Fully Authoritarian
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Population
HRF classifies the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara has been under de facto annexation by Morocco since the mid-1970s. After the end of Spain’s colonial authority over the region, the Moroccan regime launched a military invasion of the territory, an event often referred to as the “Green March,” which effectively triggered a conflict with the Polisario Front, an armed liberation movement that advocates for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people, the native inhabitants of the land. In 1991, an UN-brokered ceasefire was established, with the expectation of holding a referendum on self-determination for the Sahrawi people. However, this referendum has been repeatedly derailed by the Moroccan regime, and tensions with the Polisario remain high. Today, the Moroccan regime maintains authoritative control over roughly three-quarters of Western Sahara, with Moroccan settlers accounting for nearly two-thirds of the half-million residents. King Mohammed VI of Morocco wields significant powers, including the ability to appoint local officials, influence various aspects of governance, and oversee the judicial system, all while the Polisario and any calls for Sahrawi independence are criminalized. The lack of progress toward a long-promised referendum continues to fuel instability in the region.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream Sahrawi political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Since assuming control over Western Sahara, political expression and participation for Sahrawis, the native inhabitants, have been effectively criminalized. Moroccan laws block the formation of any political group that challenges the regime’s territorial claims in the Western Sahara, ensuring that those aligned with anti-occupation sentiments are suppressed. The electoral process is heavily influenced by the Moroccan regime, which exerts complete control over key political and administrative structures in what it refers to as “Morocco’s Southern Provinces.”
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Moroccan regime monitors political activities closely, suppressing dissent through intimidation, imprisonment, and restrictions on freedom of speech. The Moroccan regime uses vague laws to criminalize expressions of solidarity with the Sahrawi cause, suppress freedom of expression, and censor media outlets. By labeling calls for Sahrawi independence as separatism that undermines its territorial claims, the regime aims to instill fear and discourage grassroots mobilization, effectively stifling dissent within the Sahrawi community.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. In Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, access to a free and fair judicial system is significantly compromised for the Sahrawi population. While Morocco has established a legal framework that theoretically guarantees certain rights, in practice, this framework is often manipulated to maintain control over the territory and its inhabitants. The judiciary is complicit in the arbitrary arrests, lengthy pre-trial detentions, and torture of pro-independence Sahrawi activists, and regularly extends impunity to regime agents accused of perpetrating serious human rights violations. The political institutions in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara are largely extensions of the Moroccan regime, which is characterized by strong executive control and limited checks and balances. There is no genuine legislative institution representing Sahrawis with the ability to enact or challenge legislation affecting their territory independently of the Moroccan regime.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream Sahrawi political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The political landscape of Western Sahara under Moroccan administration is defined by a sophisticated architecture of institutional control designed to project a facade of electoral legitimacy while systematically stifling any genuine movement toward self-determination. Although the Moroccan regime permits residents of the territory to participate in national elections, this inclusion is strictly conditional upon the total exclusion of Sahrawi voices that advocate for independence or autonomy. By centralizing electoral authority within the Ministry of the Interior, the regime criminalizes challenges to its territorial claims and engineers the demographic and administrative parameters of the region.
As an occupying power, the Moroccan regime allows residents of the Western Sahara to vote in Morocco’s parliamentary elections, held every five years, where they elect 13 representatives to parliament in Rabat. However, Sahrawis, the native inhabitants of the region, are not allowed to form political groups that advocate for an independent Western Sahara. In an effort to legitimize its annexation of Western Sahara, the Moroccan regime established the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (Conseil Royal Consultatif des Affaires Sahariennes – CORCAS) in 2006. The regime claims that this 141-member body was created to give Sahrawis a platform to express their views and take part in discussions about the region’s future. However, all members of CORCAS are appointed directly by the king and are required to back the Moroccan government’s position on Western Sahara.
The Moroccan regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. The regime controls local elections and works to ensure that independence-minded Sahrawi leaders are excluded from both the local political process and the Moroccan Parliament. Because the regime criminalizes any challenge to its territorial claim, political activists who advocate for Sahrawi political rights face significant risks, including harassment, detention, and legal repercussions. This repression undermines their ability to form political parties and highlights the struggle for rights and self-determination among the Sahrawi people. For example, the Democratic Way (DW), a leftist Moroccan political party advocating for social justice, democracy, and self-determination, has been particularly targeted due to its stance on Western Sahara. Members of DW have faced systematic suppression, including arrests and intimidation, based on vague penal code provisions that criminalize calls for independence.
