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HRF classifies Moldova as democratic.
Moldova is a unitary parliamentary republic in which executive authority is exercised primarily by a government led by the prime minister, while the president serves as head of state with constitutionally defined powers that can influence the national agenda. Legislative authority is vested in the unicameral 101-member Parliament, elected for four-year terms through nationwide proportional representation. Since independence in 1991, power has alternated between pro-European reformist coalitions and governments favoring closer ties with Russia, while the current leadership is firmly oriented toward European integration, with EU candidate status granted in 2022 and accession negotiations opened in 2024. Part of Moldova’s internationally recognized territory, the breakaway region of Transnistria, remains outside central government control and operates as a de facto entity supported by Russia, including through a continued military presence. Additionally, Russia continues to exert coercive influence on Moldova, with credible allegations and reports describing hybrid interference activities, such as disinformation campaigns and attempts to influence elections, posing ongoing security risks. Despite these concerns, following the 28 September 2025 parliamentary election, the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity retained a governing majority and formed the Munteanu Cabinet, with Alexandru Munteanu taking office as prime minister on 1 November 2025 alongside President Maia Sandu.
Elections are largely free and fair, offering a broad range of political alternatives and respecting fundamental democratic freedoms. Although certain candidates and parties, particularly those linked to credible reports of Russian interference, have recently been excluded or deregistered, these measures have been selective rather than blanket and have occurred in the context of documented security concerns. Similarly, fundamental freedoms essential to campaigning have generally been respected, and registered contestants have been able to campaign throughout the country.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and individuals are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country maintains a large and active civil society and a pluralistic media environment, and the incumbent authorities have generally respected freedoms of association and expression. Similarly, the right to peaceful assembly has largely been upheld, with protests taking place without systematic obstruction or undue interference.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority. The incumbent government has introduced measures aimed at reducing political influence and corruption within state institutions, most notably the judiciary. Still, the longstanding structural weaknesses of key institutions and a legacy of state capture continue to render judicial independence fragile in practice. Additionally, the government has taken steps to strengthen accountability for high-level corruption, including by pursuing major prosecutions, although these efforts take place against a longstanding practice in which powerful officials were often able to evade accountability for extended periods.
National elections in Moldova are largely free and fair. Elections are generally competitive, with meaningful opposition participation and periodic transfers of power. Although certain candidates and parties, particularly those linked to credible reports of Russian interference, have recently been excluded or deregistered, these measures have been selective rather than blanket and have occurred in the context of documented security concerns. Similarly, fundamental freedoms central to campaigning have generally been respected, and registered contestants have been able to campaign throughout the country.
The Moldovan government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Moldova’s parliamentary elections are conducted under a proportional representation system for a 101-seat legislature, using closed party and electoral-bloc lists. They are administered by the Central Election Commission of Moldova (CEC) and take place within a legal framework that ensures overall fairness and competitiveness of the elections, despite frequent amendments that have in the past undermined the legal certainty of provisions governing the electoral process. As a result, elections in Moldova are generally competitive, producing close results and marked by periodic transfers of power.
To illustrate, in the most recent September 2025 Moldovan parliamentary election, voters allocated all 101 seats in the unicameral Parliament under a nationwide proportional representation system, producing a result in which the incumbent pro-European PAS, led by Speaker Igor Grosu and aligned with President Maia Sandu, retained governing control with just over half of the vote (50.2%) and 55 seats (down from its 2021 landslide but still above the 51-seat majority threshold). The main opposition Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP), associated with former president Igor Dodon, secured 24.2% and 26 seats, while three additional parties entered parliament: the Alternative Bloc (7.96%, 8 seats), Our Party (6.2%, 6 seats), and the Democracy at Home Party (5.62%, 6 seats), with the latter surpassing expectations after polling below the electoral threshold during much of the campaign. Following the results, PAS formed a renewed single-party majority government, with Alexandru Munteanu appointed prime minister in October 2025.
