Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Mozambique as a country ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Mozambique is a unitary state with a presidential system of government. The head of state, Daniel Chapo of the incumbent Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), took office in January 2025 through an electoral process widely discredited by both domestic and international observers as highly manipulated. FRELIMO emerged as a liberation movement that led Mozambique to independence from Portugal in 1975. FRELIMO turned independent Mozambique into a one-party state and prevailed in a 16-year civil war against the rival RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) before transitioning the country to a multi-party system in 1990. The proclamation of Chapo’s victory amid widespread allegations of large-scale fraud in 2024 sparked the longest and most vigorous nationwide contestation movement in the country’s history, led by opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane.
National elections in Mozambique are a sham, to the point where the mainstream political opposition party has no realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. In the seven presidential elections since the introduction of the multi-party system under the 1990 Constitution, the regime continued to distort the electoral landscape in its favor by manipulating the electoral process, placing party members in key positions, and exerting political influence over election-monitoring institutions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society figures, organizations, and ordinary citizens face open and systematic retaliation for criticizing or openly challenging the regime. The regime systematically and violently cracks down on dissenting protests, with critics and political opponents of FRELIMO facing arbitrary arrests, criminal prosecutions, threats, and deadly violence.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. FRELIMO exerts disproportionate political influence and control over the other branches of government, including the legislature, the judiciary, and other public institutions, resulting in little to no meaningful checks on executive power. For example, the constitution gives the president disproportionate power in the appointment of the country’s top judges and judicial institutions such as the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Superior Council of the Judiciary.
In Mozambique, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Since the first multi-party elections in 1994, FRELIMO has skewed the electoral playing field in its favor by blocking and disqualifying opposition candidates, fraudulently manipulating election results, stuffing ballot boxes, creating irregularities in voter rolls, exerting control over electoral management, and using state resources such as government vehicles, public servants, public financing, and state-owned media, resulting in consistent landslide victories in presidential elections.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. FRELIMO routinely uses electoral management bodies, including the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Constitutional Council – acting as the supreme electoral court – to block the candidacies of mainstream opposition parties and candidates by rejecting their nomination submissions based on legalistic arguments over procedural flaws. In the 2024 presidential elections, after the Constitutional Council approved four presidential candidates, CNE rejected the candidacy of the Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD), a political alliance supporting Venâncio Mondlane, the main opposition candidate in the October 9 presidential election. According to the resolution, which was unanimously approved by the CNE members, the CAD’s candidacy did not meet the legal requirements necessary to proceed in support of a candidate who had already gained significant popularity and public backing.
In the past, the regime has acted in a similar manner. In 2019, the Constitutional Council, also dominated by FRELIMO, dismissed the presidential candidacy of the late prominent human rights activist Alice Mabota without providing a convincing legal basis. Mabota had a realistic chance of contesting the race, mobilizing substantial public support, especially in urban areas, and potentially forcing a runoff election. In 2009, the National Electoral Commission, under the control of FRELIMO, disqualified the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) from participating in parliamentary elections in 9 out of 13 constituencies. This move prevented the then-emerging party from securing a significant number of seats in parliament, despite its rising popularity, particularly among urban youth.
Moreover, Chapo’s regime has engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud. On election day, October 9, 2024, the vote counting and announcement processes were significantly undermined in favor of the regime. European Union (EU) election observers noted deliberate invalidation of opposition votes, fraudulent alteration of election results in favor of the ruling party, ballot box stuffing by polling station staff, and cases of voter roll irregularities. Serious delays were reported in the opening of polling stations due to shortages of ballot papers and other essential materials in several regions of the country, particularly in Zambézia and Nampula, the two largest constituencies, which together account for approximately 40% of the registered voters. In addition to delays in opening polling stations, in Nampula Province, tampered ballot papers were inserted, along with unjustified alterations of election results at both the polling station and the District Electoral Commissions. As a consequence, many registered voters found that their names were missing from the voter rolls on election day, so they were not allowed to vote. All opposition parties, the Bar Association, the Catholic Church, and some civil society organizations accused the CNE of deliberate irregularities, altered results, and potential fraud. EU election observers accused the Constitutional Council of acknowledging major irregularities but refusing to carry out recounts. In December 2024, the Constitutional Council published the final results of the election without providing a complete district-by-district breakdown of the results. It awarded the FRELIMO presidential candidate, Daniel Chapo, 65% of the vote, and 24% to the main challenger, Venâncio Mondlane, who ran as an independent candidate supported by The Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS).
