Hybrid Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Lebanon as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Lebanon has a unique political system based on the proportional representation of 18 officially recognized religious confessional groups in accordance with the last official census in 1932 and the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended a 15-year civil war. Citizens elect 128 members of parliament, who in turn elect the president and approve all positions in the Council of Ministers, which often reflects the diverse makeup of parliament but is dominated by representatives from the four primary religious communities, namely Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, and Druze. The parliamentary election of the president faces regular delays due to political gridlock, as seen in the election of current president Joseph Aoun, who was elected by parliament in January 2025 to a non-renewable six-year term, 26 months after the departure of former president Michel Aoun in 2022. While independent and non-sectarian candidates won a greater share of seats in 2022 than in past parliamentary elections, governance continues to be dominated by entrenched political parties and corrupt patronage networks. Sectarian and elite actors often conspire to delay, disrupt, and intervene in democratic processes to shore up their own interests and prevent accountability for increasingly frequent national crises, such as the 2019 financial collapse that led to the Lebanese pound losing more than 98% of its value and the 2020 port explosion in Beirut that killed more than 200 people, posing significant challenges to Lebanon’s democratic system.
Elections in Lebanon are competitive. The regime does not interfere to skew elections in its favor and allows a broad spectrum of political participation. However, elections face persistent challenges, such as rampant vote-buying and a lack of oversight and accountability for intimidation and unfair campaign tactics by dominant political elites that prevent democratic elections in the country from being considered largely free and fair.
Journalists, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge establishment elites that dominate political authority in Lebanon. While the regime does not systematically retaliate against dissenting voices, it has manipulated regulatory frameworks and at times engaged in intimidation practices to target outspoken journalists and activists with predatory defamation charges and to shut down large demonstrations with force. The regime fails to hold political elites and the supporters of major sectarian organizations accountable for the frequent use of intimidation and acts of violence against critics, contributing to an environment of self-censorship on certain politically sensitive topics that seriously limit the freedom of expression in the country.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. While the regime has not weakened executive or legislative institutions, it has systematically undermined judicial independence. Through the manipulation of judicial appointments and promotions, and at times referring outspoken journalists and protesters to military courts, the regime has weakened the judiciary’s capacity to hold it and dominant political elites accountable for interference in electoral competition and retaliation against dissenters. Cases that challenge the regime are frequently delayed, dismissed, or undermined by political interference, and judges who threaten regime or elite interests have faced retaliation.
Elections in Lebanon are competitive. The regime does not interfere with the opposition, and parliament represents a diverse array of members from each of Lebanon’s 18 official religious sects, as well as non-sectarian and independent members. However, a lack of independent oversight allows dominant political elites to widely manipulate electoral processes and, at times, engage in unchecked coercive violence. As a result, opposition, anti-sectarian, and anti-establishment candidates often face disadvantages that prevent Lebanon’s democratic elections from being considered largely free and fair.
The regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections or hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Political parties representing each of Lebanon’s 18 official confessional groups, as well as non-sectarian movements and independents, compete in elections every four years for 128 seats in parliament. Candidates compete in multi-confessional districts according to the powersharing arrangements established under the 1989 Taif Agreement, which prescribe a 1:1 ratio of Christian to Muslim members of parliament, resulting in a dynamic system of interconfessional alliances and highly deliberative and collaborative decision-making. Members of parliament elect the president, traditionally a Maronite Christian, who appoints a prime minister, traditionally a Sunni Muslim, and 24 cabinet positions according to voting bloc shares. In contrast to the 2018 elections in which entrenched traditional parties and their allies won all but a single seat, during the 2022 elections, non-sectarian and anti-establishment opposition parties won 13 seats, thereby exerting influence over the election of independent Nawaf Salaam as Prime Minister and the inclusion of ten independents in the 24-member Council of Ministers. However, the main political parties, such as the Christian Lebanese Forces, the Maronite Free Patriotic Movement, the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, and the Shiite parties Hezbollah and Amal, continue to dominate parliamentary and, therefore, executive politics, which has resulted in persistent challenges that prevent elections from being considered fully free and fair.
