Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Kenya as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Kenya is a presidential republic. The Head of State, William Ruto, was elected in the 2022 elections, but has intensified authoritarian practices and repression of his predecessor, Uhuru Kenyatta, significantly undermining and reversing strides in democracy. Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963 under the leadership of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which ruled the country until 2002. The country’s democratization began in 1991 with competitive elections, the emergence of a vibrant independent media and civil society, and deepened with the adoption in 2010 of a new constitution with the country’s first-ever bill of rights and provisions strengthening the independence of the judiciary and election oversight. Since then, however, Ruto and, previously, Kenyatta have steered Kenya towards authoritarianism.
National elections are largely free and fair. The regime does not unfairly bar the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections. Since the first multi-party elections in 1992, Kenya has experienced seven competitive general election cycles, with the opposition defeating incumbents in 2002 and 2022. However, allegations of vote rigging in the 2007 and 2017 polls led to grievous post-electoral crises marked by bloody violence in the former and an annulment of the results and a revote boycotted by the opposition in the latter. The election oversight body established under the 2010 constitution, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), has faced persisting mistrust over its integrity. In each election cycle since the IEBC’s inception, the real, mainstream opposition has petitioned the Supreme Court to challenge official IEBC results.
Independent media, political leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. While Kenya has a vibrant independent press, civil society, and an outspoken citizenry, the regime and non-state actors with ties to it seriously and unfairly repress dissenting protests against its most prominent and widely publicized policies. The regime has killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents and engaged in or enabled transnational repression against foreign dissidents on its territory.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Although courts have frequently ruled against the regime’s arbitrary and unconstitutional abuses and policies, their rulings have been systematically ignored by the executive, which has furthermore sought to intimidate the judiciary and undermine its independence.
National elections are largely free and fair. The regime has not unfairly barred the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections or hindered their campaign. Elections are very competitive. However, the regime, in part, undermined independent electoral oversight and delayed institutional reforms to restore public faith in the integrity of the IEBC.
The regime does not unfairly bar the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections. With the exception of the 2002 polls and the 2017 vote boycotted by the opposition, elections have been very competitive, with margins of victory of ten points or less. For example, the 2022 presidential polls registered the narrowest margin of victory of any election in Kenyan history, with William Ruto of the Kenya Kwanza Alliance edging Raila Odinga of Azimio by less than two percentage points. The polls were considered the most transparent to date, but Azimio filed a legal challenge alleging fraud and irregularities. While the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the legal challenge, it called for further electoral reforms.
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. It removed commissioners unfavorable to its interests, delayed for more than two years the reconstitution of the commission and key institutional reforms to restore public confidence in the integrity of the commission, and controversially appointed an ally as its chair. Thus, Ruto’s regime retaliated against four IEBC commissioners who refused to certify his August 2022 election based on allegations of fraud by forcing them to resign after suspending them, investigating them on allegations of gross misconduct and incompetence, and ultimately forcing them to resign. Furthermore, in 2025, Ruto twice defied a High Court order suspending his appointments of new IEBC commissioners pending legal challenges over the transparency and integrity of the appointment process. The newly appointed IEBC chair, Erastus Ethekon, has close ties to officials in the ruling coalition.
In Kenya, independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. While Kenya has a vibrant independent press and civil society and an outspoken citizenry, the regime and non-state actors with ties to the regime seriously and unfairly repress dissenting large-scale protests against its most prominent, widely publicized policies, kills or forcibly disappears dissidents, enables transnational repression, and seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public and unfairly obstructs their work.
The regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public, and seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. For example, in August 2024, heavily armed police broke into the home of businessman and opposition politician Jimmy Wanjigi, besieging and raiding the residence for two days and forcing him into hiding, after vaguely accusing Wanjigi of funding nationwide Nane Nane pro-democracy protests. In May 2025, police raided the apartment of activist and software developer Rose Njeri, seizing her electronic devices and detaining her over her launch of a web tool allowing Kenyans to email MPs to express their opposition to a tax bill. In July 2025, police illegally raided the home and office of prominent activist Boniface Mwangi, seizing property and detaining Mwangi on baseless charges of unlawful possession of ammunition.
