Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
Country Context
HRF classifies Libya – GNU Controlled Territory as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
The overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year authoritarian rule in 2011 marked a turning point in Libyan history. However, the ensuing years have seen continued political upheaval, civil conflict, and the partition of Libya into two zones of control. In 2012, the National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed as an interim authority during the post-Gaddafi transition, leading the country to its first parliamentary and presidential elections, which resulted in the formation of a General National Congress (GNC) as the interim legislature. In 2014, Libya held another election, which led to the formation of a new legislative body, the House of Representatives (HoR). However, Islamist armed groups connected with the GNC rejected the election results and called for the GNC’s restoration by applying pressure on the Libyan Supreme Court (LSC), which effectively dissolved the HoR in favor of reinstating the GNC. As a result, members of the HoR were forced to flee Tripoli and relocate to Tobruk in eastern Libya, an area under the control of the Libyan Armed Forces (LAF), a coalition of armed groups loyal to and commanded by General Khalifa Haftar, which functions as the primary military opposition to the forces of the internationally recognized government based in Tripoli. This effectively partitioned Libya into two separate areas of control. There, they continued to operate as a separate legislative body backed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar until they established the Government of National Stability (GNS) in 2022. In the west, the GNC formed the Government of National Accord (GNA), and in the east, the HoR, backed by the LAF under Haftar, formed the Government of National Stability (GNS). After a 14-month military campaign to capture Tripoli in 2019, the GNA and the GNS/LAF eventually signed a cease-fire in March 2021 under United Nations (UN) supervision. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) convened the warring parties in Geneva for bilateral discussions, which led to the selection of Abdul Hamid Dbeibah as head of the new Government of National Unity (GNU) as a replacement for the GNA. He was tasked with leading the country to a general election. However, by 2025, Libya remained in a state of political flux. The lack of a strong central authority in Libya has emboldened numerous organized armed groups (OAGs), including armed tribes, many of whom have pledged loyalty to competing stakeholders.
Key Findings
Between 2014 and 2025, national elections were absent due to nonalignment between the GNU in western Libya and the GNS/LAF in the east, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Without elections to establish their legitimacy, and with little to no coordination, both the GNU and the GNS/LAF are operating as unelected interim authorities in separate areas of control. However, the GNU still engages in barring political opposition figures and disenfranchises voters.
Independent media, political figures, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens suffer overt and systematic reprisal if they openly criticize or question the GNU. The ongoing political conflict, combined with the expansion of opposing armed organization groups, has undermined the ability of citizens to freely express their opinions, who face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the GNU or armed groups associated with it. Independent journalists have either fled to foreign countries or currently operate underground, and most of those currently employed in the industry are obliged to either self-censor or adhere to propaganda guidelines strictly enforced by the GNU in order to preserve their personal safety. Over the course of the Libyan crisis, the space available for civil society organizations has contracted, and numerous activists have been targeted and assassinated. This has caused civil society organizations (CSOs) to either discontinue their activities, transition to online activities, or operate underground to reduce their exposure.
Institutions largely fail to check the GNU. The GNU dominates the few operational courts in their respective area of control, and frequently exerts pressure on judicial actors to fulfill political goals. OAGs allied with the GNU operate freely and continuously interfere with and undermine the legal process by intimidating or even kidnapping judges and lawyers. The GNU has struggled to effectively address the issue of impunity, particularly for those responsible for human rights abuses committed by militias and other armed groups. This has led to a cycle of violence and a lack of trust in the government’s ability to ensure justice and accountability.
National-level elections, such as parliamentary or presidential elections, are absent in the GNU-controlled territories, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. The transition from nascent electoral experimentation to a state of entrenched political stagnation in GNU territory is marked by the repeated postponement of elections, the barring of opposition candidates, and the rise of exclusionary institutional frameworks. In a context where legal and security environments are dominated by armed OAGs and competing geopolitical interests, the mechanisms required for elections are frequently manipulated to serve as tools of consolidation rather than representation. This process typically manifests in the strategic deployment of vague political isolation laws designed to disqualify mainstream opposition, and in the weaponization of national identity databases to facilitate electoral fraud.