While the regime has not formally interfered with the opposition’s ability to compete, it has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight to the point that powerful political actors are able to orchestrate electoral irregularities that prevent elections in Lebanon from being largely free and fair. The Supervisory Committee for Elections (SCE), administered by the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities, lacks the resources or authority to enforce electoral regulations such as reforms passed in the 2017 electoral law that require campaign financing transparency, spending caps, and equal media coverage for candidates. The SCE’s lack of independence and authority thus allows dominant political elites to engage in rampant vote-buying, voter intimidation, and threats of violence against candidates with impunity. For example, during the 2022 parliamentary elections, the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE), an independent observer of parliamentary and municipal elections, documented party officials “pressuring” candidates to withdraw their candidacy, and “physical violence and systematic intimidation.” LADE also documented instances of party supporters pressuring voters in front of polling centers and breaches of ballot secrecy amid a general lack of security and professionalized polling.
In addition to electoral irregularities, the regime’s lack of meaningful electoral oversight grants establishment actors in Lebanon free rein to engage in unfair and intimidating campaign practices. Due to the prevalence of vote buying and the exchange of in-kind aid for electoral support amid the burgeoning economic collapse in the country, non-establishment candidates are at a disadvantage. According to LADE, emerging movements received only five percent of media coverage during the campaign period of the 2022 elections amid a media environment that is dominated by legacy outlets with ties to dominant political parties or other governing elites. Further, a number of established political parties and their supporters engaged in frequent and unchecked intimidation of voters and candidates, especially targeting those from emerging political movements, including shredding candidates’ photos and banners, physical destruction of campaign tents, and threats of violence to force candidates to withdraw. Most prominently, supporters of the Amal Movement and Hezbollah targeted candidates Farrah Qassem and Mounir Doumani of the Chiya region with allegations of espionage and threats of murder, forcing the cancellation of campaign events. In another prominent case, candidate Bushra Khalil withdrew her candidacy after facing defamation campaigns and reporting that Amal supporters, under direct orders from Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, “threatened to burn her car and fired stun grenades and bullets at her house in an attempt to intimidate her and her family.” Khalil also reported withdrawing from a 2019 by-election in Tyre after being asked personally by former General Secretary of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah to end her campaign.
Journalists, civil society leaders, political leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge establishment elites that dominate governing authority in Lebanon. The government in Lebanon does not systematically retaliate against dissent or interfere with the rights to association or assembly, allowing citizens general freedom to engage in critical debates and a robust civic life. However, the regime has at times targeted outspoken journalists and activists with defamation charges, and otherwise weakened the ability of citizens to dissent by maintaining administrative red tape for dissenting organizations and failing to take action to hold dominant sectarian elites accountable when they unfairly hinder the ability of these actors to openly criticize the actions and policies of sectarian elites and parties.
The regime has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations, and Lebanese citizens maintain a vibrant political and civic life. De jure, there is no requirement for organizations to request government approval to form or operate. However, in practice, organizations must notify the Ministry of the Interior of their goals and leadership upon formation and receive a notification of receipt from the Ministry of the Interior to use as proof of legality. The Ministry of the Interior has at times delayed notifying organizations of receipt of their charter for months, which has impacted the ability of new organizations to open a bank account and receive international funding. There is little evidence to suggest that the governing authority abuses this power to systematically interfere with the operations of independent organizations.
