Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Madagascar as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Madagascar is a semi-presidential republic. Madagascar’s post-independence history has been marked by recurring instability since 1960, including repeated coups, disputed elections, impeachments, and elite power struggles. Most recently, the government experienced a military takeover in October 2025, following weeks of youth-led protests over chronic power and water shortages, corruption, poverty, and governance failures. An elite military unit led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina seized control after a parliamentary vote to impeach President Andry Rajoelina, who then fled into exile. The African Union suspended Madagascar’s membership in response to the coup, and international actors, including the United Nations, have expressed concern about the unconstitutional change of government. Colonel Randrianirina’s regime has maintained control amid international condemnation and ongoing regional mediation efforts.
Due to the October 2025 coup, national elections are absent, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. The military coup overthrew President Andry Rajoelina following weeks of protests against service failures and corruption, leading to the suspension of key institutions and the installation of Colonel Michael Radrianirina as transitional leader with promises of elections within 18 to 24 months. Elections held prior to the coup were widely regarded as manipulated and fraught with irregularities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Rajoelina’s regime systematically suppressed dissent and free expression in Madagascar by intimidating critics, capturing the media space, and prosecuting opponents under vague cybercrime and communication laws. Security forces frequently employed excessive force against protesters, notably during the 2025 Gen Z protests, which escalated into the military coup that ended Rajoelina’s rule.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Madagascar’s judiciary and legislature were repeatedly undermined by executive influence during Rajoelina’s presidency. The High Constitutional Court (HCC) consistently dismissed significant electoral challenges, and courts routinely upheld vague or politically-motivated charges against dissenters. Legislative weakness and selective impunity perpetuated a culture in which individuals aligned with the regime enjoyed protection while opponents were systematically constrained.
Due to the October 2025 coup, national elections are absent, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. The state of electoral competition in Madagascar remains highly uncertain and transitional under Colonel Michael Randrianirina, who heads the Council of the Presidency for the Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar. Prior to the 2025 events, elections were widely criticized as unfree and unfair, with the High Constitutional Court (HCC) frequently dismissing challenges. Opposition candidates are seriously hindered and intimidated by the regime.
A democratically elected government was overthrown in a coup d’état in October 2025. The coup was the culmination of escalating public unrest over service delivery failures and rising living costs. After weeks of Gen Z-led protests, the elected President Andry Rajoelina was impeached by parliament for desertion of duty, prompting him to flee into exile. The military then seized control, suspended key institutions, and formally installed Colonel Michael Randrianirina as transitional president. The military junta promised a civilian-led government and institutional reforms within 18 to 24 months.
Prior to the coup, the Rajoelina regime engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud. National elections are consistently marred by allegations of vote buying and large-scale electoral fraud. In the 2023 presidential election, opposition figure and runner-up Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko accused the regime of intimidating polling officials, closing polling stations, using state resources for incumbent Rajoelina’s campaign, and vote buying. A police prefect noted “various acts of sabotage” surrounding the polls, including the burning of a polling station.
In 2018, the EU election observer mission reported that two local leaders received the equivalent of $5,000 from Rajoelina’s campaign staff to secure their community’s votes. Moreover, the lack of a cap on election expenses gives unfair and significant advantages to mainstream candidates, often with massive and opaque campaign finances. For example, in 2018, Andry Rajoelina spent nearly $2.5 million in pre-campaigning, compared with $75,000 for an average candidate, highlighting the disparities caused by this lack of regulation.
The regime has historically systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ and candidates’ electoral campaigns. In early 2023, the Interior Minister issued a decree banning all political parties and members of parliament from holding rallies or protests in outdoor public spaces, whereas the members of the executive, including the incumbent Rajoelina, were still allowed to hold open-air public meetings in the performance of their duties. Ten out of 12 opposition candidates boycotted the November 2023 election, calling it a “fraud” and “joke on Madagascar,” accusing Rajoelina of creating unfair conditions.
The regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ or candidates’ electoral campaigns. Opposition candidates endured unjust attacks leading up to the 2023 polls. In November 2023, opposition hopeful Jean Jacques Ratsietison was detained after taking part in a rally police declared “banned.” Similarly, candidate and ex-parliament speaker Auguste Paraina was briefly arrested at the airport that month on charges of defamation and disseminating false information. During protests, Andry Raoeblina and former president Marc Ravalomanana were injured by tear gas grenades, leading to a one-week postponement of the election.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Security forces often use excessive force, such as tear gas and rubber bullets, most notably during the 2025 Gen Z protests. The regime controls the media through state broadcasters, and journalists and dissenters are intimidated when criticizing the regime.