Libya has successfully held only two transitional elections – in 2012 and 2014. The 2012 election led to the formation of the interim General National Congress (GNC), which then organized the National Transitional Council (NTC) and tasked it with preparing the country for the 2014 elections. The National Forces Alliance and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party secured the most votes. In 2014, the GNC lifted the quota system that reserved some seats for major political parties, but placed a non-partisan contingency that stipulated that candidates could not list their political affiliation on voting ballots. This was allegedly designed to reduce tensions between armed groups seeking to overthrow one another. The elections saw nationalist and liberal movements emerge as clear winners, with Islamist groups being reduced to only around 30 seats.
However, by 2025, Libya’s feuding political elite and their opposing geopolitical backers continued to support a dead-end power struggle that undermines the feasibility of nationwide elections, with the GNU failing to hold elections due to conflicts over electoral regulations and the participation of contentious stakeholders. While various political factions exist, the precarious legal and security environment does not allow for normal political competition. Instead, OAGs dominate the political landscape, and regular citizens have no role in political affairs.
The GNU unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. Political dissidents have been targeted by the 2013 political isolation laws that were designed to marginalize political opponents, with little to no impact on GNU actors. The overly broad law prohibited those who held certain positions under Gaddafi between 1969 and 2011 from holding public office. However, its vague terminology left officials with wide discretion when determining who to exclude from office. For example, Mahmoud Jibril, the leader of the National Forces Alliance, credited with gathering international support to force the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, and served as interim NTC prime minister in 2011, was prohibited from holding public office by the GNC for having previously served as head of the National Economic Development Board under Gaddafi from 2007 to 2011.
The GNU engages in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud and intimidation. Throughout the Libyan crisis, OAGs launched multiple attacks against public servants working with the National Identity Database (NID) in an attempt to either access the database or establish control over it. The NID is responsible for issuing identity cards to Libyan citizens, which, among other things, would allow them to vote in elections. By controlling the NID, GNU-aligned actors would be able to forge the necessary number of identity cards to win elections. In April 2017, the Civil Registry Authority (CRA) accused a Tripoli-based OAG of kidnapping its director and forcing him to give them access to the database. Between July and October 2016, an assassination attempt was made against a prior acting CRA leader, and two CRA employees were kidnapped in Tripoli.
The GNU systematically disenfranchises specific groups of voters, notably the indigenous Libyan communities of the Amazigh and Tebu peoples. These groups persist in their demands for an end to their political disenfranchisement and targeted persecution, which has predominantly manifested through violence by the Office of the Attorney General (AG) and extrajudicial detention practices. In 2014, both communities collectively boycotted national elections as a strategic effort to compel the governing authority to formally acknowledge their distinct ethnic identities and to secure constitutional protections. Furthermore, during the anticipated elections of 2021, anecdotal evidence suggests that at least 1,000 Tebu voters were disqualified on the basis of alleged non-citizenship, with reports indicating that some individuals were denied voting rights due to their Tebu names, thereby exemplifying ongoing systemic exclusion.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the GNU. This is largely accomplished through the strategic use of antiquated or vaguely worded penal codes to criminalize dissent. Central to this strategy is the totalization of the information environment, achieved not only through the arbitrary detention of media figures but also through the centralization of regulatory bodies tasked with enforcing a singular, pro-regime narrative. By leveraging both official security apparatuses and proxy OAGs, the GNU orchestrates a dual-layered system of repression: one that utilizes administrative de-licensing to dissolve civil society organizations, and another that employs extrajudicial violence to disperse physical demonstrations. Consequently, the space for independent oversight is replaced by a climate of self-censorship and regime-led vilification.
The GNU seriously intimidates independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. For instance, in July 2024, GNU agents arbitrarily arrested Ahmed Al-Senussi, the owner of the Sada economic news website and the host of the “Flusna” program on Al-Wasat TV (Wtv), after he published documents alleging corruption within the GNU Ministry of Economy and Trade. He was detained for three days, without being charged, at an undisclosed location and only set free after several international organizations called for his release.
In August 2020, GNU agents arbitrarily detained radio journalist Sami Al-Sharif and reportedly tortured him for covering protests in Tripoli. In April 2018, GNU agents in Tripoli took Suleiman Qashout and Mohamad Yaacoubi into custody without legal justification. Qashout served as the chairman of the Septimus Award Board, while Yaacoubi was the director of the program. The Septimus Award is an annual cultural event hosted in the capital that recognizes excellence among Libyan musicians, actors, and media figures. The prize draws its name from Septimius Severus, the Roman emperor of Libyan descent. While GNU agents provided no cause for the arrests, relatives speculated that Qashout and Yaccoubi were targeted because of the nature of the award ceremony, where men and women mingled, and some women wore clothing that the governing authority perceived to be conflicting with conservative social values.