Moreso, the regime seriously and unfairly represses protests against its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Police systematically crack down on such dissenting protests with violent and lethal repression. For example, during the 2023 opposition-led protests against the rising cost of living and alleged electoral fraud, police shot dead at least 31 demonstrators. In the 2024 anti-tax protests, security forces fatally shot at least 63 protesters, abducted 83 citizens involved in mobilizing the public for the demonstrations, and arbitrarily detained approximately 2,000 others. According to the Media Council of Kenya, 24 cases of police brutality against journalists were documented during the Gen Z protests in 2024. On July 7, 2025, during a new round of protests against taxation, President Ruto publicly ordered police to shoot protesters in the leg. Police fire killed 38 people and injured more than 500 others. While the right to protest is enshrined in Article 37 of the constitution, the regime has consistently abused restrictive laws, such as the draconian Public Order Act, to criminalize large-scale nationwide protests against its most prominent policies. In July 2025, ruling party lawmakers introduced the Public Order (Amendment) Bill 2025 to further restrict public demonstrations.
The regime has killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. In Kenya, there is a persistent pattern of extrajudicial abductions and killings carried out by regime officials. Despite initial progress with the disbandment of the notorious Special Service Unit in October 2022, known for its role in extrajudicial killings, the decline in such killings was short-lived. Between June 2024 and mid-2025, the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights documented a surge in forcible disappearances, with dozens of victims still missing. According to the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, a Kenyan police watchdog, at least 20 people have died while held in police custody in the first half of 2025 alone. For example, in June 2025, Albert Ojwang, an outspoken critic of police corruption and blogger, was tortured to death by the police. In July 2024, Dancun Onsongo, a street vendor and anti-Ruto protester, was found dead in a city mortuary with burns on his face and chest after being reported missing, and the battered body of Denzel Omondi was discovered in a shallow pool, nine days following his enforced disappearance. Other cases of suspicious and unsolved extrajudicial killings include anti-police brutality campaigner Caroline Mwatha, environmental activist Joannah Stutchbury, and several people linked to the ICC case against Ruto and Kenyatta, such as human rights lawyer Willie Kimani and journalist John Kituyi.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have also contributed to seriously intimidating civil society leaders, organizations, and the general public. Kenya’s powerful ruling politicians have a longstanding track record of mobilizing criminal gangs, or ethnic militia, to intimidate or eliminate critics and political rivals, derail dissenting protests, with the complicity of rogue security forces. These groups are the main executors of political violence and the prime suspects behind a pattern of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of critics of powerful politicians and human rights activists. For example, during nationwide 2024 protests against tax hikes, armed thugs frequently attacked peaceful demonstrators and vandalized and looted public and private property in full view of police and security forces. On July 6, 2025, an armed gang stormed a press conference of civil society leaders at the Kenya Human Rights Commission, one of the country’s most prominent independent watchdogs, on state violence. The assailants robbed and intimidated participants and shut down the press conference. No arrests were ever made.
In addition, the regime unfairly censors dissenting speech. It has imposed media and artistic censorship, engaged in digital repression, and interfered with outlets and creative works that challenge its narrative. For example, regime forces forcibly disappeared cartoonist Gideon “Kibet Bull” Kibet in December 2024 for his popular black-and-white caricatures mocking Ruto’s policies and governing style. He was released amid public outcry in January 2025. In May 2025, police raided the studio of four filmmakers and detained them on accusations of “publishing false information” after accusing them of involvement in the production of the documentary “Blood Parliament,” which implicated police in the killings of protestors during the youth-led “Gen-Z” protests of 2024. In April 2025, the regime censored a play titled “Echoes of War” in which the youth in a fictional kingdom lose faith in their leaders. Even after a court ruled that high school students had a right to perform the play, Police detained the playwright, assaulted and tear-gassed journalists and spectators, and denied the students a sound system or audience.
The regime has continued its predecessor’s practice of intimidating independent media. Although Kenya has one of the region’s most vibrant and pluralistic media landscapes, the country has plummeted on Reporters Without Borders’ press freedom index from 65th in 2022 to 117th in 2025. The Ruto-led regime has used its influence over the media regulator to censor critical coverage at politically sensitive times. For example, during the June 2025 youth-led protests, the regime-controlled Communication Authority of Kenya ordered all television and radio stations to halt live coverage of the demonstrations under threat of “regulatory action,” and later stormed the transmission sites of NTV and KTN to deactivate their free-to-air signals after they defied the directive. The regime also uses its Government Advertising Agency to manipulate state advertising spending in a way that applies financial pressure on critical media outlets.