The regime has seriously and unfairly repressed protests and gatherings. A youth-led uprising emerged in September 2025, primarily in the capital, Antananarivo, but spread to other cities such as Toamisina and Fianarantsoa. The protests were initially triggered by chronic electricity blackouts and severe water shortages, but then escalated into broader demands for systemic change. The Rajoelina government responded disproportionately to the young protesters, using tear gas, rubber bullets, stun grenades, batons, and live ammunition, resulting in at least 22 deaths and over 100 injuries.
Andry Rajoelina’s regime heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. While the privately-owned Malagasy media is vibrant and able to report critically on the regime, its reach is limited to the capital and large cities. As such, the government manipulates media coverage in its favor through the public media broadcasters Television Nationale Malgache (TVM) and Radio Nationale Malgache (RNM), which have national reach. Under Colonel Randrianirina, the regime has attempted to legitimize its rule and counter coup narratives through national radio and state television.
The regime has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and organizations. Some independent journalists face government intimidation when reporting on sensitive issues. For instance, in November 2023, police and ruling-party supporters physically assaulted a dozen independent journalists covering opposition protests in Antananarivo. Additionally, in 2021, the regime aired a report on TVM that relied on false testimony to discredit and smear Gaëlle Borgia, a prominent Malagasy Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter. She had reported on famine in southern Madagascar, depicting people eating tanned cowhide scraps, which cast the regime unfavorably on the international stage.
Since 2018, Rajoelina’s regime has prosecuted numerous critics and journalists under cybercrime and communication laws. In April 2020, journalist Arphine Helisoa was arrested and charged with publishing false news and inciting hatred against the state for criticizing the president’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, she was released in May 2020 as a symbolic gesture. Investigative journalist Fernando Cello and human rights activist Nini Donia also faced targeted repression for criticizing Rajoelina’s regime.
The regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Besides journalists and activists, ordinary citizens also face intimidation when criticizing the regime. For instance, in 2023, social media blogger Sylvia Randriatsotsy was detained and given a one-year prison sentence for alleging electoral irregularities ahead of the November polls. In 2020, Berija Ravelomanantsoa, a university student leader with ties to a previous administration, was arrested and sentenced to 44 months after commenting on Facebook about Covid-organics, a herbal remedy promoted by the president as a COVID-19 treatment. Additionally, opposition figure and ex-communication minister Harry Laurent Rahajason was arrested and sentenced to 44 months in prison for disrupting public order and inciting an unauthorized rally when he demanded Ravelomanantsoa’s release. He was charged with undermining state security and disrupting public order.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Particularly during Andry Rajoelina’s presidency, the judiciary and legislature retained formal independence but were often subject to executive influence and selective deference to regime interests. Concerns over electoral integrity are frequently dismissed, and courts uphold dubious charges against regime detractors. Senior officials seldom face prosecution, perpetuating a culture of impunity among those aligned with the president.
Courts have unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. For the 2023 election, the High Constitutional Court (HCC) dismissed opposition challenges to Rajoelina’s eligibility over allegations of dual French-Malagasy nationality. The court confirmed his reelection on December 1, 2023, despite a major opposition boycott, a historically low turnout, and widespread reports of irregularities. Similarly, after the contentious 2018 presidential runoff in which Rajoelina defeated Marc Ravalomanana, the HCC rejected fraud complaints—including allegations of fake electoral cards, vote buying, and intimidation. The court also validated Rajoelina’s victory in January 2019 without ordering a nationwide recount, despite appeals to verify polling records.
Courts have also frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In Madagascar, dissidents and critics are routinely convicted on vague and bogus charges, and courts routinely side with the regime rather than upholding citizens’ rights to freedom of speech. Journalist Mickaelys Ndiamahazo was prosecuted in 2024 for posts related to corruption in legislative election outcomes on Facebook. The charges fell under Madagascar’s 2016 Communication Code, which has been used to stifle criticism through criminalizing “publishing documents compromising national security” or any broadly-interpreted offenses against state security. The court imposed a five-year suspended sentence despite the non-violent nature of the offense. A similar incident occurred when Patrick Raharimanana was also convicted to a five-year suspended sentence and fined approximately $450 for posting the president’s itinerary. These charges were comparable to those against Ndiamahazo, based on “interception of data” and “compromising security.”
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Many cases reveal high-ranking officials enjoying impunity despite strong evidence of corruption. In 2023, former chief of staff Romy Andrianarisoa was arrested for attempting to solicit a $300,000 bribe from a UK mining company in exchange for mining licenses in southern Madagascar. Despite international attention and a UK conviction, domestically the investigation was downplayed, and Andrianarisoa faced neither extradition nor a local trial. Similarly, in 2022, former Minister of Energy and Hydrocarbons Paul Mahefa was implicated in embezzling approximately $2.5 million from fuel subsidy funds during the energy crisis. Despite opening an inquiry following public complaints, there was no prosecution or recovery of funds.