GNU agents have regularly weaponized vaguely worded penal codes to silence dissidents for circulating what the governing authority refers to as sensitive news. The Libyan Penal Code of 1953, amended in 2014, includes a number of vague clauses that severely restrict the right to freedom of expression and the press, often with extraordinarily harsh punishments such as the death penalty. For example, Article 207 imposes the death penalty on any individual who promotes “ideas or principles” aimed at altering “the fundamental structures of the social system” or “overthrowing the state’s political, social, and economic systems.” Journalists are frequently detained under the false pretext of violating these vaguely worded Penal Code prohibitions. Between November 2021 and March 2022, the Tripoli-based Internal Security Agency (ISA), operating under the GNU, arrested seven members of the Tanweer Movement—a prominent advocacy group focused on social justice, gender parity, and cultural rights. Among those taken into custody was a journalist, marking the beginning of the legal proceedings known as the “Tanweer Case.” Following the arrests, the ISA published videos on Facebook depicting the men confessing to being feminists, secularists, and atheists. Six of these individuals were prosecuted under Article 207 of the penal code, a statute that carries the potential for capital punishment. By December 2022, the court concluded the case by sentencing the six men to three years of imprisonment involving forced labor. In another case, journalist Fawzi Hamza was detained in September 2021 and spent ten days in pre-trial custody on a defamation allegation. Prior to his detention, Hamza posted a statement on the COVID-19 National Coordination Committee’s page in which he highlighted challenges COVID-19 patients were facing, namely the lack of oxygen that led to several deaths in the GNU-controlled city of Surman, blaming the hospital’s director for this failure. The Director of Surman Medical Center responded by lodging a defamation lawsuit against Fawzi.
In March 2023, the Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation at the Office of the Prime Minister of the GNU issued circular no. 5803, effectively instructing Libya’s Civil Society Commission to revoke the licenses given to all CSOs established since 2011. The Civil Society Commission (CSC), a GNU-controlled regulatory body established in 2018, has also been used as a means of repression against CSOs by enabling the governing authority to impose more arbitrary restrictions on the work and activities of organizations. The CSC has systematically engaged in a GNU-sponsored online vilification campaign against Libyan civil society by falsely labeling its members as foreign agents or agents of immorality on social media. At the same time, the GNU empowered Al-Radaa, a special deterrence force, by enacting the counterterrorism decree No. 578 of 2020, which provided the unit with sweeping powers, including monitoring online activities that present security concerns for the GNU and arresting dissidents and civil society leaders who are critical of the GNU and its policies. Other CSOs, including those concerned with refugee and migrant rights, were targeted by smear campaigns. For example, amid rising smear attacks on CSOs working on refugee and migrant rights, the ISA in Tripoli detained and aired forced confessions of tortured Libyan contractors of the Italian CSO Ara Pacis in May 2023. The contractors appeared to falsely admit they were resettling sub-Saharan African nationals in southern Libya. The organization was suspended indefinitely shortly after.
The GNU uses non-state actors with ties to the governing authority to repress protests or gatherings, including through organized disruptions, intimidation, or violence. In October 2024, military forces from the GNU’s Western Mountain Military Region used violence to break up a non-violent demonstration in the city of Yefren. The local population had gathered to voice their grievances regarding the declining quality of life and the occupation of their region by armed groups backed by Tripoli. According to eyewitness accounts, the crackdown resulted in at least two injuries among the participants, while 14 individuals were taken into custody without legal justification. Armed groups in Tripoli, including the Special Deterrence Force and the Al-Nawasi Brigade, used lethal force to disperse largely peaceful anti-corruption protests in August 2020 and arbitrarily detained, tortured, and disappeared at least 24 people in Tripoli before releasing them. They used machine guns and vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft weapons to disperse protesters, wounding some and killing one. One of those arrested and later released was Sami al-Sharif, director of the Tripoli-based Al-Jawhara Radio Station.