The regime engages in overwhelming voting irregularities or large-scale electoral fraud and has undermined the UN-sponsored independence referendum in the Western Sahara. Following the 1991 ceasefire, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Identification Commission worked to determine voter eligibility, but by 2024, the Moroccan regime continued to derail the process by disputing the exclusion of thousands of unqualified applicants. Following the ceasefire, the regime flooded the Western Sahara with tens of thousands of non-resident voters to manipulate the demographic landscape, in what was later referred to as the “Second Green March.” While the Polisario defined eligible voters as Sahrawis who resided in the Spanish colony before the 1975 invasion, the Moroccan regime sought a broader definition to dilute the concept of Sahrawi identity and introduce ambiguity regarding self-determination claims. By asserting that “Sahrawi” was merely a geographic label, the regime aimed to destabilize genuine Sahrawi claims to nationhood. Through these strategies, the Moroccan regime has systematically sabotaged the referendum process, undermining the potential for a fair democratic outcome and complicating the aspirations of the Sahrawi people for self-determination.
The regime does not allow for independent electoral oversight. In the absence of an independent electoral body, the regime’s Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the administration and organization of elections. It controls all matters related to electoral laws, party lists, district quotas, and voting procedures. The Ministry of the Interior is also responsible for the training of appointed members at all levels of the electoral administration and staffing elections sites. Empowered by the king, the ministry reserves the right to alter electoral procedures without referring to parliament. Instead, elections are overseen by the Minister of the Interior and the President of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime is a sophisticated system of authoritarian consolidation that utilizes multidimensional repression to enforce territorial sovereignty. This includes the weaponization of ambiguous penal codes to criminalize the core tenets of Sahrawi identity and political aspirations and the systematic neutralization of civil society to control the annexation narrative. Beyond institutional strangulation, the regime employs tactical intimidation and physical violence, torture, and transnational repression.
The regime unfairly shuts down or takes measures that lead to the shutdown of major independent, dissenting organizations that advocate opposing views or attempt to address sensitive issues, such as Sahrawi self-determination. In October 2016, French journalist Camille Lavoix was deported from the Moroccan-controlled Western Saharan city of Dakhla, where she had been reporting for M le magazine (published by Le Monde). She was one of five foreign journalists who were deported by the Moroccan regime in 2016. Because foreign media outlets are not allowed to establish a physical presence in the territory, deporting a foreign journalist effectively constitutes a full shutdown of the outlet’s ability to report on the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.
Independent media outlets that critically report on the regime face closure, harassment, and intimidation, leading to a significant reduction in coverage of human rights violations and the Sahrawi struggle. Journalists, both local and foreign, encounter extensive obstacles, including deportation and censorship, particularly concerning the Western Sahara issue. Notable organizations like the Sahrawi human rights group CODESA have been violently impeded from holding events and have faced aggressive attempts to silence their advocacy. Additionally, citizen journalist collectives such as Équipe Média exert enormous personal risk to document and disseminate information about protests and human rights abuses, countering the regime’s information blockade. Despite their efforts, independent media remains virtually nonexistent in the region, with the regime controlling all narrative through state-owned media and strict monitoring, rendering any critical dissent severely marginalized, especially in relation to the Sahrawi people’s pursuit of rights and autonomy. The term “Western Sahara” is not acknowledged in Moroccan media, which refers to it as “the Southern provinces” or “the Moroccan Sahara.” Even within regime-owned outlets, journalists face heavy monitoring and potential retaliation for deviating from official narratives, as exemplified by the dismissal of journalist Soumia Dghoughi in 2017 for mentioning “Western Sahara” in a broadcast.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Both overt and covert threats are common. This can range from verbal harassment to intimidation through anonymous messages or direct confrontations by regime officials aimed at instilling fear. Activists and journalists often face constant surveillance, including monitoring surveillance that scrutinizes their movements, communications, and online activities. In May 2023, regime agents put under surveillance the house of Sahrawi human rights activist Mahfouda Lefkir after she visited Dakhla city in solidarity with activists there. Law enforcement officers followed her every time she left her home, stopped activists visiting her by beating them in front of the house, and verbally insulted her and her family. In November 2020, regime agents obstructed the wedding of two prominent Sahrawi human rights defenders and journalists, Nazha El Khalidi and Ahmed Ettanji, both belonging to the informal Saharawi journalist organization Équipe Média. Their wedding was interrupted by regime agents cutting the electricity and barricading the doors from the outside.
