Hybrid Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies the Maldives as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
In 2008, the Maldives adopted a new constitution and held its first multiparty election, resulting in the country’s first transition of power after 30 years since Maumoon Abdul Gayoom took office in 1978. In 2013, Gayoom’s half-brother, Abdulla Yameen, assumed the presidency and rapidly centralized power. His regime was characterized by severe crackdowns on dissent and extensive control over key institutions. Since 2018, subsequent governments have rolled back many of the electoral restrictions under Yameen, but have continued to fall short in upholding civil liberties and judicial independence. In September 2023, Mohamed Muizzu was elected president with just over half of the popular vote, defeating Ibrahim Mohamed Solih of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP). In April 2024, Muizzu’s People’s National Congress (PNC) won a landslide victory in the legislative election, securing a supermajority in the People’s Majlis.
National elections in the Maldives are largely free and fair. Political parties and candidates have been able to freely compete for representation in the national parliament, and the Elections Commission conducted credible and transparent elections. However, the campaign environment has been marked by the use of public funds and political appointments to mobilize support for the regime, along with widespread vote-buying.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has relied on threats and restrictive legislation to obstruct independent journalists, temporarily blocked critical websites, banned controversial books, and extended surveillance. There have been reported instances of police violence against peaceful protestors.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The incumbent has maintained extensive control over judicial appointments and arbitrarily removed dissenting judges. Constitutional changes have increased the power of the executive overreach within parliament while broadening the policy-making agenda of the head of state. Finally, the independence of anti-corruption and elections oversight bodies has been undermined by new reforms.
National elections in the Maldives are largely free and fair. During the 2024 parliamentary election, political parties and candidates were able to freely compete, and the Elections Commission of the Maldives (ECM) demonstrated transparency and technical competence. The campaign environment was, however, marred by several concerns, including the misuse of state resources, the use of political appointments to secure electoral support, and widespread vote-buying.
Under President Muizzu, the regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Political parties have been free to compete for seats in the People’s Majlis. The first election held under the new government, which was also the country’s fourth multiparty parliamentary election, took place on April 21, 2024. This was nearly a month later than originally scheduled, following the ECM’s acceptance of a request advanced by the opposition to postpone the vote until after Ramadan. The election was highly contested, with more than 350 candidates and seven parties running for seats in the country’s unicameral legislature, which consists of 93 members, one for each electoral district under a plurality voting system. According to the results, five parties secured parliamentary representation. The People’s National Congress won a supermajority of 66 seats (or 71% of the available seats), while the rival Maldivian Democratic Party obtained 12 seats (or 13% of the available seats).
Electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined. The ECM has delivered credible and transparent legislative elections, despite still facing some legal deficiencies in its framework. Established under the 2008 constitution as an independent and impartial body responsible for administering elections and referendums, the commission consists of at least five members appointed by the President with the approval of the People’s Majlis. Ahead of each election, the ECM forms an advisory committee that includes key stakeholders, such as political parties and local observers, to promote transparency during the electoral process. The commission has in the past proven to be technically competent in delivering credible elections, earning international commendation for its administration of the 2019 parliamentary and 2023 presidential polls. The ECM generally succeeded in maintaining the freedom and fairness of the 2024 parliamentary election, as noted by the International Election Observation Program organized by the commission for that election. Nevertheless, weaknesses persist in the commission’s legal framework, particularly dismissal procedures, which allow removals of ECM members by a simple parliamentary majority and have been criticized by observers for increasing the risk of politically motivated dismissals.
There were indications that the Muizzu regime somewhat enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages in the 2024 election cycle, particularly through the abuse of state resources and strategic appointments ahead of polling. Two days prior to election day, government ministries and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) awarded or inaugurated six new development projects. Less than 20 hours from polling, the Ministry of Housing, Land, and Urban Development announced a major housing scheme through a press release. These events demonstrated the abuse of public funds, likely to “hinder voters’ right to choose a candidate without influence,” according to the non-partisan CSO Transparency Maldives. State resources were reportedly used to cover travel costs of state officials engaged in campaign activities supporting the PNC, with opposition figures alleging that about 100 million rufiyaa (approximately $64,400 at that time) was spent by the president alone on such trips. The opposition has also accused the government of swaying voters by promising government roles or job opportunities within SOEs ahead of the election. Since 2023, Muizzu has appointed around 300 deputy and state ministers and approved several appointments to SOEs across most constituencies, contributing to an increase of over 4,000 employees within these enterprises during his first year in office.
