Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Mauritania as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania has experienced civilian and military dictatorship and frequent coups d’etat since declaring political independence from France in 1960. Despite the introduction of multi-party politics to regular presidential, parliamentary, and regional elections in 1991, the military continues to maintain consolidated control over executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, as well as influence over informal business elite and tribal networks, amid power struggles between its factions. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, a high-ranking military and security official, came to power in the 2019 presidential elections, marking the country’s first peaceful transition of power from Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, a military officer who led coups in 2005 and 2008 and served as president for 10 years after winning two engineered elections.
Elections are a façade to the point where the mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Despite improvements made to electoral procedures under Ghazouani, the ruling military party, known as El Insaf or the Equity Party, dominates presidential and parliamentary politics and continues to abuse its power over the three branches of government to restrict the opposition. Since taking power in 2019, Ghazouani’s regime has maintained an unofficial moratorium on registering new political parties. In early 2025, the regime pushed through amendments to the Parties Law under the pretext of strengthening the democratic system that transferred power over party registration and regulation from the judiciary to the regime-controlled Ministry of the Interior. The amendments also introduced sweeping changes to political party regulations that, in practice, disrupt the ability of the opposition to organize and compete. Opposition supporters regularly declare election results as another army coup and face regime retaliation when they protest.
Political leaders, civil society leaders, protesters, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. At times, the regime abuses the 2021 Symbols Law and the 2016 Cybercrimes Law to restrict the ability of journalists, opposition figures, and dissidents to criticize the president, which encourages an environment of self-censorship across the country. The regime also, at times, unfairly shuts down protests, such as those that accuse the regime of committing electoral fraud in the aftermath of elections, when security forces violently disperse gatherings, storm opposition party headquarters, block access to wireless internet, and arrest politicians, activists, and journalists.
Institutions largely fail to serve as a check on the regime. Despite improvements made to the electoral system, the military regime maintains control and influence over the three branches of government, inhibiting institutions from acting independently or holding officials accountable. The president appoints judges to high courts, and the regime often ignores the rulings of lower courts, which grants a façade of judicial independence while depriving institutions of a real ability to hold regime officials accountable. Although not a systematic pattern, the present regime has also instrumentalized its influence over the courts to target political opponents, exemplified by the politically-motivated trial and sentencing of former president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz on embezzlement charges.
Elections are a façade to the point where the mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. While Mauritanians vote in regular presidential, parliamentary, and regional elections, military officers and members of the El Insaf party candidates always win majorities since the introduction of mutli-party elections in 1991. The ruling military elite abuses control over executive and legislative institutions to prevent the formation of mainstream opposition parties and to otherwise manipulate the electoral playing field.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field to the point that military or military-aligned candidates have won each presidential election and formed the majority coalition in parliament since Mauritania’s first peaceful transition of power through elections in 2019. International observers have generally lauded elections as procedurally fair and free of fraud despite concerns over the executive’s power to appoint members of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the Ministry of the Interior’s opaque implementation of election regulations, and the government’s swift repression of protests that erupted after Ghazouani declared himself the winner with no run-off election before the release of official results in 2019 and 2024. While Ghazouani’s military regime does not systematically target opposition figures and no longer engineers elections through excessive ballot stuffing or other overtly fraudulent tactics, it continues to maintain control over institutions and access to state resources. This control grants the ruling party unfair campaign advantages and enables it to co-opt opposition leaders and their supporters, effectively preventing the emergence of a popular coalition that could challenge its hegemony.
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages that allow it to interfere in the formation of opposition parties to the point that there is no mainstream organized opposition. Most prominently, amendments to political party laws that parliament passed in 2025 grant the Ministry of the Interior the power to regulate the registration of political parties and to dissolve them in opaque processes with little recourse to appeal. The amendments also complicated requirements for party registration, such as raising the number of required founding participants from 20 to 150 citizens representing every governorate, increasing the number of required endorsements to 5000 citizens representing half of the governorates, requiring that the party open offices in at least half of the governorates within six months of its licensing, and requiring that the party declare respect for “national unity, territorial integrity, the provisions of the true Islamic religion, and the principles of democracy” before being granted a license. Prior to these amendments, the Ghazouani regime maintained an informal and unannounced ban on registering new political parties formed by opposition candidates, such as those founded by Kadiata Malick Jallo, Mohamed El Amine Sidi Mouloud, and Yahya Ould Eloud.