While the regime has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor, it has seriously obstructed the work of independent dissenting media through the systematic use of defamation charges brought against critical journalists. Media outlets affiliated with the elite political families, such as LBCI, Al-Jadeed, MTV, and Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Manar, dominate the media market in Lebanon, although there is a diverse array of independent outlets, such as online newspapers Megaphone and Daraj, that have been increasingly critical of the government since the 2019 anti-establishment protest movement. In January 2024, the Criminal Investigation Department interrogated journalist Riad Tawk based on a libel suit against him filed by Deputy Prosecutor General Sabbouh Sleiman after Tawk was seen in a video criticizing Sleiman’s decision to suspend the arrest warrant against former minister Youssef Fenianos for administrative negligence in the Beirut port explosion. Tawk was neither formally arrested nor prosecuted, per the norm in Lebanon, where short-term detentions and investigations tend to intimidate journalists and others into self-censorship rather than to exact explicitly punitive measures. However, in some cases, journalists face prohibitive fines and sentences that serve as warnings to other critics, such as in July 2023 when a criminal judge sentenced journalist Dima Sadek to one year in prison and a fine of LBP 110 million (approximately $22,000 at the time of sentencing) for defamation and incitement to sectarian discord, following a complaint by the Free Patriotic Movement.
The regime does not systematically repress protests or gatherings, but it has at times unfairly shut down protests and infringed upon the rights of citizens to assemble through arbitrary detention, military persecution, and violent repression. For example, in April 2021, the Lebanese Military Intelligence forcibly disappeared and allegedly tortured detainees who participated in the protests against the COVID-19 lockdown and subsequent economic collapse. The military prosecutor charged at least 35 people with terrorism and forming criminal associations instead of referring them to civilian courts. Similarly, in the days following the August 2020 Beirut port explosion, security forces and state operatives in civilian clothes fired tear gas, rubber bullets, and pellets at protesters, injuring more than 230 individuals. Further, in the aftermath of the nationwide 2019 anti-establishment protest movement that called for accountability and reform, Amnesty International recorded that the regime summoned 75 individuals for interrogation over critical social media posts, including 20 journalists, and that security forces injured 732 protesters.
Dominant elite actors and their supporters have seriously intimidated the work of political leaders and members of the general public, and have at times killed or forcibly disappeared critics of their actions and policies. As in the case of independent political candidates, critics and dissenters face regular threats of violence from political parties and sectarian organizations that often discourage mobilization against unpopular policies. For instance, in 2023, Lebanese security officers stood idle as members of anti-LGBTQ+ groups attacked a demonstration organized by 24 civil society organizations to protest recent crackdowns on personal and political freedoms. A few days later, security forces again failed to protect citizens as members of Jnoud El-Rab (Soldiers of the Lord), a far-right Christian group, assaulted a peaceful gathering of LGBTQ+ members in Beirut.
In addition to such persistent threats, assassinations by both domestic and international actors have been relatively common in Lebanon. While most recent assassinations targeted political actors, such as the April 2024 assassination of Pascal Suleiman, a former commander of the Lebanese Forces, such extreme cases of violence contribute to the lack of freedom to freely express dissent in the country. The most recent assassination of a dissident of a major political party occurred in February 2021, when journalist and activist Lokman Slim, a fierce Hezbollah critic, was abducted and later found dead with five bullet wounds in his head at close range, one year after he had reported death threats found plastered on the walls of his home. Although an official investigation into the assassination resumed in June 2025 after being suspended by the previous judge in December 2024, the regime has yet to file any charges.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. While the Aoun government has not formally undermined the ability of the legislature or executive to operate independently or effectively, the executive maintains heavy influence over the judicial system through its appointment and promotion powers, resulting in the courts often failing to hold political elites affiliated with the regime accountable for corruption or repressive actions against citizens. The regime has also instrumentalized the judicial system against dissidents through defamation and libel cases, and at times has referred civilian dissidents to military courts. Within this system, political elites and party officials abuse their outsized influence over government institutions, especially the courts, to retaliate against attempts to hold them accountable for abuses that weaken Lebanon’s democratic system.
