Democracy
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Kosovo as democratic.
Kosovo declared independence unilaterally in 2008 after years of internationally mediated negotiations with Serbia regarding possible autonomy had failed to bring about a compromise. Part of the former Yugoslavia for most of the 20th century, Kosovo maintained a distinct Albanian minority despite the Yugoslav regime’s policies of displacing and persecuting ethnic Albanians. The region’s longtime secessionist struggles culminated in the 1998-1999 Kosovo war against the forces of the Yugoslav Federal Army. Following sustained NATO air strikes against Serbia, the political center of what remained of Yugoslavia at the time, in 1999, the belligerents signed the Kumanovo Agreement, which mandated a withdrawal of the Yugoslav armed forces. Under the Agreement, a United Nations Mission de facto governed Kosovo, facilitating the establishment of “provisional institutions for self-governance,” including a legislature, a judicial branch, and public administration agencies. Kosovo has a 120-member, unicameral national assembly (Kuvendi) serving 4-year terms. Under Kosovo’s unique institutional framework, which aims to ensure power-sharing between hitherto rival ethnic groups and protect minority rights, the Kuvendi has seats reserved for minority representatives: 10 for ethnic Serbs and 10 for other communities. The President is formally the head of state but has primarily ceremonial functions. The left-leaning Vetëvendosje (LVV) party, led by Albin Kurti, has been continuously in office since 2021.
In Kosovo, national elections are largely free and fair. The European Union, which has monitored every election since the signing of the 2013 Agreement on normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo, has generally appraised the electoral process positively. The anti-establishment, left-leaning LVV party has won four consecutive parliamentary elections (2019, 2021, February 2025, December 2025). Nonetheless, its electoral victories did not always entail full governing mandates due to internal splintering or unsuccessful cabinet negotiations with other political parties in parliament. The LVV has refrained from skewing the electoral playing field in its favor while in office, despite occasionally benefiting from its access to administrative resources.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Albin Kurti’s second cabinet (2021 – Present) pursued significant reforms aimed at bolstering the independence of Kosovo’s already diverse media sector, including a much-needed leadership change in the public broadcaster, the RTV, and an effort to enable a more speedy legal remedy for journalists who suffered harassment or physical assault. Nonetheless, these accomplishments were somewhat offset by the politicized appointment of the RTV’s new Director in 2023, the lack of significant reforms to the state agencies overseeing the media sector, and the temporary suspension of an independent broadcaster’s license in 2023, subsequently successfully contested in court. Civil society is robust, and freedom of assembly is generally respected.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Plagued by political influence, the judiciary frequently and unfairly sides with the government when reviewing challenges to government policies or interests. Public officials implicated in corruption, abuse of power, or war crimes have frequently evaded accountability, including by publicly intimidating and harassing senior members of the judiciary. Still, there are some indications that, under an ambitious new Strategic Plan for the Judiciary (2021-2026) adopted by the Kurti government, substantive improvements are underway.
National elections in Kosovo are largely free and fair. While the 2010 parliamentary elections were marred by serious irregularities, subsequent contests, including the 2021 and 2025 elections, were assessed as efficiently administered and competitive overall. The governing Vetëvendosje (LVV) party has benefited from incumbency advantages on limited occasions, but there is no evidence that this has considerably skewed the playing field in its favor.