The GNU heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor through a combination of techniques, including controlling state outlets, censoring dissent, and disseminating propaganda. The GNU effectively controls the media narrative, creating a biased and one-sided propaganda environment that undermines the principles of impartiality and objectivity. On August 11, 2021, the GNU issued decision No. 301, which was designed to ensure the GNU’s control over the country’s entire media landscape through the Government Information Authority (GIA), an agency tasked with organizing and managing the national information sector. The GIA is empowered to scrutinize and penalize media outlets based on the quality and narrative of content published, place operational contingencies on media outlets such as installing GNU-aligned media directors, and regulate the granting of licenses for the establishment of all forms of media. This decision was preceded by decision No. 116, issued on June 15, 2021, in which the GNU transferred the management of ten public media channels to six different governmental entities. By enacting these decisions and dominating the media landscape, the GNU effectively controls the media narrative, creating a biased and one-sided propaganda environment that undermines the principles of impartiality and objectivity.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions operate under conditions of institutional weakness, political interference, and impunity. Factional influences continue to undermine the judiciary’s independence, resulting in selective enforcement of laws and the inability to prosecute corruption or misconduct effectively. Similarly, legislative bodies lack the authority or political will to scrutinize or challenge executive decisions, often becoming entangled in factional disputes rather than acting as effective oversight mechanisms. The executive branch, meanwhile, frequently engages in practices of impunity, with officials evading accountability for abuses or corruption due to a lack of independent institutional checks, political patronage networks, and ongoing conflict dynamics. This systemic failure to hold officials accountable contributes to entrenched governance issues, perpetuating corruption and undermining the rule of law.
Prolonged violence and political fragmentation have undermined the independence of courts, prompting citizens to seek informal dispute resolution mechanisms and allowing GNU-aligned OAGs to commit crimes with impunity. Courts are unable to function in different parts of the country ,and the jurisdiction of Libya’s judicial system over its interim constitution remains unclear. While a small number of courts have been operating in eastern Libya since 2016, the judiciary only handles civil, personal status, and routine criminal law cases, while those involving political or security issues are typically disregarded due to fears of retaliation. For example, the Libyan judiciary has failed to prosecute those involved in war crimes uncovered by the two UN Commissions of Inquiry on Libya and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable the GNU’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The Supreme Court, based in Tripoli, theoretically has jurisdiction over all lower courts in the country. It is also responsible for cases involving constitutional interpretation, challenges to the constitutionality of legislation, and conflicts of jurisdiction. In November 2014, it invalidated national elections by ruling in favor of a legal challenge made by a group of GNC legislators and thereby effectively outlawed the elected House of Representatives (HoR) and compelled its members to flee the capital, effectively resulting in the division of Libya into two separate areas of control. Prior to the decision, members of the elected HoR had called for international support against Islamist OAGs occupying the capital. The ruling was celebrated by OAGs occupying the capital, Tripoli, who then moved to renew the mandate of the unelected GNC parliament.
Members of the judicial branch who act contrary to GNU’s interests, or who are perceived as a threat to the GNU and their aligned OAGs, frequently face retaliation. Intimidation and deliberate attacks on judicial workers have impeded justice, leaving the criminal justice system essentially unable to establish its authority, particularly in the east and south. In June 2023, Farouq Alsqidig Abdulsalam Ben Saeed, a military prosecutor, and his two sons, aged 13 and nine, were forcibly disappeared by armed men in plainclothes who claimed to be members of the Al-Radaa unit. The children, who were released a few hours after their abduction, stated that they had been taken to Mitiga prison, a GNU-controlled detention facility notorious for unlawful killings, torture, and other forms of ill-treatment. Judicial officials declined to intervene, citing that they can only do so when Al-Radaa officially notifies them of the arrest. Anecdotal reports, including from human rights groups, estimate that there are more than 4,000 individuals held by Al-Radaa, many of whom were never formally charged or tried.
Despite its expired mandate, the governing authority has capitalized on the legislature’s inability to pass meaningful democratic legislation and continues to weaponize Gaddafi-era punitive laws and circular directives to suppress free expression. The Libyan Penal Code of 1953, which was briefly revised in 2014, contains broad and vague clauses that severely restrict the right to free expression and the press, and legitimizes exceptionally harsh punishments such as the death penalty. For example, Article 207 imposes the death sentence on anybody who promotes ideas intending to “modify the fundamental principles of the constitution” or “the fundamental structures of the social system,” or those that appear “intent on overthrowing the state’s political, social, and economic institutions.”