The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority or elite interests are no longer brought to the courts or are frequently delayed or dismissed. The Council of Ministers in Lebanon appoints eight out of ten members of the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) and has often abused such powers to maintain control over all judicial assignments, promotions, and salaries. In May 2025, members of the Lebanese Judges Association, formed originally in 2018 in opposition to then-Justice Minister Salim Jreissati, criticized the Aoun government’s approval of a draft bill first introduced in 2018 to improve judicial independence by codifying the financial independence of judges within the Ministry of Justice and allowing judges to elect half of the members of the HJC. The Judges Association have alleged that the reforms in the draft law only serve to further entrench government influence over the judiciary, as they would still allow the executive branch to appoint half of the judges serving in the HJC, and the reforms prohibit the HJC from appealing decisions made by the Constitutional Council, which itself is half appointed by the president and half appointed by the parliament. This has resulted in a lack of institutional action to resolve electoral violation cases, such as those seen in the aftermath of the 2022 parliamentary elections, when the Constitutional Council upheld the appeal of two candidates affiliated with Hezbollah, a party to the previous ruling coalition, thus taking away two seats from independent candidates.
Furthermore, public prosecutors, who are appointed by the regime, tend to focus investigations on critics rather than regime supporters, and often abuse their powers to hold dissenters in police custody without a court order. In a prominent example sometimes referred to as a “judicial coup” in the Lebanese press, former lead public prosecutor Ghassan Oueidat targeted Tareq Bitar, the lead judicial investigator of the 2020 Beirut Port explosion that killed more than 218 people, with a travel ban and charges of “usurping power.” Oueidat had also previously granted himself the power to personally review all corruption cases in 2018, and often intervened to protect corrupt elites in cases seeking accountability, such as when he reversed the order of a lower judge to freeze the assets of 21 banks and their owners in 2020 and refused to investigate them despite their role in the country’s economic crisis.
Due to the regime’s outsized influence over judicial institutions, members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to governing coalition interests or who are perceived as a threat to ranking members of the regime, have faced retaliation. While the regime does not often systematically harass or fire judges who call for reform, governing coalitions in Lebanon abuse their appointment powers to install compliant judges who disrupt politically sensitive cases and investigations, and to transfer judges who are critical of the regime to less politically sensitive cases. For example, in 2025, the regime promoted Jamal al-Hajjar, a judge investigating a fuel tank explosion in the northern region of Akkar, to the position of Deputy Public Prosecutor, which effectively closed the case. Senior government and public service officials have also lodged official complaints against presiding judges, which stalls investigations into their activities and leaves judges liable to potential defamation lawsuits that disrupt their work, such as in the case of Tareq Bitar, the lead investigator of the 2020 Beirut Port explosion, who has faced defamation lawsuits brought by MP Nouhad Machnouk and former Minister Youssef Finianos in addition to aforementioned charges brought by the former head prosecutor that have stalled accountability efforts for the explosion. In addition to frequent formal interventions into the work of the judiciary, judges who present a challenge to the regime or high-ranking members of the dominant political parties have faced informal retaliation by political elites, even after they retire from the judicial corps.
In addition to the abuse of defamation cases to target dissenters and noncompliant judges, the regime has at times used military courts to charge journalists and activists. Military courts in Lebanon hold jurisdiction over civilians, including minors, in cases involving military personnel as victims or defendants and cases involving alleged harm to the military or national security interests, which allows the regime to try critical journalists and activists outside of the already co-opted judicial system. Civilians tried in military courts report incommunicado and arbitrary detention, lack of access to legal counsel, ill-treatment, torture, arbitrary sentences, and limited rights to appeal. In April 2021, the Lebanese Military Intelligence forcibly disappeared detainees who protested the COVID-19 lockdown and the economic collapse under the pretext of forcefully resisting arrest during a peaceful demonstration. The military prosecutor later charged at least 35 of the protesters with terrorism and forming criminal associations instead of referring them to civilian courts. Detained dissenters and journalists are often released after interrogation and rarely serve time in prison – military courts sentenced only two journalists from 2017 to 2023 – with most paying a fine or appealing minor sentences in a process that indefinitely delays their case in the judicial system.