Despite the result, the election took place amid credible reports of foreign interference efforts, including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and alleged vote-buying networks linked to Russia. Within that context, the CEC and Moldovan courts revoked or prevented the participation of certain contestants on allegations of illicit financing and links to Russia and the Russia-aligned Şor Party. To illustrate, the CEC de-registered The Greater Moldova Party (Moldova Mare) on 26 September, two days before election day, based on notifications alleging serious campaign and finance violations (including undeclared resources, foreign funding, and vote-buying), with appeals ultimately rejected on 28 September, only hours before polls closed. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observed that such last-minute eligibility decisions undermined legal certainty and, given the timing, limited contestants’ ability to obtain an effective remedy, at odds with international standards. Despite this, the de-registration and exclusion of participants during the elections appeared selective rather than blanket, and occurred against a backdrop of widespread security threats and extensive hybrid interference. The OSCE assessed that the vote remained broadly competitive and professionally administered.
The CEC’s and Moldovan courts’ measures against certain reportedly pro-Russian candidates built on steps taken in 2023, when Moldova’s Constitutional Court banned the pro-Russian Șor Party led by fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor (sanctioned by the US and EU for alleged Russia-linked financing), while later allowing its members to run as independents in the 2023 local elections. Also, two days before those local polls, the government’s Commission for Exceptional Situations barred the Chance Party (ȘANSĂ), a newly formed pro-Russian party with ties to Ilan Shor, from participating in the 2023 elections. Citing national security concerns, the government based its decision on a report from the Security and Information Service, which revealed various schemes through which Russia attempted to influence Moldova’s electoral process, including through the financing of the Chance Party. The ban was overturned by the Chișinău Court of Appeal in December 2023, and in March 2024, the Constitutional Court struck down subsequent broad legal restrictions aimed at excluding people associated with unconstitutional parties, finding the approach overly sweeping and insufficiently safeguarded against arbitrary disenfranchisement. Since then, as the 2025 parliamentary elections illustrate, the overall practice has improved: restrictions have generally been framed more narrowly and tied to specific eligibility or campaign-finance allegations rather than blanket, status-based exclusions.
In the same vein, the government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Fundamental freedoms central to campaigning have generally been respected, and registered contestants, including opposition parties, have been able to campaign throughout the country, even amid acute security threats and credible concerns about Russia-linked interference. Reflecting this assessment of the 2025 parliamentary elections, the OSCE concluded that “contestants campaigned freely throughout the country,” with only a few isolated incidents.
In Moldova, independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and individuals are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country maintains a large and active civil society and a pluralistic media environment, and the incumbent authorities have generally respected freedoms of association and expression. Similarly, the right to peaceful assembly has largely been upheld, with protests occurring without systematic obstruction or undue interference.
The incumbent government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Moldova has a robust civil society and generally respects freedom of association. There are more than 12,000 registered civil society organizations (CSOs), many of which freely participate in domestic policy-making, serve as accountability watchdogs, and advocate for political and financial transparency. At the same time, some politicians, including the former President Igor Dodon, tried to exert pressure on the CSOs by filing defamation lawsuits against independent organizations and outlets. Most notably, in 2016, Igor Dodon and his party, the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), filed a defamation proceeding against RISE Moldova, a Moldovan CSO, which published an article ahead of the 2016 presidential elections relating to the financing of Dodon and PSRM by an offshore company with Russian ties. First, the district court ruled in favor of PSRM, and the judgment was upheld on appeal; however, after the NGO brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the appeals court examined the case anew and dismissed the defamation action for being ill-founded in December 2017. In October 2021, ECtHR ruled in favor of RISE Moldova, finding that the outcome of the appeals court’s decision amounted to an acknowledgement of the breach of the journalists’ right to freedom of expression.
Additionally, the government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Moldova maintains a pluralistic media environment in which audiences can access a wide range of viewpoints across television, radio, print, and online platforms. The Constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of expression, while censorship is formally prohibited in media legislation. Moreover, regulatory reforms, most notably amendments to the broadcasting framework adopted in 2015, introduced requirements for radio and television outlets to disclose ownership structures and management information, improving overall transparency. Moreover, physical attacks against journalists are rare in Moldova. At the same time, during and after the state of emergency triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moldovan authorities suspended or withdrew the licences of multiple television channels linked to pro-Kremlin figures (including networks associated with Ilan Șor and Vladimir Plahotniuc), and the state also blocked access to dozens of websites deemed to threaten national security. Watchdogs, including Amnesty International, have criticized aspects of these measures for limited transparency and insufficient judicial safeguards, warning of a chilling effect and increased self-censorship.