Moreover, while the regime has not directly engaged in transnational repression, it has aided foreign governments in renditioning their critics and opponents in Kenya and engaged in refoulement of political asylees. For example, in October 2024, the regime refouled four Turkish asylum seekers to Turkey. In November 2024, it aided Uganda’s regime in abducting opposition leader Kizza Besigye in the Kenyan capital Nairobi and forcibly returning him to Uganda, where he was arraigned before a military court. In the last quarter of 2022, Kenyan police assassinated exiled Pakistani investigative journalist Arshad Sharif at a roadblock, and during the 2024 nationwide protests against tax hikes, the Law Society of Kenya documented the enforced disappearances of 72 regime critics by regime forces, with some still missing.
In Kenya, institutions are somewhat independent but are frequently constrained by the regime. Although the letter of the 2010 constitution strengthened separation of powers and institutional checks and balances, first the Kenyatta regime and then the current Ruto regime have encroached on or defied constitutional limits, protections, and powers of other branches of government. The 2010 Constitution notably restrained the president’s power to appoint and fire judges without any meaningful checks and strengthened the independence of the Judicial Service Commission, which oversees the judiciary.
The courts have frequently checked the regime’s attempts to undermine electoral competition or significantly skew the electoral process in its favor. The 2010 Constitution established the Supreme Court as the highest court in the land with the exclusive authority to adjudicate electoral disputes. In 2017, the Supreme Court delivered a historic ruling nullifying the re-election of Kenyatta, an incumbent president, on the basis of credible evidence of fraud in a legal challenge brought by opposition leader Raila Odinga. The landmark ruling, a first in Africa, was widely regarded as a democratic milestone for upholding judicial independence and electoral accountability.
Equally important, the courts frequently check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against dissenters. Although courts frequently rule against the regime’s violations of constitutional protections for freedoms of assembly and expression, the regime nullifies court rulings by systematically defying them. For example, in June 2025, the courts swiftly overturned the state regulator’s ban on live protest coverage, ruling that it had acted unlawfully. In April of the same year, the High Court upheld Butere Girls High School’s right to perform “Echoes of War” after the regime banned and censored it, and in June 2024, it barred police from using water cannons, tear gas, and bullets against protesters. However, the regime did not comply with any of the rulings, with Ruto publicly declaring in January 2024 that his regime would defy unfavorable court orders.
As a result, members of the judicial branch who act contrary to the regime’s interest somewhat face retaliation from the regime and its aligned non-state actors. The regime has attacked judges ruling against its interests with baseless claims of corruption and political bias, withdrawn their government security arrangements, and waged a campaign of public denunciations to erode judicial authority. For example, the regime disarmed and withdrew Chief Justice Koome’s security detail in January 2025, barely five months after doing the same for Justice Lawrence Mugambi, just as top police officers were scheduled to appear in court to answer charges of abduction and enforced disappearance. Regime-aligned non-state actors have also cyberbullied dissenting judges through disinformation. As a result, coordinated cyberattacks on the judiciary prompted the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to consider sending the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers to Kenya for a fact-finding mission. Nonetheless, the judiciary has not bowed to threats and attacks from Ruto.
Although the regime has not subjected courts to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence, it has somewhat limited the courts’ operational effectiveness through resource allocation. The most concrete pressures on judicial operations have been fiscal. For example, Chief Justice Koome warned that judicial budgets have been slashed by roughly 50% over the past three years, an underfunding that severely constrains the courts’ operational effectiveness.
The regime has somewhat subjected independent oversight institutions in the executive to reforms and practices that erode their independence. The Ruto-led regime has politicized, for example, the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), turning it into a “blunt weapon” for selectively prosecuting dissenters. For example, the DPP routinely withdraws or drops graft cases against senior Ruto loyalists, such as Henry Rotich and eight others, and Wycliffe Oparanya, while charging several protesters on bogus terrorism charges. However, in September 2025, the High Court nullified a decision by the DPP to drop corruption charges against Cabinet Secretary Wycliffe Oparanya, ordering his immediate rearrest.
