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HRF classifies Nepal as democratic.
Nepal underwent a decade-long armed conflict, which ended in 2006. Two years later, it abolished the constitutional monarchy and became a federal republic. While it is steadily transitioning to a democracy, Nepal continues to be mired in political instability that has resulted in 14 different governments in the past 17 years as of 2025. In September 2025, this pattern continued as Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned following the “Gen-Z protests” that erupted from Kathmandu, led by youth and student groups protesting against the widespread corruption of the government and economic turmoil across the country. Currently, an interim transition government led by former Chief Justice Sushila Karki governs Nepal until its upcoming democratic elections in March 2026.
National elections are largely free and fair. Nepal has approximately 80 active political parties at the national and local levels. However, only a handful of parties dominate electoral politics. These parties alternately win elections and often form coalitions among themselves to form a majority, despite fundamental differences in their ideologies and policies. The coalitions tend to be weak and prone to splitting up. The election management body, Election Commission (EC), has largely been able to carry out its functions without undue government interference and enforce election laws and regulations equally for all mainstream parties and candidates. Parties are able to campaign without significant government interference.
Independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Nepal has a vibrant media landscape, and civil society is robust. However, the government has increasingly wielded vague speech laws to harass journalists and media workers for their critical reporting. In addition, independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Civil society tends to self-censor despite the absence of express restrictions on its activities. While dissenting and peaceful protests are common, the government forcefully quelled many of them and limited where they may take place. The government has proposed a series of new laws and regulations aimed at further censoring dissent online and offline, though some have not yet been ratified.
Institutions largely serve as independent checks on the government. Despite the prevalence of corruption among the judiciary, executive, and legislative ranks, these institutions have largely retained their independence. Courts have successfully barred the Election Commission from unfairly disqualifying an opposition candidate, thereby preserving electoral competition and taking legal action against government critics in the election season. They have also consistently thwarted attempts by the government and its proxies to intimidate critics through spurious lawsuits. Similarly, although conviction rates remain low once cases reach the courts, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) serves as a key mechanism for government accountability in Nepal, filing approximately 200 corruption cases each fiscal year. However, judicial and independent institutional appointments remain vulnerable to executive overreach.
In Nepal, national elections are largely free and fair, but domestic coalition politics remain highly unstable. The political opposition in Nepal can run and compete in elections free from interference and coercion, and on a reasonably equal footing as the main party. Minor incidents of electoral fraud and violence occur frequently. However, powersharing among political elites reduces the competitive nature of the general elections and allows them to hold offices for a long period, creating political turbulence through coalition changes.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Nepal has approximately 80 active political parties at the national and local levels, but only three parties – the Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML), and CPN-Maoist Centre – dominate national polls. However, this dominance has not significantly tilted the competition in their favor. Since the shift to federalism, none of these parties has led with a majority, forcing them to form coalitions to govern. Such coalitions, however, tend to be fragile as they are formed in spite of potential fundamental ideological differences. For instance, ahead of the 2022 elections, the centrist Nepali Congress joined hands with the far-left CPN-Maoist Centre, despite the two historically being opposed to one another. After a coalition reshuffle in July 2024 following a vote of no confidence in former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, the country’s two largest parties, entered into a power-sharing agreement. KP Sharma Oli assumed his third term on July 15, 2024 following the agreement with premiership to be rotated between the two parties ahead of the next general elections (now preponed to March 2026 since his resignation in September 2025). Additionally, minor parties and independent candidates have increasingly succeeded in both local and national polls. For instance, despite being formed mere months prior to the 2022 elections, the fledgling Rastriya Swantantra Party is now the fourth-largest party in the lower house. In the upcoming elections in March 2026, 68 political parties will be competing for the general elections of the House of Representatives, compared to 57 during the 2022 elections. There are 22 newly registered political parties that were formed following the Gen-Z protests.