Finally, the Moldovan government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Moldova’s Constitution guarantees peaceful assemblies, while the 2008 Law on Assemblies establishes a presumption in favor of allowing assemblies. In practice, citizens are free to participate in street demonstrations and protests without the fear of government obstruction. To illustrate, the 2022–2023 wave of anti-government demonstrations lasted for months and drew large crowds, with protesters repeatedly returning to the streets to demand resignations. Even as authorities occasionally intervened (for example, detaining a small number of participants after clashes or enforcing time-and-place limitations intended to prevent weekday traffic blockages), the overall pattern was not one of blanket bans or systematic obstruction of protest activity. At the same time, the government proposed a 2025 Law on Public Events, intended to complement the existing Law on Public Assemblies by regulating cultural, religious, sporting, and commercial gatherings. The initiative, developed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and submitted to Parliament, was criticised for vague definitions determining the law’s scope of application and for disproportionate obligations on organisers, which could create legal uncertainty and excessive compliance burdens, potentially producing a chilling effect on freedom of association. As of December 2025, the bill remains pending.
In Moldova, institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority. The incumbent government has introduced measures aimed at reducing political influence and corruption within state institutions, most notably the judiciary; however, longstanding structural weaknesses and a legacy of state capture continue to render judicial independence fragile in practice. Additionally, the government has taken steps to strengthen accountability for high-level corruption, including by pursuing major prosecutions; however, these efforts unfold against a longstanding background in which powerful officials were able to evade accountability for extended periods.
The government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational autonomy. Conversely, the incumbent government has adopted measures aimed at offsetting entrenched political influence and corruption risks within the justice sector. Despite the constitutional guarantees and standards of judicial independence within the domestic legal framework, the country’s judicial system has long been marred by state capture, selective justice, and susceptibility to corruption. In March 2023, as part of a broader effort to tackle endemic corruption in the country, President Maia Sandu announced the creation of a new Anti-Corruption Court, which will hear major corruption lawsuits and cases of crime within Moldova’s judicial system. In September 2023, the OSCE found that Moldova has been making progress with its judicial reform, and in November 2023, the European Commission highlighted the country’s advances toward strengthening democracy and the rule of law. Despite these positive developments, structural vulnerabilities persist, and judicial independence remains fragile in practice.
Still, judicial and executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Despite susceptibility to corruption and the past capture of key accountability mechanisms, the incumbent government has implemented steps to hold accountable high-ranking officials who have frequently engaged in corrupt practices and enjoyed impunity. In addition to establishing the specialized Anti-Corruption Court mentioned above, authorities have pursued high-profile prosecutions and tightened the state’s response to illicit political financing and foreign interference, including in cases linked to the aforementioned Șor network: on 5 August 2025, a Chișinău court sentenced Gagauzia governor Evghenia Guțul to seven years’ imprisonment for illegally channelling Russian funds to support the (subsequently banned) Șor Party and influence voters, and the government has also sought to remove impunity in legacy grand-corruption files by renewing international cooperation and filing extradition requests for fugitive oligarchs Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Șor with multiple jurisdictions.
Despite these efforts, they take place against the broader backdrop of a longstanding pattern in which government officials have often avoided accountability for corruption during the past administrations. For example, Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor, two of Moldova’s most prominent oligarch politicians of the 2010s, were implicated in large-scale fraud and money laundering between 2012 and 2014, causing losses of over one billion dollars to the country’s banking sector. Despite investigations into his alleged involvement, Plahotniuc, then a member of parliament from 2014 and, from 2016, chairman of the governing Democratic Party, remained in power due to his influence over the governmental branches and by stalling the investigation. Shor, who served as mayor of Orhei and led the Șor Party, was sentenced to 7.5 years in 2017 but remained free and politically active while his conviction was under appeal. In 2019, both Plahotniuc and Shor left the country while facing criminal proceedings. Subsequently, under the incumbent administration, Shor’s sentence was increased to 15 years’ imprisonment in absentia in 2023, and he continued political activities from abroad through successor political projects after the banning of the Șor Party. Plahotniuc remained outside Moldova until July 2025, when he was arrested in Greece and extradited to the country in September 2025 to face corruption and banking fraud charges.