The regime abuses vague laws to suppress independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and regular citizens, particularly those who dissent or challenge the status quo regarding Western Sahara. These ambiguous laws allow for broad interpretation and enforcement, with the regime weaponizing the penal code to control political opposition. Key articles, such as Article 206 (Attacks on Territorial Integrity) and Article 263 (Defamation), have been used to target activists and journalists. Dissidents, especially human rights activists and informal citizen journalists, face significant challenges due to laws that criminalize “claiming a title or position protected by law” (Article 381). In June 2019, Naziha El Khalidi, a human rights defender and member of Équipe Média, was charged by the Court of First Instance in Laayoune for violating Article 381. The Moroccan regime’s refusal to recognize or register organizations like Équipe Média effectively criminalizes its members, complicating their efforts to advocate for human rights. In September 2020, Aminatou Haidar, a Sahrawi human rights activist advocating for Western Sahara’s independence, founded the Sahrawi Organ against Moroccan Occupation (Instance Sahraouie contre l’Occupation Marocaine – ISACOM) to promote the rights of the Sahrawi people through non-violent means. In response, regime news outlets and social media channels launched a smear campaign against Haidar and the other founders, labeling them as separatists posing a threat to social peace. Concurrently, the Moroccan Prosecutor’s Office in Laayoune launched a judicial investigation into ISACOM, alleging it “threatens national integrity” and that its establishment constitutes “a clear incitement to acts contrary to the Penal Code.” The authorities also stated they would take “adequate” measures to maintain public order and impose legal sanctions for any attack on Morocco’s territorial integrity. In March 2022, regime agents in Laayoune, the administrative capital of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, refused to allow the newly elected executive office of the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights Committed by the Moroccan State (ASVDH) to formally register, on the grounds that the organization hinders the work of public administrations. In July 2022, regime agents staged a siege of the ASVDH main office in Laayoune, physically barring members from the building and leaving at least ten people injured following a confrontation marked by racial slurs. The Moroccan regime has also refused to give the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) access to visit Western Sahara since 2015.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In October 2010, the Gdeim Izik protest camp was established near Laayoune as a pivotal expression of Sahrawi resistance against Moroccan annexation, with thousands of Sahrawis setting up makeshift tents to demand improved living conditions, employment opportunities, and rights recognition. In November 2010, the regime forcefully dismantled the camp, leading to clashes that involved excessive use of force, such as tear gas, batons, and rubber bullets. The aftermath saw significant casualties, with thousands injured and hundreds arrested, including journalists who faced prosecution for their participation in the protests. In February 2025, Sahrawi human rights defenders and activists gathered for a peaceful protest marking the 49th anniversary of the Sahrawi Republic and calling for the release of Sahrawi prisoners while denouncing state visits by French officials to occupied Western Sahara. However, Moroccan security agents dispersed the protesters using excessive force. Key activists present at the protest included Sidi Mohamed Dadach, Abdelkarim Mbrikat, and Mahfouda Bamaba Lefkire. Following the protest, the homes of several human rights defenders were blockaded, limiting their freedom of movement. For example, in March 2025, following the protest, agents surrounded the home of activist Ali Salem Tamek in Laayoune, which also acts as the CODESA headquarters, and cut off electricity before his house was stoned on one occasion and his security camera was detached and confiscated during another raid.
The regime seriously and unfairly censors dissenting speech. The regime employs a combination of legal frameworks and direct intimidation to suppress voices that challenge its territorial claim over the region or those who criticize its policies. In November 2020, Moroccan security forces initiated an informal house arrest against Sultana Khaya and her relatives, a move that coincided with an intensified campaign against Sahrawi dissenters. Khaya, a prominent campaigner for self-determination and the leader of a Boujdour-based human rights and environmental organization, faced constant intimidation alongside her family. During this period of confinement, they were physically barred from leaving their residence, and any attempts by visitors to enter were blocked by authorities. The situation escalated throughout 2021, with reports indicating that Khaya, her sister, and their elderly mother were victims of repeated sexual violence and physical abuse perpetrated by Moroccan state agents.
The regime has systematically harassed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. The regime provides broad legal authority to and mandates the General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST) and the General Directorate of National Security (DGSN) to operate without adequate checks and balances. These agencies are often involved in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and direct enforcement of policies, which can lead to arbitrary arrests, detentions, and abuses without the need for judicial oversight. Sahrawi self-determination activist Mohamed Dihani served a five-year prison sentence in Kenitra Central Prison for purportedly forming a criminal gang intending to commit acts of terrorism in relation to alleged plans to carry out attacks. During his trial, he stated that DGST intelligence agents tortured him and forced him to sign incriminating confessions while holding him incommunicado in the Temara detention centre between April and October 2010.
The regime has systematically engaged in, or enabled, transnational repression against dissidents abroad. In November 2009, Moroccan regime agents confiscated Sahrawi human rights defender Aminatou Haidar’s passport at the Hassan I Airport in Laayoune and forcefully boarded her onto a plane the following day, leaving her stranded in Lanzarote Airport, in Spain’s Canary Islands. Regime agents initially detained Haidar and offered to release her in return for a public acknowledgement of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. When she refused, she was put on a flight to Lanzarote, in the Canary Islands, without her passport. In 2022, her Spanish mobile number was included in the leaked database of 200 numbers found to have been targeted by Moroccan agents using Pegasus spyware in 2018 – demonstrating that the regime continued to surveil Haidar for several years during her exile.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. In Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, the absence of genuine institutional accountability—due to centralized control, suppression of opposition, and lack of independent legislative bodies—limits Sahrawis’ capacity to form political groups or pursue legislative action.