The regime has also engaged in some forms of voting irregularities. During the 2024 election cycle, PNC candidates reportedly offered cash payments and gifts to individuals and groups to secure votes across constituencies. Local newspapers reported that a company operated by a senior minister’s family was distributing television sets to households in the Fonadhoo district during the Majlis election period, while President Muizzu was likewise reported to have distributed gifts during his door-to-door campaign visits. It is, however, worth noting that vote buying does not appear confined to the ruling party alone; rather, it has functioned across multiple electoral cycles as a common electoral strategy, in which parties and candidates often spend the majority of their electoral budgets. Transparency Maldives raised further concerns regarding inadequate monitoring of vote buying and the limited capacity of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to effectively investigate and prosecute cases of electoral corruption.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has used credible threats against media workers and enacted legislation that expands the monitoring and sanctioning powers of supervisory bodies. The regime has also temporarily blocked anti-government websites, prohibited books deemed inconsistent with national and religious values, and increased surveillance over both traditional and social media. Finally, it has relied on repressive measures to suppress public protests.
Journalists and independent media have faced serious intimidation and obstruction from the regime. This included credible threats against media workers and the adoption of legislation that expands the monitoring and sanctioning powers of supervisory bodies. In February 2025, then-Maldives Broadcasting Commission (Broadcom) opened an investigation against Raajje TV, a private broadcaster aligned with the MDP, after it had aired a song to promote an opposition rally, thus allegedly violating rules of accuracy and impartiality. The program manager at the TV station condemned the move as part of a government-led harassment campaign against independent media. In the past, Raajje TV had also experienced a series of attacks under the former Yameen government, including defamation fines, a ban on covering court trials, and arrests of its journalists. Reporters Without Borders has classified press freedom in the Maldives as “difficult,” with the country ranking 104 out of 180 countries. This identifies a decline of four positions since 2023, the year President Muizzu took office, reflecting a worsening trend for journalists and the media environment in the Maldives.
In addition to threats, another constraint on media freedom in the Maldives has been the 2022 Evidence Act. Enacted under former President Solih, the law allows courts to compel journalists to disclose their confidential sources in cases involving “terrorism” or “national security,” with noncompliance punishable by up to three months’ imprisonment. Although there have been no reported instances of the law being abused by the current government by year’s end, an amendment to the act tabled by the PNC in October 2025 seeks to broaden its application to additional circumstances and transfer the authority to issue orders of source disclosure to the High Court. Notably, in September 2025, President Muizzu ratified the controversial Maldives Media and Broadcasting Regulations Act, formally establishing the Maldives Media and Broadcasting Commission through the merger of the former Maldives Media Council (MMC) and Broadcom. The act vests the new commission, whose composition is heavily controlled by the parliament, with extensive sanctioning powers, including content restrictions, license and permit removals, and fines up to 100,000 rufiyaa (approximately $6,400) for media outlets and up to 250,000 rufiyaa (approximately $16,100) for single broadcasting license holders that violate content rules. International and domestic observers have argued that the legislation is a masked attempt to undermine dissenting voices in the media through vague provisions and draconian penalties that even prohibit journalists from disseminating inaccurate information.
