Democracy
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HRF classifies Mongolia as democratic.
After seven decades under Soviet influence, Mongolia underwent a peaceful democratic revolution in 1990 that ended single-party communist rule and ushered in its democratic transition. The country adopted a new constitution in 1992 that established a multiparty semi-presidential system and enshrined civil liberties and competitive elections. Since then, Mongolia has had 18 governments, making it one of the most politically unstable countries in East Asia. Its political landscape remains characterized by volatility, corruption scandals, and patronage politics. Recent concerns over judicial independence, constitutional amendments expanding presidential powers, and public frustration with inequality have additionally raised questions about the resilience of existing institutions. Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh of the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), one of the country’s two major parties, has held the presidency since June 2021, succeeding Battulga Khaltmaa of the opposition Democratic Party (DP). He was also Prime Minister from October 2017 to January 2021, when a corruption scandal led to his resignation. Along with his cabinet, Gombojavyn Zandashatar of the MPP assumed the prime ministership in June 2025.
National elections are largely free and fair. Both the President and the Parliament are elected by popular vote. Equality in campaigning is a recurring concern, especially since the 2020 general elections, due to growing financial disparities between bigger and smaller parties. The two major parties are the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) and the Democratic Party (DP), which dominate the political landscape, often take turns winning elections, and are more well-resourced compared to small parties. There are occasional concerns about the independence of the election management body. Despite this, Mongolia’s elections are generally considered free and fair.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Mongolia has a robust civil society and protest culture. However, the MPP government has overseen an escalation in the targeting of journalists reporting on politically sensitive topics.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government in a way that enables it to repress criticism and significantly weaken or dismantle accountability mechanisms. Judicial independence in Mongolia has been weakened despite reforms, as political actors retain significant influence over judicial appointments and prosecutorial powers. Courts have failed to curb government repression, exemplified by harsh sentences against critics. High-level corruption cases remain unresolved due to a deferential judiciary and political tensions. Constitutional and institutional reforms have fueled an ongoing constitutional crisis and undermined the ability of the executive, legislature, and judiciary to uphold accountability and operate effectively.
National elections are largely free and fair. Mongolia holds presidential elections every six years and parliamentary elections every four years. The two dominant parties, the MPP and the DP, have alternately won both presidential and parliamentary elections since Mongolia’s democratic transition. Winning margins are typically competitive. While opposition parties enjoy the freedom to register and campaign, existing election laws impose stringent registration requirements that make it challenging for new players to participate. The campaign trail also tends to be dominated by the center-left MPP and the center-right DP, which are more financially resourced than smaller contenders. Election oversight is carried out by the General Election Commission (GEC), which is statutorily independent but has occasionally been accused of being politically influenced.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party from competing in elections. Mongolian voters have the opportunity to choose among genuine political alternatives. A total of 23 parties across the ideological spectrum, for example, competed in the most recent 2024 parliamentary elections. The MPP won 68 of the 126 contested seats, giving it a simple majority, while the DP secured 42 seats. The remaining seats were split among three other parties. An election observation mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported on existing legislation that imposes “excessive restrictions on the right to stand,” including conditions on financial and legal capacity, resulting in eleven independent candidates being denied registration for the 2024 polls. Five of them successfully challenged the denials in court. An amendment to the 2019 Parliamentary Elections Law, introduced in 2023, allowed political parties formed after the announcement of elections to nominate candidates, thereby strengthening political participation. Further, legislative reforms in recent years are expected to boost political participation: a constitutional amendment introduced in 2023 increased the number of elected representatives from 76 to 126 and created a mixed electoral system that aims to create a more diverse legislature.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party’s electoral campaign. Nevertheless, the MPP and DP benefit from extensive financial resources compared to smaller contenders. These include property ownership across the country, which enables them to reach more voters and mount a broader campaign encompassing remote areas of the country. In the 2020 parliamentary polls, 73 of the 76 winning candidates belonged to either the MPP or the DP, and on average spent 3.6 times more than other candidates. Smaller parties have limited opportunity to organize large-scale campaign events or conduct in-person voter engagement. They are therefore forced to rely mostly on social media for campaigning, in a country where internet penetration is significantly lower among voters inhabiting rural areas. Online campaigning can only be conducted on websites and social media accounts registered with local election authorities, a rule which has been criticized as curtailing political pluralism and freedom of speech. There is little evidence to suggest that these restrictions have been abused to weaken the mainstream opposition. The MPP government has also taken steps to financially empower political parties by bringing into effect the Law on Political Parties in January 2024, which introduces public funding for parties that obtained at least one percent of the votes in the last parliamentary polling.
