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HRF classifies Montenegro as democratic.
Montenegro is a parliamentary representative democratic republic in which executive authority is exercised by a government led by the prime minister, while the president serves as head of state with defined constitutional powers, including promulgating laws. Legislative authority is vested in the unicameral Parliament of Montenegro, an 81-member body elected every four years through proportional representation, producing a fragmented multiparty system in which coalition governments are the norm. Following the 2023 parliamentary elections and subsequent coalition negotiations, a new government took office in October 2023, led by Prime Minister Milojko Spajić of Europe Now! movement, while Jakov Milatović has served as president since May 2023.
In Montenegro, elections are largely free and fair, with all major parties able to compete on an open basis. In recent elections, opposition parties have generally been able to campaign freely, marking a clear improvement over earlier cycles, when the then-ruling DPS benefited from substantial advantages through the misuse of state resources.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society actors, and the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country has a historically open and pluralistic civic space, with legal guarantees for freedom of expression and a generally independent media that is able to scrutinize incumbents. Media operate in a diverse environment, public broadcasters benefit from measures to safeguard their independence, and protests are typically allowed to proceed without suppression.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Despite constitutional guarantees of judicial independence and separation of powers, and government measures intended to strengthen institutional autonomy, persistent corruption risks and continued public attacks by officials on judges undermine both public confidence and the judiciary’s effective independence. Consequently, state institutions have generally failed to hold public officials accountable.
Elections in Montenegro are largely free and fair. All major parties are able to compete freely, as evidenced by the fully inclusive and competitive 2020 and 2023 elections, which produced fragmented outcomes and peaceful transfers of power. Montenegro’s opposition has generally been able to campaign freely in recent elections, representing an improvement over previous election cycles, when the then-ruling DPS enjoyed substantial advantages through the misuse of state resources.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Montenegro’s electoral system allows political parties, coalitions, and groups of voters to register candidate lists, and in practice, all major opposition actors, including former governing parties and new political movements, are able to participate in elections. While some observers note that the electoral legal framework is flawed and outdated, lacking legal certainty and containing gaps, inconsistencies, and ambiguities, these deficiencies have not been applied in a discriminatory manner or used to exclude mainstream opposition competitors. To illustrate, in the 2023 early parliamentary elections, the State Election Commission (SEC) registered all 15 candidate lists and 1,113 candidates. As a result, all mainstream opposition parties and coalitions were able to register and compete in the electoral process that produced narrow results. Voters allocated all 81 seats in the unicameral Parliament among 9 parties and coalitions, producing a fragmented legislature in which no single force came close to an outright majority of 41 seats. The newly formed centrist Europe Now! movement (PES), led by Milojko Spajić, emerged as the largest party with 25.5% of the vote and 24 seats. The long-dominant Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), running within the Together! alliance, finished second with 23.2% and 21 seats, marking its second consecutive defeat since losing power in 2020 after the nearly 30-year uninterrupted rule. The pro-Serb For the Future of Montenegro bloc followed with 14.7% and 13 seats, while Aleksa and Dritan – Count Bravely! (Democrats-URA) secured 12.5% and 11 seats. Several smaller parties, including minority representatives, also entered parliament. After prolonged talks, a broad, multi-party coalition led by Europe Now! was formed in October 2023. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that elections were “competitive and well-run.”
This outcome followed a pattern established by the August 2020 parliamentary elections, which the OSCE also assessed as transparent and professionally conducted overall. Those elections brought an end to the Democratic Party of Socialists’ (DPS) nearly 30-year period in power and resulted in the formation of a government by three opposition blocs: For the Future of Montenegro, Peace Is Our Nation, and In Black and White. Similarly, in the 2023 presidential election, the deputy leader of Europe Now! Jakov Milatović defeated the incumbent president and long-time DPS leader Milo Đukanović, who had served multiple terms as prime minister or president since the early 1990s.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Montenegro’s electoral framework allows electoral contestants to campaign freely, with freedoms of assembly, expression, and association generally respected. While in practice, the campaign environment is affected by shortcomings such as occasional misuse of administrative resources and weak oversight of campaign finance, these deficiencies are not systemic and do not amount to a significant or targeted obstruction of opposition campaigns. In line with this, the OSCE, observing the 2023 parliamentary elections, concluded that “the campaign was free and voters were offered a wide choice,” and that contestants were able to operate in an open campaign environment.