The government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight, despite worrying instances of executive interference in the selection of Election Commission (EC) members. The EC commissioners are all appointed by the president on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council, a body chaired by the Prime Minister and whose membership includes the Leader of the Opposition. In 2021, the government of UML’s KP Sharma Oli circumvented normal procedures to make appointments to the EC, threatening its independence. Through an executive ordinance, his government enabled the Constitutional Council to decide on matters with a majority instead of a unanimous vote as statutorily required after the opposition Nepali Congress boycotted Council meetings. This effectively diminished the opposition’s voting power. The government also bypassed a mandatory endorsement by a cross-party parliamentary committee in the appointments. Despite this, various observers have affirmed the EC’s capacity to administer elections, including the latest ones in 2022, and make decisions autonomously. Criticisms of the body’s execution of its functions have largely been attributed to a lack of training. The government has allowed international observers and local poll watchers to scrutinize the elections.
Although EC commissioners have been criticized for their perceived favorability to the main parties, there are marked instances of tension between the body and those parties, suggesting that it largely retains its independence. For instance, in the 2013 elections, the EC rejected the demands of CPN-Maoist Centre leader Pushpa “Prachanda” Kamal Dahal to stop counting the votes after he claimed widespread fraud had caused his party to lose. In 2022, the EC recommended legal action against Madhav Kumar Nepal, former PM and chairman of CPN-Unified Socialist, following the discovery that he had promised voters financial benefits such as free visas and plane tickets to seek employment abroad in exchange for their support in his campaign.
The government has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Parties generally enjoy equal opportunities to campaign, and any campaign regulations are enforced by the EC in a non-discriminatory manner. For instance, in 2022, the EC set a spending limit for parties contesting elections after expressing concerns that minimal regulations around election finances facilitate corruption. It went on to take action against thousands of candidates and various parties for failing to submit details of their expenditures in line with their transparency obligations on time. Vote-buying and violence during campaign periods are common. Given that they are sporadic in nature and practiced by candidates from various parties, they do not seriously skew competition in favor of any ruling power.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the government. While Nepal has a resilient civic space, the government has grown increasingly intolerant of dissent in recent years, blocking online and print media, arresting activists, and repressing protests.
The government has unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations and has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media. On September 4, 2025, the government ordered a social media shutdown for over 26 social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, and X (formerly known as Twitter), citing failure to meet the new government regulations. The government regulations pertained to the “Directive to Regulate Use of Social Media, 2080” that required all social media platforms operating in Nepal to register with the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. As the social media platforms failed to register, the government ordered the shutdown. Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Prithvi Subba Gurung, proclaimed that negligence and disregard for Nepalese law by the media companies were the primary reasons for non-registration. While the shutdown was lifted a few days later, it seriously obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media and the general public and led to widespread public grievances and protests shortly thereafter. During KP Sharma Oli’s second term as prime minister in 2020, the government shut down or blocked at least 121 online news portals on allegations of promoting misinformation and fake news about the pandemic. Then, in May 2024, Kailash Sirohiya, chair of Nepal’s largest media group Kantipur Media Group, was arrested over alleged citizenship irregularities shortly after his outlet published reports accusing the home minister of financial misconduct. The closures and blockings were criticized by media stakeholders as intimidation and an infringement on press freedom. Nevertheless, with 4,800 newspapers and magazines in circulation, 1,193 radio stations, 246 television networks, and more than 4,600 online information sources, Nepal still has a diverse media landscape.
Civil society is robust, with more than 50,000 active organizations (CSOs) and associations. Although there is no explicit provision under local laws that prevents CSOs from engaging in political activities, there is a general sentiment among many of them that they must exercise restraint when criticizing government policies. This is due to many factors, including the need to balance competing interests between donors and government actors, as well as the existence of civil society organizations that are squarely aligned with specific political camps. Activists are also hindered in their ability to dissent. In January 2020, the police arrested staff members of Amnesty International Nepal after they protested the government’s decision to appoint a politician allegedly responsible for crimes committed during the Nepalese Civil War as Speaker of the Federal Parliament. However, staff members were ultimately never convicted. In late 2024, restaurant worker Man Bhadur Karki was arrested under the Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) after uploading a critical post against the ruling Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and its chairperson, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. Karki was detained for 10 days for “disseminating false information and defamatory statements about respectable persons”, had his phone confiscated, and was released on bail.
