Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Malawi as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Malawi is a unitary presidential republic. President Peter Mutharika, the Head of State, was democratically elected in the September 2025 elections. The political landscape is dominated by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and the main opposition, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Since the end of Kamuzu Banda’s dictatorship following the 1993 referendum and the introduction of multiparty elections in May 1994, Malawi has had six successive presidents and four handovers of power between the governing and opposition parties. In 2019, the court annulled the presidential election after finding widespread and systematic irregularities, removing the declared victory of the incumbent and making Malawi only the second country in Africa, after Kenya, where a judicial ruling overturned an incumbent’s electoral win.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point that the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance of winning. The regime’s significant and unfair campaign advantages have seriously undermined the real and mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. The regime has also seriously undermined independent electoral oversight.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to criticize or challenge the regime openly. The regime has seriously intimidated independent and dissenting media, civil society leaders, and regular people, or otherwise, by seriously and unfairly obstructing their work. More than 14 journalists have reported threats and harassment in connection with their reporting since Chakwera took office in 2020.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the regime, consistently restraining attempts to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, and weaken or dismantle accountability mechanisms. In 2019, the courts nullified the presidential election, and in 2025, they declared criminal defamation laws used against regime critics unconstitutional.
In Malawi, electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point that the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance of winning. Electoral competition is skewed by incumbency advantages, disputed electoral administration, and the manipulation of results, but remains genuine as opposition parties can, to some extent, campaign freely, win elections, and benefit from a regionally fragmented vote that makes one-party dominance difficult.
The regime has engaged in significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud through widespread and systematic irregularities, amounting to large-scale electoral malpractice. Historically, elections have at times been tainted by allegations of fraud, with the 2019 election—infamously termed the ‘Tipp-Ex election’ because of the use of correction fluid to alter results sheets— as the most blatant example of large-scale electoral fraud. In the 2025 general election, the then-ruling MCP alleged vote-count irregularities in 13 districts and unsuccessfully sought an injunction to block the announcement of results. Police also arrested eight electoral data clerks on suspicion of attempting to manipulate figures during the counting process.
The regime in power enjoys such significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. Electoral competition remains structurally uneven, and while opposition parties have removed incumbents from office through the ballot in 1994, 2014, 2020, and 2025, it has not occurred on a level playing field. For example, ahead of the 2025 general elections, then-president Lazarus Chakwera continued the long-standing practice of incumbent leaders using state resources and institutions for electioneering under the guise of “development meetings.” However, despite such entrenched advantages, the opposition won in the last two election cycles. Former president Chakwera received 58.6% in the 2020 rerun, unseating the incumbent Mutharika, while Mutharika returned to power in 2025 with 56.8% by defeating the incumbent Chakwera.
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The President holds the power of appointment of the Chair of the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) and appoints other Commissioners from secret nominations made by the political parties that have secured more than one-tenth of national votes in parliament. As a result, the MEC has faced criticism over its lack of independence. For example, in October 2024, the MEC faced accusations of a conflict of interest arising from reported blood and political ties between three commissioners, including the chair, and the then-ruling MCP party. Also, during the 2025 election, MCP and the United Democratic Front (UDF) separately filed complaints to the MEC that monitors were expelled from tallying centres, totals exceeded the number of registered voters, and discrepancies existed between manual, printed, and aggregated tally sheets.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to criticize or challenge the regime openly. Successive regimes in Malawi have systematically intimidated and obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and ordinary people, influenced media coverage in their favor, and repressed dissenting protests. Incumbent regimes rely on party cadets as informal enforcers deployed to intimidate critics, disrupt activities, and pressure media actors.
The DPP and MCP regimes have systematically intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and regular people, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work through threats, harassment, arrest, raids, and the abuse of vague laws. For example, immediately after Mutharika’s reelection in December 2025, authorities made a series of escalating arrests targeting senior MCP members such as Vitumbiko Mumba, the MCP running mate, and Jessie Kabwila, the MCP spokesperson, on politically motivated charges of spreading false information. In a separate case, MCP Secretary-General Richard Chimwendo Banda was arrested and remanded on an attempted murder charge linked to a 2021 incident, which the party characterized as politically motivated. Earlier, in November, armed regime officials stormed the residence of former president Chakwera, while in a separate operation, they also searched the home of Mumba.