Country Context
HRF classifies Libya – GNU Controlled Territory as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
The overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year authoritarian rule in 2011 marked a turning point in Libyan history. However, the ensuing years have seen continued political upheaval, civil conflict, and the partition of Libya into two zones of control. In 2012, the National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed as an interim authority during the post-Gaddafi transition, leading the country to its first parliamentary and presidential elections, which resulted in the formation of a General National Congress (GNC) as the interim legislature. In 2014, Libya held another election, which led to the formation of a new legislative body, the House of Representatives (HoR). However, Islamist armed groups connected with the GNC rejected the election results and called for the GNC’s restoration by applying pressure on the Libyan Supreme Court (LSC), which effectively dissolved the HoR in favor of reinstating the GNC. As a result, members of the HoR were forced to flee Tripoli and relocate to Tobruk in eastern Libya, an area under the control of the Libyan Armed Forces (LAF), a coalition of armed groups loyal to and commanded by General Khalifa Haftar, which functions as the primary military opposition to the forces of the internationally recognized government based in Tripoli. This effectively partitioned Libya into two separate areas of control. There, they continued to operate as a separate legislative body backed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar until they established the Government of National Stability (GNS) in 2022. In the west, the GNC formed the Government of National Accord (GNA), and in the east, the HoR, backed by the LAF under Haftar, formed the Government of National Stability (GNS). After a 14-month military campaign to capture Tripoli in 2019, the GNA and the GNS/LAF eventually signed a cease-fire in March 2021 under United Nations (UN) supervision. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) convened the warring parties in Geneva for bilateral discussions, which led to the selection of Abdul Hamid Dbeibah as head of the new Government of National Unity (GNU) as a replacement for the GNA. He was tasked with leading the country to a general election. However, by 2025, Libya remained in a state of political flux. The lack of a strong central authority in Libya has emboldened numerous organized armed groups (OAGs), including armed tribes, many of whom have pledged loyalty to competing stakeholders.
Key Findings
Between 2014 and 2025, national elections were absent due to nonalignment between the GNU in western Libya and the GNS/LAF in the east, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Without elections to establish their legitimacy, and with little to no coordination, both the GNU and the GNS/LAF are operating as unelected interim authorities in separate areas of control. However, the GNU still engages in barring political opposition figures and disenfranchises voters.
Independent media, political figures, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens suffer overt and systematic reprisal if they openly criticize or question the GNU. The ongoing political conflict, combined with the expansion of opposing armed organization groups, has undermined the ability of citizens to freely express their opinions, who face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the GNU or armed groups associated with it. Independent journalists have either fled to foreign countries or currently operate underground, and most of those currently employed in the industry are obliged to either self-censor or adhere to propaganda guidelines strictly enforced by the GNU in order to preserve their personal safety. Over the course of the Libyan crisis, the space available for civil society organizations has contracted, and numerous activists have been targeted and assassinated. This has caused civil society organizations (CSOs) to either discontinue their activities, transition to online activities, or operate underground to reduce their exposure.
Institutions largely fail to check the GNU. The GNU dominates the few operational courts in their respective area of control, and frequently exerts pressure on judicial actors to fulfill political goals. OAGs allied with the GNU operate freely and continuously interfere with and undermine the legal process by intimidating or even kidnapping judges and lawyers. The GNU has struggled to effectively address the issue of impunity, particularly for those responsible for human rights abuses committed by militias and other armed groups. This has led to a cycle of violence and a lack of trust in the government’s ability to ensure justice and accountability.
National-level elections, such as parliamentary or presidential elections, are absent in the GNU-controlled territories, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. The transition from nascent electoral experimentation to a state of entrenched political stagnation in GNU territory is marked by the repeated postponement of elections, the barring of opposition candidates, and the rise of exclusionary institutional frameworks. In a context where legal and security environments are dominated by armed OAGs and competing geopolitical interests, the mechanisms required for elections are frequently manipulated to serve as tools of consolidation rather than representation. This process typically manifests in the strategic deployment of vague political isolation laws designed to disqualify mainstream opposition, and in the weaponization of national identity databases to facilitate electoral fraud.