The regime has also seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Tactics have included strict surveillance regulation and temporary bans on websites and books. One month after Muizzu took office, the government temporarily blocked two news websites and a registered media outlet critical of the administration. Access was restored shortly thereafter, following accusations by media watchdogs that the government had used its earlier decision to ban explicit online content to target news platforms publishing anti-government content. Moreover, in November 2023, the Ministry of Education released a circular ordering schools across the country to remove all content deemed inconsistent with Islamic and Maldivian values, including books and other privately donated materials. Although such attempts at regulating dissenting speech have so far remained sporadic, the 2025 Maldives Media and Broadcasting Regulation Act appears to significantly expand state surveillance mechanisms. Although the act claims to combat disinformation and fake news across the media, critics warn that the law’s overbroad and vague provisions risk enabling state censorship over all sources of online information, including social media users.
Finally, protests have also been seriously and unfairly repressed. The regime has used strict regulations and violent tactics to suppress demonstrations, including arrests. Despite pledges to amend it, the government has kept in place the 2013 Freedom of Peaceful Assembly Act, which has been harshly criticized for placing extensive buffer zones around public buildings, which is particularly consequential for small, densely populated islands such as Malé, and for limiting journalists’ access to protest sites. Moreover, under a 2016 amendment ratified by then-President Yameen, the act requires organizers to obtain prior approval from the police to hold gatherings in Malé. Civil rights observers and the MDP have harshly opposed the provision as unconstitutional, arguing that it contravenes Article 32 of the constitution, which guarantees “the right to freedom of peaceful assembly without prior permission of the State.” However, successive governments since Yameen have continued to invoke the act to restrict freedom of assembly. In March 2025, observers noted that the police employed disproportionate force against peaceful protestors, including elderly people, during a series of opposition-led demonstrations against government corruption in Malé. Reports described police officers forcefully pushing individuals, using pepper spray, and sealing off the area around the opposition campaign site to restrict the protest. Two MDP politicians were also arrested during a gathering, while another MDP lawmaker was summoned by the police for allegedly violating the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly Act. Similar events occurred again in May, when youth-led protests calling for judicial accountability were forcefully disrupted and contained by the police, resulting in the temporary detention of two organizers.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Political influence over the judiciary is primarily exercised through the Judicial Service Commission, which oversees judicial appointments and disciplinary proceedings. The regime has also arbitrarily removed dissenting judges in an effort to defend its policies. In addition, a constitutional amendment has raised the political cost of parliamentary defection and broadened the president’s policy-making authority. Recent institutional changes have consolidated political influence over anti-corruption and election regulatory bodies.
The operational independence of judicial institutions remains seriously weak. The regime has failed to improve the legal framework regulating the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), thereby allowing continued political influence and opaque selection procedures. The JSC is a constitutionally mandated body responsible for the appointment, transfer, and promotion of judges, with the exception of Supreme Court judges, as well as for initiating disciplinary proceedings against them. While formally independent and impartial, the commission has long been criticized for being politicized, given that its ten-member composition includes political representatives, such as the parliament speaker and a representative of the head of state. This lack of independence has subjected the JSC to external influence, with successive governments using the commission as a tool to exert control over the judiciary. A notable example occurred in July 2025, when the JSC appointed Mohamed Shaheed, former Deputy Minister of Home Affairs under Muizzu and staunch PNC activist, to a vacant position in the High Court. The appointment triggered public backlash due to its perceived political nature, leading Shaheed to withdraw his candidacy hours prior to the oath-taking ceremony. Critics have also reported a lack of transparency in the JSC’s selection procedures as well as a number of due process violations in the conduct of its disciplinary proceedings.
Members of the judicial branch who are perceived as a threat to the regime have faced retaliation. The regime has employed arbitrary dismissals against dissenting judges. In May 2025, the Maldivian parliament voted to dismiss two Supreme Court judges over allegations of abuse of power. The decision came more than two months after the JSC suspended the judges along with another colleague, who later resigned in protest, citing an ongoing investigation by the Anti-Corruption Commission against them. At the time of their suspension, the Supreme Court was set to rule on a petition challenging a November 2024 constitutional amendment expanding partisan conditions for the disqualification of members of parliament. The two Supreme Court justices expressed concern about excessive political interference in the case and alleged that the attorney general sent agents to threaten judges with disciplinary action in an attempt to influence the judicial review process.