In addition, successive administrations have systematically abused vague laws to intimidate independent, dissenting media, civil society leaders, and ordinary people. The Cyber Security and Electronic Transaction Act, the 1913 Official Secrets Act, the Protected Flags, Emblems and Names Act, and the Penal Code are some of the laws frequently used by the regime to criminally prosecute dissidents or opponents. For example, at least 20 people, including journalist Macmillan Mhone, legislator Kemplepo Kalua, political activist Bon Kalindo, and cleric Kondwani Gondwe, have been charged under the cybercrime law since 2020 for online criticism of the regime, and more than 14 journalists reported threats and harassment related to their reporting between 2020 and 2025. In April 2022, Gregory Gondwe, a prominent investigative journalist, was detained and questioned about his sources, and in February 2024, he was forced to go into hiding after being threatened with arrest by the military over a report on public corruption. In December 2023, the Chakwera regime terminated its partnership with refugee rights group INUA Advocacy and expelled the organization from Dzaleka refugee camp in retaliation for its criticism of the regime’s treatment of refugees.
Authorities seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. In August 2022, security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition to violently crack down on protests against the judiciary’s perceived favoring of the wealthy over the poor in delivering justice. Security forces detained 75 protesters who were charged with unlawful assembly and inciting violence. A month earlier, civil society accused the then-ruling MCP party operatives of abducting activist Sylvester Namiwa ahead of another planned protest, which was eventually canceled. Authorities have also detained political activist Bon Kalindo multiple times for organizing and leading protests.
The regime seriously manipulates media coverage in the ruling party’s favour. New presidents in Malawi often replace the managing boards of the state broadcaster with individuals loyal to their administration. However, independent media outlets can criticize the regime, showcasing some degree of press freedom.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the regime, consistently restraining attempts to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, and weaken or dismantle accountability mechanisms. The courts have overturned an incumbent’s election win, enforced the 50%+1 rule, granted bail to critics, ruled in favor of protests, dismissed politically motivated cases, and affirmed freedom of expression.
The court in Malawi predominantly serves as a check on the regime, particularly in its efforts to significantly undermine electoral competition or skew the electoral process in its favor. In the past decade, they have ruled against an incumbent by overturning a presidential election, enforcing a higher winning threshold, and dismissing an attempt to block the announcement of results. The judiciary demonstrated its autonomy when the Constitutional Court unanimously voted to nullify the reelection of an incumbent in 2019, citing widespread irregularities, and ordered a fresh election within 150 days. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Constitutional Court in 2020. The courts also removed the system that had allowed sitting presidents to win with less than half the vote and enforced the 50% + 1 winning threshold. In September 2025, the High Court dismissed a bid by the then-incumbent Chakwera to block the announcement of the 2025 general election results over allegations of irregularities.
The judiciary largely checks the regime in its ability to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The courts have safeguarded political dissent by granting bail to detained critics, dismissing weak or politically motivated charges, and adjudicating constitutional challenges to restrictions on protests and freedom of expression. For example, in a landmark July 2025 ruling, the High Court declared criminal defamation unconstitutional, thereby removing a major legal tool previously used by the regime to stifle freedom of expression and prosecute critics. Also, in September 2019, the Supreme Court of Appeal of Malawi rejected the Attorney General’s petition to ban protests against the results of fraudulent elections. The Court ruled that protests could not be banned based on the fear of violent unrest, establishing an important precedent for freedom of assembly. However, in July 2022, the High Court sided with the regime in upholding a legal injunction on protests against the judiciary.
Judges who ruled contrary to regime interests or who were perceived as a threat to the regime were particularly threatened by Mutharika’s regime between 2014 and 2020, especially after the decision to nullify the 2019 election. The landmark ruling brought with it threats and intimidation, forcing Constitutional Court judges to go into hiding while preparing for their ruling and go to court under military escort wearing bulletproof vests. Post-verdict, the Mutharika regime tried but failed to dismiss Andrew Nyirenda, then Chief Justice, and Edward Twea, then second most senior judge, a few days before the fresh election by placing them on leave pending retirement. However, there was a notable improvement during Chakwera’s presidential term, as judges were no longer subjected to retaliation by the regime.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Instances have arisen where well-founded corruption cases against high-profile regime officials were discontinued. This is primarily attributed to the actions of prosecutors and other regime authorities, including the Anti-Corruption Bureau. For example, in 2022, the High Court dismissed a corruption case against the late Vice President Saulos Chilima at the behest of the state prosecutor.