The ruling party has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages, such as FRELIMO’s leveraging and manipulation of state resources, including state vehicles, public servants, public financing, and state-owned media. For example, the security forces have been used solely to protect the regime’s rallies. Beyond the misuse of security forces, further irregularities also emerged in the management of campaign financing. Through the CNE, the regime disbursed the campaign subsidy belatedly with the purpose of interfering with the opposition’s ability to carry out its campaign. The CNE deliberately delayed the allocation of 260 million Meticals (approximately $4.06 million at the time) to dependent opposition candidates until a late stage. In concrete terms, smaller parties faced serious difficulties in reaching remote areas and competing on equal terms in disseminating their electoral manifesto due to financial constraints. Furthermore, the delayed financing limited their ability to produce campaign materials and organize essential activities to reach voters. During the 2024 presidential elections, the regime’s candidate, Daniel Chapo, received the most airtime and overall coverage among candidates in the race. Moreover, the coverage of opposition parties’ campaigns included criticism and reports of negative events, whereas coverage of the regime’s candidate was largely free of criticism.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The legal framework gives the three parties with the most seats in the National Assembly the power to select the commissioners of the CNE, in proportionality to their share of elected lawmakers. Under this system, FRELIMO’s majority in parliament enables the regime to directly appoint 9 out of 17 CNE commissioners. For example, CNE officials selectively barred opposition-aligned election supervisors on the grounds that their credentials lacked official stamps, particularly in rural areas, including in Tete, Manica, Sofala, Nampula, and Zambezia provinces, which are opposition strongholds. At one polling station in Tete, six opposition representatives were removed from the premises. In the cities of Beira and Quelimane, observers reported that vote counting was conducted behind closed doors, without the presence of opposition delegates. The EU election observers identified multiple cases of result manipulation at the district level. At four locations, police officers forced observers to leave the counting centers on the second day of the process after detecting discrepancies between polling station results and the final figures released.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally claims victory in elections with a very high vote share. In most elections, the regime won by a landslide. In 2014, Filipe Nyusi, the FRELIMO candidate, won with 63%, and Dhlakama of RENAMO obtained 30%. In 2019, Filipe Nyusi was re-elected with 71.28% of the vote, while Ossufo Momade of RENAMO came second. In the last election of 2024, the regime’s candidate, Daniel Chapo, won with 65.2% of the vote, after a revision that adjusted the initial percentage of 70.7%, and Venâncio Mondlane, the main rival of the regime’s candidate, reached 24.2%.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society figures, organizations, and ordinary citizens face overt and systematic retaliation for criticizing or openly challenging the regime. The regime manipulates the media, systematically suppresses protests, and targets dissidents, including through forced disappearances and killings.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Regime critics face systematic intimidation through harassment, death threats, arbitrary arrests, physical assaults, and restrictions on their professional activities as part of a routine effort by authorities to disrupt their work, deter criticism, and indicate the consequences of dissent. For example, in June 2024, during a live broadcast, journalist and human rights activist Sheila Wilson was violently attacked by the police, arbitrarily arrested, had her equipment confiscated, detained for several hours, and later released without charge for livestreaming a dissenting protest. During the 2024 post-election protests, police arrested local and international journalists, injuring at least 15 journalists, including Bruno Marrengula, who was hit in the leg by a teargas canister, and Nuno Gemusse Alberto, who was assaulted and briefly detained. Also, the Center for Public Integrity, a non-governmental organization, denounced acts of police intimidation linked to its public campaign opposing the payment of Mozambique’s hidden debts.
Authorities have seriously and unfairly repressed protests and gatherings, using excessive force, arbitrary arrests, live ammunition, and tear gas largely against peaceful demonstrators. Despite constitutional protections, authorities routinely invoke notification and timing rules to block protests on technicalities, effectively converting the notification requirement into a de facto authorization system. After the October 2024 general elections, authorities violently cracked down on protesters by firing live ammunition, killing at least 411, wounding more than 700, and detaining thousands. In 2023, police in Maputo used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse a gathering honoring rapper Azagaia, resulting in 22 detentions and one injury. During the December 2021 demonstration against gender-based violence in Maputo, authorities violently dispersed protesters and arbitrarily arrested 20 despite the protesters’ compliance with the notification requirement under the law.