The Muizzu regime has also subjected legislative institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence. These changes included new regulations governing parliamentary defections and a broadening of the president’s policy-making authority. In November 2024, Muizzu’s PNC leveraged its parliamentary supermajority to hastily pass the aforementioned constitutional amendment introducing stricter anti-defection rules. The amendment requires lawmakers to forfeit their seats if they switch parties, are expelled from their party, or formally join a party for the first time. It also expanded the presidential agenda by empowering the president to formulate national development plans. While supporters defended the amendment as a necessary measure to curb political fragmentation in the country’s legislature, the opposition and civil society lamented that the anti-defection provisions could function as a constraint on parliamentary autonomy, by effectively providing the executive and party leaderships to enforce compliance among fellow party members through the threat of removal from office. Furthermore, the amendment chipped away at the powers of local councils, which were previously tasked with drawing up development plans in consultation with the public, and further centralized executive power over an important area of policy-making.
Finally, the regime has also subjected oversight institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence. These changes have consolidated political influence over both anti-corruption and election regulatory bodies. Observers have raised concerns about an amendment passed by parliament in November 2024 that empowers the head of state to appoint the president and vice president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, warning that this might enable the regime to use the commission for political ends. Domestic monitors have further noted a range of internal problems that have rendered the commission ineffective and unable to investigate corruption cases in a timely and transparent manner. Chief among these is the commission’s organizational structure, which centralizes authority in the hands of its president, whose approval is required for all investigative actions. This system severely constrains the ACC’s ability to operate independently and investigate cases efficiently, especially those involving government officials, given the president’s oversized influence over the commission’s composition.
Similar worries have been raised in relation to the Elections Commission, the constitutionally mandated body responsible for electoral management. In November 2024, the PNC-controlled parliament passed an amendment to the 2008 Elections Commission Act that expanded presidential authority by granting him the power to nominate the ECM’s president and vice president, positions that were originally selected by and among the commissioners themselves. This reform sparked criticism from the opposition, which portrayed it as an attempt by President Muizzu to influence electoral oversight in view of future elections.
HRF classifies the Maldives as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
In 2008, the Maldives adopted a new constitution and held its first multiparty election, resulting in the country’s first transition of power after 30 years since Maumoon Abdul Gayoom took office in 1978. In 2013, Gayoom’s half-brother, Abdulla Yameen, assumed the presidency and rapidly centralized power. His regime was characterized by severe crackdowns on dissent and extensive control over key institutions. Since 2018, subsequent governments have rolled back many of the electoral restrictions under Yameen, but have continued to fall short in upholding civil liberties and judicial independence. In September 2023, Mohamed Muizzu was elected president with just over half of the popular vote, defeating Ibrahim Mohamed Solih of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP). In April 2024, Muizzu’s People’s National Congress (PNC) won a landslide victory in the legislative election, securing a supermajority in the People’s Majlis.
National elections in the Maldives are largely free and fair. Political parties and candidates have been able to freely compete for representation in the national parliament, and the Elections Commission conducted credible and transparent elections. However, the campaign environment has been marked by the use of public funds and political appointments to mobilize support for the regime, along with widespread vote-buying.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has relied on threats and restrictive legislation to obstruct independent journalists, temporarily blocked critical websites, banned controversial books, and extended surveillance. There have been reported instances of police violence against peaceful protestors.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The incumbent has maintained extensive control over judicial appointments and arbitrarily removed dissenting judges. Constitutional changes have increased the power of the executive overreach within parliament while broadening the policy-making agenda of the head of state. Finally, the independence of anti-corruption and elections oversight bodies has been undermined by new reforms.
National elections in the Maldives are largely free and fair. During the 2024 parliamentary election, political parties and candidates were able to freely compete, and the Elections Commission of the Maldives (ECM) demonstrated transparency and technical competence. The campaign environment was, however, marred by several concerns, including the misuse of state resources, the use of political appointments to secure electoral support, and widespread vote-buying.
