Fully Authoritarian
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Population
HRF classifies Laos as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) has ruled Laos uninterrupted since 1975, maintaining absolute control over elections, the legislature, and the presidency. Only party members or vetted candidates may run, and institutions operate entirely under party oversight, leaving no independent checks or accountability mechanisms. The LPRP tightly controls media and civil society, represses dissent, and engages in transnational attacks against exiled activists. Critics face arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, or extrajudicial harm, including the regime critic Joseph Akaravong’s attack in a public area in France in 2025. Through control of elections, institutions, and public discourse, the LPRP preserves its monopoly on power and prevents meaningful political participation.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Elections are held only to legitimize the regime’s rule. The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) is the sole recognized political party and has ruled uninterrupted since the inception of modern and communist Laos in 1975. All political parties, aside from the LPRP and other forms of organized political opposition, are prohibited.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime does not tolerate dissent; there is no independent media, dissenting protests of any scale are rare, and civil society organizations operate only in service of regime policies. Those who dissent risk arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and extrajudicial killing. The regime also perpetrates transnational repression against exiled Lao activists in neighboring countries.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The regime exercises absolute control over the appointment, removal, and discipline of judges. Courts ordinarily try dissidents behind closed doors and violate fair trial standards. They are otherwise not empowered to review regime policies.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Elections are held only to legitimize the regime’s rule. Held in the complete absence of political opposition, elections in Laos are a sham designed to supply the regime with a pretense of legitimacy. All political parties, aside from the LPRP and other forms of organized political opposition, are prohibited.
Although Laos holds parliamentary elections every five years, they are held in a repressive political environment and designed to supply the regime with a pretense of legitimacy as opposed to being a genuine democratic process. Only candidates who belong to the LPRP – the sole existing political party – or independent ones who have been vetted by the regime or LPRP-backed mass organizations can compete in the elections. Together, they have won 100% of the popular vote in every election since the inception of communist Laos in 1975, a margin that suggests a complete absence of electoral competition. The current constitution, which was promulgated in 1991, enshrines the designation of the LPRP as “the leading nucleus” of the Lao political system, thereby cementing the permanence of its rule. This provision also serves as the basis for the regime to outlaw all parties other than the LPRP and other forms of organized political opposition. The president, who is also the head of state, is indirectly elected by the National Assembly, the rubber-stamp legislature.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The National Election Committee (NEC), which administers the elections, consists of 15 to 17 members who are entirely appointed by the president, who is also the leader of the LPRP, based on nominations by a standing committee of the National Assembly. The NEC has historically been packed with LPRP members.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime maintains total control over all media, civil society, and public discourse. Critics face criminalization, enforced disappearance, violent attacks, and assassination.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. There are no independent and dissenting media and civil society organizations in the country. All of Laos’ 24 newspapers, 32 television networks, and 44 radio stations are either regime-owned or regime-affiliated. They are required to conform to the party policy line dictated by the People’s Propaganda Commissariat of the ruling LPRP. Self-censorship is the norm among journalists, and their publications tend to echo those of Kaosan Pathet Lao, the official state news agency and a regime mouthpiece. The regime requires foreign news organizations to submit their materials for approval prior to publication when covering events in Laos. In August 2023, the regime announced that social media pages that share perceived false news or otherwise complain about the governance of Laos online would be monitored and subject to “re-education,” a term the regime left undefined.
Civil society organizations operate to implement, and not challenge, regime policies. Most civil society activities are carried out by LPRP-sponsored mass organizations directly accountable to the regime, such as the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC). Only those who work in non-political fields such as development and social welfare are openly active within Laos, while those who engage in criticism of the regime are working from abroad or underground.
The regime has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents. One of the most well-known cases of state-sponsored enforced disappearance concerns Sombath Somphone, a community development worker, who was abducted in the capital Vientiane in 2012 shortly after criticizing the regime’s development policies in an advocacy forum. The case remains unresolved to date. Somphone’s wife, Shui-Meng Ng, spoke at the 2016 Oslo Freedom Forum about the regime’s denial of involvement in his disappearance. The regime is also widely believed to have attempted the assassination of 25-year-old activist Anousa “Jack” Luangsuphom in May 2023 by shooting him point-blank in the face and chest at a coffee shop in Vientiane. The incident was never investigated.
The regime has systematically engaged in transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Towards the end of 2019, for instance, Lao pro-democracy activists Od Savayong and Phetphoutone Philachanh were forcibly disappeared in Bangkok, Thailand, where they had been residing as a UNHCR-recognized refugee and asylum seeker, respectively. Both are members of Free Laos, a pro-democracy movement in exile, and had organized peaceful protests calling for regime accountability for its human rights abuses in front of the Lao Embassy in Bangkok. In May 2023, Bounsuan Kitiyano – Savayong and Philachanh’s colleague, as well as a fellow Free Laos member – was found dead with gunshot wounds in a forest in northeastern Thailand close to the border with Laos. International rights groups and the UN Special Rapporteur have attributed these attacks to the regime. In June 2025, blogger and regime critic Joseph Akaravong, who had been exiled in France for years, was attacked by an unidentified assailant in a public area in Pau, France, and sustained multiple stab wounds in the neck and torso. The attack took place while Akaravong was meeting with a Lao activist who had been detained by the regime. It suggests the potential involvement of regime-affiliated non-state actors in transnational repression against exiled dissidents.