Libya has successfully held only two transitional elections – in 2012 and 2014. The 2012 election led to the formation of the interim General National Congress (GNC), which then organized the National Transitional Council (NTC) and tasked it with preparing the country for the 2014 elections. The National Forces Alliance and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party secured the most votes. In 2014, the GNC lifted the quota system that reserved some seats for major political parties, but placed a non-partisan contingency that stipulated that candidates could not list their political affiliation on voting ballots. This was allegedly designed to reduce tensions between armed groups seeking to overthrow one another. The elections saw nationalist and liberal movements emerge as clear winners, with Islamist groups being reduced to only around 30 seats.
However, by 2025, Libya’s feuding political elite and their opposing geopolitical backers continued to support a dead-end power struggle that undermines the feasibility of nationwide elections, with the GNU failing to hold elections due to conflicts over electoral regulations and the participation of contentious stakeholders. While various political factions exist, the precarious legal and security environment does not allow for normal political competition. Instead, OAGs dominate the political landscape, and regular citizens have no role in political affairs.
The GNU unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. Political dissidents have been targeted by the 2013 political isolation laws that were designed to marginalize political opponents, with little to no impact on GNU actors. The overly broad law prohibited those who held certain positions under Gaddafi between 1969 and 2011 from holding public office. However, its vague terminology left officials with wide discretion when determining who to exclude from office. For example, Mahmoud Jibril, the leader of the National Forces Alliance, credited with gathering international support to force the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, and served as interim NTC prime minister in 2011, was prohibited from holding public office by the GNC for having previously served as head of the National Economic Development Board under Gaddafi from 2007 to 2011.
The GNU engages in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud and intimidation. Throughout the Libyan crisis, OAGs launched multiple attacks against public servants working with the National Identity Database (NID) in an attempt to either access the database or establish control over it. The NID is responsible for issuing identity cards to Libyan citizens, which, among other things, would allow them to vote in elections. By controlling the NID, GNU-aligned actors would be able to forge the necessary number of identity cards to win elections. In April 2017, the Civil Registry Authority (CRA) accused a Tripoli-based OAG of kidnapping its director and forcing him to give them access to the database. Between July and October 2016, an assassination attempt was made against a prior acting CRA leader, and two CRA employees were kidnapped in Tripoli.
The GNU systematically disenfranchises specific groups of voters, notably the indigenous Libyan communities of the Amazigh and Tebu peoples. These groups persist in their demands for an end to their political disenfranchisement and targeted persecution, which has predominantly manifested through violence by the Office of the Attorney General (AG) and extrajudicial detention practices. In 2014, both communities collectively boycotted national elections as a strategic effort to compel the governing authority to formally acknowledge their distinct ethnic identities and to secure constitutional protections. Furthermore, during the anticipated elections of 2021, anecdotal evidence suggests that at least 1,000 Tebu voters were disqualified on the basis of alleged non-citizenship, with reports indicating that some individuals were denied voting rights due to their Tebu names, thereby exemplifying ongoing systemic exclusion.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the GNU. This is largely accomplished through the strategic use of antiquated or vaguely worded penal codes to criminalize dissent. Central to this strategy is the totalization of the information environment, achieved not only through the arbitrary detention of media figures but also through the centralization of regulatory bodies tasked with enforcing a singular, pro-regime narrative. By leveraging both official security apparatuses and proxy OAGs, the GNU orchestrates a dual-layered system of repression: one that utilizes administrative de-licensing to dissolve civil society organizations, and another that employs extrajudicial violence to disperse physical demonstrations. Consequently, the space for independent oversight is replaced by a climate of self-censorship and regime-led vilification.
The GNU seriously intimidates independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. For instance, in July 2024, GNU agents arbitrarily arrested Ahmed Al-Senussi, the owner of the Sada economic news website and the host of the “Flusna” program on Al-Wasat TV (Wtv), after he published documents alleging corruption within the GNU Ministry of Economy and Trade. He was detained for three days, without being charged, at an undisclosed location and only set free after several international organizations called for his release.
In August 2020, GNU agents arbitrarily detained radio journalist Sami Al-Sharif and reportedly tortured him for covering protests in Tripoli. In April 2018, GNU agents in Tripoli took Suleiman Qashout and Mohamad Yaacoubi into custody without legal justification. Qashout served as the chairman of the Septimus Award Board, while Yaacoubi was the director of the program. The Septimus Award is an annual cultural event hosted in the capital that recognizes excellence among Libyan musicians, actors, and media figures. The prize draws its name from Septimius Severus, the Roman emperor of Libyan descent. While GNU agents provided no cause for the arrests, relatives speculated that Qashout and Yaccoubi were targeted because of the nature of the award ceremony, where men and women mingled, and some women wore clothing that the governing authority perceived to be conflicting with conservative social values.