Under President Muizzu, the regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Political parties have been free to compete for seats in the People’s Majlis. The first election held under the new government, which was also the country’s fourth multiparty parliamentary election, took place on April 21, 2024. This was nearly a month later than originally scheduled, following the ECM’s acceptance of a request advanced by the opposition to postpone the vote until after Ramadan. The election was highly contested, with more than 350 candidates and seven parties running for seats in the country’s unicameral legislature, which consists of 93 members, one for each electoral district under a plurality voting system. According to the results, five parties secured parliamentary representation. The People’s National Congress won a supermajority of 66 seats (or 71% of the available seats), while the rival Maldivian Democratic Party obtained 12 seats (or 13% of the available seats).
Electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined. The ECM has delivered credible and transparent legislative elections, despite still facing some legal deficiencies in its framework. Established under the 2008 constitution as an independent and impartial body responsible for administering elections and referendums, the commission consists of at least five members appointed by the President with the approval of the People’s Majlis. Ahead of each election, the ECM forms an advisory committee that includes key stakeholders, such as political parties and local observers, to promote transparency during the electoral process. The commission has in the past proven to be technically competent in delivering credible elections, earning international commendation for its administration of the 2019 parliamentary and 2023 presidential polls. The ECM generally succeeded in maintaining the freedom and fairness of the 2024 parliamentary election, as noted by the International Election Observation Program organized by the commission for that election. Nevertheless, weaknesses persist in the commission’s legal framework, particularly dismissal procedures, which allow removals of ECM members by a simple parliamentary majority and have been criticized by observers for increasing the risk of politically motivated dismissals.
There were indications that the Muizzu regime somewhat enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages in the 2024 election cycle, particularly through the abuse of state resources and strategic appointments ahead of polling. Two days prior to election day, government ministries and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) awarded or inaugurated six new development projects. Less than 20 hours from polling, the Ministry of Housing, Land, and Urban Development announced a major housing scheme through a press release. These events demonstrated the abuse of public funds, likely to “hinder voters’ right to choose a candidate without influence,” according to the non-partisan CSO Transparency Maldives. State resources were reportedly used to cover travel costs of state officials engaged in campaign activities supporting the PNC, with opposition figures alleging that about 100 million rufiyaa (approximately $64,400 at that time) was spent by the president alone on such trips. The opposition has also accused the government of swaying voters by promising government roles or job opportunities within SOEs ahead of the election. Since 2023, Muizzu has appointed around 300 deputy and state ministers and approved several appointments to SOEs across most constituencies, contributing to an increase of over 4,000 employees within these enterprises during his first year in office.
The regime has also engaged in some forms of voting irregularities. During the 2024 election cycle, PNC candidates reportedly offered cash payments and gifts to individuals and groups to secure votes across constituencies. Local newspapers reported that a company operated by a senior minister’s family was distributing television sets to households in the Fonadhoo district during the Majlis election period, while President Muizzu was likewise reported to have distributed gifts during his door-to-door campaign visits. It is, however, worth noting that vote buying does not appear confined to the ruling party alone; rather, it has functioned across multiple electoral cycles as a common electoral strategy, in which parties and candidates often spend the majority of their electoral budgets. Transparency Maldives raised further concerns regarding inadequate monitoring of vote buying and the limited capacity of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to effectively investigate and prosecute cases of electoral corruption.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has used credible threats against media workers and enacted legislation that expands the monitoring and sanctioning powers of supervisory bodies. The regime has also temporarily blocked anti-government websites, prohibited books deemed inconsistent with national and religious values, and increased surveillance over both traditional and social media. Finally, it has relied on repressive measures to suppress public protests.
Journalists and independent media have faced serious intimidation and obstruction from the regime. This included credible threats against media workers and the adoption of legislation that expands the monitoring and sanctioning powers of supervisory bodies. In February 2025, then-Maldives Broadcasting Commission (Broadcom) opened an investigation against Raajje TV, a private broadcaster aligned with the MDP, after it had aired a song to promote an opposition rally, thus allegedly violating rules of accuracy and impartiality. The program manager at the TV station condemned the move as part of a government-led harassment campaign against independent media. In the past, Raajje TV had also experienced a series of attacks under the former Yameen government, including defamation fines, a ban on covering court trials, and arrests of its journalists. Reporters Without Borders has classified press freedom in the Maldives as “difficult,” with the country ranking 104 out of 180 countries. This identifies a decline of four positions since 2023, the year President Muizzu took office, reflecting a worsening trend for journalists and the media environment in the Maldives.
