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HRF classifies Italy as democratic.
Italy is a unitary parliamentary republic governed under the 1948 Constitution, in which the President of the Republic (currently Sergio Mattarella) serves as head of state and guarantor of constitutional order and national unity, while executive authority is exercised by the Council of Ministers led by the Prime Minister (currently Giorgia Meloni). Legislative power is vested in a perfectly bicameral Parliament, meaning both chambers have equal powers and must approve legislation in identical form: the Chamber of Deputies (400 members) and the Senate of the Republic (200 elected members, plus a small number of senators for life). Italy’s political system is characterized by multiparty competition and frequent coalition governments, with politics marked by recurring cabinet turnover and periods of fragmentation and instability. Since the September 25, 2022, general election, Italy has been governed by a centre-right coalition led by Brothers of Italy (“Fratelli d’Italia”), in alliance with the League (“Lega”) and Forza Italia, under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
In Italy, national elections are generally free and fair. The electoral framework allows mainstream opposition parties and candidates to compete effectively, producing competitive contests and broad parliamentary representation. Legal provisions governing campaign finance and media access are intended to promote a level playing field and enable parties and candidates to campaign freely.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the public are generally able to criticize and challenge the government openly. Civil society remains active and diverse, with organizations operating across a wide range of sectors. At the same time, groups engaged in politically sensitive areas encounter bureaucratic, legal, and financial constraints that can complicate their activities. The media environment is formally protected by law and includes a plurality of independent outlets, but political influence remains a structural concern, especially in relation to the public broadcaster RAI. Public demonstrations also continue to take place and are typically permitted without undue interference.
Institutions are generally independent and continue to function as meaningful checks on governing authorities. The judiciary, in particular, benefits from strong constitutional and institutional safeguards that provide substantial autonomy, enabling courts to effectively scrutinize government action, including in high-profile, politically sensitive cases. Despite persistently elevated corruption risks, Italian enforcement bodies retain the capacity to investigate and prosecute public officials. However, structural weaknesses continue to constrain overall effectiveness. Lengthy judicial proceedings, the frequent imposition of suspended sentences, and other procedural bottlenecks reduce both the efficiency of enforcement and its deterrent impact.
In Italy, national elections are largely free and fair. The electoral system enables mainstream opposition parties and candidates to compete effectively, resulting in competitive contests with broad parliamentary representation. Legal safeguards on campaign financing and equal media access further support a level playing field, allowing parties and candidates to campaign freely. There have been no reports of the government using its position to secure undue campaign advantages in recent electoral cycles, although concerns have been raised about state-controlled media potentially favoring incumbents.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The country employs a mixed electoral system, combining majoritarian and proportional elements. Approximately one-third of parliamentary seats are allocated via first-past-the-post races in single-member districts, while the remaining two-thirds are distributed proportionally from party lists at the regional level. This system balances the representation of smaller parties with the election of majoritarian candidates in local constituencies. For example, in the September 2022 Italian general election, voters elected 400 members of the Chamber of Deputies and 200 members of the Senate, producing a clear victory for the center-right coalition led by Brothers of Italy (“Fratelli d’Italia”) and Giorgia Meloni. The coalition secured an absolute majority with 237 seats in the Chamber and 115 seats in the Senate, despite winning about 44% of the national vote. Within the coalition, Brothers of Italy emerged as the largest party with roughly 26% of the vote, translating into 119 seats in the Chamber and 65 seats in the Senate, while its partners, Matteo Salvini’s League (“Lega”) and Forza Italia, each won about 8% of the vote and a smaller share of seats. The Democratic Party led the fragmented center-left with about 19% of the vote, winning 69 seats in the Chamber and 39 in the Senate, while the Five Star Movement followed with approximately 15% of the vote and 52 Chamber seats and 28 Senate seats.
The Italian government has not hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Campaigns in Italy are regulated by laws such as the Consolidated Electoral Law, which guarantees transparency in campaign financing and limits undue financial influence. The Authority for Communications Guarantees oversees media coverage, mandating equal airtime for all parties on public broadcasters. These measures help maintain a level playing field and allow for vibrant political competition. As a result, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has consistently found, including with respect to the most recent parliamentary elections in 2022, that political parties and candidates in Italy are able to conduct their campaigns freely and that electoral campaigns are competitive, allowing for a wide range of parties and candidates.