The Moroccan regime has established full judicial, legislative, and executive control over Western Sahara by integrating the territory into its legal and administrative systems, passing specific laws to justify its sovereignty, and leveraging constitutional provisions. Under King Mohamed, regime officials have been emboldened by legislation asserting the Moroccan regime’s sovereignty over Western Sahara and its integration into Morocco’s legal and governance system. The most notable of the laws is the Organic Law on the Administrative Division 111-14, which outlined territorial subdivisions and formally incorporated Western Sahara’s provinces (such as Laayoune and Dakhla) into Morocco’s administrative structure. In 2011, after passing a dubious referendum designed to appease national protests, the Moroccan king ratified a new constitution emphasizing the indivisibility of the Moroccan nation and its sovereignty over all its territories, including the Western Sahara. This constitutional stance provides the regime, and its agents, with the legal basis to criminalize activities that challenge this sovereignty, restrict dissent and any criticism relating to the status of the Western Sahara, and allows the regime to frame any such actions as threats to national unity. Without institutional mechanisms to hold regime actors accountable, corruption, abuse of power, and policy distortions go unchecked. The king, acting through the High Judicial Court, controls nomination, promotion, and disciplinary proceedings for judges. As a result, the Moroccan regime has systematically leveraged the judicial system to influence the political landscape in ways that favor parties aligned with the monarchy, such as through interventions in electoral campaigns, manipulations of electoral laws, and the use of judicial processes against dissenters.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. For example, in August 2016, the Moroccan Parliament enacted a series of penal code amendments alongside an ambiguous new press code. These legislative updates established criminal penalties—including potential incarceration and steep financial sanctions for various activities, most notably the “incitement” of threats against the nation’s territorial integrity. These laws are then used and applied selectively by the judiciary, allowing the regime to deny registration to organizations that challenge its policies or relate to Sahrawi identity and autonomy— as was evidenced in the case of ISACOM. While parties that align with the monarchy or the regime’s position on Western Sahara are given preferential treatment, those that advocate for Sahrawi rights encounter systemic obstacles. This inequity is reflected in the electoral outcomes, where dissenting organizations remain marginalized.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary has upheld various laws that criminalize dissent, particularly those targeting speech or actions perceived as threatening the Moroccan state. This legal framework often enables the regime to retaliate against critics under the guise of protecting national security or public order. Anyone advocating for the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination can be met with reprisals such as asset freezes, torture, or arbitrary arrests. In 2010, a Moroccan court sentenced 20 independence activists from Western Sahara to harsh prison sentences for their role in the 2010 Gdeim Izik protests outside Laayoune. In June 2024, a ten-year prison sentence was handed down to El-Hussein Bourkaba and Ayman El Yetrabi. The two men, recognized for their vocal advocacy for Sahrawi sovereignty and the right to self-determination, were convicted on charges of robbery and involvement in physical violence—allegations widely regarded as being fabricated to silence their political activities.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable, with recent actions reflecting a troubling pattern of intimidation against those who report abuses. For instance, human rights defender Naâma Asfari is currently serving a 30-year sentence in Kenitra prison in Morocco on dubious charges of “defamation, disrespect towards public officials, fraudulent practices to incite false testimony, and public slander” linked to his participation in the 2010 Gdeim Izik protest. These accusations appear to serve as retribution for his earlier complaint lodged in France and with the UN Torture Committee in February 2014, concerning the torture and inhumane treatment he endured after his arrest during the dismantling of the Gdeim Izik camp in November 2010. This pattern of behavior is not new; it echoes the systemic failures of the judicial, legislative, and executive systems to address enforced disappearances and other abuses committed during the “years of lead,” the era of military and police repression under the late King Hassan II. During this period, the regime engaged in widespread violence and repression against political dissidents and independence activists, which included arbitrary detentions, widespread arrests, and killings, but no investigations or prosecutions have been initiated for these historical crimes. Under King Mohammed, regime agents continue to operate with full impunity, particularly those affiliated with the DGST and DGSN, which are closely linked to the executive branch. This close affiliation often shields agents from accountability despite documented instances where agents have used excessive force, carried out arbitrary detention, torture, and engaged in other abuses, particularly against Sahrawi protesters, activists, and regular civilians. The Moroccan legislature has also contributed to extending impunity to regime agents by enacting vague laws that lack accountability provisions, granting legal protections, and limiting oversight mechanisms. These legislative choices have preserved the regime’s control and stability at the expense of justice for victims of human rights violations.
The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts, such as military courts or constitutional tribunals. While the regime adopted a new Military Justice Law in 2015, effectively ending the trial of civilians before military courts, Article 219 of the law confirmed that past verdicts on civilian cases made by military courts will remain in effect. In January 2014, Mbarek Daoudi, a vocal proponent of the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, was brought before a military tribunal to face allegations of illegal weapons possession—charges widely characterized as fabricated. However, the trial was suspended without a clear timeline, resulting in Daoudi being held in pre-trial custody for 15 months. The legal proceedings concluded in February 2016, when the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Appeal in Agadir affirmed a five-year prison sentence for Daoudi.