Most governments of newly independent Kosovo have not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation. Voting irregularities or electoral fraud, with one notable exception, were adequately redressed by the relevant institutions. Under the UN’s interim administration of Kosovo, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) directly organized the first two parliamentary elections (2001, 2004) to guarantee their integrity. Other domestic and international observers monitored subsequent electoral cycles, all but one of which were assessed positively. The 2010 parliamentary election, the first independently administered since Kosovo declared independence, was marred by credible allegations of electoral irregularities, such as ballot-box stuffing and proxy voting, unfairly benefiting the incumbent Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK). In addition, certain precincts deemed strongholds of the incumbent had highly implausible voter turnouts approaching, and in some instances exceeding, 100%. After reviewing dozens of electoral complaints, the Central Election Commission ordered a re-poll in 21 polling stations. Despite the re-polls and the mainstream opposition’s contestation of the overall fairness of the election, the final outcome, a resounding victory for the DPK, remained largely unchanged. The European Union, which has regularly deployed observation missions since the signing of the 2013 Agreement on normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo (a.k.a. the Brussels Agreement), has appraised subsequent electoral cycles positively overall while underscoring that many of its priority recommendations still need to be addressed as of 2024. These include revising voting lists to remove deceased or non-resident individuals, fully establishing and empowering the state agency tasked with overseeing campaign finance (a process that began in late 2022), and streamlining election dispute resolution.
Recent governments have not systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ electoral campaigns, as evident from the rising popularity of new political actors and peaceful transfers of power in recent years. The LVV’s surge in the 2019 parliamentary elections ended the 12-year tenure of the conservative Democratic Party of Kosovo, which had been a fixture of local politics since the late 1990s. LVV was briefly in office between October 2019 and March 2020 but lost a no-confidence vote in Parliament following growing discord with its coalition partner, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). However, public disaffection with the no-confidence vote likely contributed to the landslide victory of the LVV in the subsequent election in 2021. Then, the party won a majority of the popular vote (50.3%), an unprecedented outcome in Kosovo’s history as an independent state. EU observers assessed the election as “well-administered, transparent and competitive. Nonetheless, there were reports indicating that the LVV has benefited from certain unfair campaign advantages while in office. Shortly before the December 2025 parliamentary elections, the LVV-led government announced it was introducing new welfare benefits for women and pensioners. International experts generally advise against pursuing such policies so close to an upcoming election, as they risk blurring the line between state and party and directly influencing voter preferences. Nonetheless, the OSCE and domestic actors did not assess that the LVV’s incumbency advantage was overwhelming and systemic. In addition, the Kurti government had adopted reforms addressing prior gaps in campaign financing regulation. In 2023, Parliament passed the Law on Financing of Political Parties, which imposed more rigorous donation limits and transparency and reporting requirements, and strengthened independent auditing of parties’ finances.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. In the limited instances of overt editorial interference or obstruction of independent outlets since the LVV came into office, civil society and the courts have typically intervened to check the government and mitigate the risks to media pluralism. Civil society is robust, with CSOs taking on increasingly prominent watchdog and policymaking roles, and with frequent peaceful demonstrations occurring without undue interference from officials.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Upon assuming office in 2021, Kurti’s government committed to addressing longstanding concerns about political capture of the public broadcaster, the RTK, and to bolstering the independence of key media oversight bodies. However, some of its early accomplishments in this regard were somewhat offset by controversial subsequent appointments. In 2021, the LVV-led Parliament voted to dismiss the old Board of the RTK and appoint its replacement in a procedure international observers hailed as transparent and meritocratic overall. In 2023, Rilind Gërvalla, a sympathizer of the LVV who had frequently attended party events, was elected Director of the RTK, sparking some concern that the broadcaster would once again become susceptible to overt interference. In addition, the new Parliament has failed to fill all vacant positions on the Independent Media Commission (IMC), the agency overseeing the entire sector, thereby precluding the quorum necessary for important decisions, despite repeated calls from the EU monitoring mission to fill them promptly. Lastly, a controversial 2023 decision by the Ministry of Justice to suspend Klan Kosova’s broadcasting license, a popular independent outlet, citing a technical error in its business registration, sparked criticism and protests. The Pristina Commercial Court later that year stayed the order, ruling that, after rectifying these minor oversights, Klan Kosova had met the legal criteria for registration. Since the court’s decision, the government has taken no further action against the broadcaster or any other critical outlets. Overall, the media sector has remained diverse and vibrant, according to EU observers and international watchdog groups, despite ongoing concerns about its high polarization and insufficiently transparent ownership. Critical and investigative outlets, such as BIRN, Kosovo 2.0, and others, have a wide reach.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations, and civil society is robust. In November 2021, thirty-eight local NGOs established the Human Rights Network (HRN) coalition, which includes representatives from different ethnic backgrounds, with UN backing. HRN has since regularly reported on the human rights situation in Kosovo and collaborated with local decision-makers.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Periodic, if limited, clashes between law enforcement and demonstrators in the majority-Serb northern municipalities are one notable exception. In May 2023, security forces used stun grenades and tear gas to disperse a crowd of ethnic Serbs denouncing what they perceived as undue interference in their self-governance by elected local officials of Albanian descent. The incident drew criticism from Kosovo’s international partners, including the United States and the UK.