In addition to threats, another constraint on media freedom in the Maldives has been the 2022 Evidence Act. Enacted under former President Solih, the law allows courts to compel journalists to disclose their confidential sources in cases involving “terrorism” or “national security,” with noncompliance punishable by up to three months’ imprisonment. Although there have been no reported instances of the law being abused by the current government by year’s end, an amendment to the act tabled by the PNC in October 2025 seeks to broaden its application to additional circumstances and transfer the authority to issue orders of source disclosure to the High Court. Notably, in September 2025, President Muizzu ratified the controversial Maldives Media and Broadcasting Regulations Act, formally establishing the Maldives Media and Broadcasting Commission through the merger of the former Maldives Media Council (MMC) and Broadcom. The act vests the new commission, whose composition is heavily controlled by the parliament, with extensive sanctioning powers, including content restrictions, license and permit removals, and fines up to 100,000 rufiyaa (approximately $6,400) for media outlets and up to 250,000 rufiyaa (approximately $16,100) for single broadcasting license holders that violate content rules. International and domestic observers have argued that the legislation is a masked attempt to undermine dissenting voices in the media through vague provisions and draconian penalties that even prohibit journalists from disseminating inaccurate information.
The regime has also seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Tactics have included strict surveillance regulation and temporary bans on websites and books. One month after Muizzu took office, the government temporarily blocked two news websites and a registered media outlet critical of the administration. Access was restored shortly thereafter, following accusations by media watchdogs that the government had used its earlier decision to ban explicit online content to target news platforms publishing anti-government content. Moreover, in November 2023, the Ministry of Education released a circular ordering schools across the country to remove all content deemed inconsistent with Islamic and Maldivian values, including books and other privately donated materials. Although such attempts at regulating dissenting speech have so far remained sporadic, the 2025 Maldives Media and Broadcasting Regulation Act appears to significantly expand state surveillance mechanisms. Although the act claims to combat disinformation and fake news across the media, critics warn that the law’s overbroad and vague provisions risk enabling state censorship over all sources of online information, including social media users.
Finally, protests have also been seriously and unfairly repressed. The regime has used strict regulations and violent tactics to suppress demonstrations, including arrests. Despite pledges to amend it, the government has kept in place the 2013 Freedom of Peaceful Assembly Act, which has been harshly criticized for placing extensive buffer zones around public buildings, which is particularly consequential for small, densely populated islands such as Malé, and for limiting journalists’ access to protest sites. Moreover, under a 2016 amendment ratified by then-President Yameen, the act requires organizers to obtain prior approval from the police to hold gatherings in Malé. Civil rights observers and the MDP have harshly opposed the provision as unconstitutional, arguing that it contravenes Article 32 of the constitution, which guarantees “the right to freedom of peaceful assembly without prior permission of the State.” However, successive governments since Yameen have continued to invoke the act to restrict freedom of assembly. In March 2025, observers noted that the police employed disproportionate force against peaceful protestors, including elderly people, during a series of opposition-led demonstrations against government corruption in Malé. Reports described police officers forcefully pushing individuals, using pepper spray, and sealing off the area around the opposition campaign site to restrict the protest. Two MDP politicians were also arrested during a gathering, while another MDP lawmaker was summoned by the police for allegedly violating the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly Act. Similar events occurred again in May, when youth-led protests calling for judicial accountability were forcefully disrupted and contained by the police, resulting in the temporary detention of two organizers.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Political influence over the judiciary is primarily exercised through the Judicial Service Commission, which oversees judicial appointments and disciplinary proceedings. The regime has also arbitrarily removed dissenting judges in an effort to defend its policies. In addition, a constitutional amendment has raised the political cost of parliamentary defection and broadened the president’s policy-making authority. Recent institutional changes have consolidated political influence over anti-corruption and election regulatory bodies.