The regime has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents. Security forces and unknown armed groups aligned with the regime’s interests have killed and abducted hundreds of supporters and members of the main opposition leader, Venâncio Mondlane’s movement. In October 2024, Elvino Dias, legal advisor to presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, and Paulo Guambe, the national representative of PODEMOS, were killed in the city of Maputo by unidentified individuals. Joel Amaral, Venâncio Mondlane’s Chief of Mobilization, was shot in April 2025. Leão de Deus Nhachengo, a supporter of former presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, was found dead on the banks of a river in Zavala district, Inhambane Province, with three gunshot wounds after having gone missing in the early hours of the morning. Two members of the PODEMOS party, Daniel Ricardo Guambe and Rafito Sebastião Sitoe, were shot dead in Massinga, also in Inhambane. Journalist Arlindo Chissale, also a supporter of Venâncio Mondlane, went missing. All of these disappearances and killings have targeted dissidents of the regime.
In addition, the FRELIMO government has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. In Mozambique, control over state-owned media gives the regime a significant advantage, as independent media outlets lack resources and are largely confined to major urban centers. State-owned media, on the other hand, has nationwide coverage due to public funding, allowing the regime’s propaganda messages to reach a much broader audience. The majority of their coverage focused on promoting the regime, while systematically downplaying or omitting any information that could give visibility to the opposition. Private media’s editorial independence is systematically constrained by economic dependence on state institutions and entities that dominate advertising placement and funding. The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech through internet and social media disruptions, suppression of broadcasts, and interference with public expression. For example, in February 2025, the National Institute of Communications of Mozambique suspended three dissenting radio stations in Nampula—Encontro, Haq, and Vida—formally citing signal interference, a justification that was widely perceived as politically motivated, given the stations’ critical coverage of the ruling FRELIMO party. During the 2024 post-election unrest, officials imposed internet restrictions, including a partial shutdown, and subsequently blocked access to social and messaging platforms, and suppressed protest coverage by arresting journalists and activists and confiscating their broadcast equipment.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. FRELIMO maintains extensive political dominance over other branches of government, including the legislature, judiciary, and key public institutions, leaving the executive branch largely unchecked. The president, in particular, holds significant authority in shaping the judiciary, as the constitution grants him decisive power over the appointment of senior judges and the leadership of judicial bodies, including the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Superior Council of the Judiciary. This dominance also extends to electoral and legislative processes, as the president influences the composition of the National Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Council, while the FRELIMO-controlled parliament passes legislation that further consolidates executive power.
Courts have systematically and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Through the appointment of judges belonging to the Constitutional Council, responsible for validating electoral results, the regime manipulates the courts’ ability to rule independently. In the 2024 elections, credible cases of electoral fraud were reported by both domestic and international observers. More than 200 complaints were submitted denouncing irregularities committed by the regime from the voting process through to the counting of results. The Constitutional Council accepted some of these complaints as grounds for a new investigation, which led to the publication of updated results. Despite several delays in the process, the results announced on December 23, 2024, confirmed the regime’s victory with few significant changes. The Constitutional Council followed the same approach in 2019, upholding the 15 October election results and dismissing opposition challenges despite documented irregularities.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies, due to a lack of independent oversight, allowing political prosecutions and punitive legal proceedings against regime critics to proceed unchecked. Courts often endorse or overlook regime measures to stifle dissent, providing inconsistent protection, especially in high-stakes political cases. Following the 2024 elections, the Attorney General’s Office launched criminal prosecutions against opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane, his associates, and supporters in connection with post-election protests, including charges of instigating terrorism. Courts allowed the cases to proceed primarily on the basis of Mondlane’s public statements and protest-related speech, without publicly requiring evidence of violence or criminal intent, thereby endorsing the criminalization of political dissent.