While international expertise and monitoring facilitated the establishment of Kosovo’s institutional framework, democratic norms and practices did not fully consolidate and, in some instances, eroded under previous governments. As a result, institutions remain somewhat independent but frequently constrained, not so much by active government obstruction as by the slow pace of necessary reforms. The legacies of political capture within the judiciary and prosecution that the LVV inherited from previous governments continue to hamper full accountability for potential abuses of office. The governing party has only partially implemented its ambitious judicial reform strategy, while pursuing some controversial appointments to key oversight bodies.
Plagued by pervasive political influence in the past, judicial and executive institutions frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. During the DPK’s tenure, multiple public officials evaded accountability for corruption and abuse of power, often through direct intimidation of senior judiciary members. For instance, Special Prosecutor Elez Blakaj unexpectedly resigned from his post in 2018 while investigating several high-profile cases, including a welfare benefits abuse scheme later known as the “war veterans affair.” Before Blakaj resigned, DPK MP Shkumbin Demaliaj, a defendant in the case, said in an RTV interview that he would “deal with” the Prosecutor by any means necessary. Blakaj also reported he received threats from other political elites he declined to identify publicly. The prosecution’s investigation revealed that government officials had added 19,000 individuals who weren’t war veterans to the list of former fighters in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), allowing them to claim welfare benefits. According to 2018 estimates, these illegal payments had cost Kosovo about 82 million USD over several years (which represented about 1% of Kosovo’s GDP in 2018). In 2021, all 12 defendants in the case were acquitted by a Pristina Court, to the dismay of local watchdog groups. Other tactics for securing favorable rulings included tampering with the case management system to ensure that only certain judges would review politically sensitive cases.
Having promised a thorough overhaul of the judiciary in its 2021 bid for Parliament, the LVV adopted an ambitious Strategy for the Rule of Law (2021-2026) and refrained from policies that would further undermine judicial institutions’ independence and effectiveness. However, progress has been uneven, as assessed by international partners. Some reforms, such as an audit of the case management system, were rolled out promptly, while others, such as the comprehensive vetting and asset declaration system for judges and prosecutors, are still awaiting full implementation. EU observers had repeatedly stressed the need for vetting, given that judges were rarely held accountable for abuses of office in the past, even when ample incriminating evidence was available.
In contrast with the uneven record of holding public officials to account, the courts have generally checked the government’s or business elites’ attempts to silence criticism. As discussed above, the Pristina Commercial Court promptly intervened to restore Klan Kosova’s broadcasting rights, thereby dissuading officials from pursuing further legal action against the outlet. Defamation and slander are decriminalized, and none of the few Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) initiated by powerful business interests in recent years have succeeded in court. In 2023, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) won a landmark case in the Pristina Administrative Court challenging a warning issued three years prior by the Independent Media Commission on behalf of the Devolli energy corporation. Devolli had complained that an investigative report by BIRN, which shed light on its violations of anti-monopoly law in producing and distributing solar energy, was denigrating and misleading. The IMC sided with the corporation and warned BIRN to discontinue publicizing its investigation. The Administrative Court, on the other hand, found the reporting was “factual and professional” and rejected the IMC’s measure.