The government has somewhat repressed dissenting protests. Local authorities have resorted to using disproportionate force to disperse peaceful protesters on occasion, while allowing many others to be conducted without serious interference. Authorities have restricted protest areas without providing a clear justification. Between March and May 2025, large-scale pro-monarchy and teachers’ protests were met with violent crackdowns by police, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries. Rights groups condemned the use of force as excessive and politically motivated. On September 8, 2025, Nepali state forces used disproportionate force against young protesters for dissenting against the government’s widespread corruption, mass unemployment, and economic distress, thereby killing nineteen protesters. As the protests were predominantly led and organized by youth and students, they came to be called “Gen-Z protests”. The following day, a violent mob (unrelated to the Gen-Z protesters) burnt prominent government buildings, attacked media organizations, schools, and private businesses, and assaulted ministers, other politicians, and journalists. Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned the afternoon of September 9, and shortly thereafter, Nepal’s army chief, Ashok Raj Sigdel, led discussions with representatives of the protests along with other politicians. The stakeholder discussion led to an agreement with the President to dissolve the Parliament and to have the former chief justice, Sushila Karki, head an interim government that could hold democratic elections. Karki’s interim government has scheduled fresh elections for March 5, 2026.
The government has moved to enact additional laws and regulations that are expected to curtail dissent further. In February 2025, the National Assembly passed the Media Council Bill 2080, which retains a controversial provision giving the government-appointed chairperson authority to lead the new council, replacing the independent Press Council, raising serious concerns about its independence. The council is tasked with regulating media conduct, advising the government on its media policy, and ensuring compliance with media ethics. The Social Media Bill 2081, registered in January 2025, would mandate registration of media platforms, enable content takedown orders, and include fines up to NPR 1.5 million and prison terms for vague offenses such as “activities that threaten national integrity” and “creation of fake accounts that harm national security”.
While the government has not killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents, there have been high-profile cases of journalists—notably Suresh Bhul and Suresh Rajak—being killed in circumstances where state actors appear to have failed in their duty to protect them or may have been implicitly complicit. In late 2024, Suresh Bhul was lynched in Dhangadhi by a mob amid allegations that local political officials had previously threatened him due to his investigative reporting and activism over the right to information. In early 2025, Suresh Rajak was trapped and burned alive when pro-monarchy protesters set a building ablaze where he was reporting. Despite national and international calls for investigation, including from RSF and UNESCO, both cases remain unsolved with no arrests or judicial progress. In September 2025, many journalists covering the Gen Z protests were attacked by both the state forces and by mob violence, with some journalists being injured by kinetic impact projectiles fired by the police on September 8.
Independent institutions largely serve as independent checks on the government, with courts ensuring electoral competition, and the government not subjecting institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence.
The judiciary has been able to check the government in cases that could have an impact on electoral competition and dissent. In 2022, the Supreme Court granted a formal request filed by minor opposition candidate Dr. Toshima Karki, which prevented her from being unfairly disqualified by the EC ahead of the general elections that year. Karki went on to win her seat. Months later, the Supreme Court again went against the EC by issuing an interim order prohibiting the body from taking legal action against the coordinators of “No, Not Again,” a largely online campaign that criticized several veteran political leaders in the country who were contesting the polls. The Court held that the EC had gone against the spirit of the constitution by threatening campaign participants, who had the freedom to campaign against any election candidate, with criminal penalties.
While courts frequently check the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent policies, recent cases point to a concerning trend of lower courts banning news outlets critical of corruption. In June 2025, the Kathmandu District Court ordered online news portals Nepal Khabar and Bizmandu to remove articles alleging bribery by a top official, claiming they were defamatory to his personal and professional reputation. There is also a recurring concern of authorities flouting court rulings. Also in June 2025, for example, authorities issued an arrest warrant for journalist Dil Bhusan Pathak under the ETA, a law most frequently weaponized by Oli’s government to silence its critics, over a YouTube video critical of a political figure’s son, despite a Patan High Court order blocking the arrest.