This has marked a significant improvement compared to previous election cycles, during which the DPS, while in government, enjoyed a range of unfair advantages. These included the abuse of state and administrative resources, unequal access to and representation in the media, credible allegations of vote-buying and other forms of illicit voter mobilization, and, in some instances, the harassment of political rivals. Since the transfer of power initiated by the 2020 parliamentary elections, none of the incumbent parties has misused administrative resources to a comparable extent, as noted above.
In Montenegro, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Montenegro has a historically open and pluralistic civic space. The country’s legal framework guarantees freedom of expression, and independent media and organizations are generally able to criticize incumbents. Media operate in a pluralistic environment, and the government has implemented measures aimed at ensuring the independence of public broadcasters. Protests are generally not suppressed and continue to occur.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Montenegro has a robust civil society, with several thousand civil society organizations (CSOs) registered in the country as of December 2025. These organizations operate across a wide range of fields, including social services and humanitarian aid, human rights, media freedom, anti-corruption, and democratic governance, and frequently advocate for policy change, transparency, and accountability, including through criticism of government actions. They generally operate openly and are able to participate in pluralistic public discourse. Virtually all governments since 2006, when Montenegro gained independence from Serbia, have largely refrained from obstructing the work of non-governmental organizations while in office. At the same time, in October 2024, members of For the Future of Montenegro, part of the parliamentary governing majority alongside Europe Now, proposed draft legislation commonly referred to as a “foreign agents” law, which would have imposed additional registration and labeling requirements on NGOs receiving foreign funding. This proposal was met with strong criticism from civil society organizations, which warned that it could undermine civic space and democratic standards, and it has not been adopted following domestic and international pushback.
Montenegro’s incumbent government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The country’s constitutional and legal framework formally guarantees freedom of expression, and these protections are generally respected in practice. Independent and dissenting media outlets are able to operate openly and to criticize the authorities without facing routine repression. This represents a clear improvement following the defeat of the DPS in the 2020 parliamentary elections. Under the DPS’s long period in power (1990–2020), journalists and media outlets critical of the authorities were frequently exposed to harassment, hostile rhetoric, and arbitrary judicial proceedings on questionable grounds. Since 2020, such practices have declined significantly, and the overall environment for public criticism has become less coercive. At the same time, important concerns remain. While recent years have seen fewer physical attacks on journalists, several serious cases from earlier periods remain unresolved, most notably the 2004 murder of Dan editor Duško Jovanović and the attempted murder of investigative journalist Olivera Lakić.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Media operate in a pluralistic environment in which both pro-government and government-critical editorial lines are present. The central public service broadcaster is Radio and Television of Montenegro (RTCG), which operates national television and radio channels and is funded primarily from the state budget, supplemented by limited advertising revenues. Alongside RTCG, Montenegro has a large number of private television and radio stations, some with nationwide reach and many operating at the local level. The nation’s media regulator, the Agency for Audiovisual Media Services (AMU), is an independent entity responsible for licensing and supervising audiovisual media service providers.
Since 2020, the government has adopted measures aimed at strengthening media pluralism and independence following systemic weaknesses inherited from the long rule of the DPS. In 2020, it established the Media Pluralism and Diversity Fund, tasked with allocating 0.09% of the annual state budget to support media pluralism and diversity. In June 2024, Montenegro adopted the Media Law (54/24), which increased funding for the Media Pluralism and Diversity Fund to 0.2% of the annual state budget and introduced additional safeguards to support editorial independence, including statutory protection of editorial autonomy from owners and political actors.
At the same time, concerns persist regarding political influence over public broadcasting. In July 2023, the re-appointment of RTCG Director General Boris Raonić provoked strong criticism from civil society and media watchdogs, particularly because his earlier appointment had been annulled by the High Court in Podgorica due to a conflict of interest.