HRF classifies Malawi as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Malawi is a unitary presidential republic. President Peter Mutharika, the Head of State, was democratically elected in the September 2025 elections. The political landscape is dominated by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and the main opposition, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Since the end of Kamuzu Banda’s dictatorship following the 1993 referendum and the introduction of multiparty elections in May 1994, Malawi has had six successive presidents and four handovers of power between the governing and opposition parties. In 2019, the court annulled the presidential election after finding widespread and systematic irregularities, removing the declared victory of the incumbent and making Malawi only the second country in Africa, after Kenya, where a judicial ruling overturned an incumbent’s electoral win.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point that the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance of winning. The regime’s significant and unfair campaign advantages have seriously undermined the real and mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. The regime has also seriously undermined independent electoral oversight.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to criticize or challenge the regime openly. The regime has seriously intimidated independent and dissenting media, civil society leaders, and regular people, or otherwise, by seriously and unfairly obstructing their work. More than 14 journalists have reported threats and harassment in connection with their reporting since Chakwera took office in 2020.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the regime, consistently restraining attempts to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, and weaken or dismantle accountability mechanisms. In 2019, the courts nullified the presidential election, and in 2025, they declared criminal defamation laws used against regime critics unconstitutional.
In Malawi, electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point that the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic, chance of winning. Electoral competition is skewed by incumbency advantages, disputed electoral administration, and the manipulation of results, but remains genuine as opposition parties can, to some extent, campaign freely, win elections, and benefit from a regionally fragmented vote that makes one-party dominance difficult.
The regime has engaged in significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud through widespread and systematic irregularities, amounting to large-scale electoral malpractice. Historically, elections have at times been tainted by allegations of fraud, with the 2019 election—infamously termed the ‘Tipp-Ex election’ because of the use of correction fluid to alter results sheets— as the most blatant example of large-scale electoral fraud. In the 2025 general election, the then-ruling MCP alleged vote-count irregularities in 13 districts and unsuccessfully sought an injunction to block the announcement of results. Police also arrested eight electoral data clerks on suspicion of attempting to manipulate figures during the counting process.
The regime in power enjoys such significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. Electoral competition remains structurally uneven, and while opposition parties have removed incumbents from office through the ballot in 1994, 2014, 2020, and 2025, it has not occurred on a level playing field. For example, ahead of the 2025 general elections, then-president Lazarus Chakwera continued the long-standing practice of incumbent leaders using state resources and institutions for electioneering under the guise of “development meetings.” However, despite such entrenched advantages, the opposition won in the last two election cycles. Former president Chakwera received 58.6% in the 2020 rerun, unseating the incumbent Mutharika, while Mutharika returned to power in 2025 with 56.8% by defeating the incumbent Chakwera.
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The President holds the power of appointment of the Chair of the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) and appoints other Commissioners from secret nominations made by the political parties that have secured more than one-tenth of national votes in parliament. As a result, the MEC has faced criticism over its lack of independence. For example, in October 2024, the MEC faced accusations of a conflict of interest arising from reported blood and political ties between three commissioners, including the chair, and the then-ruling MCP party. Also, during the 2025 election, MCP and the United Democratic Front (UDF) separately filed complaints to the MEC that monitors were expelled from tallying centres, totals exceeded the number of registered voters, and discrepancies existed between manual, printed, and aggregated tally sheets.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to criticize or challenge the regime openly. Successive regimes in Malawi have systematically intimidated and obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and ordinary people, influenced media coverage in their favor, and repressed dissenting protests. Incumbent regimes rely on party cadets as informal enforcers deployed to intimidate critics, disrupt activities, and pressure media actors.
The DPP and MCP regimes have systematically intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and regular people, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructed their work through threats, harassment, arrest, raids, and the abuse of vague laws. For example, immediately after Mutharika’s reelection in December 2025, authorities made a series of escalating arrests targeting senior MCP members such as Vitumbiko Mumba, the MCP running mate, and Jessie Kabwila, the MCP spokesperson, on politically motivated charges of spreading false information. In a separate case, MCP Secretary-General Richard Chimwendo Banda was arrested and remanded on an attempted murder charge linked to a 2021 incident, which the party characterized as politically motivated. Earlier, in November, armed regime officials stormed the residence of former president Chakwera, while in a separate operation, they also searched the home of Mumba.