Courts have nevertheless faced scrutiny for corruption and internal turmoil. A case in point comes from 2021, when as many as 98 opposition lawmakers launched an impeachment proceeding against then-Chief Justice Cholendra Shumsher Rana with the support of Rana’s fellow Supreme Court justices and the Nepal Bar Association. Rana had co-signed a series of decisions against K.P. Sharma Oli when he was in power, which prevented him from unilaterally dissolving parliament when his party was losing majority support. With Rana at the helm, the Supreme Court also granted the petition of 146 sitting lawmakers, who represented more than half of parliament, to replace Oli with Sher Bahadur Deuba, leader of the main opposition Nepali Congress. Rana was subsequently accused of siding with the Nepali Congress in exchange for a share in the party’s cabinet for his relatives. Rana ultimately retired in December 2022 pending the outcome of his impeachment. Courts have been embroiled in tensions with other branches of government, which in the past has resulted in retaliation against a sitting judge. In 2017, a motion of impeachment was brought against the Chief Justice at the time, Sushila Karki, by the two major constituent parties of the ruling coalition, the Nepali Congress and CPN-Maoist Centre. Justice Karki adopted a strong stance against corruption and had a history of making bold rulings against high-ranking officials. These were widely believed to have motivated the impeachment attempt. She eventually reached the mandatory age of retirement before the impeachment proceedings concluded. The case of Sushila Karki is the only well-known instance of overt retaliation to date.
While the government has not subjected judicial, legislative, or executive branches to reforms that seriously weaken their independence, independent constitutional bodies such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Election Commission, and Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) have been subjected to such reforms. A key development was the 2020 ordinance amending the Constitutional Council Act, which changed the quorum requirements for making appointments to constitutional bodies. The amendment allowed the Constitutional Council to make decisions with a simple majority rather than requiring the full panel, enabling appointments without opposition members present. This change has effectively centralized appointment power in the hands of the Prime Minister, as meetings can now be held and decisions made with only the ruling party’s representatives present. While these reforms have not formally abolished the independence of these oversight institutions, they substantially erode their functional independence, although no such cases have occurred so far.
HRF classifies Nepal as democratic.
Nepal underwent a decade-long armed conflict, which ended in 2006. Two years later, it abolished the constitutional monarchy and became a federal republic. While it is steadily transitioning to a democracy, Nepal continues to be mired in political instability that has resulted in 14 different governments in the past 17 years as of 2025. In September 2025, this pattern continued as Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned following the “Gen-Z protests” that erupted from Kathmandu, led by youth and student groups protesting against the widespread corruption of the government and economic turmoil across the country. Currently, an interim transition government led by former Chief Justice Sushila Karki governs Nepal until its upcoming democratic elections in March 2026.
National elections are largely free and fair. Nepal has approximately 80 active political parties at the national and local levels. However, only a handful of parties dominate electoral politics. These parties alternately win elections and often form coalitions among themselves to form a majority, despite fundamental differences in their ideologies and policies. The coalitions tend to be weak and prone to splitting up. The election management body, Election Commission (EC), has largely been able to carry out its functions without undue government interference and enforce election laws and regulations equally for all mainstream parties and candidates. Parties are able to campaign without significant government interference.
Independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Nepal has a vibrant media landscape, and civil society is robust. However, the government has increasingly wielded vague speech laws to harass journalists and media workers for their critical reporting. In addition, independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Civil society tends to self-censor despite the absence of express restrictions on its activities. While dissenting and peaceful protests are common, the government forcefully quelled many of them and limited where they may take place. The government has proposed a series of new laws and regulations aimed at further censoring dissent online and offline, though some have not yet been ratified.
Institutions largely serve as independent checks on the government. Despite the prevalence of corruption among the judiciary, executive, and legislative ranks, these institutions have largely retained their independence. Courts have successfully barred the Election Commission from unfairly disqualifying an opposition candidate, thereby preserving electoral competition and taking legal action against government critics in the election season. They have also consistently thwarted attempts by the government and its proxies to intimidate critics through spurious lawsuits. Similarly, although conviction rates remain low once cases reach the courts, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) serves as a key mechanism for government accountability in Nepal, filing approximately 200 corruption cases each fiscal year. However, judicial and independent institutional appointments remain vulnerable to executive overreach.