Lastly, Montenegro’s government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Most peaceful demonstrations in recent years have proceeded without undue interference by law enforcement, notwithstanding authorities’ inconsistent application of COVID-related restrictions on public assemblies in 2020-2021. For example, in January 2025, thousands of protesters gathered in Podgorica to demand accountability and the resignation of senior security officials following a mass shooting in Cetinje that killed 13 people. Demonstrators publicly criticized the government’s response, called for policy reforms, including stricter gun regulations, and organized commemorative activities, such as a 13-minute silence for the victims. The protests proceeded without reports of significant police repression or excessive use of force.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Although the constitution guarantees judicial independence and separation of powers, and the incumbent government has adopted measures aimed at strengthening the autonomy of courts and executive bodies, persistent corruption risks and continued public attacks by officials against judges undermine both public trust and the effective independence of the judiciary. As a result, state institutions have generally failed to hold public officials accountable, notwithstanding a small number of recent cases that suggest a tentative departure from this pattern.
The government has not subjected judicial or executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Montenegro’s legal framework formally guarantees judicial independence and the separation of powers; however, in practice, these safeguards were not effectively implemented for an extended period, particularly during the DPS’s tenure, which was marked by systemic corruption and political influence over institutions. The incumbent government pursued measures aimed at reversing the long-term deterioration of institutional independence that had developed over previous decades.
In 2024, the parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the Judicial Council and Judges and the Law on the State Prosecution Service with the stated objective of restoring judicial and prosecutorial autonomy and aligning the system with European standards. Under this framework, the Judicial Council of Montenegro is responsible for the appointment, promotion, evaluation, and discipline of judges, including court presidents, while the Prosecutorial Council of Montenegro exercises corresponding powers in relation to state prosecutors.
At the same time, institutional independence remains far from secured: despite new legal safeguards, significant corruption risks persist in the aftermath of DPS’s tenure, while incumbent government representatives and elected officials have repeatedly made statements that demonize judges and portray the judiciary as corrupt or ineffective, thereby eroding public trust even further. As a result, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers concluded that these shortcomings continue to “undermine the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the prosecution service.”
As a result, Montenegro’s judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Despite formal measures aimed at ensuring judicial independence and impartiality, state institutions continue to demonstrate a limited capacity to effectively enforce the law against government officials, particularly in politically sensitive cases. To illustrate, Montenegro’s institutions failed to hold officials accountable for attempts to skew electoral competition in favor of the then-ruling DPS. In the 2019 “Envelope Affair,” a leaked video showed businessman Duško Knežević handing an envelope containing approximately €97,000 (around $105,000) to Slavoljub Stijepović, then mayor of Podgorica and a senior DPS official, allegedly “as agreed with” Milo Đukanović, then DPS leader. The funds were widely understood to be linked to the DPS’s 2016 parliamentary election campaign and were not transparently reported in official campaign finance disclosures. In April 2025, the Podgorica High Court issued a first-instance verdict, acquitting all defendants of charges, including the creation of a criminal organization and money laundering. As of December 2025, appellate proceedings remained ongoing.
Nonetheless, some attempts to hold former officials accountable for past abuses of office and uphold media independence warrant cautious optimism that the judiciary could move closer to becoming an independent branch of government. In a landmark case, the High Court of Podgorica indicted former Supreme Court president Vesna Medenica in 2023 on charges related to abuse of office and protection of a criminal organisation. Medenica had been arrested in April 2022 following the publication of encrypted communications exchanged between her son, Miloš Medenica, and a police officer, which prosecutors argued demonstrated her awareness of, and unlawful protection for, a criminal network involved in drug and cigarette smuggling. Criminal proceedings subsequently advanced to trial, with both Medenica and her son facing serious corruption-related charges. As of December 2025, no final judgment had been issued, and the court’s decision remained pending. Regardless of the eventual outcome, prosecuting a former Supreme Court president represents one of the most significant corruption cases and a rare attempt at securing high-level accountability.