The courts also have the capacity to check the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. EU experts assess that Kosovo’s legal framework for electoral dispute resolution is sound overall, despite some outstanding recommendations, such as extending the deadlines for submitting complaints and clarifying procedures for challenging final election results. An impartial Electoral Complaints and Appeals Commission (ECAP), composed of 10 judges, reviews complaints and appeals at the first instance, with the possibility of appeal before the Supreme Court. These procedures have allowed candidates to successfully challenge vote tabulation in both parliamentary (e.g., 2017) and local elections (e.g., 2021), and request a recount. The ECAP has also held officials accountable for serious electoral violations. Following the 2021 local elections, the Srpska Lista party was fined EUR 10,000 (approx. USD 11,500 at the time) for vote-buying and intimidation after another Serb minority party, Srpska Narodna Sloga, submitted a complaint to the ECAP.
The government has not subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Kosovo’s legislature retains formal authority to oversee the executive by approving the budget, organizing investigative committees and special commissions, and reviewing international agreements. However, political polarization has somewhat hampered parliament’s efficacy. Boycotts by the DPK and the Democratic League of Kosovo have at times prevented a quorum, delaying the adoption of key laws. Internal divisions within the LVV on some issues (e.g., amendments to the civil code; protections for religious freedoms) have also weakened parliamentary oversight somewhat.
The government has generally refrained from subjecting independent oversight institutions to reforms that seriously undermine their independence or operational effectiveness, though there have been notable exceptions. For instance, in July 2024, Parliament adopted a law that placed the IMC, the main media watchdog, under stricter government control, in what the Association of Journalists of Kosovo (AJK) described as an overt attempt to discipline the media sector. The AJK then successfully challenged the new provisions in the Constitutional Court, which pronounced the Law unconstitutional in April 2025, thereby annulling it. Despite this reversal, welcomed by domestic and international experts, Besnik Bersisha, whose contentious appointment as chair of the IMC in January 2025 was made possible by the controversial law, remains in office as of the end of 2025.
HRF classifies Kosovo as democratic.
Kosovo declared independence unilaterally in 2008 after years of internationally mediated negotiations with Serbia regarding possible autonomy had failed to bring about a compromise. Part of the former Yugoslavia for most of the 20th century, Kosovo maintained a distinct Albanian minority despite the Yugoslav regime’s policies of displacing and persecuting ethnic Albanians. The region’s longtime secessionist struggles culminated in the 1998-1999 Kosovo war against the forces of the Yugoslav Federal Army. Following sustained NATO air strikes against Serbia, the political center of what remained of Yugoslavia at the time, in 1999, the belligerents signed the Kumanovo Agreement, which mandated a withdrawal of the Yugoslav armed forces. Under the Agreement, a United Nations Mission de facto governed Kosovo, facilitating the establishment of “provisional institutions for self-governance,” including a legislature, a judicial branch, and public administration agencies. Kosovo has a 120-member, unicameral national assembly (Kuvendi) serving 4-year terms. Under Kosovo’s unique institutional framework, which aims to ensure power-sharing between hitherto rival ethnic groups and protect minority rights, the Kuvendi has seats reserved for minority representatives: 10 for ethnic Serbs and 10 for other communities. The President is formally the head of state but has primarily ceremonial functions. The left-leaning Vetëvendosje (LVV) party, led by Albin Kurti, has been continuously in office since 2021.