HRF classifies the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara has been under de facto annexation by Morocco since the mid-1970s. After the end of Spain’s colonial authority over the region, the Moroccan regime launched a military invasion of the territory, an event often referred to as the “Green March,” which effectively triggered a conflict with the Polisario Front, an armed liberation movement that advocates for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people, the native inhabitants of the land. In 1991, an UN-brokered ceasefire was established, with the expectation of holding a referendum on self-determination for the Sahrawi people. However, this referendum has been repeatedly derailed by the Moroccan regime, and tensions with the Polisario remain high. Today, the Moroccan regime maintains authoritative control over roughly three-quarters of Western Sahara, with Moroccan settlers accounting for nearly two-thirds of the half-million residents. King Mohammed VI of Morocco wields significant powers, including the ability to appoint local officials, influence various aspects of governance, and oversee the judicial system, all while the Polisario and any calls for Sahrawi independence are criminalized. The lack of progress toward a long-promised referendum continues to fuel instability in the region.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream Sahrawi political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Since assuming control over Western Sahara, political expression and participation for Sahrawis, the native inhabitants, have been effectively criminalized. Moroccan laws block the formation of any political group that challenges the regime’s territorial claims in the Western Sahara, ensuring that those aligned with anti-occupation sentiments are suppressed. The electoral process is heavily influenced by the Moroccan regime, which exerts complete control over key political and administrative structures in what it refers to as “Morocco’s Southern Provinces.”
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Moroccan regime monitors political activities closely, suppressing dissent through intimidation, imprisonment, and restrictions on freedom of speech. The Moroccan regime uses vague laws to criminalize expressions of solidarity with the Sahrawi cause, suppress freedom of expression, and censor media outlets. By labeling calls for Sahrawi independence as separatism that undermines its territorial claims, the regime aims to instill fear and discourage grassroots mobilization, effectively stifling dissent within the Sahrawi community.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. In Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, access to a free and fair judicial system is significantly compromised for the Sahrawi population. While Morocco has established a legal framework that theoretically guarantees certain rights, in practice, this framework is often manipulated to maintain control over the territory and its inhabitants. The judiciary is complicit in the arbitrary arrests, lengthy pre-trial detentions, and torture of pro-independence Sahrawi activists, and regularly extends impunity to regime agents accused of perpetrating serious human rights violations. The political institutions in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara are largely extensions of the Moroccan regime, which is characterized by strong executive control and limited checks and balances. There is no genuine legislative institution representing Sahrawis with the ability to enact or challenge legislation affecting their territory independently of the Moroccan regime.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream Sahrawi political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The political landscape of Western Sahara under Moroccan administration is defined by a sophisticated architecture of institutional control designed to project a facade of electoral legitimacy while systematically stifling any genuine movement toward self-determination. Although the Moroccan regime permits residents of the territory to participate in national elections, this inclusion is strictly conditional upon the total exclusion of Sahrawi voices that advocate for independence or autonomy. By centralizing electoral authority within the Ministry of the Interior, the regime criminalizes challenges to its territorial claims and engineers the demographic and administrative parameters of the region.
As an occupying power, the Moroccan regime allows residents of the Western Sahara to vote in Morocco’s parliamentary elections, held every five years, where they elect 13 representatives to parliament in Rabat. However, Sahrawis, the native inhabitants of the region, are not allowed to form political groups that advocate for an independent Western Sahara. In an effort to legitimize its annexation of Western Sahara, the Moroccan regime established the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (Conseil Royal Consultatif des Affaires Sahariennes – CORCAS) in 2006. The regime claims that this 141-member body was created to give Sahrawis a platform to express their views and take part in discussions about the region’s future. However, all members of CORCAS are appointed directly by the king and are required to back the Moroccan government’s position on Western Sahara.
The Moroccan regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. The regime controls local elections and works to ensure that independence-minded Sahrawi leaders are excluded from both the local political process and the Moroccan Parliament. Because the regime criminalizes any challenge to its territorial claim, political activists who advocate for Sahrawi political rights face significant risks, including harassment, detention, and legal repercussions. This repression undermines their ability to form political parties and highlights the struggle for rights and self-determination among the Sahrawi people. For example, the Democratic Way (DW), a leftist Moroccan political party advocating for social justice, democracy, and self-determination, has been particularly targeted due to its stance on Western Sahara. Members of DW have faced systematic suppression, including arrests and intimidation, based on vague penal code provisions that criminalize calls for independence.