The operational independence of judicial institutions remains seriously weak. The regime has failed to improve the legal framework regulating the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), thereby allowing continued political influence and opaque selection procedures. The JSC is a constitutionally mandated body responsible for the appointment, transfer, and promotion of judges, with the exception of Supreme Court judges, as well as for initiating disciplinary proceedings against them. While formally independent and impartial, the commission has long been criticized for being politicized, given that its ten-member composition includes political representatives, such as the parliament speaker and a representative of the head of state. This lack of independence has subjected the JSC to external influence, with successive governments using the commission as a tool to exert control over the judiciary. A notable example occurred in July 2025, when the JSC appointed Mohamed Shaheed, former Deputy Minister of Home Affairs under Muizzu and staunch PNC activist, to a vacant position in the High Court. The appointment triggered public backlash due to its perceived political nature, leading Shaheed to withdraw his candidacy hours prior to the oath-taking ceremony. Critics have also reported a lack of transparency in the JSC’s selection procedures as well as a number of due process violations in the conduct of its disciplinary proceedings.
Members of the judicial branch who are perceived as a threat to the regime have faced retaliation. The regime has employed arbitrary dismissals against dissenting judges. In May 2025, the Maldivian parliament voted to dismiss two Supreme Court judges over allegations of abuse of power. The decision came more than two months after the JSC suspended the judges along with another colleague, who later resigned in protest, citing an ongoing investigation by the Anti-Corruption Commission against them. At the time of their suspension, the Supreme Court was set to rule on a petition challenging a November 2024 constitutional amendment expanding partisan conditions for the disqualification of members of parliament. The two Supreme Court justices expressed concern about excessive political interference in the case and alleged that the attorney general sent agents to threaten judges with disciplinary action in an attempt to influence the judicial review process.
The Muizzu regime has also subjected legislative institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence. These changes included new regulations governing parliamentary defections and a broadening of the president’s policy-making authority. In November 2024, Muizzu’s PNC leveraged its parliamentary supermajority to hastily pass the aforementioned constitutional amendment introducing stricter anti-defection rules. The amendment requires lawmakers to forfeit their seats if they switch parties, are expelled from their party, or formally join a party for the first time. It also expanded the presidential agenda by empowering the president to formulate national development plans. While supporters defended the amendment as a necessary measure to curb political fragmentation in the country’s legislature, the opposition and civil society lamented that the anti-defection provisions could function as a constraint on parliamentary autonomy, by effectively providing the executive and party leaderships to enforce compliance among fellow party members through the threat of removal from office. Furthermore, the amendment chipped away at the powers of local councils, which were previously tasked with drawing up development plans in consultation with the public, and further centralized executive power over an important area of policy-making.
Finally, the regime has also subjected oversight institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence. These changes have consolidated political influence over both anti-corruption and election regulatory bodies. Observers have raised concerns about an amendment passed by parliament in November 2024 that empowers the head of state to appoint the president and vice president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, warning that this might enable the regime to use the commission for political ends. Domestic monitors have further noted a range of internal problems that have rendered the commission ineffective and unable to investigate corruption cases in a timely and transparent manner. Chief among these is the commission’s organizational structure, which centralizes authority in the hands of its president, whose approval is required for all investigative actions. This system severely constrains the ACC’s ability to operate independently and investigate cases efficiently, especially those involving government officials, given the president’s oversized influence over the commission’s composition.
Similar worries have been raised in relation to the Elections Commission, the constitutionally mandated body responsible for electoral management. In November 2024, the PNC-controlled parliament passed an amendment to the 2008 Elections Commission Act that expanded presidential authority by granting him the power to nominate the ECM’s president and vice president, positions that were originally selected by and among the commissioners themselves. This reform sparked criticism from the opposition, which portrayed it as an attempt by President Muizzu to influence electoral oversight in view of future elections.