HRF classifies Moldova as democratic.
Moldova is a unitary parliamentary republic in which executive authority is exercised primarily by a government led by the prime minister, while the president serves as head of state with constitutionally defined powers that can influence the national agenda. Legislative authority is vested in the unicameral 101-member Parliament, elected for four-year terms through nationwide proportional representation. Since independence in 1991, power has alternated between pro-European reformist coalitions and governments favoring closer ties with Russia, while the current leadership is firmly oriented toward European integration, with EU candidate status granted in 2022 and accession negotiations opened in 2024. Part of Moldova’s internationally recognized territory, the breakaway region of Transnistria, remains outside central government control and operates as a de facto entity supported by Russia, including through a continued military presence. Additionally, Russia continues to exert coercive influence on Moldova, with credible allegations and reports describing hybrid interference activities, such as disinformation campaigns and attempts to influence elections, posing ongoing security risks. Despite these concerns, following the 28 September 2025 parliamentary election, the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity retained a governing majority and formed the Munteanu Cabinet, with Alexandru Munteanu taking office as prime minister on 1 November 2025 alongside President Maia Sandu.
Elections are largely free and fair, offering a broad range of political alternatives and respecting fundamental democratic freedoms. Although certain candidates and parties, particularly those linked to credible reports of Russian interference, have recently been excluded or deregistered, these measures have been selective rather than blanket and have occurred in the context of documented security concerns. Similarly, fundamental freedoms essential to campaigning have generally been respected, and registered contestants have been able to campaign throughout the country.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and individuals are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country maintains a large and active civil society and a pluralistic media environment, and the incumbent authorities have generally respected freedoms of association and expression. Similarly, the right to peaceful assembly has largely been upheld, with protests taking place without systematic obstruction or undue interference.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority. The incumbent government has introduced measures aimed at reducing political influence and corruption within state institutions, most notably the judiciary. Still, the longstanding structural weaknesses of key institutions and a legacy of state capture continue to render judicial independence fragile in practice. Additionally, the government has taken steps to strengthen accountability for high-level corruption, including by pursuing major prosecutions, although these efforts take place against a longstanding practice in which powerful officials were often able to evade accountability for extended periods.
National elections in Moldova are largely free and fair. Elections are generally competitive, with meaningful opposition participation and periodic transfers of power. Although certain candidates and parties, particularly those linked to credible reports of Russian interference, have recently been excluded or deregistered, these measures have been selective rather than blanket and have occurred in the context of documented security concerns. Similarly, fundamental freedoms central to campaigning have generally been respected, and registered contestants have been able to campaign throughout the country.
The Moldovan government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Moldova’s parliamentary elections are conducted under a proportional representation system for a 101-seat legislature, using closed party and electoral-bloc lists. They are administered by the Central Election Commission of Moldova (CEC) and take place within a legal framework that ensures overall fairness and competitiveness of the elections, despite frequent amendments that have in the past undermined the legal certainty of provisions governing the electoral process. As a result, elections in Moldova are generally competitive, producing close results and marked by periodic transfers of power.
To illustrate, in the most recent September 2025 Moldovan parliamentary election, voters allocated all 101 seats in the unicameral Parliament under a nationwide proportional representation system, producing a result in which the incumbent pro-European PAS, led by Speaker Igor Grosu and aligned with President Maia Sandu, retained governing control with just over half of the vote (50.2%) and 55 seats (down from its 2021 landslide but still above the 51-seat majority threshold). The main opposition Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP), associated with former president Igor Dodon, secured 24.2% and 26 seats, while three additional parties entered parliament: the Alternative Bloc (7.96%, 8 seats), Our Party (6.2%, 6 seats), and the Democracy at Home Party (5.62%, 6 seats), with the latter surpassing expectations after polling below the electoral threshold during much of the campaign. Following the results, PAS formed a renewed single-party majority government, with Alexandru Munteanu appointed prime minister in October 2025.