The government has not undermined independent electoral oversight. Observers have noted the GEC’s overall credibility and technical competence. There have been isolated accusations of political meddling in the GEC’s functioning, most notably in 2016, when evidence surfaced that the body allowed former members of political parties to become election officers. These allegations are limited and have not been a prominent feature of more recent elections. Citizen watchdogs also commonly participate in the elections. In the 2024 polls, for example, the GEC accredited 259 international observers, and reported 300 civil society observers and 29,000 political party and candidate observers registered across localities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Freedom of dissent in Mongolia presents a complex picture with a relatively open environment for civic and political engagement, yet notable constraints with respect to media freedom and transparency.
The media is generally free from overt manipulation. There were an estimated 434 media outlets in Mongolia by 2023, most of which were privately owned. However, media ownership in Mongolia is largely not transparent, and a 2016 study found that 74% of investigated media outlets in the country had various degrees of affiliation with local politicians. There is no statutory duty for media organizations to disclose their ownership. An action plan proposed by the MPP government to establish ownership disclosure practices was eventually tabled. Additionally, media licensing and registration are entirely controlled by the government. While there is no indication of the government abusing this power, it creates the risk of political meddling in the licensing and registration process.
Although the government has not manipulated media coverage, the work of dissenting media is increasingly obstructed. There have been a number of documented incidents where journalists and bloggers were targeted for covering politically sensitive topics, such as the Southern (Inner) Mongolian cause. In 2022, for example, prominent activist and blogger Munkhbayar Chuluundorj was arrested after calling for then-Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene to resign in a Facebook post for his failure to advocate for the independence of Southern Mongolia and his close relations with China. He was accused of “receiving instructions and funds from a foreign intelligence group,” but no further details on the basis of these charges were given. In June 2022, a local court sentenced him to 10 years. Another notable case concerns Unurtsetseg Naran, editor-in-chief of the independent news site Zarig, who in 2022 and 2023 ran several exposés on government corruption and was eventually arrested as a result. She was sentenced to four years and nine months’ imprisonment in July 2024. Authorities also blocked access to Zarig’s website in December 2023, which lasted for two days, and raided the outlet’s offices. In the latest spate of cases, journalist Bayarmaa Ayurzana was arrested on May 5, 2024, for her investigation into suspected embezzlement by Deputy Prime Minister Amarsaikhan Sainbuyan. She was detained for 48 hours for “threatening to disseminate information that might cause serious damage” against Amarsaikhan, and faces up to eight years in prison. On March 17, 2025, eight journalists from Noorog Creative Studio, an independent news outlet known for its investigative work, were taken into custody during a raid on their office under Mongolia’s Criminal Law Act. They were accused of “undermining national unity,” which government officials later claimed to be linked to an alleged online gambling scheme.
Mongolians still enjoy considerable space to dissent, despite the above attacks on press freedom. As of December 2023, there are approximately 7,480 active civil society organizations, and overt retaliation has not been as prominent regarding activists, academics, political opposition, or general members of the public, compared to journalists. Mongolians are also able to protest and gather without being unfairly repressed, as illustrated by anti-government protests that took place between May and June 2025 that were precipitated mainly by government corruption and inequality. The protests drew hundreds of participants and successfully prompted the resignation of Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene as Prime Minister, due to the corruption and wealth accumulation scandal in which he was embroiled. In 2021, the government passed a new law aimed at enhancing state protection of human rights defenders. The government is also undertaking efforts to strengthen its press freedom legislation, with the aid of international stakeholders.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government in a way that enables it to repress criticism and systematically weaken or dismantle accountability mechanisms. Institutional accountability has experienced a notable decline under the MPP government, which has been in office since 2016. Heavy executive influence on judicial appointments renders the judiciary vulnerable to political meddling. Courts have taken steps to rein in government powers, but have increasingly failed to preserve fair electoral competition, legitimate criticisms of the government, and accountability of officials. The executive and legislative branches are notably dominant in accountability processes, and often engage in power struggles with one another that undermine their effective functioning. Considerable political influence on the judiciary and anti-corruption authority has significantly hampered anti-corruption efforts. Some recent reforms signal a willingness to improve the independence of institutions, but have not sufficiently addressed overarching concerns.