GNU agents have regularly weaponized vaguely worded penal codes to silence dissidents for circulating what the governing authority refers to as sensitive news. The Libyan Penal Code of 1953, amended in 2014, includes a number of vague clauses that severely restrict the right to freedom of expression and the press, often with extraordinarily harsh punishments such as the death penalty. For example, Article 207 imposes the death penalty on any individual who promotes “ideas or principles” aimed at altering “the fundamental structures of the social system” or “overthrowing the state’s political, social, and economic systems.” Journalists are frequently detained under the false pretext of violating these vaguely worded Penal Code prohibitions. Between November 2021 and March 2022, the Tripoli-based Internal Security Agency (ISA), operating under the GNU, arrested seven members of the Tanweer Movement—a prominent advocacy group focused on social justice, gender parity, and cultural rights. Among those taken into custody was a journalist, marking the beginning of the legal proceedings known as the “Tanweer Case.” Following the arrests, the ISA published videos on Facebook depicting the men confessing to being feminists, secularists, and atheists. Six of these individuals were prosecuted under Article 207 of the penal code, a statute that carries the potential for capital punishment. By December 2022, the court concluded the case by sentencing the six men to three years of imprisonment involving forced labor. In another case, journalist Fawzi Hamza was detained in September 2021 and spent ten days in pre-trial custody on a defamation allegation. Prior to his detention, Hamza posted a statement on the COVID-19 National Coordination Committee’s page in which he highlighted challenges COVID-19 patients were facing, namely the lack of oxygen that led to several deaths in the GNU-controlled city of Surman, blaming the hospital’s director for this failure. The Director of Surman Medical Center responded by lodging a defamation lawsuit against Fawzi.
In March 2023, the Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation at the Office of the Prime Minister of the GNU issued circular no. 5803, effectively instructing Libya’s Civil Society Commission to revoke the licenses given to all CSOs established since 2011. The Civil Society Commission (CSC), a GNU-controlled regulatory body established in 2018, has also been used as a means of repression against CSOs by enabling the governing authority to impose more arbitrary restrictions on the work and activities of organizations. The CSC has systematically engaged in a GNU-sponsored online vilification campaign against Libyan civil society by falsely labeling its members as foreign agents or agents of immorality on social media. At the same time, the GNU empowered Al-Radaa, a special deterrence force, by enacting the counterterrorism decree No. 578 of 2020, which provided the unit with sweeping powers, including monitoring online activities that present security concerns for the GNU and arresting dissidents and civil society leaders who are critical of the GNU and its policies. Other CSOs, including those concerned with refugee and migrant rights, were targeted by smear campaigns. For example, amid rising smear attacks on CSOs working on refugee and migrant rights, the ISA in Tripoli detained and aired forced confessions of tortured Libyan contractors of the Italian CSO Ara Pacis in May 2023. The contractors appeared to falsely admit they were resettling sub-Saharan African nationals in southern Libya. The organization was suspended indefinitely shortly after.
The GNU uses non-state actors with ties to the governing authority to repress protests or gatherings, including through organized disruptions, intimidation, or violence. In October 2024, military forces from the GNU’s Western Mountain Military Region used violence to break up a non-violent demonstration in the city of Yefren. The local population had gathered to voice their grievances regarding the declining quality of life and the occupation of their region by armed groups backed by Tripoli. According to eyewitness accounts, the crackdown resulted in at least two injuries among the participants, while 14 individuals were taken into custody without legal justification. Armed groups in Tripoli, including the Special Deterrence Force and the Al-Nawasi Brigade, used lethal force to disperse largely peaceful anti-corruption protests in August 2020 and arbitrarily detained, tortured, and disappeared at least 24 people in Tripoli before releasing them. They used machine guns and vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft weapons to disperse protesters, wounding some and killing one. One of those arrested and later released was Sami al-Sharif, director of the Tripoli-based Al-Jawhara Radio Station.