In Kosovo, national elections are largely free and fair. The European Union, which has monitored every election since the signing of the 2013 Agreement on normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo, has generally appraised the electoral process positively. The anti-establishment, left-leaning LVV party has won four consecutive parliamentary elections (2019, 2021, February 2025, December 2025). Nonetheless, its electoral victories did not always entail full governing mandates due to internal splintering or unsuccessful cabinet negotiations with other political parties in parliament. The LVV has refrained from skewing the electoral playing field in its favor while in office, despite occasionally benefiting from its access to administrative resources.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Albin Kurti’s second cabinet (2021 – Present) pursued significant reforms aimed at bolstering the independence of Kosovo’s already diverse media sector, including a much-needed leadership change in the public broadcaster, the RTV, and an effort to enable a more speedy legal remedy for journalists who suffered harassment or physical assault. Nonetheless, these accomplishments were somewhat offset by the politicized appointment of the RTV’s new Director in 2023, the lack of significant reforms to the state agencies overseeing the media sector, and the temporary suspension of an independent broadcaster’s license in 2023, subsequently successfully contested in court. Civil society is robust, and freedom of assembly is generally respected.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Plagued by political influence, the judiciary frequently and unfairly sides with the government when reviewing challenges to government policies or interests. Public officials implicated in corruption, abuse of power, or war crimes have frequently evaded accountability, including by publicly intimidating and harassing senior members of the judiciary. Still, there are some indications that, under an ambitious new Strategic Plan for the Judiciary (2021-2026) adopted by the Kurti government, substantive improvements are underway.
National elections in Kosovo are largely free and fair. While the 2010 parliamentary elections were marred by serious irregularities, subsequent contests, including the 2021 and 2025 elections, were assessed as efficiently administered and competitive overall. The governing Vetëvendosje (LVV) party has benefited from incumbency advantages on limited occasions, but there is no evidence that this has considerably skewed the playing field in its favor.
Most governments of newly independent Kosovo have not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation. Voting irregularities or electoral fraud, with one notable exception, were adequately redressed by the relevant institutions. Under the UN’s interim administration of Kosovo, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) directly organized the first two parliamentary elections (2001, 2004) to guarantee their integrity. Other domestic and international observers monitored subsequent electoral cycles, all but one of which were assessed positively. The 2010 parliamentary election, the first independently administered since Kosovo declared independence, was marred by credible allegations of electoral irregularities, such as ballot-box stuffing and proxy voting, unfairly benefiting the incumbent Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK). In addition, certain precincts deemed strongholds of the incumbent had highly implausible voter turnouts approaching, and in some instances exceeding, 100%. After reviewing dozens of electoral complaints, the Central Election Commission ordered a re-poll in 21 polling stations. Despite the re-polls and the mainstream opposition’s contestation of the overall fairness of the election, the final outcome, a resounding victory for the DPK, remained largely unchanged. The European Union, which has regularly deployed observation missions since the signing of the 2013 Agreement on normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo (a.k.a. the Brussels Agreement), has appraised subsequent electoral cycles positively overall while underscoring that many of its priority recommendations still need to be addressed as of 2024. These include revising voting lists to remove deceased or non-resident individuals, fully establishing and empowering the state agency tasked with overseeing campaign finance (a process that began in late 2022), and streamlining election dispute resolution.
Recent governments have not systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ electoral campaigns, as evident from the rising popularity of new political actors and peaceful transfers of power in recent years. The LVV’s surge in the 2019 parliamentary elections ended the 12-year tenure of the conservative Democratic Party of Kosovo, which had been a fixture of local politics since the late 1990s. LVV was briefly in office between October 2019 and March 2020 but lost a no-confidence vote in Parliament following growing discord with its coalition partner, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). However, public disaffection with the no-confidence vote likely contributed to the landslide victory of the LVV in the subsequent election in 2021. Then, the party won a majority of the popular vote (50.3%), an unprecedented outcome in Kosovo’s history as an independent state. EU observers assessed the election as “well-administered, transparent and competitive. Nonetheless, there were reports indicating that the LVV has benefited from certain unfair campaign advantages while in office. Shortly before the December 2025 parliamentary elections, the LVV-led government announced it was introducing new welfare benefits for women and pensioners. International experts generally advise against pursuing such policies so close to an upcoming election, as they risk blurring the line between state and party and directly influencing voter preferences. Nonetheless, the OSCE and domestic actors did not assess that the LVV’s incumbency advantage was overwhelming and systemic. In addition, the Kurti government had adopted reforms addressing prior gaps in campaign financing regulation. In 2023, Parliament passed the Law on Financing of Political Parties, which imposed more rigorous donation limits and transparency and reporting requirements, and strengthened independent auditing of parties’ finances.