Institutions largely or completely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The political system is centralized under the LPRP, and institutions operate within the framework of the one-party system.
The judiciary fails to serve as a check on the regime. The domestic court system, also known as the people’s court system, functions as a ruling party instrument rather than as an independent arbiter of disputes among citizens or between them and the regime. The regime exercises absolute control over judicial appointments, removals, and disciplinary action, guaranteeing that judges do not defeat regime interests in exercising their authority. The President of the People’s Supreme Court, a post equivalent to the Chief Justice in other jurisdictions, is appointed and removed by the LPRP-controlled National Assembly based on the recommendations of the president. As of August 2025, this title is held by Viengthong Siphandone, who is also a high-ranking LPRP member and a part of the party’s Central Committee, its most superior decision-making organ. Appointments, transfers, and removals of all other judges in the country are made by the LPRP-controlled National Assembly Standing Committee based on the recommendation of the President of the People’s Supreme Court. The LNFC, an LPRP proxy, is also involved in monitoring the judiciary’s conduct through its representatives at the central, provincial, and municipality levels.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enable, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Many politically sensitive proceedings, including those that concern regime attempts to stifle criticism, are held behind closed doors, and their outcomes are rarely publicized. The few cases that received limited domestic and international coverage indicate that the judiciary frequently and unfairly sides with the regime in handling cases implicating dissidents. For example, in 2021, a court convicted environmental activist Houayheung “Muay” Xayabouly to five years and a fine on charges of criminal defamation and distributing anti-state propaganda. Muay had been a vocal critic of the impact of various regime practices on local communities. She was arrested without a warrant and subsequently held incommunicado and denied legal counsel. Her trial prompted denunciations from various rights groups, including HRF.
The legislative and executive branches similarly serve to further the party line. The LPRP holds most seats in parliament, except for the few it reserves for independent lawmakers it handpicks. Executive institutions such as the Prime Minister’s Office, ministries, and local administrations are subordinate to the party apparatus. Cabinet ministers typically also serve as ruling party leaders or representatives within their respective ministries. Other institutions are only nominally independent. For example, the State Inspection and Anti-Corruption Authority (SIAA), a body responsible for investigating corruption and inspecting public officials, is directly accountable to the Prime Minister and the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. In practice, investigations carried out by the SIAA rarely extend to high-level officials, and corruption remains endemic in the country.
HRF classifies Laos as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) has ruled Laos uninterrupted since 1975, maintaining absolute control over elections, the legislature, and the presidency. Only party members or vetted candidates may run, and institutions operate entirely under party oversight, leaving no independent checks or accountability mechanisms. The LPRP tightly controls media and civil society, represses dissent, and engages in transnational attacks against exiled activists. Critics face arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, or extrajudicial harm, including the regime critic Joseph Akaravong’s attack in a public area in France in 2025. Through control of elections, institutions, and public discourse, the LPRP preserves its monopoly on power and prevents meaningful political participation.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Elections are held only to legitimize the regime’s rule. The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) is the sole recognized political party and has ruled uninterrupted since the inception of modern and communist Laos in 1975. All political parties, aside from the LPRP and other forms of organized political opposition, are prohibited.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime does not tolerate dissent; there is no independent media, dissenting protests of any scale are rare, and civil society organizations operate only in service of regime policies. Those who dissent risk arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and extrajudicial killing. The regime also perpetrates transnational repression against exiled Lao activists in neighboring countries.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The regime exercises absolute control over the appointment, removal, and discipline of judges. Courts ordinarily try dissidents behind closed doors and violate fair trial standards. They are otherwise not empowered to review regime policies.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Elections are held only to legitimize the regime’s rule. Held in the complete absence of political opposition, elections in Laos are a sham designed to supply the regime with a pretense of legitimacy. All political parties, aside from the LPRP and other forms of organized political opposition, are prohibited.
Although Laos holds parliamentary elections every five years, they are held in a repressive political environment and designed to supply the regime with a pretense of legitimacy as opposed to being a genuine democratic process. Only candidates who belong to the LPRP – the sole existing political party – or independent ones who have been vetted by the regime or LPRP-backed mass organizations can compete in the elections. Together, they have won 100% of the popular vote in every election since the inception of communist Laos in 1975, a margin that suggests a complete absence of electoral competition. The current constitution, which was promulgated in 1991, enshrines the designation of the LPRP as “the leading nucleus” of the Lao political system, thereby cementing the permanence of its rule. This provision also serves as the basis for the regime to outlaw all parties other than the LPRP and other forms of organized political opposition. The president, who is also the head of state, is indirectly elected by the National Assembly, the rubber-stamp legislature.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The National Election Committee (NEC), which administers the elections, consists of 15 to 17 members who are entirely appointed by the president, who is also the leader of the LPRP, based on nominations by a standing committee of the National Assembly. The NEC has historically been packed with LPRP members.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime maintains total control over all media, civil society, and public discourse. Critics face criminalization, enforced disappearance, violent attacks, and assassination.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. There are no independent and dissenting media and civil society organizations in the country. All of Laos’ 24 newspapers, 32 television networks, and 44 radio stations are either regime-owned or regime-affiliated. They are required to conform to the party policy line dictated by the People’s Propaganda Commissariat of the ruling LPRP. Self-censorship is the norm among journalists, and their publications tend to echo those of Kaosan Pathet Lao, the official state news agency and a regime mouthpiece. The regime requires foreign news organizations to submit their materials for approval prior to publication when covering events in Laos. In August 2023, the regime announced that social media pages that share perceived false news or otherwise complain about the governance of Laos online would be monitored and subject to “re-education,” a term the regime left undefined.