HRF classifies Lebanon as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Lebanon has a unique political system based on the proportional representation of 18 officially recognized religious confessional groups in accordance with the last official census in 1932 and the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended a 15-year civil war. Citizens elect 128 members of parliament, who in turn elect the president and approve all positions in the Council of Ministers, which often reflects the diverse makeup of parliament but is dominated by representatives from the four primary religious communities, namely Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, and Druze. The parliamentary election of the president faces regular delays due to political gridlock, as seen in the election of current president Joseph Aoun, who was elected by parliament in January 2025 to a non-renewable six-year term, 26 months after the departure of former president Michel Aoun in 2022. While independent and non-sectarian candidates won a greater share of seats in 2022 than in past parliamentary elections, governance continues to be dominated by entrenched political parties and corrupt patronage networks. Sectarian and elite actors often conspire to delay, disrupt, and intervene in democratic processes to shore up their own interests and prevent accountability for increasingly frequent national crises, such as the 2019 financial collapse that led to the Lebanese pound losing more than 98% of its value and the 2020 port explosion in Beirut that killed more than 200 people, posing significant challenges to Lebanon’s democratic system.
Elections in Lebanon are competitive. The regime does not interfere to skew elections in its favor and allows a broad spectrum of political participation. However, elections face persistent challenges, such as rampant vote-buying and a lack of oversight and accountability for intimidation and unfair campaign tactics by dominant political elites that prevent democratic elections in the country from being considered largely free and fair.
Journalists, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge establishment elites that dominate political authority in Lebanon. While the regime does not systematically retaliate against dissenting voices, it has manipulated regulatory frameworks and at times engaged in intimidation practices to target outspoken journalists and activists with predatory defamation charges and to shut down large demonstrations with force. The regime fails to hold political elites and the supporters of major sectarian organizations accountable for the frequent use of intimidation and acts of violence against critics, contributing to an environment of self-censorship on certain politically sensitive topics that seriously limit the freedom of expression in the country.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. While the regime has not weakened executive or legislative institutions, it has systematically undermined judicial independence. Through the manipulation of judicial appointments and promotions, and at times referring outspoken journalists and protesters to military courts, the regime has weakened the judiciary’s capacity to hold it and dominant political elites accountable for interference in electoral competition and retaliation against dissenters. Cases that challenge the regime are frequently delayed, dismissed, or undermined by political interference, and judges who threaten regime or elite interests have faced retaliation.
Elections in Lebanon are competitive. The regime does not interfere with the opposition, and parliament represents a diverse array of members from each of Lebanon’s 18 official religious sects, as well as non-sectarian and independent members. However, a lack of independent oversight allows dominant political elites to widely manipulate electoral processes and, at times, engage in unchecked coercive violence. As a result, opposition, anti-sectarian, and anti-establishment candidates often face disadvantages that prevent Lebanon’s democratic elections from being considered largely free and fair.
The regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections or hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Political parties representing each of Lebanon’s 18 official confessional groups, as well as non-sectarian movements and independents, compete in elections every four years for 128 seats in parliament. Candidates compete in multi-confessional districts according to the powersharing arrangements established under the 1989 Taif Agreement, which prescribe a 1:1 ratio of Christian to Muslim members of parliament, resulting in a dynamic system of interconfessional alliances and highly deliberative and collaborative decision-making. Members of parliament elect the president, traditionally a Maronite Christian, who appoints a prime minister, traditionally a Sunni Muslim, and 24 cabinet positions according to voting bloc shares. In contrast to the 2018 elections in which entrenched traditional parties and their allies won all but a single seat, during the 2022 elections, non-sectarian and anti-establishment opposition parties won 13 seats, thereby exerting influence over the election of independent Nawaf Salaam as Prime Minister and the inclusion of ten independents in the 24-member Council of Ministers. However, the main political parties, such as the Christian Lebanese Forces, the Maronite Free Patriotic Movement, the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, and the Shiite parties Hezbollah and Amal, continue to dominate parliamentary and, therefore, executive politics, which has resulted in persistent challenges that prevent elections from being considered fully free and fair.