Similarly, the government has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. During recent electoral cycles, there were no reports that the government used its position to gain undue advantages that would place aligned parties ahead of the opposition. However, concerns have been raised about the recent use of state-controlled media, particularly the public broadcaster RAI. These include allowing political rallies, particularly those in government, to be broadcast live and in full, without journalists questioning or contextualizing them, and permitting politicians, including government ministers, to receive airtime during the election period to speak about their work in parliament or in government. Critics argue that this makes it harder for viewers to tell the difference between neutral government information and political campaigning.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the general public in Italy are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country’s civil society remains vibrant, with independent organizations continuing to operate across many sectors, but some, particularly those working on politically sensitive issues, face bureaucratic, legal, and financial obstacles. Italy maintains formally independent media within a protective legal framework, but government influence, particularly under Giorgia Meloni, has intensified at the public broadcaster RAI. Additionally, protests continue to occur freely and generally without undue obstruction, but recent security-oriented legislation, particularly targeting non-violent disruptive tactics such as roadblocks and sit-ins, has raised concerns about disproportionate restrictions on the freedom of dissent.
The Italian government has not unfairly shut down independent or dissenting organizations. The country’s civil society remains vibrant, and independent organizations continue to operate, with tens of thousands of civil society organizations (CSOs) active nationwide across areas ranging from human rights to culture and education. There have been no major reports of the government directly shutting down dissenting organizations. At the same time, civil society actors occasionally encounter obstacles facing bureaucratic or financial challenges when engaging in politically sensitive issues, particularly those dealing with migration rights, environmental activism. For example, in 2023, Italy intensified efforts to deter migration by restricting nongovernmental search-and-rescue operations. Measures included fines, ship seizures, delayed disembarkation, and criminal investigations against rescue workers for allegedly facilitating irregular migration. A notable case is the seizure of the rescue vessel Iuventa in 2017 and the prosecution of its crew, who faced years of prosecution before being fully acquitted in 2024. Although Italian courts have annulled fines and lifted seizures in several cases, these actions have imposed sustained legal, financial, and operational burdens on CSOs, constraining some rescue activities.
At the same time, the Italian government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. In Italy, independent media and civil society operate within a framework of legal protections but face challenges stemming from media concentration and political influence. The public broadcaster RAI, funded through mandatory license fees and commercial revenue, has frequently been criticized for its lack of editorial independence. Successive governments have long influenced its leadership and editorial decisions, but this interference has increased significantly under Giorgia Meloni’s administration. In the year following Giorgia Meloni’s rise to power in October 2022, a significant number of RAI executives were either replaced or forced out, and pressure for pro-government coverage increased. To illustrate, Carlo Fuortes, the former chief executive of RAI appointed under Mario Draghi’s government, resigned in May 2023, citing mounting political pressure. Fuortes’ refusal to align with government expectations led to allegations of a political conflict that has, in turn, weakened RAI’s role as a public service broadcaster. Fabio Fazio, a prominent left-leaning talk show host, and his co-presenter, comedian Luciana Littizzetto, also left RAI after their contracts were not renewed for Che Tempo Che Fa, a show that frequently criticized incumbents. Fuortes was replaced by Roberto Sergio, a RAI veteran whose political stance has historically shifted based on the party in power. Giampaolo Rossi, a former RAI board member and strong supporter of Brothers of Italy, Giorgia Meloni’s party, was appointed director general.
Additionally, investigative journalists working for the public broadcaster RAI and independent outlets have been subjected to defamation lawsuits and summoned before parliamentary committees following critical reporting. Additionally, the politicians and the government’s senior officials have actively used the Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) against independent journalists. For example, the case against journalist Roberto Saviano, initiated by Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in 2022, garnered significant international attention. Saviano called Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni a “bastard” during a televised program over her hardline views on immigration. In 2023, he was convicted of criminal defamation and fined €1,000 (approximately $1,200), a penalty that was suspended and does not require payment.
Finally, the Italian government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. As of December 2025, protests continue to occur freely and generally without undue obstruction. At the same time, the government has been increasingly criticized for adopting restrictive legislative and policing measures that disproportionately affect certain forms of dissent, particularly under the administration of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. These measures have been most visible in the government’s response to environmental and climate activism. Environmental activists, among others, have faced heightened repression through security-oriented legislation adopted via emergency decree-laws. Most notably, in April 2025, the government enacted Decree-Law No. 48/2025 (“Security Decree”), later approved by Parliament in June 2025, which introduced stricter criminal penalties for protest-related activities, including non-violent roadblocks, sit-ins, and passive resistance. While framed as urgent public-order measures, the Security Decree expanded police powers, increased sanctions for offenses against public officials, and introduced new crimes such as the “unlawful occupation of property,” carrying penalties of up to seven years’ imprisonment. Taken together with similar instruments adopted under Meloni’s administration, these measures have a cumulative effect that disproportionately restricts the right to protest.
