Alexander) is the formal head of state with largely ceremonial duties, while executive power is exercised by the cabinet led in practice by the prime minister. Legislative authority is shared between the government and the bicameral States General, comprising the directly elected House of Representatives (“Tweede Kamer,” 150 seats), which can initiate and amend legislation and holds the cabinet to account, and the indirectly elected Senate (“Eerste Kamer,” 75 seats), which primarily reviews legislation. Dutch politics is defined by proportional representation, a highly fragmented multiparty system, and a strong tradition of consensus-building that makes coalition governments the norm. Following the October 2025 parliamentary elections, the dispersion of seats once again necessitated prolonged coalition negotiations, which concluded in January 2026 with the formation of a rare minority government led by Prime Minister Rob Jetten.
In the Netherlands, national elections are largely free and fair. The nation has a competitive, inclusive electoral system whose proportional representation rules produce a fragmented multiparty landscape that requires coalition governments. Elections in 2023 and 2025 illustrated the openness and competitiveness of the system, with all 150 parliamentary seats distributed across a wide range of parties.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society, and members of the general public are largely free to criticize the Dutch government. The state has not unfairly shut down dissenting organizations or censored media, and press freedom is protected by strong constitutional and institutional safeguards. At the same time, journalists face growing harassment from third parties, although the government has taken legislative and practical steps to address these risks. Protests generally occur without undue restrictions.
Dutch institutions function independently and provide effective checks on the governing authority. The judiciary operates without government interference, enjoys high public confidence, and continues to rule on cases challenging the state without facing retaliation. Beyond the courts, executive and oversight bodies retain operational independence, supporting effective accountability through autonomous prosecution and established enforcement mechanisms.
In the Netherlands, national elections are largely free and fair. The nation has a competitive, inclusive electoral system whose proportional representation rules produce a fragmented multiparty landscape that requires coalition governments. The government does not significantly hinder opposition campaigning and operates within a credible electoral framework supported by regulated campaign financing, pluralistic media access, and professional, independent election administration. Elections in 2023 and 2025 illustrated the openness and competitiveness of the system, with all 150 parliamentary seats distributed across a wide range of parties.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The country uses a nationwide system of proportional representation, meaning that seats in parliament are allocated in proportion to each party’s share of the national vote. Because the electoral threshold is low, many parties are able to win seats without facing significant barriers. This results in a highly fragmented multiparty system in which coalition governments are necessary and political decision-making is shaped by negotiation and compromise. To illustrate, in the October 2025 Dutch general election, voters distributed all 150 seats in the House of Representatives across a wide range of parties, producing a fragmented outcome in which no single party came close to a majority (76 seats). Democrats 66 (D66) finished first by a razor-thin margin with 16.9% of the vote and 26 seats, essentially tied with the Party for Freedom (PVV), which won 16.7% and also secured 26 seats. The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) followed with 14.2% of the vote and 22 seats, while the GroenLinks-PvdA alliance took 12.79% and 20 seats, and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) rebounded with 11.7% and 18 seats. Smaller parties, such as JA21 (5.9%, 9 seats), Forum for Democracy (4.5%, 7 seats), and the Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB) (2.6%, 4 seats), also gained representation, along with several parties that each won three seats (DENK, SGP, PvdD, CU, and SP). In addition, 50PLUS returned to parliament with two seats, and Volt secured one seat. This broad dispersion of seats ensured that post-election coalition negotiations were again required to form a government. In fact, negotiations lasted more than three months and culminated in January 2026 in a rare minority coalition among D66, CDA, and VVD, totaling just 66 seats, with D66 leader Rob Jetten becoming prime minister and displacing the PVV-led governing arrangement that had collapsed earlier in the year.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign, nor has it undermined independent electoral oversight. International observers, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have assessed the Netherlands’ legal framework as conducive to electoral integrity. The country imposes limits on campaign donations and restrictions on contributions from foreign sources. Moreover, the media landscape in the Netherlands is pluralistic, with equitable access for election participants supported by constitutional protections for media freedom and by the Media Act 2008, which requires public broadcasters to allocate coverage to political parties in proportion to their electoral representation. Electoral oversight in the Netherlands is also efficient and credible. The election administration comprises several institutions, including the Ministry of Interior, the Electoral Commission (“Kiesraad”), District Election Commissions, and municipal authorities, all working collectively to ensure elections’ impartial administration.