The government has subjected the judiciary to reforms that somewhat weaken its independence or operational effectiveness. It has intervened with the courts’ powers by concentrating judicial appointments in the executive branch, through recent, swift dismissals of top prosecutors and judges. The 1992 Constitution guarantees judicial independence from outside influences. The responsibility to uphold this independence and ensure judges’ impartiality is vested in a Judicial General Council (JGC) per Article 49 of the Constitution. Based on a reform introduced in 2021, half of the JGC’s 10 members are appointed by the Parliament, which has drawn concerns regarding potential political meddling with the body’s functioning. Until 2021, the body was entirely appointed by the President. Additionally, a legislative amendment swiftly passed by the Parliament in an emergency session in 2019 allowed the National Security Council, chaired by the President, to remove top judges, prosecutors, and anti-corruption officials. The amendment took effect on the same day. In its immediate aftermath, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as well as the Prosecutor-General and Deputy Prosecutor, were reportedly dismissed by presidential order issued on the recommendation of the National Security Council.
Courts have failed to check government attempts to repress criticism. The cases of activist and blogger Munkhbayar Chuluundorj and journalist Unurtsetseg Naran highlight the lack of judicial intervention in this respect. Munkhbayar remains detained as of November 2025, despite reports of his declining health. Journalist Unurtsetseg Naran was sentenced in a closed-door trial and not allowed to have her lawyer present. Her conviction was upheld on appeal.
Judicial institutions have somewhat failed to hold officials accountable. A number of graft scandals involving senior ruling party members have not been resolved to date. This is fueled not only by a judiciary deferential to the government but also by recurrent, destabilizing tensions between the executive and legislature. For example, several MPP members were implicated in a high-profile corruption scandal dubbed the “MNT60 billion tugrik scandal,” which involved allegations that, ahead of the 2016 parliamentary election, senior members of the MPP conspired to raise about MNT60 billion to fund the party’s campaign by selling cabinet positions in the incoming administration. In 2019, a district court found two members guilty and sentenced them to four years each. This conviction was overturned on appeal. Then-Speaker of Parliament Miyeegombyn Enkhbold, who allegedly led the scheme, was removed from office but never formally charged by the anti-corruption authority.
The executive and legislative branches are subjected to reforms that undermine their operational effectiveness. Mongolia’s semi-presidential system has recurrently produced institutional conflict that disrupts the balance between presidential authority and legislative powers. Most recently, in October 2025, efforts by Parliament to remove a prime minister through a no-confidence vote were thwarted by a presidential veto allowed by the 1992 Constitution, which deepens the political deadlock that impedes democratic accountability. The 1992 Constitution allows Parliament to remove a sitting Prime Minister through a no-confidence vote by a simple majority, a mechanism intended to ensure executive accountability. At the same time, however, the Constitution grants the President broad authority to veto parliamentary resolutions on procedural grounds. In practice, this dual arrangement has weakened parliamentary oversight rather than strengthened it. This tension has been central to Mongolia’s constitutional crisis, which remains ongoing as of November 2025. In October 2025, following widespread criticism of Prime Minister Gombojavyn Zandanshatar’s mineral policy and his unilateral appointment of a justice minister, Parliament initiated a no-confidence vote against him. The President then intervened by vetoing the resolution authorizing the vote, arguing it was procedurally flawed. This crisis illustrates how executive allies in Mongolia have increasingly overridden parliamentary mechanisms of accountability, with negative implications for democracy. Prime Minister Gombojavyn was able to stay in power after the Constitutional Court sided with the President.