In addition, successive administrations have systematically abused vague laws to intimidate independent, dissenting media, civil society leaders, and ordinary people. The Cyber Security and Electronic Transaction Act, the 1913 Official Secrets Act, the Protected Flags, Emblems and Names Act, and the Penal Code are some of the laws frequently used by the regime to criminally prosecute dissidents or opponents. For example, at least 20 people, including journalist Macmillan Mhone, legislator Kemplepo Kalua, political activist Bon Kalindo, and cleric Kondwani Gondwe, have been charged under the cybercrime law since 2020 for online criticism of the regime, and more than 14 journalists reported threats and harassment related to their reporting between 2020 and 2025. In April 2022, Gregory Gondwe, a prominent investigative journalist, was detained and questioned about his sources, and in February 2024, he was forced to go into hiding after being threatened with arrest by the military over a report on public corruption. In December 2023, the Chakwera regime terminated its partnership with refugee rights group INUA Advocacy and expelled the organization from Dzaleka refugee camp in retaliation for its criticism of the regime’s treatment of refugees.
Authorities seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. In August 2022, security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition to violently crack down on protests against the judiciary’s perceived favoring of the wealthy over the poor in delivering justice. Security forces detained 75 protesters who were charged with unlawful assembly and inciting violence. A month earlier, civil society accused the then-ruling MCP party operatives of abducting activist Sylvester Namiwa ahead of another planned protest, which was eventually canceled. Authorities have also detained political activist Bon Kalindo multiple times for organizing and leading protests.
The regime seriously manipulates media coverage in the ruling party’s favour. New presidents in Malawi often replace the managing boards of the state broadcaster with individuals loyal to their administration. However, independent media outlets can criticize the regime, showcasing some degree of press freedom.
Institutions are largely independent and serve as effective checks on the regime, consistently restraining attempts to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, and weaken or dismantle accountability mechanisms. The courts have overturned an incumbent’s election win, enforced the 50%+1 rule, granted bail to critics, ruled in favor of protests, dismissed politically motivated cases, and affirmed freedom of expression.
The court in Malawi predominantly serves as a check on the regime, particularly in its efforts to significantly undermine electoral competition or skew the electoral process in its favor. In the past decade, they have ruled against an incumbent by overturning a presidential election, enforcing a higher winning threshold, and dismissing an attempt to block the announcement of results. The judiciary demonstrated its autonomy when the Constitutional Court unanimously voted to nullify the reelection of an incumbent in 2019, citing widespread irregularities, and ordered a fresh election within 150 days. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Constitutional Court in 2020. The courts also removed the system that had allowed sitting presidents to win with less than half the vote and enforced the 50% + 1 winning threshold. In September 2025, the High Court dismissed a bid by the then-incumbent Chakwera to block the announcement of the 2025 general election results over allegations of irregularities.
The judiciary largely checks the regime in its ability to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The courts have safeguarded political dissent by granting bail to detained critics, dismissing weak or politically motivated charges, and adjudicating constitutional challenges to restrictions on protests and freedom of expression. For example, in a landmark July 2025 ruling, the High Court declared criminal defamation unconstitutional, thereby removing a major legal tool previously used by the regime to stifle freedom of expression and prosecute critics. Also, in September 2019, the Supreme Court of Appeal of Malawi rejected the Attorney General’s petition to ban protests against the results of fraudulent elections. The Court ruled that protests could not be banned based on the fear of violent unrest, establishing an important precedent for freedom of assembly. However, in July 2022, the High Court sided with the regime in upholding a legal injunction on protests against the judiciary.
Judges who ruled contrary to regime interests or who were perceived as a threat to the regime were particularly threatened by Mutharika’s regime between 2014 and 2020, especially after the decision to nullify the 2019 election. The landmark ruling brought with it threats and intimidation, forcing Constitutional Court judges to go into hiding while preparing for their ruling and go to court under military escort wearing bulletproof vests. Post-verdict, the Mutharika regime tried but failed to dismiss Andrew Nyirenda, then Chief Justice, and Edward Twea, then second most senior judge, a few days before the fresh election by placing them on leave pending retirement. However, there was a notable improvement during Chakwera’s presidential term, as judges were no longer subjected to retaliation by the regime.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Instances have arisen where well-founded corruption cases against high-profile regime officials were discontinued. This is primarily attributed to the actions of prosecutors and other regime authorities, including the Anti-Corruption Bureau. For example, in 2022, the High Court dismissed a corruption case against the late Vice President Saulos Chilima at the behest of the state prosecutor.