The GNU heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor through a combination of techniques, including controlling state outlets, censoring dissent, and disseminating propaganda. The GNU effectively controls the media narrative, creating a biased and one-sided propaganda environment that undermines the principles of impartiality and objectivity. On August 11, 2021, the GNU issued decision No. 301, which was designed to ensure the GNU’s control over the country’s entire media landscape through the Government Information Authority (GIA), an agency tasked with organizing and managing the national information sector. The GIA is empowered to scrutinize and penalize media outlets based on the quality and narrative of content published, place operational contingencies on media outlets such as installing GNU-aligned media directors, and regulate the granting of licenses for the establishment of all forms of media. This decision was preceded by decision No. 116, issued on June 15, 2021, in which the GNU transferred the management of ten public media channels to six different governmental entities. By enacting these decisions and dominating the media landscape, the GNU effectively controls the media narrative, creating a biased and one-sided propaganda environment that undermines the principles of impartiality and objectivity.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions operate under conditions of institutional weakness, political interference, and impunity. Factional influences continue to undermine the judiciary’s independence, resulting in selective enforcement of laws and the inability to prosecute corruption or misconduct effectively. Similarly, legislative bodies lack the authority or political will to scrutinize or challenge executive decisions, often becoming entangled in factional disputes rather than acting as effective oversight mechanisms. The executive branch, meanwhile, frequently engages in practices of impunity, with officials evading accountability for abuses or corruption due to a lack of independent institutional checks, political patronage networks, and ongoing conflict dynamics. This systemic failure to hold officials accountable contributes to entrenched governance issues, perpetuating corruption and undermining the rule of law.
Prolonged violence and political fragmentation have undermined the independence of courts, prompting citizens to seek informal dispute resolution mechanisms and allowing GNU-aligned OAGs to commit crimes with impunity. Courts are unable to function in different parts of the country ,and the jurisdiction of Libya’s judicial system over its interim constitution remains unclear. While a small number of courts have been operating in eastern Libya since 2016, the judiciary only handles civil, personal status, and routine criminal law cases, while those involving political or security issues are typically disregarded due to fears of retaliation. For example, the Libyan judiciary has failed to prosecute those involved in war crimes uncovered by the two UN Commissions of Inquiry on Libya and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, or enable the GNU’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The Supreme Court, based in Tripoli, theoretically has jurisdiction over all lower courts in the country. It is also responsible for cases involving constitutional interpretation, challenges to the constitutionality of legislation, and conflicts of jurisdiction. In November 2014, it invalidated national elections by ruling in favor of a legal challenge made by a group of GNC legislators and thereby effectively outlawed the elected House of Representatives (HoR) and compelled its members to flee the capital, effectively resulting in the division of Libya into two separate areas of control. Prior to the decision, members of the elected HoR had called for international support against Islamist OAGs occupying the capital. The ruling was celebrated by OAGs occupying the capital, Tripoli, who then moved to renew the mandate of the unelected GNC parliament.
Members of the judicial branch who act contrary to GNU’s interests, or who are perceived as a threat to the GNU and their aligned OAGs, frequently face retaliation. Intimidation and deliberate attacks on judicial workers have impeded justice, leaving the criminal justice system essentially unable to establish its authority, particularly in the east and south. In June 2023, Farouq Alsqidig Abdulsalam Ben Saeed, a military prosecutor, and his two sons, aged 13 and nine, were forcibly disappeared by armed men in plainclothes who claimed to be members of the Al-Radaa unit. The children, who were released a few hours after their abduction, stated that they had been taken to Mitiga prison, a GNU-controlled detention facility notorious for unlawful killings, torture, and other forms of ill-treatment. Judicial officials declined to intervene, citing that they can only do so when Al-Radaa officially notifies them of the arrest. Anecdotal reports, including from human rights groups, estimate that there are more than 4,000 individuals held by Al-Radaa, many of whom were never formally charged or tried.
Despite its expired mandate, the governing authority has capitalized on the legislature’s inability to pass meaningful democratic legislation and continues to weaponize Gaddafi-era punitive laws and circular directives to suppress free expression. The Libyan Penal Code of 1953, which was briefly revised in 2014, contains broad and vague clauses that severely restrict the right to free expression and the press, and legitimizes exceptionally harsh punishments such as the death penalty. For example, Article 207 imposes the death sentence on anybody who promotes ideas intending to “modify the fundamental principles of the constitution” or “the fundamental structures of the social system,” or those that appear “intent on overthrowing the state’s political, social, and economic institutions.”