HRF classifies Montenegro as democratic.
Montenegro is a parliamentary representative democratic republic in which executive authority is exercised by a government led by the prime minister, while the president serves as head of state with defined constitutional powers, including promulgating laws. Legislative authority is vested in the unicameral Parliament of Montenegro, an 81-member body elected every four years through proportional representation, producing a fragmented multiparty system in which coalition governments are the norm. Following the 2023 parliamentary elections and subsequent coalition negotiations, a new government took office in October 2023, led by Prime Minister Milojko Spajić of Europe Now! movement, while Jakov Milatović has served as president since May 2023.
In Montenegro, elections are largely free and fair, with all major parties able to compete on an open basis. In recent elections, opposition parties have generally been able to campaign freely, marking a clear improvement over earlier cycles, when the then-ruling DPS benefited from substantial advantages through the misuse of state resources.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society actors, and the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country has a historically open and pluralistic civic space, with legal guarantees for freedom of expression and a generally independent media that is able to scrutinize incumbents. Media operate in a diverse environment, public broadcasters benefit from measures to safeguard their independence, and protests are typically allowed to proceed without suppression.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Despite constitutional guarantees of judicial independence and separation of powers, and government measures intended to strengthen institutional autonomy, persistent corruption risks and continued public attacks by officials on judges undermine both public confidence and the judiciary’s effective independence. Consequently, state institutions have generally failed to hold public officials accountable.
Elections in Montenegro are largely free and fair. All major parties are able to compete freely, as evidenced by the fully inclusive and competitive 2020 and 2023 elections, which produced fragmented outcomes and peaceful transfers of power. Montenegro’s opposition has generally been able to campaign freely in recent elections, representing an improvement over previous election cycles, when the then-ruling DPS enjoyed substantial advantages through the misuse of state resources.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Montenegro’s electoral system allows political parties, coalitions, and groups of voters to register candidate lists, and in practice, all major opposition actors, including former governing parties and new political movements, are able to participate in elections. While some observers note that the electoral legal framework is flawed and outdated, lacking legal certainty and containing gaps, inconsistencies, and ambiguities, these deficiencies have not been applied in a discriminatory manner or used to exclude mainstream opposition competitors. To illustrate, in the 2023 early parliamentary elections, the State Election Commission (SEC) registered all 15 candidate lists and 1,113 candidates. As a result, all mainstream opposition parties and coalitions were able to register and compete in the electoral process that produced narrow results. Voters allocated all 81 seats in the unicameral Parliament among 9 parties and coalitions, producing a fragmented legislature in which no single force came close to an outright majority of 41 seats. The newly formed centrist Europe Now! movement (PES), led by Milojko Spajić, emerged as the largest party with 25.5% of the vote and 24 seats. The long-dominant Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), running within the Together! alliance, finished second with 23.2% and 21 seats, marking its second consecutive defeat since losing power in 2020 after the nearly 30-year uninterrupted rule. The pro-Serb For the Future of Montenegro bloc followed with 14.7% and 13 seats, while Aleksa and Dritan – Count Bravely! (Democrats-URA) secured 12.5% and 11 seats. Several smaller parties, including minority representatives, also entered parliament. After prolonged talks, a broad, multi-party coalition led by Europe Now! was formed in October 2023. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that elections were “competitive and well-run.”
This outcome followed a pattern established by the August 2020 parliamentary elections, which the OSCE also assessed as transparent and professionally conducted overall. Those elections brought an end to the Democratic Party of Socialists’ (DPS) nearly 30-year period in power and resulted in the formation of a government by three opposition blocs: For the Future of Montenegro, Peace Is Our Nation, and In Black and White. Similarly, in the 2023 presidential election, the deputy leader of Europe Now! Jakov Milatović defeated the incumbent president and long-time DPS leader Milo Đukanović, who had served multiple terms as prime minister or president since the early 1990s.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Montenegro’s electoral framework allows electoral contestants to campaign freely, with freedoms of assembly, expression, and association generally respected. While in practice, the campaign environment is affected by shortcomings such as occasional misuse of administrative resources and weak oversight of campaign finance, these deficiencies are not systemic and do not amount to a significant or targeted obstruction of opposition campaigns. In line with this, the OSCE, observing the 2023 parliamentary elections, concluded that “the campaign was free and voters were offered a wide choice,” and that contestants were able to operate in an open campaign environment.