While the regime has not formally interfered with the opposition’s ability to compete, it has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight to the point that powerful political actors are able to orchestrate electoral irregularities that prevent elections in Lebanon from being largely free and fair. The Supervisory Committee for Elections (SCE), administered by the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities, lacks the resources or authority to enforce electoral regulations such as reforms passed in the 2017 electoral law that require campaign financing transparency, spending caps, and equal media coverage for candidates. The SCE’s lack of independence and authority thus allows dominant political elites to engage in rampant vote-buying, voter intimidation, and threats of violence against candidates with impunity. For example, during the 2022 parliamentary elections, the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE), an independent observer of parliamentary and municipal elections, documented party officials “pressuring” candidates to withdraw their candidacy, and “physical violence and systematic intimidation.” LADE also documented instances of party supporters pressuring voters in front of polling centers and breaches of ballot secrecy amid a general lack of security and professionalized polling.
In addition to electoral irregularities, the regime’s lack of meaningful electoral oversight grants establishment actors in Lebanon free rein to engage in unfair and intimidating campaign practices. Due to the prevalence of vote buying and the exchange of in-kind aid for electoral support amid the burgeoning economic collapse in the country, non-establishment candidates are at a disadvantage. According to LADE, emerging movements received only five percent of media coverage during the campaign period of the 2022 elections amid a media environment that is dominated by legacy outlets with ties to dominant political parties or other governing elites. Further, a number of established political parties and their supporters engaged in frequent and unchecked intimidation of voters and candidates, especially targeting those from emerging political movements, including shredding candidates’ photos and banners, physical destruction of campaign tents, and threats of violence to force candidates to withdraw. Most prominently, supporters of the Amal Movement and Hezbollah targeted candidates Farrah Qassem and Mounir Doumani of the Chiya region with allegations of espionage and threats of murder, forcing the cancellation of campaign events. In another prominent case, candidate Bushra Khalil withdrew her candidacy after facing defamation campaigns and reporting that Amal supporters, under direct orders from Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, “threatened to burn her car and fired stun grenades and bullets at her house in an attempt to intimidate her and her family.” Khalil also reported withdrawing from a 2019 by-election in Tyre after being asked personally by former General Secretary of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah to end her campaign.
Journalists, civil society leaders, political leaders, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge establishment elites that dominate governing authority in Lebanon. The government in Lebanon does not systematically retaliate against dissent or interfere with the rights to association or assembly, allowing citizens general freedom to engage in critical debates and a robust civic life. However, the regime has at times targeted outspoken journalists and activists with defamation charges, and otherwise weakened the ability of citizens to dissent by maintaining administrative red tape for dissenting organizations and failing to take action to hold dominant sectarian elites accountable when they unfairly hinder the ability of these actors to openly criticize the actions and policies of sectarian elites and parties.
The regime has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations, and Lebanese citizens maintain a vibrant political and civic life. De jure, there is no requirement for organizations to request government approval to form or operate. However, in practice, organizations must notify the Ministry of the Interior of their goals and leadership upon formation and receive a notification of receipt from the Ministry of the Interior to use as proof of legality. The Ministry of the Interior has at times delayed notifying organizations of receipt of their charter for months, which has impacted the ability of new organizations to open a bank account and receive international funding. There is little evidence to suggest that the governing authority abuses this power to systematically interfere with the operations of independent organizations.