The ruling party also mobilizes resources and informal patronage relationships, such as those with business and tribal elites, to support candidates that back its policy agenda while threatening to withhold resources from candidates and entire districts that support campaigns against its policies. Those who voice support for opposition candidates rarely face direct state repression; however, vocal supporters, especially from rural areas, may face other repercussions such as canceled government contracts, surprise tax audits, or being blocked from employment in the public sector, which dominates the Mauritanian economy. Such informal co-optation tactics resulted in the progressive dissolution of the left-wing People’s Progressive Alliance (APP) in the lead-up to the 2023 legislative elections.
Political leaders, civil society leaders, protesters, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Amid a relatively free media environment and active civil society, the regime seriously abuses vague laws to grant a pretext for censorship and interference in the work of journalists, political organizations, and civic actors. Regime-controlled institutions, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the High Authority for Press and Audiovisual (HAPA), have abused these vague legal statutes and their regulatory powers to silence and retaliate against critical voices. Opponents to the regime also face intimidation and coercion from regime-affiliated security agents, cybersecurity officials, and police forces, who have employed violent tactics to disrupt peaceful protests and retaliate against activists.
The regime seriously intimidates and obstructs the work of independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Although the media environment remains relatively free and civil society is robust, the Ghazouani regime has introduced and instrumentalized a number of vague laws and informal tactics to interfere with and restrict the press, online speech, and protests. Vague legal statutes in the 2021 Law on Protection of National Symbols Law, the 2021 Law on Combating Manipulation of Information, and the 2016 Law on Cyber Crimes criminalize criticism of the head of state and violations of public order, good manners, or Islamic values as defined by the state. While the regime does not systematically instrumentalize these laws to retaliate against all types of dissent, the ruling party has at times used these laws arbitrarily to retaliate against exemplary dissenters in such a way that encourages an environment of self-censorship in the country.
In addition to using laws at times to restrict the freedom to dissent, the regime abuses its control over state institutions and influence over tribal and business networks to coerce dissidents and their supporters into expressing support for the regime or remaining silent. For example, funders of opposition candidates have reported facing surprise tax audits or government investigations, and dissident bloggers have reported being told to delete critical posts by media monitoring agencies. Activists also report that police officers have hacked their phones, fabricated evidence, and forced confessions. In 2024, cybersecurity officials intimidated and arrested blogger Mohamed Khaled Ahmed Salem after receiving a complaint from the High Authority for Press and Audiovisual (HAPA), accusing him of defaming a public official and refusing to take down his blog post that criticized the prime minister and government-set fish prices. The HAPA also targeted prominent opposition member of parliament, Mohamed Bouy Ould Cheikh Mohamed Fadel, in 2023, forcing him to delete a video clip of a controversial speech he made in parliament, claiming that it included “content offensive to the Prophet.”
While citizens enjoy a relatively free press with a range of independent media in the country since the decriminalization of press offenses in 2011, the regime continues to seriously and unfairly censor dissenting speech in the press and online. Since 2024, the regime has increasingly enforced vague legal statutes in the Symbols Law and the Cyber Crimes Law, which resulted in Mauritania dropping from a rank of 33rd globally in 2024 to 50th globally in RSF’s World Press Freedom Index for 2025. The Symbols Law criminalizes content that “aims to undermine the morale of members of the armed forces and security forces or undermine their loyalty to the Republic” as well as content that “undermines the fundamentals and sanctities of the Islamic religion, national unity, or territorial integrity, or insults the person of the President of the Republic, the flag, or the national anthem” punishable by two to four years in prison and a fine of 200,000 to 500,000 ouguiyas (approximately $5,000 to $12,600). The regime’s uneven application of the law restricts the ability of journalists, especially those in economically vulnerable areas, to report freely on politically sensitive topics and encourages the press and members of the general public to moderate their criticism of ruling institutions.