HRF classifies Kenya as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Kenya is a presidential republic. The Head of State, William Ruto, was elected in the 2022 elections, but has intensified authoritarian practices and repression of his predecessor, Uhuru Kenyatta, significantly undermining and reversing strides in democracy. Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963 under the leadership of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which ruled the country until 2002. The country’s democratization began in 1991 with competitive elections, the emergence of a vibrant independent media and civil society, and deepened with the adoption in 2010 of a new constitution with the country’s first-ever bill of rights and provisions strengthening the independence of the judiciary and election oversight. Since then, however, Ruto and, previously, Kenyatta have steered Kenya towards authoritarianism.
National elections are largely free and fair. The regime does not unfairly bar the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections. Since the first multi-party elections in 1992, Kenya has experienced seven competitive general election cycles, with the opposition defeating incumbents in 2002 and 2022. However, allegations of vote rigging in the 2007 and 2017 polls led to grievous post-electoral crises marked by bloody violence in the former and an annulment of the results and a revote boycotted by the opposition in the latter. The election oversight body established under the 2010 constitution, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), has faced persisting mistrust over its integrity. In each election cycle since the IEBC’s inception, the real, mainstream opposition has petitioned the Supreme Court to challenge official IEBC results.
Independent media, political leaders, organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. While Kenya has a vibrant independent press, civil society, and an outspoken citizenry, the regime and non-state actors with ties to it seriously and unfairly repress dissenting protests against its most prominent and widely publicized policies. The regime has killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents and engaged in or enabled transnational repression against foreign dissidents on its territory.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Although courts have frequently ruled against the regime’s arbitrary and unconstitutional abuses and policies, their rulings have been systematically ignored by the executive, which has furthermore sought to intimidate the judiciary and undermine its independence.
National elections are largely free and fair. The regime has not unfairly barred the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections or hindered their campaign. Elections are very competitive. However, the regime, in part, undermined independent electoral oversight and delayed institutional reforms to restore public faith in the integrity of the IEBC.
The regime does not unfairly bar the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections. With the exception of the 2002 polls and the 2017 vote boycotted by the opposition, elections have been very competitive, with margins of victory of ten points or less. For example, the 2022 presidential polls registered the narrowest margin of victory of any election in Kenyan history, with William Ruto of the Kenya Kwanza Alliance edging Raila Odinga of Azimio by less than two percentage points. The polls were considered the most transparent to date, but Azimio filed a legal challenge alleging fraud and irregularities. While the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the legal challenge, it called for further electoral reforms.
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. It removed commissioners unfavorable to its interests, delayed for more than two years the reconstitution of the commission and key institutional reforms to restore public confidence in the integrity of the commission, and controversially appointed an ally as its chair. Thus, Ruto’s regime retaliated against four IEBC commissioners who refused to certify his August 2022 election based on allegations of fraud by forcing them to resign after suspending them, investigating them on allegations of gross misconduct and incompetence, and ultimately forcing them to resign. Furthermore, in 2025, Ruto twice defied a High Court order suspending his appointments of new IEBC commissioners pending legal challenges over the transparency and integrity of the appointment process. The newly appointed IEBC chair, Erastus Ethekon, has close ties to officials in the ruling coalition.
In Kenya, independent media, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. While Kenya has a vibrant independent press and civil society and an outspoken citizenry, the regime and non-state actors with ties to the regime seriously and unfairly repress dissenting large-scale protests against its most prominent, widely publicized policies, kills or forcibly disappears dissidents, enables transnational repression, and seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public and unfairly obstructs their work.
The regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public, and seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. For example, in August 2024, heavily armed police broke into the home of businessman and opposition politician Jimmy Wanjigi, besieging and raiding the residence for two days and forcing him into hiding, after vaguely accusing Wanjigi of funding nationwide Nane Nane pro-democracy protests. In May 2025, police raided the apartment of activist and software developer Rose Njeri, seizing her electronic devices and detaining her over her launch of a web tool allowing Kenyans to email MPs to express their opposition to a tax bill. In July 2025, police illegally raided the home and office of prominent activist Boniface Mwangi, seizing property and detaining Mwangi on baseless charges of unlawful possession of ammunition.