Despite the result, the election took place amid credible reports of foreign interference efforts, including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and alleged vote-buying networks linked to Russia. Within that context, the CEC and Moldovan courts revoked or prevented the participation of certain contestants on allegations of illicit financing and links to Russia and the Russia-aligned Şor Party. To illustrate, the CEC de-registered The Greater Moldova Party (Moldova Mare) on 26 September, two days before election day, based on notifications alleging serious campaign and finance violations (including undeclared resources, foreign funding, and vote-buying), with appeals ultimately rejected on 28 September, only hours before polls closed. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observed that such last-minute eligibility decisions undermined legal certainty and, given the timing, limited contestants’ ability to obtain an effective remedy, at odds with international standards. Despite this, the de-registration and exclusion of participants during the elections appeared selective rather than blanket, and occurred against a backdrop of widespread security threats and extensive hybrid interference. The OSCE assessed that the vote remained broadly competitive and professionally administered.
The CEC’s and Moldovan courts’ measures against certain reportedly pro-Russian candidates built on steps taken in 2023, when Moldova’s Constitutional Court banned the pro-Russian Șor Party led by fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor (sanctioned by the US and EU for alleged Russia-linked financing), while later allowing its members to run as independents in the 2023 local elections. Also, two days before those local polls, the government’s Commission for Exceptional Situations barred the Chance Party (ȘANSĂ), a newly formed pro-Russian party with ties to Ilan Shor, from participating in the 2023 elections. Citing national security concerns, the government based its decision on a report from the Security and Information Service, which revealed various schemes through which Russia attempted to influence Moldova’s electoral process, including through the financing of the Chance Party. The ban was overturned by the Chișinău Court of Appeal in December 2023, and in March 2024, the Constitutional Court struck down subsequent broad legal restrictions aimed at excluding people associated with unconstitutional parties, finding the approach overly sweeping and insufficiently safeguarded against arbitrary disenfranchisement. Since then, as the 2025 parliamentary elections illustrate, the overall practice has improved: restrictions have generally been framed more narrowly and tied to specific eligibility or campaign-finance allegations rather than blanket, status-based exclusions.
In the same vein, the government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Fundamental freedoms central to campaigning have generally been respected, and registered contestants, including opposition parties, have been able to campaign throughout the country, even amid acute security threats and credible concerns about Russia-linked interference. Reflecting this assessment of the 2025 parliamentary elections, the OSCE concluded that “contestants campaigned freely throughout the country,” with only a few isolated incidents.
In Moldova, independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and individuals are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country maintains a large and active civil society and a pluralistic media environment, and the incumbent authorities have generally respected freedoms of association and expression. Similarly, the right to peaceful assembly has largely been upheld, with protests occurring without systematic obstruction or undue interference.
The incumbent government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Moldova has a robust civil society and generally respects freedom of association. There are more than 12,000 registered civil society organizations (CSOs), many of which freely participate in domestic policy-making, serve as accountability watchdogs, and advocate for political and financial transparency. At the same time, some politicians, including the former President Igor Dodon, tried to exert pressure on the CSOs by filing defamation lawsuits against independent organizations and outlets. Most notably, in 2016, Igor Dodon and his party, the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), filed a defamation proceeding against RISE Moldova, a Moldovan CSO, which published an article ahead of the 2016 presidential elections relating to the financing of Dodon and PSRM by an offshore company with Russian ties. First, the district court ruled in favor of PSRM, and the judgment was upheld on appeal; however, after the NGO brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the appeals court examined the case anew and dismissed the defamation action for being ill-founded in December 2017. In October 2021, ECtHR ruled in favor of RISE Moldova, finding that the outcome of the appeals court’s decision amounted to an acknowledgement of the breach of the journalists’ right to freedom of expression.
Additionally, the government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Moldova maintains a pluralistic media environment in which audiences can access a wide range of viewpoints across television, radio, print, and online platforms. The Constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of expression, while censorship is formally prohibited in media legislation. Moreover, regulatory reforms, most notably amendments to the broadcasting framework adopted in 2015, introduced requirements for radio and television outlets to disclose ownership structures and management information, improving overall transparency. Moreover, physical attacks against journalists are rare in Moldova. At the same time, during and after the state of emergency triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moldovan authorities suspended or withdrew the licences of multiple television channels linked to pro-Kremlin figures (including networks associated with Ilan Șor and Vladimir Plahotniuc), and the state also blocked access to dozens of websites deemed to threaten national security. Watchdogs, including Amnesty International, have criticized aspects of these measures for limited transparency and insufficient judicial safeguards, warning of a chilling effect and increased self-censorship.