In spite of reforms made that increase the ability of Mauritanians to freely associate, the regime has at times resorted to seriously intimidating or obstructing the work of independent political and civil society organizations. The Ghazouani regime passed reforms in the 2021 Law on Associations, Foundations, and Networks to strengthen civil society and associations. Notably, the reforms made it possible for associations to form without prior authorization from the Ministry of the Interior, and granted nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) access to public, private, and international funding. However, the military regime has repeatedly interfered with and targeted members of the Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA), an anti-slavery organization that has fielded opposition candidates in elections. In April 2025, the regime arrested activist and head of the IRA’s immigration section Abdoulaye Ba for making a social media post calling for an end to arrests and expulsions of irregular migrants to Mauritania. Regime courts convicted him of “incitement to hatred” and sentenced him to six months in prison and a fine of 20,000 ouguiyas (approximately $500). The regime has also targeted teachers’ associations, such as in 2021, when the Ministry of Education widely intimidated teachers’ associations that were demanding reform, including by initiating smear campaigns against striking teachers and disrupting peaceful protests.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. In particular, police forces across the country often violently disperse peaceful protests and temporarily hold prominent activists in unsafe detention conditions. In April 2025, police dispersed and beat student protesters demanding educational reforms promised by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, and as of December 2025, no officials have been held accountable for their violent conduct. In the immediate aftermath of the 2024 elections, police officers in the southern opposition stronghold of Kaédi violently dispersed protesters and conducted mass arrests of activists protesting Ghazouani’s first-round win in the elections, which resulted in the deaths of at least three detained activists. Further, the regime often shuts down wireless internet across the country during times of politically sensitive dissent, such as when opposition parties and supporters protest election outcomes. In the immediate aftermath of both the 2019 and 2024 presidential elections, the regime blocked nationwide access to the internet, security officials raided opposition party headquarters, and police arrested several politicians, activists, and journalists, especially targeting Haratin and Black African communities in the main towns of the south.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Regime officials and affiliated party members dominate both the presidency and the parliament and abuse their power to disrupt opposition movements. The presidency also abuses its powers to appoint high-ranking members of the judiciary to maintain military influence over the courts, which, at times, issue rulings against regime interests but are left unable to hold officials accountable without public pressure. Since taking power in 2019, the Ghazouani regime has abused its influence over the judiciary to retaliate against political opponents.
The regime has seriously undermined institutional independence. As a presidential republic, the system in Mauritania subordinates legislative and executive institutions to the office of the president, which maintains tight control over government ministries and sets the legislative agenda. In addition to lacking structural independence, the ruling military party, El Insaf, known as the Union for the Republic (UPR) until 2022, has dominated parliamentary politics since 2009. Further, the regime coerces and co-opts opposition members of parliament by instrumentalizing its control over state administration and resources, including over the electoral process, to the point that members of parliament do not openly challenge the military’s central position in politics. The Ghazouani regime has moved to rescind the parliamentary immunity of at least four opposition members of parliament after they criticized regime actions, such as charging a student with blasphemy for what she had written in a school essay or for speaking out against police conduct. The regime has also employed informal tactics such as withholding state funds and material support from the districts of parliamentarians who do not agree to its policy agenda.
Courts systematically and unfairly fail to check executive overreach across all three branches of government. Despite a constitutional guarantee of judicial independence, the regime maintains influence over the judiciary by appointing judges to high courts and often ignores rulings from lower courts that attempt to hold regime officials accountable. As a result, courts are unable to check the regime’s attempts to suppress public protests or shut down access to the internet in response to popular dissent. Courts especially fail to hold perpetrators of police violence and harassment accountable without public pressure, and victims of state violence, who often face defamatory public smear campaigns, have no reliable opportunity for judicial recourse when the regime frequently ignores judicial decisions that are not in its favor. Regime officials often quietly fail to implement rulings within their jurisdictions, informally challenging the judiciary’s authority to check the regime. For example, in 2022, then-Minister of Housing, Urbanism, and Territorial Reclamation, Sidi Ahmed Ould Mohamed, publicly derided the judiciary and refused to obey judicial rulings against his interests; he later issued a partial apology for his remarks.
Although not a systematic pattern, the Ghazouani regime has at times instrumentalized its influence over the judicial system to target political opponents. Most prominently, the judicial system in Mauritania facilitated the politically motivated prosecution of former president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in 2023. Despite the peaceful transition of power between former allies Abdel Aziz and Ghazouani in 2019, the present regime launched an investigation into the administration of Abdel Aziz in 2020 for alleged embezzlement of government funds after the former president attempted to maintain an outsized influence over the ruling political party. The Ghazouani regime charged Abdel Aziz with corruption and money laundering in 2020, and the courts sentenced him to five years in prison in 2023. Both the government and Abdel Aziz appealed the sentence, and in 2025, the appeals court increased Abdel Aziz’s sentence to 15 years in prison, added a $3 million fine, and also cleared six senior officials from his administration who had also been tried and sentenced for corruption in 2023.