In Nepal, national elections are largely free and fair, but domestic coalition politics remain highly unstable. The political opposition in Nepal can run and compete in elections free from interference and coercion, and on a reasonably equal footing as the main party. Minor incidents of electoral fraud and violence occur frequently. However, powersharing among political elites reduces the competitive nature of the general elections and allows them to hold offices for a long period, creating political turbulence through coalition changes.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Nepal has approximately 80 active political parties at the national and local levels, but only three parties – the Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML), and CPN-Maoist Centre – dominate national polls. However, this dominance has not significantly tilted the competition in their favor. Since the shift to federalism, none of these parties has led with a majority, forcing them to form coalitions to govern. Such coalitions, however, tend to be fragile as they are formed in spite of potential fundamental ideological differences. For instance, ahead of the 2022 elections, the centrist Nepali Congress joined hands with the far-left CPN-Maoist Centre, despite the two historically being opposed to one another. After a coalition reshuffle in July 2024 following a vote of no confidence in former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, the country’s two largest parties, entered into a power-sharing agreement. KP Sharma Oli assumed his third term on July 15, 2024 following the agreement with premiership to be rotated between the two parties ahead of the next general elections (now preponed to March 2026 since his resignation in September 2025). Additionally, minor parties and independent candidates have increasingly succeeded in both local and national polls. For instance, despite being formed mere months prior to the 2022 elections, the fledgling Rastriya Swantantra Party is now the fourth-largest party in the lower house. In the upcoming elections in March 2026, 68 political parties will be competing for the general elections of the House of Representatives, compared to 57 during the 2022 elections. There are 22 newly registered political parties that were formed following the Gen-Z protests.
The government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight, despite worrying instances of executive interference in the selection of Election Commission (EC) members. The EC commissioners are all appointed by the president on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council, a body chaired by the Prime Minister and whose membership includes the Leader of the Opposition. In 2021, the government of UML’s KP Sharma Oli circumvented normal procedures to make appointments to the EC, threatening its independence. Through an executive ordinance, his government enabled the Constitutional Council to decide on matters with a majority instead of a unanimous vote as statutorily required after the opposition Nepali Congress boycotted Council meetings. This effectively diminished the opposition’s voting power. The government also bypassed a mandatory endorsement by a cross-party parliamentary committee in the appointments. Despite this, various observers have affirmed the EC’s capacity to administer elections, including the latest ones in 2022, and make decisions autonomously. Criticisms of the body’s execution of its functions have largely been attributed to a lack of training. The government has allowed international observers and local poll watchers to scrutinize the elections.
Although EC commissioners have been criticized for their perceived favorability to the main parties, there are marked instances of tension between the body and those parties, suggesting that it largely retains its independence. For instance, in the 2013 elections, the EC rejected the demands of CPN-Maoist Centre leader Pushpa “Prachanda” Kamal Dahal to stop counting the votes after he claimed widespread fraud had caused his party to lose. In 2022, the EC recommended legal action against Madhav Kumar Nepal, former PM and chairman of CPN-Unified Socialist, following the discovery that he had promised voters financial benefits such as free visas and plane tickets to seek employment abroad in exchange for their support in his campaign.
The government has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Parties generally enjoy equal opportunities to campaign, and any campaign regulations are enforced by the EC in a non-discriminatory manner. For instance, in 2022, the EC set a spending limit for parties contesting elections after expressing concerns that minimal regulations around election finances facilitate corruption. It went on to take action against thousands of candidates and various parties for failing to submit details of their expenditures in line with their transparency obligations on time. Vote-buying and violence during campaign periods are common. Given that they are sporadic in nature and practiced by candidates from various parties, they do not seriously skew competition in favor of any ruling power.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the government. While Nepal has a resilient civic space, the government has grown increasingly intolerant of dissent in recent years, blocking online and print media, arresting activists, and repressing protests.