The regime engages in overwhelming voting irregularities or large-scale electoral fraud and has undermined the UN-sponsored independence referendum in the Western Sahara. Following the 1991 ceasefire, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Identification Commission worked to determine voter eligibility, but by 2024, the Moroccan regime continued to derail the process by disputing the exclusion of thousands of unqualified applicants. Following the ceasefire, the regime flooded the Western Sahara with tens of thousands of non-resident voters to manipulate the demographic landscape, in what was later referred to as the “Second Green March.” While the Polisario defined eligible voters as Sahrawis who resided in the Spanish colony before the 1975 invasion, the Moroccan regime sought a broader definition to dilute the concept of Sahrawi identity and introduce ambiguity regarding self-determination claims. By asserting that “Sahrawi” was merely a geographic label, the regime aimed to destabilize genuine Sahrawi claims to nationhood. Through these strategies, the Moroccan regime has systematically sabotaged the referendum process, undermining the potential for a fair democratic outcome and complicating the aspirations of the Sahrawi people for self-determination.
The regime does not allow for independent electoral oversight. In the absence of an independent electoral body, the regime’s Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the administration and organization of elections. It controls all matters related to electoral laws, party lists, district quotas, and voting procedures. The Ministry of the Interior is also responsible for the training of appointed members at all levels of the electoral administration and staffing elections sites. Empowered by the king, the ministry reserves the right to alter electoral procedures without referring to parliament. Instead, elections are overseen by the Minister of the Interior and the President of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime is a sophisticated system of authoritarian consolidation that utilizes multidimensional repression to enforce territorial sovereignty. This includes the weaponization of ambiguous penal codes to criminalize the core tenets of Sahrawi identity and political aspirations and the systematic neutralization of civil society to control the annexation narrative. Beyond institutional strangulation, the regime employs tactical intimidation and physical violence, torture, and transnational repression.
The regime unfairly shuts down or takes measures that lead to the shutdown of major independent, dissenting organizations that advocate opposing views or attempt to address sensitive issues, such as Sahrawi self-determination. In October 2016, French journalist Camille Lavoix was deported from the Moroccan-controlled Western Saharan city of Dakhla, where she had been reporting for M le magazine (published by Le Monde). She was one of five foreign journalists who were deported by the Moroccan regime in 2016. Because foreign media outlets are not allowed to establish a physical presence in the territory, deporting a foreign journalist effectively constitutes a full shutdown of the outlet’s ability to report on the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.
Independent media outlets that critically report on the regime face closure, harassment, and intimidation, leading to a significant reduction in coverage of human rights violations and the Sahrawi struggle. Journalists, both local and foreign, encounter extensive obstacles, including deportation and censorship, particularly concerning the Western Sahara issue. Notable organizations like the Sahrawi human rights group CODESA have been violently impeded from holding events and have faced aggressive attempts to silence their advocacy. Additionally, citizen journalist collectives such as Équipe Média exert enormous personal risk to document and disseminate information about protests and human rights abuses, countering the regime’s information blockade. Despite their efforts, independent media remains virtually nonexistent in the region, with the regime controlling all narrative through state-owned media and strict monitoring, rendering any critical dissent severely marginalized, especially in relation to the Sahrawi people’s pursuit of rights and autonomy. The term “Western Sahara” is not acknowledged in Moroccan media, which refers to it as “the Southern provinces” or “the Moroccan Sahara.” Even within regime-owned outlets, journalists face heavy monitoring and potential retaliation for deviating from official narratives, as exemplified by the dismissal of journalist Soumia Dghoughi in 2017 for mentioning “Western Sahara” in a broadcast.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Both overt and covert threats are common. This can range from verbal harassment to intimidation through anonymous messages or direct confrontations by regime officials aimed at instilling fear. Activists and journalists often face constant surveillance, including monitoring surveillance that scrutinizes their movements, communications, and online activities. In May 2023, regime agents put under surveillance the house of Sahrawi human rights activist Mahfouda Lefkir after she visited Dakhla city in solidarity with activists there. Law enforcement officers followed her every time she left her home, stopped activists visiting her by beating them in front of the house, and verbally insulted her and her family. In November 2020, regime agents obstructed the wedding of two prominent Sahrawi human rights defenders and journalists, Nazha El Khalidi and Ahmed Ettanji, both belonging to the informal Saharawi journalist organization Équipe Média. Their wedding was interrupted by regime agents cutting the electricity and barricading the doors from the outside.