HRF classifies Mongolia as democratic.
After seven decades under Soviet influence, Mongolia underwent a peaceful democratic revolution in 1990 that ended single-party communist rule and ushered in its democratic transition. The country adopted a new constitution in 1992 that established a multiparty semi-presidential system and enshrined civil liberties and competitive elections. Since then, Mongolia has had 18 governments, making it one of the most politically unstable countries in East Asia. Its political landscape remains characterized by volatility, corruption scandals, and patronage politics. Recent concerns over judicial independence, constitutional amendments expanding presidential powers, and public frustration with inequality have additionally raised questions about the resilience of existing institutions. Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh of the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), one of the country’s two major parties, has held the presidency since June 2021, succeeding Battulga Khaltmaa of the opposition Democratic Party (DP). He was also Prime Minister from October 2017 to January 2021, when a corruption scandal led to his resignation. Along with his cabinet, Gombojavyn Zandashatar of the MPP assumed the prime ministership in June 2025.
National elections are largely free and fair. Both the President and the Parliament are elected by popular vote. Equality in campaigning is a recurring concern, especially since the 2020 general elections, due to growing financial disparities between bigger and smaller parties. The two major parties are the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) and the Democratic Party (DP), which dominate the political landscape, often take turns winning elections, and are more well-resourced compared to small parties. There are occasional concerns about the independence of the election management body. Despite this, Mongolia’s elections are generally considered free and fair.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Mongolia has a robust civil society and protest culture. However, the MPP government has overseen an escalation in the targeting of journalists reporting on politically sensitive topics.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government in a way that enables it to repress criticism and significantly weaken or dismantle accountability mechanisms. Judicial independence in Mongolia has been weakened despite reforms, as political actors retain significant influence over judicial appointments and prosecutorial powers. Courts have failed to curb government repression, exemplified by harsh sentences against critics. High-level corruption cases remain unresolved due to a deferential judiciary and political tensions. Constitutional and institutional reforms have fueled an ongoing constitutional crisis and undermined the ability of the executive, legislature, and judiciary to uphold accountability and operate effectively.
National elections are largely free and fair. Mongolia holds presidential elections every six years and parliamentary elections every four years. The two dominant parties, the MPP and the DP, have alternately won both presidential and parliamentary elections since Mongolia’s democratic transition. Winning margins are typically competitive. While opposition parties enjoy the freedom to register and campaign, existing election laws impose stringent registration requirements that make it challenging for new players to participate. The campaign trail also tends to be dominated by the center-left MPP and the center-right DP, which are more financially resourced than smaller contenders. Election oversight is carried out by the General Election Commission (GEC), which is statutorily independent but has occasionally been accused of being politically influenced.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party from competing in elections. Mongolian voters have the opportunity to choose among genuine political alternatives. A total of 23 parties across the ideological spectrum, for example, competed in the most recent 2024 parliamentary elections. The MPP won 68 of the 126 contested seats, giving it a simple majority, while the DP secured 42 seats. The remaining seats were split among three other parties. An election observation mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported on existing legislation that imposes “excessive restrictions on the right to stand,” including conditions on financial and legal capacity, resulting in eleven independent candidates being denied registration for the 2024 polls. Five of them successfully challenged the denials in court. An amendment to the 2019 Parliamentary Elections Law, introduced in 2023, allowed political parties formed after the announcement of elections to nominate candidates, thereby strengthening political participation. Further, legislative reforms in recent years are expected to boost political participation: a constitutional amendment introduced in 2023 increased the number of elected representatives from 76 to 126 and created a mixed electoral system that aims to create a more diverse legislature.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party’s electoral campaign. Nevertheless, the MPP and DP benefit from extensive financial resources compared to smaller contenders. These include property ownership across the country, which enables them to reach more voters and mount a broader campaign encompassing remote areas of the country. In the 2020 parliamentary polls, 73 of the 76 winning candidates belonged to either the MPP or the DP, and on average spent 3.6 times more than other candidates. Smaller parties have limited opportunity to organize large-scale campaign events or conduct in-person voter engagement. They are therefore forced to rely mostly on social media for campaigning, in a country where internet penetration is significantly lower among voters inhabiting rural areas. Online campaigning can only be conducted on websites and social media accounts registered with local election authorities, a rule which has been criticized as curtailing political pluralism and freedom of speech. There is little evidence to suggest that these restrictions have been abused to weaken the mainstream opposition. The MPP government has also taken steps to financially empower political parties by bringing into effect the Law on Political Parties in January 2024, which introduces public funding for parties that obtained at least one percent of the votes in the last parliamentary polling.