The government has unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations and has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media. On September 4, 2025, the government ordered a social media shutdown for over 26 social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, and X (formerly known as Twitter), citing failure to meet the new government regulations. The government regulations pertained to the “Directive to Regulate Use of Social Media, 2080” that required all social media platforms operating in Nepal to register with the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. As the social media platforms failed to register, the government ordered the shutdown. Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Prithvi Subba Gurung, proclaimed that negligence and disregard for Nepalese law by the media companies were the primary reasons for non-registration. While the shutdown was lifted a few days later, it seriously obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media and the general public and led to widespread public grievances and protests shortly thereafter. During KP Sharma Oli’s second term as prime minister in 2020, the government shut down or blocked at least 121 online news portals on allegations of promoting misinformation and fake news about the pandemic. Then, in May 2024, Kailash Sirohiya, chair of Nepal’s largest media group Kantipur Media Group, was arrested over alleged citizenship irregularities shortly after his outlet published reports accusing the home minister of financial misconduct. The closures and blockings were criticized by media stakeholders as intimidation and an infringement on press freedom. Nevertheless, with 4,800 newspapers and magazines in circulation, 1,193 radio stations, 246 television networks, and more than 4,600 online information sources, Nepal still has a diverse media landscape.
Civil society is robust, with more than 50,000 active organizations (CSOs) and associations. Although there is no explicit provision under local laws that prevents CSOs from engaging in political activities, there is a general sentiment among many of them that they must exercise restraint when criticizing government policies. This is due to many factors, including the need to balance competing interests between donors and government actors, as well as the existence of civil society organizations that are squarely aligned with specific political camps. Activists are also hindered in their ability to dissent. In January 2020, the police arrested staff members of Amnesty International Nepal after they protested the government’s decision to appoint a politician allegedly responsible for crimes committed during the Nepalese Civil War as Speaker of the Federal Parliament. However, staff members were ultimately never convicted. In late 2024, restaurant worker Man Bhadur Karki was arrested under the Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) after uploading a critical post against the ruling Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and its chairperson, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. Karki was detained for 10 days for “disseminating false information and defamatory statements about respectable persons”, had his phone confiscated, and was released on bail.
The government has somewhat repressed dissenting protests. Local authorities have resorted to using disproportionate force to disperse peaceful protesters on occasion, while allowing many others to be conducted without serious interference. Authorities have restricted protest areas without providing a clear justification. Between March and May 2025, large-scale pro-monarchy and teachers’ protests were met with violent crackdowns by police, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries. Rights groups condemned the use of force as excessive and politically motivated. On September 8, 2025, Nepali state forces used disproportionate force against young protesters for dissenting against the government’s widespread corruption, mass unemployment, and economic distress, thereby killing nineteen protesters. As the protests were predominantly led and organized by youth and students, they came to be called “Gen-Z protests”. The following day, a violent mob (unrelated to the Gen-Z protesters) burnt prominent government buildings, attacked media organizations, schools, and private businesses, and assaulted ministers, other politicians, and journalists. Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned the afternoon of September 9, and shortly thereafter, Nepal’s army chief, Ashok Raj Sigdel, led discussions with representatives of the protests along with other politicians. The stakeholder discussion led to an agreement with the President to dissolve the Parliament and to have the former chief justice, Sushila Karki, head an interim government that could hold democratic elections. Karki’s interim government has scheduled fresh elections for March 5, 2026.
The government has moved to enact additional laws and regulations that are expected to curtail dissent further. In February 2025, the National Assembly passed the Media Council Bill 2080, which retains a controversial provision giving the government-appointed chairperson authority to lead the new council, replacing the independent Press Council, raising serious concerns about its independence. The council is tasked with regulating media conduct, advising the government on its media policy, and ensuring compliance with media ethics. The Social Media Bill 2081, registered in January 2025, would mandate registration of media platforms, enable content takedown orders, and include fines up to NPR 1.5 million and prison terms for vague offenses such as “activities that threaten national integrity” and “creation of fake accounts that harm national security”.