Members of the judiciary who rule against the regime’s interests, or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, have faced retaliation from state and non-state actors when handling politically sensitive cases, including election disputes, protests, and corruption cases. While not all incidents can be conclusively attributed to direct action by the regime, judges have faced threats, harassment, smear campaigns, and coercive acts in cases where their decisions carried clear political implications. Taken together, pressures from regime officials, ruling-party affiliates, and unidentified actors have created a climate in which judges perceived as politically inconvenient face heightened personal and professional risk. In November 2023, Judge Celso Alexandre Vasco was threatened by ruling party members, who left a coffin at the courthouse bearing a note that he may not live to see the next elections in retaliation for releasing 34 protesters. Similarly, judges of the Constitutional Council have also received anonymous death threats in the post-election periods of both 2019 and 2025.
The regime has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence and operational effectiveness by stripping judges of their constitutionally protected independent standing and placing their compensation under executive management. The Single Salary Table law of 2020 (TSU Law No. 5/2022) demoted all judges, except the President and Supreme Court judges, to regular civil servant status, stripping them of their sovereign status and transferring their salary control to the executive branch. The Mozambican Association of Judges and civil society groups denounced the reforms as an unconstitutional setback that erodes judicial autonomy. Additionally, the regime, through a supermajority in parliament, enacted the 2024 Electoral Package, which barred district courts from ordering vote recounts in cases of electoral irregularities, reserving such authority exclusively for the CNE and the Constitutional Council. The reform stripped district courts of authority following their 2023 municipal election rulings against the ruling party, in which they ordered recounts and annulled results due to alleged irregularities.
The judicial, legislative, and executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable, and are pressured by the regime to enforce selective accountability to uphold a certain image of legitimacy. Senior ruling party officials are shielded from prosecution through institutional capture and selective enforcement. In the $2 billion “hidden debts” corruption scandal, parliament remained submissive, prosecutors acted as political gatekeepers, and courts delivered justice only within limits that protected the regime’s core interests. For example, while courts convicted some former regime officials, including the ex-president’s son and intelligence chiefs, no sitting senior FRELIMO officials were prosecuted despite evidence implicating them. The courts selectively enforced accountability on expendable actors while insulating the senior regime officials.
HRF classifies Mozambique as a country ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Mozambique is a unitary state with a presidential system of government. The head of state, Daniel Chapo of the incumbent Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), took office in January 2025 through an electoral process widely discredited by both domestic and international observers as highly manipulated. FRELIMO emerged as a liberation movement that led Mozambique to independence from Portugal in 1975. FRELIMO turned independent Mozambique into a one-party state and prevailed in a 16-year civil war against the rival RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) before transitioning the country to a multi-party system in 1990. The proclamation of Chapo’s victory amid widespread allegations of large-scale fraud in 2024 sparked the longest and most vigorous nationwide contestation movement in the country’s history, led by opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane.
National elections in Mozambique are a sham, to the point where the mainstream political opposition party has no realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. In the seven presidential elections since the introduction of the multi-party system under the 1990 Constitution, the regime continued to distort the electoral landscape in its favor by manipulating the electoral process, placing party members in key positions, and exerting political influence over election-monitoring institutions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society figures, organizations, and ordinary citizens face open and systematic retaliation for criticizing or openly challenging the regime. The regime systematically and violently cracks down on dissenting protests, with critics and political opponents of FRELIMO facing arbitrary arrests, criminal prosecutions, threats, and deadly violence.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. FRELIMO exerts disproportionate political influence and control over the other branches of government, including the legislature, the judiciary, and other public institutions, resulting in little to no meaningful checks on executive power. For example, the constitution gives the president disproportionate power in the appointment of the country’s top judges and judicial institutions such as the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Superior Council of the Judiciary.
In Mozambique, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Since the first multi-party elections in 1994, FRELIMO has skewed the electoral playing field in its favor by blocking and disqualifying opposition candidates, fraudulently manipulating election results, stuffing ballot boxes, creating irregularities in voter rolls, exerting control over electoral management, and using state resources such as government vehicles, public servants, public financing, and state-owned media, resulting in consistent landslide victories in presidential elections.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. FRELIMO routinely uses electoral management bodies, including the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Constitutional Council – acting as the supreme electoral court – to block the candidacies of mainstream opposition parties and candidates by rejecting their nomination submissions based on legalistic arguments over procedural flaws. In the 2024 presidential elections, after the Constitutional Council approved four presidential candidates, CNE rejected the candidacy of the Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD), a political alliance supporting Venâncio Mondlane, the main opposition candidate in the October 9 presidential election. According to the resolution, which was unanimously approved by the CNE members, the CAD’s candidacy did not meet the legal requirements necessary to proceed in support of a candidate who had already gained significant popularity and public backing.