The government has not undermined independent electoral oversight. Observers have noted the GEC’s overall credibility and technical competence. There have been isolated accusations of political meddling in the GEC’s functioning, most notably in 2016, when evidence surfaced that the body allowed former members of political parties to become election officers. These allegations are limited and have not been a prominent feature of more recent elections. Citizen watchdogs also commonly participate in the elections. In the 2024 polls, for example, the GEC accredited 259 international observers, and reported 300 civil society observers and 29,000 political party and candidate observers registered across localities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Freedom of dissent in Mongolia presents a complex picture with a relatively open environment for civic and political engagement, yet notable constraints with respect to media freedom and transparency.
The media is generally free from overt manipulation. There were an estimated 434 media outlets in Mongolia by 2023, most of which were privately owned. However, media ownership in Mongolia is largely not transparent, and a 2016 study found that 74% of investigated media outlets in the country had various degrees of affiliation with local politicians. There is no statutory duty for media organizations to disclose their ownership. An action plan proposed by the MPP government to establish ownership disclosure practices was eventually tabled. Additionally, media licensing and registration are entirely controlled by the government. While there is no indication of the government abusing this power, it creates the risk of political meddling in the licensing and registration process.
Although the government has not manipulated media coverage, the work of dissenting media is increasingly obstructed. There have been a number of documented incidents where journalists and bloggers were targeted for covering politically sensitive topics, such as the Southern (Inner) Mongolian cause. In 2022, for example, prominent activist and blogger Munkhbayar Chuluundorj was arrested after calling for then-Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene to resign in a Facebook post for his failure to advocate for the independence of Southern Mongolia and his close relations with China. He was accused of “receiving instructions and funds from a foreign intelligence group,” but no further details on the basis of these charges were given. In June 2022, a local court sentenced him to 10 years. Another notable case concerns Unurtsetseg Naran, editor-in-chief of the independent news site Zarig, who in 2022 and 2023 ran several exposés on government corruption and was eventually arrested as a result. She was sentenced to four years and nine months’ imprisonment in July 2024. Authorities also blocked access to Zarig’s website in December 2023, which lasted for two days, and raided the outlet’s offices. In the latest spate of cases, journalist Bayarmaa Ayurzana was arrested on May 5, 2024, for her investigation into suspected embezzlement by Deputy Prime Minister Amarsaikhan Sainbuyan. She was detained for 48 hours for “threatening to disseminate information that might cause serious damage” against Amarsaikhan, and faces up to eight years in prison. On March 17, 2025, eight journalists from Noorog Creative Studio, an independent news outlet known for its investigative work, were taken into custody during a raid on their office under Mongolia’s Criminal Law Act. They were accused of “undermining national unity,” which government officials later claimed to be linked to an alleged online gambling scheme.
Mongolians still enjoy considerable space to dissent, despite the above attacks on press freedom. As of December 2023, there are approximately 7,480 active civil society organizations, and overt retaliation has not been as prominent regarding activists, academics, political opposition, or general members of the public, compared to journalists. Mongolians are also able to protest and gather without being unfairly repressed, as illustrated by anti-government protests that took place between May and June 2025 that were precipitated mainly by government corruption and inequality. The protests drew hundreds of participants and successfully prompted the resignation of Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene as Prime Minister, due to the corruption and wealth accumulation scandal in which he was embroiled. In 2021, the government passed a new law aimed at enhancing state protection of human rights defenders. The government is also undertaking efforts to strengthen its press freedom legislation, with the aid of international stakeholders.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government in a way that enables it to repress criticism and systematically weaken or dismantle accountability mechanisms. Institutional accountability has experienced a notable decline under the MPP government, which has been in office since 2016. Heavy executive influence on judicial appointments renders the judiciary vulnerable to political meddling. Courts have taken steps to rein in government powers, but have increasingly failed to preserve fair electoral competition, legitimate criticisms of the government, and accountability of officials. The executive and legislative branches are notably dominant in accountability processes, and often engage in power struggles with one another that undermine their effective functioning. Considerable political influence on the judiciary and anti-corruption authority has significantly hampered anti-corruption efforts. Some recent reforms signal a willingness to improve the independence of institutions, but have not sufficiently addressed overarching concerns.