This has marked a significant improvement compared to previous election cycles, during which the DPS, while in government, enjoyed a range of unfair advantages. These included the abuse of state and administrative resources, unequal access to and representation in the media, credible allegations of vote-buying and other forms of illicit voter mobilization, and, in some instances, the harassment of political rivals. Since the transfer of power initiated by the 2020 parliamentary elections, none of the incumbent parties has misused administrative resources to a comparable extent, as noted above.
In Montenegro, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Montenegro has a historically open and pluralistic civic space. The country’s legal framework guarantees freedom of expression, and independent media and organizations are generally able to criticize incumbents. Media operate in a pluralistic environment, and the government has implemented measures aimed at ensuring the independence of public broadcasters. Protests are generally not suppressed and continue to occur.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Montenegro has a robust civil society, with several thousand civil society organizations (CSOs) registered in the country as of December 2025. These organizations operate across a wide range of fields, including social services and humanitarian aid, human rights, media freedom, anti-corruption, and democratic governance, and frequently advocate for policy change, transparency, and accountability, including through criticism of government actions. They generally operate openly and are able to participate in pluralistic public discourse. Virtually all governments since 2006, when Montenegro gained independence from Serbia, have largely refrained from obstructing the work of non-governmental organizations while in office. At the same time, in October 2024, members of For the Future of Montenegro, part of the parliamentary governing majority alongside Europe Now, proposed draft legislation commonly referred to as a “foreign agents” law, which would have imposed additional registration and labeling requirements on NGOs receiving foreign funding. This proposal was met with strong criticism from civil society organizations, which warned that it could undermine civic space and democratic standards, and it has not been adopted following domestic and international pushback.
Montenegro’s incumbent government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The country’s constitutional and legal framework formally guarantees freedom of expression, and these protections are generally respected in practice. Independent and dissenting media outlets are able to operate openly and to criticize the authorities without facing routine repression. This represents a clear improvement following the defeat of the DPS in the 2020 parliamentary elections. Under the DPS’s long period in power (1990–2020), journalists and media outlets critical of the authorities were frequently exposed to harassment, hostile rhetoric, and arbitrary judicial proceedings on questionable grounds. Since 2020, such practices have declined significantly, and the overall environment for public criticism has become less coercive. At the same time, important concerns remain. While recent years have seen fewer physical attacks on journalists, several serious cases from earlier periods remain unresolved, most notably the 2004 murder of Dan editor Duško Jovanović and the attempted murder of investigative journalist Olivera Lakić.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Media operate in a pluralistic environment in which both pro-government and government-critical editorial lines are present. The central public service broadcaster is Radio and Television of Montenegro (RTCG), which operates national television and radio channels and is funded primarily from the state budget, supplemented by limited advertising revenues. Alongside RTCG, Montenegro has a large number of private television and radio stations, some with nationwide reach and many operating at the local level. The nation’s media regulator, the Agency for Audiovisual Media Services (AMU), is an independent entity responsible for licensing and supervising audiovisual media service providers.
Since 2020, the government has adopted measures aimed at strengthening media pluralism and independence following systemic weaknesses inherited from the long rule of the DPS. In 2020, it established the Media Pluralism and Diversity Fund, tasked with allocating 0.09% of the annual state budget to support media pluralism and diversity. In June 2024, Montenegro adopted the Media Law (54/24), which increased funding for the Media Pluralism and Diversity Fund to 0.2% of the annual state budget and introduced additional safeguards to support editorial independence, including statutory protection of editorial autonomy from owners and political actors.
At the same time, concerns persist regarding political influence over public broadcasting. In July 2023, the re-appointment of RTCG Director General Boris Raonić provoked strong criticism from civil society and media watchdogs, particularly because his earlier appointment had been annulled by the High Court in Podgorica due to a conflict of interest.