In the past, the regime has acted in a similar manner. In 2019, the Constitutional Council, also dominated by FRELIMO, dismissed the presidential candidacy of the late prominent human rights activist Alice Mabota without providing a convincing legal basis. Mabota had a realistic chance of contesting the race, mobilizing substantial public support, especially in urban areas, and potentially forcing a runoff election. In 2009, the National Electoral Commission, under the control of FRELIMO, disqualified the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) from participating in parliamentary elections in 9 out of 13 constituencies. This move prevented the then-emerging party from securing a significant number of seats in parliament, despite its rising popularity, particularly among urban youth.
Moreover, Chapo’s regime has engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud. On election day, October 9, 2024, the vote counting and announcement processes were significantly undermined in favor of the regime. European Union (EU) election observers noted deliberate invalidation of opposition votes, fraudulent alteration of election results in favor of the ruling party, ballot box stuffing by polling station staff, and cases of voter roll irregularities. Serious delays were reported in the opening of polling stations due to shortages of ballot papers and other essential materials in several regions of the country, particularly in Zambézia and Nampula, the two largest constituencies, which together account for approximately 40% of the registered voters. In addition to delays in opening polling stations, in Nampula Province, tampered ballot papers were inserted, along with unjustified alterations of election results at both the polling station and the District Electoral Commissions. As a consequence, many registered voters found that their names were missing from the voter rolls on election day, so they were not allowed to vote. All opposition parties, the Bar Association, the Catholic Church, and some civil society organizations accused the CNE of deliberate irregularities, altered results, and potential fraud. EU election observers accused the Constitutional Council of acknowledging major irregularities but refusing to carry out recounts. In December 2024, the Constitutional Council published the final results of the election without providing a complete district-by-district breakdown of the results. It awarded the FRELIMO presidential candidate, Daniel Chapo, 65% of the vote, and 24% to the main challenger, Venâncio Mondlane, who ran as an independent candidate supported by The Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS).
The ruling party has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages, such as FRELIMO’s leveraging and manipulation of state resources, including state vehicles, public servants, public financing, and state-owned media. For example, the security forces have been used solely to protect the regime’s rallies. Beyond the misuse of security forces, further irregularities also emerged in the management of campaign financing. Through the CNE, the regime disbursed the campaign subsidy belatedly with the purpose of interfering with the opposition’s ability to carry out its campaign. The CNE deliberately delayed the allocation of 260 million Meticals (approximately $4.06 million at the time) to dependent opposition candidates until a late stage. In concrete terms, smaller parties faced serious difficulties in reaching remote areas and competing on equal terms in disseminating their electoral manifesto due to financial constraints. Furthermore, the delayed financing limited their ability to produce campaign materials and organize essential activities to reach voters. During the 2024 presidential elections, the regime’s candidate, Daniel Chapo, received the most airtime and overall coverage among candidates in the race. Moreover, the coverage of opposition parties’ campaigns included criticism and reports of negative events, whereas coverage of the regime’s candidate was largely free of criticism.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The legal framework gives the three parties with the most seats in the National Assembly the power to select the commissioners of the CNE, in proportionality to their share of elected lawmakers. Under this system, FRELIMO’s majority in parliament enables the regime to directly appoint 9 out of 17 CNE commissioners. For example, CNE officials selectively barred opposition-aligned election supervisors on the grounds that their credentials lacked official stamps, particularly in rural areas, including in Tete, Manica, Sofala, Nampula, and Zambezia provinces, which are opposition strongholds. At one polling station in Tete, six opposition representatives were removed from the premises. In the cities of Beira and Quelimane, observers reported that vote counting was conducted behind closed doors, without the presence of opposition delegates. The EU election observers identified multiple cases of result manipulation at the district level. At four locations, police officers forced observers to leave the counting centers on the second day of the process after detecting discrepancies between polling station results and the final figures released.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally claims victory in elections with a very high vote share. In most elections, the regime won by a landslide. In 2014, Filipe Nyusi, the FRELIMO candidate, won with 63%, and Dhlakama of RENAMO obtained 30%. In 2019, Filipe Nyusi was re-elected with 71.28% of the vote, while Ossufo Momade of RENAMO came second. In the last election of 2024, the regime’s candidate, Daniel Chapo, won with 65.2% of the vote, after a revision that adjusted the initial percentage of 70.7%, and Venâncio Mondlane, the main rival of the regime’s candidate, reached 24.2%.