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. In the limited instances of overt editorial interference or obstruction of independent outlets since the LVV came into office, civil society and the courts have typically intervened to check the government and mitigate the risks to media pluralism. Civil society is robust, with CSOs taking on increasingly prominent watchdog and policymaking roles, and with frequent peaceful demonstrations occurring without undue interference from officials.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Upon assuming office in 2021, Kurti’s government committed to addressing longstanding concerns about political capture of the public broadcaster, the RTK, and to bolstering the independence of key media oversight bodies. However, some of its early accomplishments in this regard were somewhat offset by controversial subsequent appointments. In 2021, the LVV-led Parliament voted to dismiss the old Board of the RTK and appoint its replacement in a procedure international observers hailed as transparent and meritocratic overall. In 2023, Rilind Gërvalla, a sympathizer of the LVV who had frequently attended party events, was elected Director of the RTK, sparking some concern that the broadcaster would once again become susceptible to overt interference. In addition, the new Parliament has failed to fill all vacant positions on the Independent Media Commission (IMC), the agency overseeing the entire sector, thereby precluding the quorum necessary for important decisions, despite repeated calls from the EU monitoring mission to fill them promptly. Lastly, a controversial 2023 decision by the Ministry of Justice to suspend Klan Kosova’s broadcasting license, a popular independent outlet, citing a technical error in its business registration, sparked criticism and protests. The Pristina Commercial Court later that year stayed the order, ruling that, after rectifying these minor oversights, Klan Kosova had met the legal criteria for registration. Since the court’s decision, the government has taken no further action against the broadcaster or any other critical outlets. Overall, the media sector has remained diverse and vibrant, according to EU observers and international watchdog groups, despite ongoing concerns about its high polarization and insufficiently transparent ownership. Critical and investigative outlets, such as BIRN, Kosovo 2.0, and others, have a wide reach.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations, and civil society is robust. In November 2021, thirty-eight local NGOs established the Human Rights Network (HRN) coalition, which includes representatives from different ethnic backgrounds, with UN backing. HRN has since regularly reported on the human rights situation in Kosovo and collaborated with local decision-makers.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Periodic, if limited, clashes between law enforcement and demonstrators in the majority-Serb northern municipalities are one notable exception. In May 2023, security forces used stun grenades and tear gas to disperse a crowd of ethnic Serbs denouncing what they perceived as undue interference in their self-governance by elected local officials of Albanian descent. The incident drew criticism from Kosovo’s international partners, including the United States and the UK.
While international expertise and monitoring facilitated the establishment of Kosovo’s institutional framework, democratic norms and practices did not fully consolidate and, in some instances, eroded under previous governments. As a result, institutions remain somewhat independent but frequently constrained, not so much by active government obstruction as by the slow pace of necessary reforms. The legacies of political capture within the judiciary and prosecution that the LVV inherited from previous governments continue to hamper full accountability for potential abuses of office. The governing party has only partially implemented its ambitious judicial reform strategy, while pursuing some controversial appointments to key oversight bodies.
Plagued by pervasive political influence in the past, judicial and executive institutions frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. During the DPK’s tenure, multiple public officials evaded accountability for corruption and abuse of power, often through direct intimidation of senior judiciary members. For instance, Special Prosecutor Elez Blakaj unexpectedly resigned from his post in 2018 while investigating several high-profile cases, including a welfare benefits abuse scheme later known as the “war veterans affair.” Before Blakaj resigned, DPK MP Shkumbin Demaliaj, a defendant in the case, said in an RTV interview that he would “deal with” the Prosecutor by any means necessary. Blakaj also reported he received threats from other political elites he declined to identify publicly. The prosecution’s investigation revealed that government officials had added 19,000 individuals who weren’t war veterans to the list of former fighters in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), allowing them to claim welfare benefits. According to 2018 estimates, these illegal payments had cost Kosovo about 82 million USD over several years (which represented about 1% of Kosovo’s GDP in 2018). In 2021, all 12 defendants in the case were acquitted by a Pristina Court, to the dismay of local watchdog groups. Other tactics for securing favorable rulings included tampering with the case management system to ensure that only certain judges would review politically sensitive cases.