HRF classifies Madagascar as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Madagascar is a semi-presidential republic. Madagascar’s post-independence history has been marked by recurring instability since 1960, including repeated coups, disputed elections, impeachments, and elite power struggles. Most recently, the government experienced a military takeover in October 2025, following weeks of youth-led protests over chronic power and water shortages, corruption, poverty, and governance failures. An elite military unit led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina seized control after a parliamentary vote to impeach President Andry Rajoelina, who then fled into exile. The African Union suspended Madagascar’s membership in response to the coup, and international actors, including the United Nations, have expressed concern about the unconstitutional change of government. Colonel Randrianirina’s regime has maintained control amid international condemnation and ongoing regional mediation efforts.
Due to the October 2025 coup, national elections are absent, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. The military coup overthrew President Andry Rajoelina following weeks of protests against service failures and corruption, leading to the suspension of key institutions and the installation of Colonel Michael Radrianirina as transitional leader with promises of elections within 18 to 24 months. Elections held prior to the coup were widely regarded as manipulated and fraught with irregularities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Rajoelina’s regime systematically suppressed dissent and free expression in Madagascar by intimidating critics, capturing the media space, and prosecuting opponents under vague cybercrime and communication laws. Security forces frequently employed excessive force against protesters, notably during the 2025 Gen Z protests, which escalated into the military coup that ended Rajoelina’s rule.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Madagascar’s judiciary and legislature were repeatedly undermined by executive influence during Rajoelina’s presidency. The High Constitutional Court (HCC) consistently dismissed significant electoral challenges, and courts routinely upheld vague or politically-motivated charges against dissenters. Legislative weakness and selective impunity perpetuated a culture in which individuals aligned with the regime enjoyed protection while opponents were systematically constrained.
Due to the October 2025 coup, national elections are absent, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. The state of electoral competition in Madagascar remains highly uncertain and transitional under Colonel Michael Randrianirina, who heads the Council of the Presidency for the Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar. Prior to the 2025 events, elections were widely criticized as unfree and unfair, with the High Constitutional Court (HCC) frequently dismissing challenges. Opposition candidates are seriously hindered and intimidated by the regime.
A democratically elected government was overthrown in a coup d’état in October 2025. The coup was the culmination of escalating public unrest over service delivery failures and rising living costs. After weeks of Gen Z-led protests, the elected President Andry Rajoelina was impeached by parliament for desertion of duty, prompting him to flee into exile. The military then seized control, suspended key institutions, and formally installed Colonel Michael Randrianirina as transitional president. The military junta promised a civilian-led government and institutional reforms within 18 to 24 months.
Prior to the coup, the Rajoelina regime engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud. National elections are consistently marred by allegations of vote buying and large-scale electoral fraud. In the 2023 presidential election, opposition figure and runner-up Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko accused the regime of intimidating polling officials, closing polling stations, using state resources for incumbent Rajoelina’s campaign, and vote buying. A police prefect noted “various acts of sabotage” surrounding the polls, including the burning of a polling station.
In 2018, the EU election observer mission reported that two local leaders received the equivalent of $5,000 from Rajoelina’s campaign staff to secure their community’s votes. Moreover, the lack of a cap on election expenses gives unfair and significant advantages to mainstream candidates, often with massive and opaque campaign finances. For example, in 2018, Andry Rajoelina spent nearly $2.5 million in pre-campaigning, compared with $75,000 for an average candidate, highlighting the disparities caused by this lack of regulation.
The regime has historically systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ and candidates’ electoral campaigns. In early 2023, the Interior Minister issued a decree banning all political parties and members of parliament from holding rallies or protests in outdoor public spaces, whereas the members of the executive, including the incumbent Rajoelina, were still allowed to hold open-air public meetings in the performance of their duties. Ten out of 12 opposition candidates boycotted the November 2023 election, calling it a “fraud” and “joke on Madagascar,” accusing Rajoelina of creating unfair conditions.
The regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ or candidates’ electoral campaigns. Opposition candidates endured unjust attacks leading up to the 2023 polls. In November 2023, opposition hopeful Jean Jacques Ratsietison was detained after taking part in a rally police declared “banned.” Similarly, candidate and ex-parliament speaker Auguste Paraina was briefly arrested at the airport that month on charges of defamation and disseminating false information. During protests, Andry Raoeblina and former president Marc Ravalomanana were injured by tear gas grenades, leading to a one-week postponement of the election.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Security forces often use excessive force, such as tear gas and rubber bullets, most notably during the 2025 Gen Z protests. The regime controls the media through state broadcasters, and journalists and dissenters are intimidated when criticizing the regime.