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society figures, organizations, and ordinary citizens face overt and systematic retaliation for criticizing or openly challenging the regime. The regime manipulates the media, systematically suppresses protests, and targets dissidents, including through forced disappearances and killings.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Regime critics face systematic intimidation through harassment, death threats, arbitrary arrests, physical assaults, and restrictions on their professional activities as part of a routine effort by authorities to disrupt their work, deter criticism, and indicate the consequences of dissent. For example, in June 2024, during a live broadcast, journalist and human rights activist Sheila Wilson was violently attacked by the police, arbitrarily arrested, had her equipment confiscated, detained for several hours, and later released without charge for livestreaming a dissenting protest. During the 2024 post-election protests, police arrested local and international journalists, injuring at least 15 journalists, including Bruno Marrengula, who was hit in the leg by a teargas canister, and Nuno Gemusse Alberto, who was assaulted and briefly detained. Also, the Center for Public Integrity, a non-governmental organization, denounced acts of police intimidation linked to its public campaign opposing the payment of Mozambique’s hidden debts.
Authorities have seriously and unfairly repressed protests and gatherings, using excessive force, arbitrary arrests, live ammunition, and tear gas largely against peaceful demonstrators. Despite constitutional protections, authorities routinely invoke notification and timing rules to block protests on technicalities, effectively converting the notification requirement into a de facto authorization system. After the October 2024 general elections, authorities violently cracked down on protesters by firing live ammunition, killing at least 411, wounding more than 700, and detaining thousands. In 2023, police in Maputo used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse a gathering honoring rapper Azagaia, resulting in 22 detentions and one injury. During the December 2021 demonstration against gender-based violence in Maputo, authorities violently dispersed protesters and arbitrarily arrested 20 despite the protesters’ compliance with the notification requirement under the law.
The regime has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents. Security forces and unknown armed groups aligned with the regime’s interests have killed and abducted hundreds of supporters and members of the main opposition leader, Venâncio Mondlane’s movement. In October 2024, Elvino Dias, legal advisor to presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, and Paulo Guambe, the national representative of PODEMOS, were killed in the city of Maputo by unidentified individuals. Joel Amaral, Venâncio Mondlane’s Chief of Mobilization, was shot in April 2025. Leão de Deus Nhachengo, a supporter of former presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, was found dead on the banks of a river in Zavala district, Inhambane Province, with three gunshot wounds after having gone missing in the early hours of the morning. Two members of the PODEMOS party, Daniel Ricardo Guambe and Rafito Sebastião Sitoe, were shot dead in Massinga, also in Inhambane. Journalist Arlindo Chissale, also a supporter of Venâncio Mondlane, went missing. All of these disappearances and killings have targeted dissidents of the regime.
In addition, the FRELIMO government has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. In Mozambique, control over state-owned media gives the regime a significant advantage, as independent media outlets lack resources and are largely confined to major urban centers. State-owned media, on the other hand, has nationwide coverage due to public funding, allowing the regime’s propaganda messages to reach a much broader audience. The majority of their coverage focused on promoting the regime, while systematically downplaying or omitting any information that could give visibility to the opposition. Private media’s editorial independence is systematically constrained by economic dependence on state institutions and entities that dominate advertising placement and funding. The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech through internet and social media disruptions, suppression of broadcasts, and interference with public expression. For example, in February 2025, the National Institute of Communications of Mozambique suspended three dissenting radio stations in Nampula—Encontro, Haq, and Vida—formally citing signal interference, a justification that was widely perceived as politically motivated, given the stations’ critical coverage of the ruling FRELIMO party. During the 2024 post-election unrest, officials imposed internet restrictions, including a partial shutdown, and subsequently blocked access to social and messaging platforms, and suppressed protest coverage by arresting journalists and activists and confiscating their broadcast equipment.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. FRELIMO maintains extensive political dominance over other branches of government, including the legislature, judiciary, and key public institutions, leaving the executive branch largely unchecked. The president, in particular, holds significant authority in shaping the judiciary, as the constitution grants him decisive power over the appointment of senior judges and the leadership of judicial bodies, including the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Superior Council of the Judiciary. This dominance also extends to electoral and legislative processes, as the president influences the composition of the National Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Council, while the FRELIMO-controlled parliament passes legislation that further consolidates executive power.