Having promised a thorough overhaul of the judiciary in its 2021 bid for Parliament, the LVV adopted an ambitious Strategy for the Rule of Law (2021-2026) and refrained from policies that would further undermine judicial institutions’ independence and effectiveness. However, progress has been uneven, as assessed by international partners. Some reforms, such as an audit of the case management system, were rolled out promptly, while others, such as the comprehensive vetting and asset declaration system for judges and prosecutors, are still awaiting full implementation. EU observers had repeatedly stressed the need for vetting, given that judges were rarely held accountable for abuses of office in the past, even when ample incriminating evidence was available.
In contrast with the uneven record of holding public officials to account, the courts have generally checked the government’s or business elites’ attempts to silence criticism. As discussed above, the Pristina Commercial Court promptly intervened to restore Klan Kosova’s broadcasting rights, thereby dissuading officials from pursuing further legal action against the outlet. Defamation and slander are decriminalized, and none of the few Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) initiated by powerful business interests in recent years have succeeded in court. In 2023, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) won a landmark case in the Pristina Administrative Court challenging a warning issued three years prior by the Independent Media Commission on behalf of the Devolli energy corporation. Devolli had complained that an investigative report by BIRN, which shed light on its violations of anti-monopoly law in producing and distributing solar energy, was denigrating and misleading. The IMC sided with the corporation and warned BIRN to discontinue publicizing its investigation. The Administrative Court, on the other hand, found the reporting was “factual and professional” and rejected the IMC’s measure.
The courts also have the capacity to check the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. EU experts assess that Kosovo’s legal framework for electoral dispute resolution is sound overall, despite some outstanding recommendations, such as extending the deadlines for submitting complaints and clarifying procedures for challenging final election results. An impartial Electoral Complaints and Appeals Commission (ECAP), composed of 10 judges, reviews complaints and appeals at the first instance, with the possibility of appeal before the Supreme Court. These procedures have allowed candidates to successfully challenge vote tabulation in both parliamentary (e.g., 2017) and local elections (e.g., 2021), and request a recount. The ECAP has also held officials accountable for serious electoral violations. Following the 2021 local elections, the Srpska Lista party was fined EUR 10,000 (approx. USD 11,500 at the time) for vote-buying and intimidation after another Serb minority party, Srpska Narodna Sloga, submitted a complaint to the ECAP.
The government has not subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Kosovo’s legislature retains formal authority to oversee the executive by approving the budget, organizing investigative committees and special commissions, and reviewing international agreements. However, political polarization has somewhat hampered parliament’s efficacy. Boycotts by the DPK and the Democratic League of Kosovo have at times prevented a quorum, delaying the adoption of key laws. Internal divisions within the LVV on some issues (e.g., amendments to the civil code; protections for religious freedoms) have also weakened parliamentary oversight somewhat.
The government has generally refrained from subjecting independent oversight institutions to reforms that seriously undermine their independence or operational effectiveness, though there have been notable exceptions. For instance, in July 2024, Parliament adopted a law that placed the IMC, the main media watchdog, under stricter government control, in what the Association of Journalists of Kosovo (AJK) described as an overt attempt to discipline the media sector. The AJK then successfully challenged the new provisions in the Constitutional Court, which pronounced the Law unconstitutional in April 2025, thereby annulling it. Despite this reversal, welcomed by domestic and international experts, Besnik Bersisha, whose contentious appointment as chair of the IMC in January 2025 was made possible by the controversial law, remains in office as of the end of 2025.