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organisations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticise or challenge the Dutch government. The government has not unfairly shut down independent or dissenting organizations, and the Netherlands continues to host a large and diverse civil society sector. Additionally, it has not seriously intimidated or censored independent media or dissenting voices, and the country benefits from a diverse media landscape protected by strong constitutional and statutory guarantees of press freedom. Similarly, the Dutch authorities have not manipulated media coverage in their favor. At the same time, despite strong formal protections, journalists increasingly face violence, intimidation, and legal and online harassment from third parties, but the government has implemented practical and legislative measures to address these concerns. Finally, the government has generally not repressed protests or gatherings, which continue to occur.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. The Netherlands has a robust civil society, with many thousands of civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in different spheres spanning from human rights and humanitarian assistance to health, education, and social services. The government has traditionally supported CSOs through public subsidies; however, major funding reductions announced by the PVV government in November 2024 are expected to significantly undermine such organizations, particularly those working on international development, human rights, and minority issues. Under the new policy framework for 2026-2030, the civil society subsidy budget is reduced from approximately €1.4 billion (around $1.5 billion) in the previous funding period to around €400-€500 million (around $430-$540 million). In addition, fundraising requirements for aid organizations have been tightened: CSOs must now independently raise at least 50% of their budgets to qualify for state subsidies, up from the previous requirement of 25%.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, nor has it censored dissenting speech. The country benefits from a diverse media landscape comprising independent national and regional newspapers, commercial broadcasters, and the independent public broadcaster Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS). In addition, the Netherlands has served as a safe haven for media in exile, including Russian outlets such as The Moscow Times and TV Dozhd. Press freedom in the Netherlands is protected by the Dutch Constitution, which protects freedom of expression and, under Article 7, explicitly requires that “[n]o one shall require prior permission to publish thoughts or opinions through the press.” These constitutional protections are operationalized through a detailed statutory framework, notably the Media Act 2008 and the Media Decree 2008, which legally safeguard the independence, quality, diversity, and accessibility of audiovisual media.
Media oversight is carried out by the Dutch Media Authority (“Commissariaat voor de Media”), which is functionally independent and operates under a statutory mandate designed to safeguard impartiality and media pluralism. It is led by a three-member Board of Commissioners appointed by the Minister of Primary and Secondary Education and Media, under procedures intended to ensure professional independence and impartiality (including fixed terms of office, statutory duties to act independently, and the prohibition on the minister directing or influencing their decisions in individual cases). The Authority licenses broadcasters, registers video-on-demand services, and monitors compliance. It does not exercise prior restraint and does not assess journalistic viewpoints or political content.
At the same time, independent journalists increasingly face a combination of physical violence, intimidation, legal pressure, and online harassment from third parties. The most notable attack on press freedom in the Netherlands was the assassination of crime journalist Peter R. de Vries in 2021 by hired criminals linked to organized crime networks. Although authorities stated he was targeted for his role as an adviser to a protected witness in a criminal trial, the killing was widely perceived as an attack on journalism and the rule of law and had a chilling effect, particularly on crime reporting. In response, the Dutch government adopted several measures to strengthen journalist protection. Doxing was criminalized in 2024, making the intentional public disclosure of personal data to intimidate or obstruct individuals a criminal offence, with aggravated penalties when journalists are targeted. In 2025, legislation was introduced to implement the EU Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation Directive, providing safeguards against abusive civil lawsuits intended to silence journalists and other public-interest actors. The government also provides structural funding to PersVeilig, a national initiative offering reporting mechanisms, legal support, and safety training for journalists, including in cases of online harassment.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Regarding the government-controlled media, public broadcasters in the Netherlands operate under the Media Act 2008, which, as mentioned above, establishes the legal framework for public broadcasting and safeguards editorial independence. Under this Act, the publicly funded foundation Netherlands Public Broadcasting (“Nederlandse Publieke Omroep”) coordinates government-allocated budgets, broadcasting schedules, and cooperation among the public broadcasting associations. Editorial responsibility for programme content remains with the individual broadcasters.