While the regime has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor, it has seriously obstructed the work of independent dissenting media through the systematic use of defamation charges brought against critical journalists. Media outlets affiliated with the elite political families, such as LBCI, Al-Jadeed, MTV, and Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Manar, dominate the media market in Lebanon, although there is a diverse array of independent outlets, such as online newspapers Megaphone and Daraj, that have been increasingly critical of the government since the 2019 anti-establishment protest movement. In January 2024, the Criminal Investigation Department interrogated journalist Riad Tawk based on a libel suit against him filed by Deputy Prosecutor General Sabbouh Sleiman after Tawk was seen in a video criticizing Sleiman’s decision to suspend the arrest warrant against former minister Youssef Fenianos for administrative negligence in the Beirut port explosion. Tawk was neither formally arrested nor prosecuted, per the norm in Lebanon, where short-term detentions and investigations tend to intimidate journalists and others into self-censorship rather than to exact explicitly punitive measures. However, in some cases, journalists face prohibitive fines and sentences that serve as warnings to other critics, such as in July 2023 when a criminal judge sentenced journalist Dima Sadek to one year in prison and a fine of LBP 110 million (approximately $22,000 at the time of sentencing) for defamation and incitement to sectarian discord, following a complaint by the Free Patriotic Movement.
The regime does not systematically repress protests or gatherings, but it has at times unfairly shut down protests and infringed upon the rights of citizens to assemble through arbitrary detention, military persecution, and violent repression. For example, in April 2021, the Lebanese Military Intelligence forcibly disappeared and allegedly tortured detainees who participated in the protests against the COVID-19 lockdown and subsequent economic collapse. The military prosecutor charged at least 35 people with terrorism and forming criminal associations instead of referring them to civilian courts. Similarly, in the days following the August 2020 Beirut port explosion, security forces and state operatives in civilian clothes fired tear gas, rubber bullets, and pellets at protesters, injuring more than 230 individuals. Further, in the aftermath of the nationwide 2019 anti-establishment protest movement that called for accountability and reform, Amnesty International recorded that the regime summoned 75 individuals for interrogation over critical social media posts, including 20 journalists, and that security forces injured 732 protesters.
Dominant elite actors and their supporters have seriously intimidated the work of political leaders and members of the general public, and have at times killed or forcibly disappeared critics of their actions and policies. As in the case of independent political candidates, critics and dissenters face regular threats of violence from political parties and sectarian organizations that often discourage mobilization against unpopular policies. For instance, in 2023, Lebanese security officers stood idle as members of anti-LGBTQ+ groups attacked a demonstration organized by 24 civil society organizations to protest recent crackdowns on personal and political freedoms. A few days later, security forces again failed to protect citizens as members of Jnoud El-Rab (Soldiers of the Lord), a far-right Christian group, assaulted a peaceful gathering of LGBTQ+ members in Beirut.
In addition to such persistent threats, assassinations by both domestic and international actors have been relatively common in Lebanon. While most recent assassinations targeted political actors, such as the April 2024 assassination of Pascal Suleiman, a former commander of the Lebanese Forces, such extreme cases of violence contribute to the lack of freedom to freely express dissent in the country. The most recent assassination of a dissident of a major political party occurred in February 2021, when journalist and activist Lokman Slim, a fierce Hezbollah critic, was abducted and later found dead with five bullet wounds in his head at close range, one year after he had reported death threats found plastered on the walls of his home. Although an official investigation into the assassination resumed in June 2025 after being suspended by the previous judge in December 2024, the regime has yet to file any charges.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. While the Aoun government has not formally undermined the ability of the legislature or executive to operate independently or effectively, the executive maintains heavy influence over the judicial system through its appointment and promotion powers, resulting in the courts often failing to hold political elites affiliated with the regime accountable for corruption or repressive actions against citizens. The regime has also instrumentalized the judicial system against dissidents through defamation and libel cases, and at times has referred civilian dissidents to military courts. Within this system, political elites and party officials abuse their outsized influence over government institutions, especially the courts, to retaliate against attempts to hold them accountable for abuses that weaken Lebanon’s democratic system.