Moreso, the regime seriously and unfairly represses protests against its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Police systematically crack down on such dissenting protests with violent and lethal repression. For example, during the 2023 opposition-led protests against the rising cost of living and alleged electoral fraud, police shot dead at least 31 demonstrators. In the 2024 anti-tax protests, security forces fatally shot at least 63 protesters, abducted 83 citizens involved in mobilizing the public for the demonstrations, and arbitrarily detained approximately 2,000 others. According to the Media Council of Kenya, 24 cases of police brutality against journalists were documented during the Gen Z protests in 2024. On July 7, 2025, during a new round of protests against taxation, President Ruto publicly ordered police to shoot protesters in the leg. Police fire killed 38 people and injured more than 500 others. While the right to protest is enshrined in Article 37 of the constitution, the regime has consistently abused restrictive laws, such as the draconian Public Order Act, to criminalize large-scale nationwide protests against its most prominent policies. In July 2025, ruling party lawmakers introduced the Public Order (Amendment) Bill 2025 to further restrict public demonstrations.
The regime has killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. In Kenya, there is a persistent pattern of extrajudicial abductions and killings carried out by regime officials. Despite initial progress with the disbandment of the notorious Special Service Unit in October 2022, known for its role in extrajudicial killings, the decline in such killings was short-lived. Between June 2024 and mid-2025, the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights documented a surge in forcible disappearances, with dozens of victims still missing. According to the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, a Kenyan police watchdog, at least 20 people have died while held in police custody in the first half of 2025 alone. For example, in June 2025, Albert Ojwang, an outspoken critic of police corruption and blogger, was tortured to death by the police. In July 2024, Dancun Onsongo, a street vendor and anti-Ruto protester, was found dead in a city mortuary with burns on his face and chest after being reported missing, and the battered body of Denzel Omondi was discovered in a shallow pool, nine days following his enforced disappearance. Other cases of suspicious and unsolved extrajudicial killings include anti-police brutality campaigner Caroline Mwatha, environmental activist Joannah Stutchbury, and several people linked to the ICC case against Ruto and Kenyatta, such as human rights lawyer Willie Kimani and journalist John Kituyi.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have also contributed to seriously intimidating civil society leaders, organizations, and the general public. Kenya’s powerful ruling politicians have a longstanding track record of mobilizing criminal gangs, or ethnic militia, to intimidate or eliminate critics and political rivals, derail dissenting protests, with the complicity of rogue security forces. These groups are the main executors of political violence and the prime suspects behind a pattern of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of critics of powerful politicians and human rights activists. For example, during nationwide 2024 protests against tax hikes, armed thugs frequently attacked peaceful demonstrators and vandalized and looted public and private property in full view of police and security forces. On July 6, 2025, an armed gang stormed a press conference of civil society leaders at the Kenya Human Rights Commission, one of the country’s most prominent independent watchdogs, on state violence. The assailants robbed and intimidated participants and shut down the press conference. No arrests were ever made.
In addition, the regime unfairly censors dissenting speech. It has imposed media and artistic censorship, engaged in digital repression, and interfered with outlets and creative works that challenge its narrative. For example, regime forces forcibly disappeared cartoonist Gideon “Kibet Bull” Kibet in December 2024 for his popular black-and-white caricatures mocking Ruto’s policies and governing style. He was released amid public outcry in January 2025. In May 2025, police raided the studio of four filmmakers and detained them on accusations of “publishing false information” after accusing them of involvement in the production of the documentary “Blood Parliament,” which implicated police in the killings of protestors during the youth-led “Gen-Z” protests of 2024. In April 2025, the regime censored a play titled “Echoes of War” in which the youth in a fictional kingdom lose faith in their leaders. Even after a court ruled that high school students had a right to perform the play, Police detained the playwright, assaulted and tear-gassed journalists and spectators, and denied the students a sound system or audience.
The regime has continued its predecessor’s practice of intimidating independent media. Although Kenya has one of the region’s most vibrant and pluralistic media landscapes, the country has plummeted on Reporters Without Borders’ press freedom index from 65th in 2022 to 117th in 2025. The Ruto-led regime has used its influence over the media regulator to censor critical coverage at politically sensitive times. For example, during the June 2025 youth-led protests, the regime-controlled Communication Authority of Kenya ordered all television and radio stations to halt live coverage of the demonstrations under threat of “regulatory action,” and later stormed the transmission sites of NTV and KTN to deactivate their free-to-air signals after they defied the directive. The regime also uses its Government Advertising Agency to manipulate state advertising spending in a way that applies financial pressure on critical media outlets.