With regard to independent media, the government refrained from influencing editorial decisions. There have been concerns about media concentration following the 2011 expiry of the Temporary Act on Media Ownership, which introduced more robust antitrust regulations (including an absolute 35% market share cap). Currently, the top four broadcasting companies control between 69% and 91% of the market, according to different expert estimates. At the same time, monitoring by local watchdogs doesn’t suggest that political or business elites exert disproportionate control over programming, personnel, or editorial policies. Dutch media has a long tradition of self-regulation in the sphere of journalistic ethics and editorial standards, with professional associations, such as the Union of Journalists and the Society of Chief Editors, participating in appointing the independent Press Council. The Council, in turn, investigates violations of good journalistic practice and helps maintain ethical standards.
Finally, the Dutch government has not systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Authorities generally respect the freedom of assembly, although specific provisions in the Public Assemblies Act have prompted criticism by watchdogs such as Amnesty International. The Act allows mayors to restrict, ban, or disperse assemblies in instances in which international human rights law would not, such as where assemblies are restricted or sanctioned solely due to failure to provide prior notification or comply with imposed conditions (for example, location, route, or time requirements). In some cases, authorities have arbitrarily dispersed peaceful environmental and pro-Palestinian demonstrations, using tactics such as mass detentions and water cannons. These instances prompted the CIVICUS monitor to downgrade the Netherlands’ civic space rating from “Open” (the highest category) to “Narrowed” (the second-highest) in 2024. This classification indicates that while the freedoms of assembly and association are generally upheld, isolated yet notable exceptions occur.
The Dutch institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority. The judiciary operates in practice without governmental interference and enjoys high public confidence. As a result, courts continue to hear and decide cases challenging the government without facing retaliation. Beyond the judiciary, the Dutch government has preserved the independence and operational capacity of executive and oversight institutions, enabling effective accountability through well-defined ministerial responsibilities, autonomous prosecutorial bodies, and a proven record of holding public officials accountable.
The Dutch government has not undermined judicial independence. Article 117(1)-(3) of the Constitution provides the core personal guarantees of independence by stating that “[m]embers of the judiciary responsible for the administration of justice [. . .] shall be appointed for life by Royal Decree” and that they “may be suspended or dismissed” only “[i]n cases laid down by Act of Parliament [. . .] by a court that is part of the judiciary and designated by Act of Parliament.” These constitutional standards are effectively operationalised through the judiciary’s institutional organization. The Netherlands’ Council for the Judiciary (“Raad voor de rechtspraak”) is responsible for the allocation of budgets to courts, supervision of financial management, review of applications for vacant positions in the judiciary, and submission of recommendations to the Crown for formal approval. It consists of four members (two former judges and two non-judicial members with senior administrative experience) appointed by Royal Decree upon nomination by the Minister of Justice and Security. It forms part of the judiciary and is not subordinate to the Minister. Furthermore, under the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, each court is governed by a collegial court board (“gerechtsbestuur”) responsible for integral management and day-to-day operations.
As a result, the government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Instead, Dutch courts are willing to rule against the state. For example, in January 2025, the District Court of The Hague held that the government had acted unlawfully by failing to comply with legally mandated nitrogen-emissions reduction targets designed to protect environmentally sensitive areas. The court ordered the state to meet those targets by 2030 and attached a potential financial penalty for non-compliance. The decision demonstrates the judiciary’s readiness to impose concrete legal obligations on the executive even in politically contentious cases.
Similarly, the government has not subjected executive or independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence, ensuring that systems are able to hold government officials accountable. Operational accountability is ensured by the independent Public Prosecution Service (“Openbaar Ministerie”), which autonomously decides on investigations and prosecutions and is supported by the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (“Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst”), and the national police. The robustness of these institutions, together with the effectiveness of public accountability, is reflected in the independent anti-corruption assessments, including by Transparency International, which has historically positioned the Netherlands among the leaders of anti-corruption action. This reputation is supported by concrete instances in which public officials have been investigated, prosecuted, and sanctioned. For example, between 2012 and 2016, long-serving politician and former member of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, Jozef Franciscus Bernard (“Jos”) van Rey, was investigated and prosecuted for corruption-related offenses, including bribery and breach of official secrecy. In 2016, he was sentenced to a one-year suspended prison term and a two-year disqualification from holding public office, demonstrating the practical enforcement of accountability mechanisms regardless of political status.