The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority or elite interests are no longer brought to the courts or are frequently delayed or dismissed. The Council of Ministers in Lebanon appoints eight out of ten members of the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) and has often abused such powers to maintain control over all judicial assignments, promotions, and salaries. In May 2025, members of the Lebanese Judges Association, formed originally in 2018 in opposition to then-Justice Minister Salim Jreissati, criticized the Aoun government’s approval of a draft bill first introduced in 2018 to improve judicial independence by codifying the financial independence of judges within the Ministry of Justice and allowing judges to elect half of the members of the HJC. The Judges Association have alleged that the reforms in the draft law only serve to further entrench government influence over the judiciary, as they would still allow the executive branch to appoint half of the judges serving in the HJC, and the reforms prohibit the HJC from appealing decisions made by the Constitutional Council, which itself is half appointed by the president and half appointed by the parliament. This has resulted in a lack of institutional action to resolve electoral violation cases, such as those seen in the aftermath of the 2022 parliamentary elections, when the Constitutional Council upheld the appeal of two candidates affiliated with Hezbollah, a party to the previous ruling coalition, thus taking away two seats from independent candidates.
Furthermore, public prosecutors, who are appointed by the regime, tend to focus investigations on critics rather than regime supporters, and often abuse their powers to hold dissenters in police custody without a court order. In a prominent example sometimes referred to as a “judicial coup” in the Lebanese press, former lead public prosecutor Ghassan Oueidat targeted Tareq Bitar, the lead judicial investigator of the 2020 Beirut Port explosion that killed more than 218 people, with a travel ban and charges of “usurping power.” Oueidat had also previously granted himself the power to personally review all corruption cases in 2018, and often intervened to protect corrupt elites in cases seeking accountability, such as when he reversed the order of a lower judge to freeze the assets of 21 banks and their owners in 2020 and refused to investigate them despite their role in the country’s economic crisis.
Due to the regime’s outsized influence over judicial institutions, members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to governing coalition interests or who are perceived as a threat to ranking members of the regime, have faced retaliation. While the regime does not often systematically harass or fire judges who call for reform, governing coalitions in Lebanon abuse their appointment powers to install compliant judges who disrupt politically sensitive cases and investigations, and to transfer judges who are critical of the regime to less politically sensitive cases. For example, in 2025, the regime promoted Jamal al-Hajjar, a judge investigating a fuel tank explosion in the northern region of Akkar, to the position of Deputy Public Prosecutor, which effectively closed the case. Senior government and public service officials have also lodged official complaints against presiding judges, which stalls investigations into their activities and leaves judges liable to potential defamation lawsuits that disrupt their work, such as in the case of Tareq Bitar, the lead investigator of the 2020 Beirut Port explosion, who has faced defamation lawsuits brought by MP Nouhad Machnouk and former Minister Youssef Finianos in addition to aforementioned charges brought by the former head prosecutor that have stalled accountability efforts for the explosion. In addition to frequent formal interventions into the work of the judiciary, judges who present a challenge to the regime or high-ranking members of the dominant political parties have faced informal retaliation by political elites, even after they retire from the judicial corps.
In addition to the abuse of defamation cases to target dissenters and noncompliant judges, the regime has at times used military courts to charge journalists and activists. Military courts in Lebanon hold jurisdiction over civilians, including minors, in cases involving military personnel as victims or defendants and cases involving alleged harm to the military or national security interests, which allows the regime to try critical journalists and activists outside of the already co-opted judicial system. Civilians tried in military courts report incommunicado and arbitrary detention, lack of access to legal counsel, ill-treatment, torture, arbitrary sentences, and limited rights to appeal. In April 2021, the Lebanese Military Intelligence forcibly disappeared detainees who protested the COVID-19 lockdown and the economic collapse under the pretext of forcefully resisting arrest during a peaceful demonstration. The military prosecutor later charged at least 35 of the protesters with terrorism and forming criminal associations instead of referring them to civilian courts. Detained dissenters and journalists are often released after interrogation and rarely serve time in prison – military courts sentenced only two journalists from 2017 to 2023 – with most paying a fine or appealing minor sentences in a process that indefinitely delays their case in the judicial system.