The regime abuses vague laws to suppress independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and regular citizens, particularly those who dissent or challenge the status quo regarding Western Sahara. These ambiguous laws allow for broad interpretation and enforcement, with the regime weaponizing the penal code to control political opposition. Key articles, such as Article 206 (Attacks on Territorial Integrity) and Article 263 (Defamation), have been used to target activists and journalists. Dissidents, especially human rights activists and informal citizen journalists, face significant challenges due to laws that criminalize “claiming a title or position protected by law” (Article 381). In June 2019, Naziha El Khalidi, a human rights defender and member of Équipe Média, was charged by the Court of First Instance in Laayoune for violating Article 381. The Moroccan regime’s refusal to recognize or register organizations like Équipe Média effectively criminalizes its members, complicating their efforts to advocate for human rights. In September 2020, Aminatou Haidar, a Sahrawi human rights activist advocating for Western Sahara’s independence, founded the Sahrawi Organ against Moroccan Occupation (Instance Sahraouie contre l’Occupation Marocaine – ISACOM) to promote the rights of the Sahrawi people through non-violent means. In response, regime news outlets and social media channels launched a smear campaign against Haidar and the other founders, labeling them as separatists posing a threat to social peace. Concurrently, the Moroccan Prosecutor’s Office in Laayoune launched a judicial investigation into ISACOM, alleging it “threatens national integrity” and that its establishment constitutes “a clear incitement to acts contrary to the Penal Code.” The authorities also stated they would take “adequate” measures to maintain public order and impose legal sanctions for any attack on Morocco’s territorial integrity. In March 2022, regime agents in Laayoune, the administrative capital of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, refused to allow the newly elected executive office of the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights Committed by the Moroccan State (ASVDH) to formally register, on the grounds that the organization hinders the work of public administrations. In July 2022, regime agents staged a siege of the ASVDH main office in Laayoune, physically barring members from the building and leaving at least ten people injured following a confrontation marked by racial slurs. The Moroccan regime has also refused to give the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) access to visit Western Sahara since 2015.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In October 2010, the Gdeim Izik protest camp was established near Laayoune as a pivotal expression of Sahrawi resistance against Moroccan annexation, with thousands of Sahrawis setting up makeshift tents to demand improved living conditions, employment opportunities, and rights recognition. In November 2010, the regime forcefully dismantled the camp, leading to clashes that involved excessive use of force, such as tear gas, batons, and rubber bullets. The aftermath saw significant casualties, with thousands injured and hundreds arrested, including journalists who faced prosecution for their participation in the protests. In February 2025, Sahrawi human rights defenders and activists gathered for a peaceful protest marking the 49th anniversary of the Sahrawi Republic and calling for the release of Sahrawi prisoners while denouncing state visits by French officials to occupied Western Sahara. However, Moroccan security agents dispersed the protesters using excessive force. Key activists present at the protest included Sidi Mohamed Dadach, Abdelkarim Mbrikat, and Mahfouda Bamaba Lefkire. Following the protest, the homes of several human rights defenders were blockaded, limiting their freedom of movement. For example, in March 2025, following the protest, agents surrounded the home of activist Ali Salem Tamek in Laayoune, which also acts as the CODESA headquarters, and cut off electricity before his house was stoned on one occasion and his security camera was detached and confiscated during another raid.
The regime seriously and unfairly censors dissenting speech. The regime employs a combination of legal frameworks and direct intimidation to suppress voices that challenge its territorial claim over the region or those who criticize its policies. In November 2020, Moroccan security forces initiated an informal house arrest against Sultana Khaya and her relatives, a move that coincided with an intensified campaign against Sahrawi dissenters. Khaya, a prominent campaigner for self-determination and the leader of a Boujdour-based human rights and environmental organization, faced constant intimidation alongside her family. During this period of confinement, they were physically barred from leaving their residence, and any attempts by visitors to enter were blocked by authorities. The situation escalated throughout 2021, with reports indicating that Khaya, her sister, and their elderly mother were victims of repeated sexual violence and physical abuse perpetrated by Moroccan state agents.
The regime has systematically harassed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. The regime provides broad legal authority to and mandates the General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST) and the General Directorate of National Security (DGSN) to operate without adequate checks and balances. These agencies are often involved in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and direct enforcement of policies, which can lead to arbitrary arrests, detentions, and abuses without the need for judicial oversight. Sahrawi self-determination activist Mohamed Dihani served a five-year prison sentence in Kenitra Central Prison for purportedly forming a criminal gang intending to commit acts of terrorism in relation to alleged plans to carry out attacks. During his trial, he stated that DGST intelligence agents tortured him and forced him to sign incriminating confessions while holding him incommunicado in the Temara detention centre between April and October 2010.
The regime has systematically engaged in, or enabled, transnational repression against dissidents abroad. In November 2009, Moroccan regime agents confiscated Sahrawi human rights defender Aminatou Haidar’s passport at the Hassan I Airport in Laayoune and forcefully boarded her onto a plane the following day, leaving her stranded in Lanzarote Airport, in Spain’s Canary Islands. Regime agents initially detained Haidar and offered to release her in return for a public acknowledgement of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. When she refused, she was put on a flight to Lanzarote, in the Canary Islands, without her passport. In 2022, her Spanish mobile number was included in the leaked database of 200 numbers found to have been targeted by Moroccan agents using Pegasus spyware in 2018 – demonstrating that the regime continued to surveil Haidar for several years during her exile.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. In Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, the absence of genuine institutional accountability—due to centralized control, suppression of opposition, and lack of independent legislative bodies—limits Sahrawis’ capacity to form political groups or pursue legislative action.