While the government has not killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents, there have been high-profile cases of journalists—notably Suresh Bhul and Suresh Rajak—being killed in circumstances where state actors appear to have failed in their duty to protect them or may have been implicitly complicit. In late 2024, Suresh Bhul was lynched in Dhangadhi by a mob amid allegations that local political officials had previously threatened him due to his investigative reporting and activism over the right to information. In early 2025, Suresh Rajak was trapped and burned alive when pro-monarchy protesters set a building ablaze where he was reporting. Despite national and international calls for investigation, including from RSF and UNESCO, both cases remain unsolved with no arrests or judicial progress. In September 2025, many journalists covering the Gen Z protests were attacked by both the state forces and by mob violence, with some journalists being injured by kinetic impact projectiles fired by the police on September 8.
Independent institutions largely serve as independent checks on the government, with courts ensuring electoral competition, and the government not subjecting institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence.
The judiciary has been able to check the government in cases that could have an impact on electoral competition and dissent. In 2022, the Supreme Court granted a formal request filed by minor opposition candidate Dr. Toshima Karki, which prevented her from being unfairly disqualified by the EC ahead of the general elections that year. Karki went on to win her seat. Months later, the Supreme Court again went against the EC by issuing an interim order prohibiting the body from taking legal action against the coordinators of “No, Not Again,” a largely online campaign that criticized several veteran political leaders in the country who were contesting the polls. The Court held that the EC had gone against the spirit of the constitution by threatening campaign participants, who had the freedom to campaign against any election candidate, with criminal penalties.
While courts frequently check the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent policies, recent cases point to a concerning trend of lower courts banning news outlets critical of corruption. In June 2025, the Kathmandu District Court ordered online news portals Nepal Khabar and Bizmandu to remove articles alleging bribery by a top official, claiming they were defamatory to his personal and professional reputation. There is also a recurring concern of authorities flouting court rulings. Also in June 2025, for example, authorities issued an arrest warrant for journalist Dil Bhusan Pathak under the ETA, a law most frequently weaponized by Oli’s government to silence its critics, over a YouTube video critical of a political figure’s son, despite a Patan High Court order blocking the arrest.
Courts have nevertheless faced scrutiny for corruption and internal turmoil. A case in point comes from 2021, when as many as 98 opposition lawmakers launched an impeachment proceeding against then-Chief Justice Cholendra Shumsher Rana with the support of Rana’s fellow Supreme Court justices and the Nepal Bar Association. Rana had co-signed a series of decisions against K.P. Sharma Oli when he was in power, which prevented him from unilaterally dissolving parliament when his party was losing majority support. With Rana at the helm, the Supreme Court also granted the petition of 146 sitting lawmakers, who represented more than half of parliament, to replace Oli with Sher Bahadur Deuba, leader of the main opposition Nepali Congress. Rana was subsequently accused of siding with the Nepali Congress in exchange for a share in the party’s cabinet for his relatives. Rana ultimately retired in December 2022 pending the outcome of his impeachment. Courts have been embroiled in tensions with other branches of government, which in the past has resulted in retaliation against a sitting judge. In 2017, a motion of impeachment was brought against the Chief Justice at the time, Sushila Karki, by the two major constituent parties of the ruling coalition, the Nepali Congress and CPN-Maoist Centre. Justice Karki adopted a strong stance against corruption and had a history of making bold rulings against high-ranking officials. These were widely believed to have motivated the impeachment attempt. She eventually reached the mandatory age of retirement before the impeachment proceedings concluded. The case of Sushila Karki is the only well-known instance of overt retaliation to date.
While the government has not subjected judicial, legislative, or executive branches to reforms that seriously weaken their independence, independent constitutional bodies such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Election Commission, and Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) have been subjected to such reforms. A key development was the 2020 ordinance amending the Constitutional Council Act, which changed the quorum requirements for making appointments to constitutional bodies. The amendment allowed the Constitutional Council to make decisions with a simple majority rather than requiring the full panel, enabling appointments without opposition members present. This change has effectively centralized appointment power in the hands of the Prime Minister, as meetings can now be held and decisions made with only the ruling party’s representatives present. While these reforms have not formally abolished the independence of these oversight institutions, they substantially erode their functional independence, although no such cases have occurred so far.