Lastly, Montenegro’s government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Most peaceful demonstrations in recent years have proceeded without undue interference by law enforcement, notwithstanding authorities’ inconsistent application of COVID-related restrictions on public assemblies in 2020-2021. For example, in January 2025, thousands of protesters gathered in Podgorica to demand accountability and the resignation of senior security officials following a mass shooting in Cetinje that killed 13 people. Demonstrators publicly criticized the government’s response, called for policy reforms, including stricter gun regulations, and organized commemorative activities, such as a 13-minute silence for the victims. The protests proceeded without reports of significant police repression or excessive use of force.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Although the constitution guarantees judicial independence and separation of powers, and the incumbent government has adopted measures aimed at strengthening the autonomy of courts and executive bodies, persistent corruption risks and continued public attacks by officials against judges undermine both public trust and the effective independence of the judiciary. As a result, state institutions have generally failed to hold public officials accountable, notwithstanding a small number of recent cases that suggest a tentative departure from this pattern.
The government has not subjected judicial or executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Montenegro’s legal framework formally guarantees judicial independence and the separation of powers; however, in practice, these safeguards were not effectively implemented for an extended period, particularly during the DPS’s tenure, which was marked by systemic corruption and political influence over institutions. The incumbent government pursued measures aimed at reversing the long-term deterioration of institutional independence that had developed over previous decades.
In 2024, the parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the Judicial Council and Judges and the Law on the State Prosecution Service with the stated objective of restoring judicial and prosecutorial autonomy and aligning the system with European standards. Under this framework, the Judicial Council of Montenegro is responsible for the appointment, promotion, evaluation, and discipline of judges, including court presidents, while the Prosecutorial Council of Montenegro exercises corresponding powers in relation to state prosecutors.
At the same time, institutional independence remains far from secured: despite new legal safeguards, significant corruption risks persist in the aftermath of DPS’s tenure, while incumbent government representatives and elected officials have repeatedly made statements that demonize judges and portray the judiciary as corrupt or ineffective, thereby eroding public trust even further. As a result, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers concluded that these shortcomings continue to “undermine the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the prosecution service.”
As a result, Montenegro’s judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Despite formal measures aimed at ensuring judicial independence and impartiality, state institutions continue to demonstrate a limited capacity to effectively enforce the law against government officials, particularly in politically sensitive cases. To illustrate, Montenegro’s institutions failed to hold officials accountable for attempts to skew electoral competition in favor of the then-ruling DPS. In the 2019 “Envelope Affair,” a leaked video showed businessman Duško Knežević handing an envelope containing approximately €97,000 (around $105,000) to Slavoljub Stijepović, then mayor of Podgorica and a senior DPS official, allegedly “as agreed with” Milo Đukanović, then DPS leader. The funds were widely understood to be linked to the DPS’s 2016 parliamentary election campaign and were not transparently reported in official campaign finance disclosures. In April 2025, the Podgorica High Court issued a first-instance verdict, acquitting all defendants of charges, including the creation of a criminal organization and money laundering. As of December 2025, appellate proceedings remained ongoing.
Nonetheless, some attempts to hold former officials accountable for past abuses of office and uphold media independence warrant cautious optimism that the judiciary could move closer to becoming an independent branch of government. In a landmark case, the High Court of Podgorica indicted former Supreme Court president Vesna Medenica in 2023 on charges related to abuse of office and protection of a criminal organisation. Medenica had been arrested in April 2022 following the publication of encrypted communications exchanged between her son, Miloš Medenica, and a police officer, which prosecutors argued demonstrated her awareness of, and unlawful protection for, a criminal network involved in drug and cigarette smuggling. Criminal proceedings subsequently advanced to trial, with both Medenica and her son facing serious corruption-related charges. As of December 2025, no final judgment had been issued, and the court’s decision remained pending. Regardless of the eventual outcome, prosecuting a former Supreme Court president represents one of the most significant corruption cases and a rare attempt at securing high-level accountability.