The government has subjected the judiciary to reforms that somewhat weaken its independence or operational effectiveness. It has intervened with the courts’ powers by concentrating judicial appointments in the executive branch, through recent, swift dismissals of top prosecutors and judges. The 1992 Constitution guarantees judicial independence from outside influences. The responsibility to uphold this independence and ensure judges’ impartiality is vested in a Judicial General Council (JGC) per Article 49 of the Constitution. Based on a reform introduced in 2021, half of the JGC’s 10 members are appointed by the Parliament, which has drawn concerns regarding potential political meddling with the body’s functioning. Until 2021, the body was entirely appointed by the President. Additionally, a legislative amendment swiftly passed by the Parliament in an emergency session in 2019 allowed the National Security Council, chaired by the President, to remove top judges, prosecutors, and anti-corruption officials. The amendment took effect on the same day. In its immediate aftermath, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as well as the Prosecutor-General and Deputy Prosecutor, were reportedly dismissed by presidential order issued on the recommendation of the National Security Council.
Courts have failed to check government attempts to repress criticism. The cases of activist and blogger Munkhbayar Chuluundorj and journalist Unurtsetseg Naran highlight the lack of judicial intervention in this respect. Munkhbayar remains detained as of November 2025, despite reports of his declining health. Journalist Unurtsetseg Naran was sentenced in a closed-door trial and not allowed to have her lawyer present. Her conviction was upheld on appeal.
Judicial institutions have somewhat failed to hold officials accountable. A number of graft scandals involving senior ruling party members have not been resolved to date. This is fueled not only by a judiciary deferential to the government but also by recurrent, destabilizing tensions between the executive and legislature. For example, several MPP members were implicated in a high-profile corruption scandal dubbed the “MNT60 billion tugrik scandal,” which involved allegations that, ahead of the 2016 parliamentary election, senior members of the MPP conspired to raise about MNT60 billion to fund the party’s campaign by selling cabinet positions in the incoming administration. In 2019, a district court found two members guilty and sentenced them to four years each. This conviction was overturned on appeal. Then-Speaker of Parliament Miyeegombyn Enkhbold, who allegedly led the scheme, was removed from office but never formally charged by the anti-corruption authority.
The executive and legislative branches are subjected to reforms that undermine their operational effectiveness. Mongolia’s semi-presidential system has recurrently produced institutional conflict that disrupts the balance between presidential authority and legislative powers. Most recently, in October 2025, efforts by Parliament to remove a prime minister through a no-confidence vote were thwarted by a presidential veto allowed by the 1992 Constitution, which deepens the political deadlock that impedes democratic accountability. The 1992 Constitution allows Parliament to remove a sitting Prime Minister through a no-confidence vote by a simple majority, a mechanism intended to ensure executive accountability. At the same time, however, the Constitution grants the President broad authority to veto parliamentary resolutions on procedural grounds. In practice, this dual arrangement has weakened parliamentary oversight rather than strengthened it. This tension has been central to Mongolia’s constitutional crisis, which remains ongoing as of November 2025. In October 2025, following widespread criticism of Prime Minister Gombojavyn Zandanshatar’s mineral policy and his unilateral appointment of a justice minister, Parliament initiated a no-confidence vote against him. The President then intervened by vetoing the resolution authorizing the vote, arguing it was procedurally flawed. This crisis illustrates how executive allies in Mongolia have increasingly overridden parliamentary mechanisms of accountability, with negative implications for democracy. Prime Minister Gombojavyn was able to stay in power after the Constitutional Court sided with the President.