HRF classifies Mauritania as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania has experienced civilian and military dictatorship and frequent coups d’etat since declaring political independence from France in 1960. Despite the introduction of multi-party politics to regular presidential, parliamentary, and regional elections in 1991, the military continues to maintain consolidated control over executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, as well as influence over informal business elite and tribal networks, amid power struggles between its factions. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, a high-ranking military and security official, came to power in the 2019 presidential elections, marking the country’s first peaceful transition of power from Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, a military officer who led coups in 2005 and 2008 and served as president for 10 years after winning two engineered elections.
Elections are a façade to the point where the mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Despite improvements made to electoral procedures under Ghazouani, the ruling military party, known as El Insaf or the Equity Party, dominates presidential and parliamentary politics and continues to abuse its power over the three branches of government to restrict the opposition. Since taking power in 2019, Ghazouani’s regime has maintained an unofficial moratorium on registering new political parties. In early 2025, the regime pushed through amendments to the Parties Law under the pretext of strengthening the democratic system that transferred power over party registration and regulation from the judiciary to the regime-controlled Ministry of the Interior. The amendments also introduced sweeping changes to political party regulations that, in practice, disrupt the ability of the opposition to organize and compete. Opposition supporters regularly declare election results as another army coup and face regime retaliation when they protest.
Political leaders, civil society leaders, protesters, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. At times, the regime abuses the 2021 Symbols Law and the 2016 Cybercrimes Law to restrict the ability of journalists, opposition figures, and dissidents to criticize the president, which encourages an environment of self-censorship across the country. The regime also, at times, unfairly shuts down protests, such as those that accuse the regime of committing electoral fraud in the aftermath of elections, when security forces violently disperse gatherings, storm opposition party headquarters, block access to wireless internet, and arrest politicians, activists, and journalists.
Institutions largely fail to serve as a check on the regime. Despite improvements made to the electoral system, the military regime maintains control and influence over the three branches of government, inhibiting institutions from acting independently or holding officials accountable. The president appoints judges to high courts, and the regime often ignores the rulings of lower courts, which grants a façade of judicial independence while depriving institutions of a real ability to hold regime officials accountable. Although not a systematic pattern, the present regime has also instrumentalized its influence over the courts to target political opponents, exemplified by the politically-motivated trial and sentencing of former president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz on embezzlement charges.
Elections are a façade to the point where the mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. While Mauritanians vote in regular presidential, parliamentary, and regional elections, military officers and members of the El Insaf party candidates always win majorities since the introduction of mutli-party elections in 1991. The ruling military elite abuses control over executive and legislative institutions to prevent the formation of mainstream opposition parties and to otherwise manipulate the electoral playing field.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field to the point that military or military-aligned candidates have won each presidential election and formed the majority coalition in parliament since Mauritania’s first peaceful transition of power through elections in 2019. International observers have generally lauded elections as procedurally fair and free of fraud despite concerns over the executive’s power to appoint members of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the Ministry of the Interior’s opaque implementation of election regulations, and the government’s swift repression of protests that erupted after Ghazouani declared himself the winner with no run-off election before the release of official results in 2019 and 2024. While Ghazouani’s military regime does not systematically target opposition figures and no longer engineers elections through excessive ballot stuffing or other overtly fraudulent tactics, it continues to maintain control over institutions and access to state resources. This control grants the ruling party unfair campaign advantages and enables it to co-opt opposition leaders and their supporters, effectively preventing the emergence of a popular coalition that could challenge its hegemony.
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages that allow it to interfere in the formation of opposition parties to the point that there is no mainstream organized opposition. Most prominently, amendments to political party laws that parliament passed in 2025 grant the Ministry of the Interior the power to regulate the registration of political parties and to dissolve them in opaque processes with little recourse to appeal. The amendments also complicated requirements for party registration, such as raising the number of required founding participants from 20 to 150 citizens representing every governorate, increasing the number of required endorsements to 5000 citizens representing half of the governorates, requiring that the party open offices in at least half of the governorates within six months of its licensing, and requiring that the party declare respect for “national unity, territorial integrity, the provisions of the true Islamic religion, and the principles of democracy” before being granted a license. Prior to these amendments, the Ghazouani regime maintained an informal and unannounced ban on registering new political parties formed by opposition candidates, such as those founded by Kadiata Malick Jallo, Mohamed El Amine Sidi Mouloud, and Yahya Ould Eloud.