Finally, the Moldovan government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Moldova’s Constitution guarantees peaceful assemblies, while the 2008 Law on Assemblies establishes a presumption in favor of allowing assemblies. In practice, citizens are free to participate in street demonstrations and protests without the fear of government obstruction. To illustrate, the 2022–2023 wave of anti-government demonstrations lasted for months and drew large crowds, with protesters repeatedly returning to the streets to demand resignations. Even as authorities occasionally intervened (for example, detaining a small number of participants after clashes or enforcing time-and-place limitations intended to prevent weekday traffic blockages), the overall pattern was not one of blanket bans or systematic obstruction of protest activity. At the same time, the government proposed a 2025 Law on Public Events, intended to complement the existing Law on Public Assemblies by regulating cultural, religious, sporting, and commercial gatherings. The initiative, developed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and submitted to Parliament, was criticised for vague definitions determining the law’s scope of application and for disproportionate obligations on organisers, which could create legal uncertainty and excessive compliance burdens, potentially producing a chilling effect on freedom of association. As of December 2025, the bill remains pending.
In Moldova, institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authority. The incumbent government has introduced measures aimed at reducing political influence and corruption within state institutions, most notably the judiciary; however, longstanding structural weaknesses and a legacy of state capture continue to render judicial independence fragile in practice. Additionally, the government has taken steps to strengthen accountability for high-level corruption, including by pursuing major prosecutions; however, these efforts unfold against a longstanding background in which powerful officials were able to evade accountability for extended periods.
The government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational autonomy. Conversely, the incumbent government has adopted measures aimed at offsetting entrenched political influence and corruption risks within the justice sector. Despite the constitutional guarantees and standards of judicial independence within the domestic legal framework, the country’s judicial system has long been marred by state capture, selective justice, and susceptibility to corruption. In March 2023, as part of a broader effort to tackle endemic corruption in the country, President Maia Sandu announced the creation of a new Anti-Corruption Court, which will hear major corruption lawsuits and cases of crime within Moldova’s judicial system. In September 2023, the OSCE found that Moldova has been making progress with its judicial reform, and in November 2023, the European Commission highlighted the country’s advances toward strengthening democracy and the rule of law. Despite these positive developments, structural vulnerabilities persist, and judicial independence remains fragile in practice.
Still, judicial and executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Despite susceptibility to corruption and the past capture of key accountability mechanisms, the incumbent government has implemented steps to hold accountable high-ranking officials who have frequently engaged in corrupt practices and enjoyed impunity. In addition to establishing the specialized Anti-Corruption Court mentioned above, authorities have pursued high-profile prosecutions and tightened the state’s response to illicit political financing and foreign interference, including in cases linked to the aforementioned Șor network: on 5 August 2025, a Chișinău court sentenced Gagauzia governor Evghenia Guțul to seven years’ imprisonment for illegally channelling Russian funds to support the (subsequently banned) Șor Party and influence voters, and the government has also sought to remove impunity in legacy grand-corruption files by renewing international cooperation and filing extradition requests for fugitive oligarchs Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Șor with multiple jurisdictions.
Despite these efforts, they take place against the broader backdrop of a longstanding pattern in which government officials have often avoided accountability for corruption during the past administrations. For example, Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor, two of Moldova’s most prominent oligarch politicians of the 2010s, were implicated in large-scale fraud and money laundering between 2012 and 2014, causing losses of over one billion dollars to the country’s banking sector. Despite investigations into his alleged involvement, Plahotniuc, then a member of parliament from 2014 and, from 2016, chairman of the governing Democratic Party, remained in power due to his influence over the governmental branches and by stalling the investigation. Shor, who served as mayor of Orhei and led the Șor Party, was sentenced to 7.5 years in 2017 but remained free and politically active while his conviction was under appeal. In 2019, both Plahotniuc and Shor left the country while facing criminal proceedings. Subsequently, under the incumbent administration, Shor’s sentence was increased to 15 years’ imprisonment in absentia in 2023, and he continued political activities from abroad through successor political projects after the banning of the Șor Party. Plahotniuc remained outside Moldova until July 2025, when he was arrested in Greece and extradited to the country in September 2025 to face corruption and banking fraud charges.