The regime has seriously and unfairly repressed protests and gatherings. A youth-led uprising emerged in September 2025, primarily in the capital, Antananarivo, but spread to other cities such as Toamisina and Fianarantsoa. The protests were initially triggered by chronic electricity blackouts and severe water shortages, but then escalated into broader demands for systemic change. The Rajoelina government responded disproportionately to the young protesters, using tear gas, rubber bullets, stun grenades, batons, and live ammunition, resulting in at least 22 deaths and over 100 injuries.
Andry Rajoelina’s regime heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. While the privately-owned Malagasy media is vibrant and able to report critically on the regime, its reach is limited to the capital and large cities. As such, the government manipulates media coverage in its favor through the public media broadcasters Television Nationale Malgache (TVM) and Radio Nationale Malgache (RNM), which have national reach. Under Colonel Randrianirina, the regime has attempted to legitimize its rule and counter coup narratives through national radio and state television.
The regime has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and organizations. Some independent journalists face government intimidation when reporting on sensitive issues. For instance, in November 2023, police and ruling-party supporters physically assaulted a dozen independent journalists covering opposition protests in Antananarivo. Additionally, in 2021, the regime aired a report on TVM that relied on false testimony to discredit and smear Gaëlle Borgia, a prominent Malagasy Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter. She had reported on famine in southern Madagascar, depicting people eating tanned cowhide scraps, which cast the regime unfavorably on the international stage.
Since 2018, Rajoelina’s regime has prosecuted numerous critics and journalists under cybercrime and communication laws. In April 2020, journalist Arphine Helisoa was arrested and charged with publishing false news and inciting hatred against the state for criticizing the president’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, she was released in May 2020 as a symbolic gesture. Investigative journalist Fernando Cello and human rights activist Nini Donia also faced targeted repression for criticizing Rajoelina’s regime.
The regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Besides journalists and activists, ordinary citizens also face intimidation when criticizing the regime. For instance, in 2023, social media blogger Sylvia Randriatsotsy was detained and given a one-year prison sentence for alleging electoral irregularities ahead of the November polls. In 2020, Berija Ravelomanantsoa, a university student leader with ties to a previous administration, was arrested and sentenced to 44 months after commenting on Facebook about Covid-organics, a herbal remedy promoted by the president as a COVID-19 treatment. Additionally, opposition figure and ex-communication minister Harry Laurent Rahajason was arrested and sentenced to 44 months in prison for disrupting public order and inciting an unauthorized rally when he demanded Ravelomanantsoa’s release. He was charged with undermining state security and disrupting public order.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Particularly during Andry Rajoelina’s presidency, the judiciary and legislature retained formal independence but were often subject to executive influence and selective deference to regime interests. Concerns over electoral integrity are frequently dismissed, and courts uphold dubious charges against regime detractors. Senior officials seldom face prosecution, perpetuating a culture of impunity among those aligned with the president.
Courts have unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. For the 2023 election, the High Constitutional Court (HCC) dismissed opposition challenges to Rajoelina’s eligibility over allegations of dual French-Malagasy nationality. The court confirmed his reelection on December 1, 2023, despite a major opposition boycott, a historically low turnout, and widespread reports of irregularities. Similarly, after the contentious 2018 presidential runoff in which Rajoelina defeated Marc Ravalomanana, the HCC rejected fraud complaints—including allegations of fake electoral cards, vote buying, and intimidation. The court also validated Rajoelina’s victory in January 2019 without ordering a nationwide recount, despite appeals to verify polling records.
Courts have also frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In Madagascar, dissidents and critics are routinely convicted on vague and bogus charges, and courts routinely side with the regime rather than upholding citizens’ rights to freedom of speech. Journalist Mickaelys Ndiamahazo was prosecuted in 2024 for posts related to corruption in legislative election outcomes on Facebook. The charges fell under Madagascar’s 2016 Communication Code, which has been used to stifle criticism through criminalizing “publishing documents compromising national security” or any broadly-interpreted offenses against state security. The court imposed a five-year suspended sentence despite the non-violent nature of the offense. A similar incident occurred when Patrick Raharimanana was also convicted to a five-year suspended sentence and fined approximately $450 for posting the president’s itinerary. These charges were comparable to those against Ndiamahazo, based on “interception of data” and “compromising security.”
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Many cases reveal high-ranking officials enjoying impunity despite strong evidence of corruption. In 2023, former chief of staff Romy Andrianarisoa was arrested for attempting to solicit a $300,000 bribe from a UK mining company in exchange for mining licenses in southern Madagascar. Despite international attention and a UK conviction, domestically the investigation was downplayed, and Andrianarisoa faced neither extradition nor a local trial. Similarly, in 2022, former Minister of Energy and Hydrocarbons Paul Mahefa was implicated in embezzling approximately $2.5 million from fuel subsidy funds during the energy crisis. Despite opening an inquiry following public complaints, there was no prosecution or recovery of funds.