Courts have systematically and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Through the appointment of judges belonging to the Constitutional Council, responsible for validating electoral results, the regime manipulates the courts’ ability to rule independently. In the 2024 elections, credible cases of electoral fraud were reported by both domestic and international observers. More than 200 complaints were submitted denouncing irregularities committed by the regime from the voting process through to the counting of results. The Constitutional Council accepted some of these complaints as grounds for a new investigation, which led to the publication of updated results. Despite several delays in the process, the results announced on December 23, 2024, confirmed the regime’s victory with few significant changes. The Constitutional Council followed the same approach in 2019, upholding the 15 October election results and dismissing opposition challenges despite documented irregularities.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies, due to a lack of independent oversight, allowing political prosecutions and punitive legal proceedings against regime critics to proceed unchecked. Courts often endorse or overlook regime measures to stifle dissent, providing inconsistent protection, especially in high-stakes political cases. Following the 2024 elections, the Attorney General’s Office launched criminal prosecutions against opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane, his associates, and supporters in connection with post-election protests, including charges of instigating terrorism. Courts allowed the cases to proceed primarily on the basis of Mondlane’s public statements and protest-related speech, without publicly requiring evidence of violence or criminal intent, thereby endorsing the criminalization of political dissent.
Members of the judiciary who rule against the regime’s interests, or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, have faced retaliation from state and non-state actors when handling politically sensitive cases, including election disputes, protests, and corruption cases. While not all incidents can be conclusively attributed to direct action by the regime, judges have faced threats, harassment, smear campaigns, and coercive acts in cases where their decisions carried clear political implications. Taken together, pressures from regime officials, ruling-party affiliates, and unidentified actors have created a climate in which judges perceived as politically inconvenient face heightened personal and professional risk. In November 2023, Judge Celso Alexandre Vasco was threatened by ruling party members, who left a coffin at the courthouse bearing a note that he may not live to see the next elections in retaliation for releasing 34 protesters. Similarly, judges of the Constitutional Council have also received anonymous death threats in the post-election periods of both 2019 and 2025.
The regime has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence and operational effectiveness by stripping judges of their constitutionally protected independent standing and placing their compensation under executive management. The Single Salary Table law of 2020 (TSU Law No. 5/2022) demoted all judges, except the President and Supreme Court judges, to regular civil servant status, stripping them of their sovereign status and transferring their salary control to the executive branch. The Mozambican Association of Judges and civil society groups denounced the reforms as an unconstitutional setback that erodes judicial autonomy. Additionally, the regime, through a supermajority in parliament, enacted the 2024 Electoral Package, which barred district courts from ordering vote recounts in cases of electoral irregularities, reserving such authority exclusively for the CNE and the Constitutional Council. The reform stripped district courts of authority following their 2023 municipal election rulings against the ruling party, in which they ordered recounts and annulled results due to alleged irregularities.
The judicial, legislative, and executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable, and are pressured by the regime to enforce selective accountability to uphold a certain image of legitimacy. Senior ruling party officials are shielded from prosecution through institutional capture and selective enforcement. In the $2 billion “hidden debts” corruption scandal, parliament remained submissive, prosecutors acted as political gatekeepers, and courts delivered justice only within limits that protected the regime’s core interests. For example, while courts convicted some former regime officials, including the ex-president’s son and intelligence chiefs, no sitting senior FRELIMO officials were prosecuted despite evidence implicating them. The courts selectively enforced accountability on expendable actors while insulating the senior regime officials.