Civil society organizations operate to implement, and not challenge, regime policies. Most civil society activities are carried out by LPRP-sponsored mass organizations directly accountable to the regime, such as the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC). Only those who work in non-political fields such as development and social welfare are openly active within Laos, while those who engage in criticism of the regime are working from abroad or underground.
The regime has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents. One of the most well-known cases of state-sponsored enforced disappearance concerns Sombath Somphone, a community development worker, who was abducted in the capital Vientiane in 2012 shortly after criticizing the regime’s development policies in an advocacy forum. The case remains unresolved to date. Somphone’s wife, Shui-Meng Ng, spoke at the 2016 Oslo Freedom Forum about the regime’s denial of involvement in his disappearance. The regime is also widely believed to have attempted the assassination of 25-year-old activist Anousa “Jack” Luangsuphom in May 2023 by shooting him point-blank in the face and chest at a coffee shop in Vientiane. The incident was never investigated.
The regime has systematically engaged in transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Towards the end of 2019, for instance, Lao pro-democracy activists Od Savayong and Phetphoutone Philachanh were forcibly disappeared in Bangkok, Thailand, where they had been residing as a UNHCR-recognized refugee and asylum seeker, respectively. Both are members of Free Laos, a pro-democracy movement in exile, and had organized peaceful protests calling for regime accountability for its human rights abuses in front of the Lao Embassy in Bangkok. In May 2023, Bounsuan Kitiyano – Savayong and Philachanh’s colleague, as well as a fellow Free Laos member – was found dead with gunshot wounds in a forest in northeastern Thailand close to the border with Laos. International rights groups and the UN Special Rapporteur have attributed these attacks to the regime. In June 2025, blogger and regime critic Joseph Akaravong, who had been exiled in France for years, was attacked by an unidentified assailant in a public area in Pau, France, and sustained multiple stab wounds in the neck and torso. The attack took place while Akaravong was meeting with a Lao activist who had been detained by the regime. It suggests the potential involvement of regime-affiliated non-state actors in transnational repression against exiled dissidents.
Institutions largely or completely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The political system is centralized under the LPRP, and institutions operate within the framework of the one-party system.
The judiciary fails to serve as a check on the regime. The domestic court system, also known as the people’s court system, functions as a ruling party instrument rather than as an independent arbiter of disputes among citizens or between them and the regime. The regime exercises absolute control over judicial appointments, removals, and disciplinary action, guaranteeing that judges do not defeat regime interests in exercising their authority. The President of the People’s Supreme Court, a post equivalent to the Chief Justice in other jurisdictions, is appointed and removed by the LPRP-controlled National Assembly based on the recommendations of the president. As of August 2025, this title is held by Viengthong Siphandone, who is also a high-ranking LPRP member and a part of the party’s Central Committee, its most superior decision-making organ. Appointments, transfers, and removals of all other judges in the country are made by the LPRP-controlled National Assembly Standing Committee based on the recommendation of the President of the People’s Supreme Court. The LNFC, an LPRP proxy, is also involved in monitoring the judiciary’s conduct through its representatives at the central, provincial, and municipality levels.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enable, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Many politically sensitive proceedings, including those that concern regime attempts to stifle criticism, are held behind closed doors, and their outcomes are rarely publicized. The few cases that received limited domestic and international coverage indicate that the judiciary frequently and unfairly sides with the regime in handling cases implicating dissidents. For example, in 2021, a court convicted environmental activist Houayheung “Muay” Xayabouly to five years and a fine on charges of criminal defamation and distributing anti-state propaganda. Muay had been a vocal critic of the impact of various regime practices on local communities. She was arrested without a warrant and subsequently held incommunicado and denied legal counsel. Her trial prompted denunciations from various rights groups, including HRF.
The legislative and executive branches similarly serve to further the party line. The LPRP holds most seats in parliament, except for the few it reserves for independent lawmakers it handpicks. Executive institutions such as the Prime Minister’s Office, ministries, and local administrations are subordinate to the party apparatus. Cabinet ministers typically also serve as ruling party leaders or representatives within their respective ministries. Other institutions are only nominally independent. For example, the State Inspection and Anti-Corruption Authority (SIAA), a body responsible for investigating corruption and inspecting public officials, is directly accountable to the Prime Minister and the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. In practice, investigations carried out by the SIAA rarely extend to high-level officials, and corruption remains endemic in the country.