The Moroccan regime has established full judicial, legislative, and executive control over Western Sahara by integrating the territory into its legal and administrative systems, passing specific laws to justify its sovereignty, and leveraging constitutional provisions. Under King Mohamed, regime officials have been emboldened by legislation asserting the Moroccan regime’s sovereignty over Western Sahara and its integration into Morocco’s legal and governance system. The most notable of the laws is the Organic Law on the Administrative Division 111-14, which outlined territorial subdivisions and formally incorporated Western Sahara’s provinces (such as Laayoune and Dakhla) into Morocco’s administrative structure. In 2011, after passing a dubious referendum designed to appease national protests, the Moroccan king ratified a new constitution emphasizing the indivisibility of the Moroccan nation and its sovereignty over all its territories, including the Western Sahara. This constitutional stance provides the regime, and its agents, with the legal basis to criminalize activities that challenge this sovereignty, restrict dissent and any criticism relating to the status of the Western Sahara, and allows the regime to frame any such actions as threats to national unity. Without institutional mechanisms to hold regime actors accountable, corruption, abuse of power, and policy distortions go unchecked. The king, acting through the High Judicial Court, controls nomination, promotion, and disciplinary proceedings for judges. As a result, the Moroccan regime has systematically leveraged the judicial system to influence the political landscape in ways that favor parties aligned with the monarchy, such as through interventions in electoral campaigns, manipulations of electoral laws, and the use of judicial processes against dissenters.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. For example, in August 2016, the Moroccan Parliament enacted a series of penal code amendments alongside an ambiguous new press code. These legislative updates established criminal penalties—including potential incarceration and steep financial sanctions for various activities, most notably the “incitement” of threats against the nation’s territorial integrity. These laws are then used and applied selectively by the judiciary, allowing the regime to deny registration to organizations that challenge its policies or relate to Sahrawi identity and autonomy— as was evidenced in the case of ISACOM. While parties that align with the monarchy or the regime’s position on Western Sahara are given preferential treatment, those that advocate for Sahrawi rights encounter systemic obstacles. This inequity is reflected in the electoral outcomes, where dissenting organizations remain marginalized.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary has upheld various laws that criminalize dissent, particularly those targeting speech or actions perceived as threatening the Moroccan state. This legal framework often enables the regime to retaliate against critics under the guise of protecting national security or public order. Anyone advocating for the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination can be met with reprisals such as asset freezes, torture, or arbitrary arrests. In 2010, a Moroccan court sentenced 20 independence activists from Western Sahara to harsh prison sentences for their role in the 2010 Gdeim Izik protests outside Laayoune. In June 2024, a ten-year prison sentence was handed down to El-Hussein Bourkaba and Ayman El Yetrabi. The two men, recognized for their vocal advocacy for Sahrawi sovereignty and the right to self-determination, were convicted on charges of robbery and involvement in physical violence—allegations widely regarded as being fabricated to silence their political activities.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable, with recent actions reflecting a troubling pattern of intimidation against those who report abuses. For instance, human rights defender Naâma Asfari is currently serving a 30-year sentence in Kenitra prison in Morocco on dubious charges of “defamation, disrespect towards public officials, fraudulent practices to incite false testimony, and public slander” linked to his participation in the 2010 Gdeim Izik protest. These accusations appear to serve as retribution for his earlier complaint lodged in France and with the UN Torture Committee in February 2014, concerning the torture and inhumane treatment he endured after his arrest during the dismantling of the Gdeim Izik camp in November 2010. This pattern of behavior is not new; it echoes the systemic failures of the judicial, legislative, and executive systems to address enforced disappearances and other abuses committed during the “years of lead,” the era of military and police repression under the late King Hassan II. During this period, the regime engaged in widespread violence and repression against political dissidents and independence activists, which included arbitrary detentions, widespread arrests, and killings, but no investigations or prosecutions have been initiated for these historical crimes. Under King Mohammed, regime agents continue to operate with full impunity, particularly those affiliated with the DGST and DGSN, which are closely linked to the executive branch. This close affiliation often shields agents from accountability despite documented instances where agents have used excessive force, carried out arbitrary detention, torture, and engaged in other abuses, particularly against Sahrawi protesters, activists, and regular civilians. The Moroccan legislature has also contributed to extending impunity to regime agents by enacting vague laws that lack accountability provisions, granting legal protections, and limiting oversight mechanisms. These legislative choices have preserved the regime’s control and stability at the expense of justice for victims of human rights violations.
The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts, such as military courts or constitutional tribunals. While the regime adopted a new Military Justice Law in 2015, effectively ending the trial of civilians before military courts, Article 219 of the law confirmed that past verdicts on civilian cases made by military courts will remain in effect. In January 2014, Mbarek Daoudi, a vocal proponent of the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, was brought before a military tribunal to face allegations of illegal weapons possession—charges widely characterized as fabricated. However, the trial was suspended without a clear timeline, resulting in Daoudi being held in pre-trial custody for 15 months. The legal proceedings concluded in February 2016, when the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Appeal in Agadir affirmed a five-year prison sentence for Daoudi.