The ruling party also mobilizes resources and informal patronage relationships, such as those with business and tribal elites, to support candidates that back its policy agenda while threatening to withhold resources from candidates and entire districts that support campaigns against its policies. Those who voice support for opposition candidates rarely face direct state repression; however, vocal supporters, especially from rural areas, may face other repercussions such as canceled government contracts, surprise tax audits, or being blocked from employment in the public sector, which dominates the Mauritanian economy. Such informal co-optation tactics resulted in the progressive dissolution of the left-wing People’s Progressive Alliance (APP) in the lead-up to the 2023 legislative elections.
Political leaders, civil society leaders, protesters, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Amid a relatively free media environment and active civil society, the regime seriously abuses vague laws to grant a pretext for censorship and interference in the work of journalists, political organizations, and civic actors. Regime-controlled institutions, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the High Authority for Press and Audiovisual (HAPA), have abused these vague legal statutes and their regulatory powers to silence and retaliate against critical voices. Opponents to the regime also face intimidation and coercion from regime-affiliated security agents, cybersecurity officials, and police forces, who have employed violent tactics to disrupt peaceful protests and retaliate against activists.
The regime seriously intimidates and obstructs the work of independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Although the media environment remains relatively free and civil society is robust, the Ghazouani regime has introduced and instrumentalized a number of vague laws and informal tactics to interfere with and restrict the press, online speech, and protests. Vague legal statutes in the 2021 Law on Protection of National Symbols Law, the 2021 Law on Combating Manipulation of Information, and the 2016 Law on Cyber Crimes criminalize criticism of the head of state and violations of public order, good manners, or Islamic values as defined by the state. While the regime does not systematically instrumentalize these laws to retaliate against all types of dissent, the ruling party has at times used these laws arbitrarily to retaliate against exemplary dissenters in such a way that encourages an environment of self-censorship in the country.
In addition to using laws at times to restrict the freedom to dissent, the regime abuses its control over state institutions and influence over tribal and business networks to coerce dissidents and their supporters into expressing support for the regime or remaining silent. For example, funders of opposition candidates have reported facing surprise tax audits or government investigations, and dissident bloggers have reported being told to delete critical posts by media monitoring agencies. Activists also report that police officers have hacked their phones, fabricated evidence, and forced confessions. In 2024, cybersecurity officials intimidated and arrested blogger Mohamed Khaled Ahmed Salem after receiving a complaint from the High Authority for Press and Audiovisual (HAPA), accusing him of defaming a public official and refusing to take down his blog post that criticized the prime minister and government-set fish prices. The HAPA also targeted prominent opposition member of parliament, Mohamed Bouy Ould Cheikh Mohamed Fadel, in 2023, forcing him to delete a video clip of a controversial speech he made in parliament, claiming that it included “content offensive to the Prophet.”
While citizens enjoy a relatively free press with a range of independent media in the country since the decriminalization of press offenses in 2011, the regime continues to seriously and unfairly censor dissenting speech in the press and online. Since 2024, the regime has increasingly enforced vague legal statutes in the Symbols Law and the Cyber Crimes Law, which resulted in Mauritania dropping from a rank of 33rd globally in 2024 to 50th globally in RSF’s World Press Freedom Index for 2025. The Symbols Law criminalizes content that “aims to undermine the morale of members of the armed forces and security forces or undermine their loyalty to the Republic” as well as content that “undermines the fundamentals and sanctities of the Islamic religion, national unity, or territorial integrity, or insults the person of the President of the Republic, the flag, or the national anthem” punishable by two to four years in prison and a fine of 200,000 to 500,000 ouguiyas (approximately $5,000 to $12,600). The regime’s uneven application of the law restricts the ability of journalists, especially those in economically vulnerable areas, to report freely on politically sensitive topics and encourages the press and members of the general public to moderate their criticism of ruling institutions.