Moreover, while the regime has not directly engaged in transnational repression, it has aided foreign governments in renditioning their critics and opponents in Kenya and engaged in refoulement of political asylees. For example, in October 2024, the regime refouled four Turkish asylum seekers to Turkey. In November 2024, it aided Uganda’s regime in abducting opposition leader Kizza Besigye in the Kenyan capital Nairobi and forcibly returning him to Uganda, where he was arraigned before a military court. In the last quarter of 2022, Kenyan police assassinated exiled Pakistani investigative journalist Arshad Sharif at a roadblock, and during the 2024 nationwide protests against tax hikes, the Law Society of Kenya documented the enforced disappearances of 72 regime critics by regime forces, with some still missing.
In Kenya, institutions are somewhat independent but are frequently constrained by the regime. Although the letter of the 2010 constitution strengthened separation of powers and institutional checks and balances, first the Kenyatta regime and then the current Ruto regime have encroached on or defied constitutional limits, protections, and powers of other branches of government. The 2010 Constitution notably restrained the president’s power to appoint and fire judges without any meaningful checks and strengthened the independence of the Judicial Service Commission, which oversees the judiciary.
The courts have frequently checked the regime’s attempts to undermine electoral competition or significantly skew the electoral process in its favor. The 2010 Constitution established the Supreme Court as the highest court in the land with the exclusive authority to adjudicate electoral disputes. In 2017, the Supreme Court delivered a historic ruling nullifying the re-election of Kenyatta, an incumbent president, on the basis of credible evidence of fraud in a legal challenge brought by opposition leader Raila Odinga. The landmark ruling, a first in Africa, was widely regarded as a democratic milestone for upholding judicial independence and electoral accountability.
Equally important, the courts frequently check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against dissenters. Although courts frequently rule against the regime’s violations of constitutional protections for freedoms of assembly and expression, the regime nullifies court rulings by systematically defying them. For example, in June 2025, the courts swiftly overturned the state regulator’s ban on live protest coverage, ruling that it had acted unlawfully. In April of the same year, the High Court upheld Butere Girls High School’s right to perform “Echoes of War” after the regime banned and censored it, and in June 2024, it barred police from using water cannons, tear gas, and bullets against protesters. However, the regime did not comply with any of the rulings, with Ruto publicly declaring in January 2024 that his regime would defy unfavorable court orders.
As a result, members of the judicial branch who act contrary to the regime’s interest somewhat face retaliation from the regime and its aligned non-state actors. The regime has attacked judges ruling against its interests with baseless claims of corruption and political bias, withdrawn their government security arrangements, and waged a campaign of public denunciations to erode judicial authority. For example, the regime disarmed and withdrew Chief Justice Koome’s security detail in January 2025, barely five months after doing the same for Justice Lawrence Mugambi, just as top police officers were scheduled to appear in court to answer charges of abduction and enforced disappearance. Regime-aligned non-state actors have also cyberbullied dissenting judges through disinformation. As a result, coordinated cyberattacks on the judiciary prompted the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to consider sending the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers to Kenya for a fact-finding mission. Nonetheless, the judiciary has not bowed to threats and attacks from Ruto.
Although the regime has not subjected courts to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence, it has somewhat limited the courts’ operational effectiveness through resource allocation. The most concrete pressures on judicial operations have been fiscal. For example, Chief Justice Koome warned that judicial budgets have been slashed by roughly 50% over the past three years, an underfunding that severely constrains the courts’ operational effectiveness.
The regime has somewhat subjected independent oversight institutions in the executive to reforms and practices that erode their independence. The Ruto-led regime has politicized, for example, the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), turning it into a “blunt weapon” for selectively prosecuting dissenters. For example, the DPP routinely withdraws or drops graft cases against senior Ruto loyalists, such as Henry Rotich and eight others, and Wycliffe Oparanya, while charging several protesters on bogus terrorism charges. However, in September 2025, the High Court nullified a decision by the DPP to drop corruption charges against Cabinet Secretary Wycliffe Oparanya, ordering his immediate rearrest.