In spite of reforms made that increase the ability of Mauritanians to freely associate, the regime has at times resorted to seriously intimidating or obstructing the work of independent political and civil society organizations. The Ghazouani regime passed reforms in the 2021 Law on Associations, Foundations, and Networks to strengthen civil society and associations. Notably, the reforms made it possible for associations to form without prior authorization from the Ministry of the Interior, and granted nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) access to public, private, and international funding. However, the military regime has repeatedly interfered with and targeted members of the Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA), an anti-slavery organization that has fielded opposition candidates in elections. In April 2025, the regime arrested activist and head of the IRA’s immigration section Abdoulaye Ba for making a social media post calling for an end to arrests and expulsions of irregular migrants to Mauritania. Regime courts convicted him of “incitement to hatred” and sentenced him to six months in prison and a fine of 20,000 ouguiyas (approximately $500). The regime has also targeted teachers’ associations, such as in 2021, when the Ministry of Education widely intimidated teachers’ associations that were demanding reform, including by initiating smear campaigns against striking teachers and disrupting peaceful protests.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. In particular, police forces across the country often violently disperse peaceful protests and temporarily hold prominent activists in unsafe detention conditions. In April 2025, police dispersed and beat student protesters demanding educational reforms promised by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, and as of December 2025, no officials have been held accountable for their violent conduct. In the immediate aftermath of the 2024 elections, police officers in the southern opposition stronghold of Kaédi violently dispersed protesters and conducted mass arrests of activists protesting Ghazouani’s first-round win in the elections, which resulted in the deaths of at least three detained activists. Further, the regime often shuts down wireless internet across the country during times of politically sensitive dissent, such as when opposition parties and supporters protest election outcomes. In the immediate aftermath of both the 2019 and 2024 presidential elections, the regime blocked nationwide access to the internet, security officials raided opposition party headquarters, and police arrested several politicians, activists, and journalists, especially targeting Haratin and Black African communities in the main towns of the south.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Regime officials and affiliated party members dominate both the presidency and the parliament and abuse their power to disrupt opposition movements. The presidency also abuses its powers to appoint high-ranking members of the judiciary to maintain military influence over the courts, which, at times, issue rulings against regime interests but are left unable to hold officials accountable without public pressure. Since taking power in 2019, the Ghazouani regime has abused its influence over the judiciary to retaliate against political opponents.
The regime has seriously undermined institutional independence. As a presidential republic, the system in Mauritania subordinates legislative and executive institutions to the office of the president, which maintains tight control over government ministries and sets the legislative agenda. In addition to lacking structural independence, the ruling military party, El Insaf, known as the Union for the Republic (UPR) until 2022, has dominated parliamentary politics since 2009. Further, the regime coerces and co-opts opposition members of parliament by instrumentalizing its control over state administration and resources, including over the electoral process, to the point that members of parliament do not openly challenge the military’s central position in politics. The Ghazouani regime has moved to rescind the parliamentary immunity of at least four opposition members of parliament after they criticized regime actions, such as charging a student with blasphemy for what she had written in a school essay or for speaking out against police conduct. The regime has also employed informal tactics such as withholding state funds and material support from the districts of parliamentarians who do not agree to its policy agenda.
Courts systematically and unfairly fail to check executive overreach across all three branches of government. Despite a constitutional guarantee of judicial independence, the regime maintains influence over the judiciary by appointing judges to high courts and often ignores rulings from lower courts that attempt to hold regime officials accountable. As a result, courts are unable to check the regime’s attempts to suppress public protests or shut down access to the internet in response to popular dissent. Courts especially fail to hold perpetrators of police violence and harassment accountable without public pressure, and victims of state violence, who often face defamatory public smear campaigns, have no reliable opportunity for judicial recourse when the regime frequently ignores judicial decisions that are not in its favor. Regime officials often quietly fail to implement rulings within their jurisdictions, informally challenging the judiciary’s authority to check the regime. For example, in 2022, then-Minister of Housing, Urbanism, and Territorial Reclamation, Sidi Ahmed Ould Mohamed, publicly derided the judiciary and refused to obey judicial rulings against his interests; he later issued a partial apology for his remarks.
Although not a systematic pattern, the Ghazouani regime has at times instrumentalized its influence over the judicial system to target political opponents. Most prominently, the judicial system in Mauritania facilitated the politically motivated prosecution of former president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in 2023. Despite the peaceful transition of power between former allies Abdel Aziz and Ghazouani in 2019, the present regime launched an investigation into the administration of Abdel Aziz in 2020 for alleged embezzlement of government funds after the former president attempted to maintain an outsized influence over the ruling political party. The Ghazouani regime charged Abdel Aziz with corruption and money laundering in 2020, and the courts sentenced him to five years in prison in 2023. Both the government and Abdel Aziz appealed the sentence, and in 2025, the appeals court increased Abdel Aziz’s sentence to 15 years in prison, added a $3 million fine, and also cleared six senior officials from his administration who had also been tried and sentenced for corruption in 2023.