In Italy, institutions are independent and largely function as effective checks on the governing authorities. The judiciary remains largely independent due to strong institutional and constitutional safeguards. As a result, courts are generally able to effectively scrutinize government action, including in high-profile cases. Despite persistently high levels of corruption, Italian institutions, often working in cooperation with European bodies, are able to investigate and prosecute public officials. However, lengthy proceedings, the frequent use of suspended sentences, and other structural limitations continue to reduce the overall effectiveness and deterrent impact of enforcement.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Judicial independence is enshrined in the constitution under Article 104, which proclaims that “[t]he Judiciary is a branch that is autonomous and independent of all other powers” and establishes the High Council for the Judiciary (CSM). The CSM is an independent and autonomous institution, with thirds of its members elected by magistrates themselves, while the remaining one third are elected by Parliament from among senior legal professionals. The CSM exercises exclusive authority over the appointment, assignment, promotion, transfer, and discipline of ordinary judges and prosecutors. Although the Minister of Justice may submit observations or propose disciplinary action, final decisions rest with the CSM.
As a result, the government has not undermined institutional independence to the point that cases challenging the governing authorities are no longer brought or are routinely dismissed. Members of the judiciary who rule against the government have not faced retaliation. On the contrary, Italian courts have repeatedly ruled against the government in high-profile cases without judges suffering adverse consequences. For example, in March 2025, Italy’s Court of Cassation, the country’s highest appeals court, ruled that an Eritrean migrant was entitled to compensation for having been unlawfully detained aboard an Italian coast guard vessel in 2018, after the then-government refused to allow rescued migrants to disembark. In its decision, the court emphasized that government actions are never exempt from judicial review when they exceed constitutional and legal limits, particularly where fundamental rights are concerned. While the ruling was met with strong criticism from senior members of the governing coalition, the judges did not face retaliation. In another case, in January 2025, a Rome appeals court blocked the fast-track expulsion of 43 migrants transferred to Albania under the Meloni government’s plan to process asylum applications outside EU territory. The judges declined to validate the migrants’ detention and return, holding that the designation of certain countries as “safe” must first be assessed by the European Court of Justice. In neither case did judges face clear retaliation from the government.
Italy’s legal and institutional framework has not been systematically weakened in a manner that would effectively prevent accountability of government or public officials. Italian courts, prosecutors, the High Council for the Judiciary, the independent National Anti-Corruption Authority, the Court of Auditors, as well as the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), continue to operate and bring cases against public officials. For example, in April 2023, an officer of Italy’s Financial Police was convicted in EPPO proceedings for corruption linked to a major VAT fraud investigation and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with confiscation exceeding €500,000 (approximately $545,000). Additionally, in 2024, the Court of Auditors issued 177 convictions for financial damage to the public administration, prosecutors filed 271 new indictments, and Italian prosecutors investigated 51 corruption cases under EPPO competence. However, persistent delays, a high rate of suspended sentences, and pending legislation on conflicts of interest, lobbying, and party financing limit the system’s deterrent effect.
At the same time, some structural and procedural safeguards applicable to senior political officials continue to create significant gaps in accountability. In particular, criminal prosecution against members of government can only continue if Parliament gives its authorization. When this authorization is denied, cases can be closed without judicial review on the merits. For example, in 2025, an investigation into senior government officials, including the Undersecretary to the Prime Minister, related to the release and expulsion of a foreign official wanted by the International Criminal Court was dropped after Parliament refused to allow the prosecution to proceed. Although these safeguards are part of the constitutional system, their use in politically sensitive cases has raised concerns that high-level officials can avoid effective accountability.
HRF classifies Italy as democratic.
Italy is a unitary parliamentary republic governed under the 1948 Constitution, in which the President of the Republic (currently Sergio Mattarella) serves as head of state and guarantor of constitutional order and national unity, while executive authority is exercised by the Council of Ministers led by the Prime Minister (currently Giorgia Meloni). Legislative power is vested in a perfectly bicameral Parliament, meaning both chambers have equal powers and must approve legislation in identical form: the Chamber of Deputies (400 members) and the Senate of the Republic (200 elected members, plus a small number of senators for life). Italy’s political system is characterized by multiparty competition and frequent coalition governments, with politics marked by recurring cabinet turnover and periods of fragmentation and instability. Since the September 25, 2022, general election, Italy has been governed by a centre-right coalition led by Brothers of Italy (“Fratelli d’Italia”), in alliance with the League (“Lega”) and Forza Italia, under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
In Italy, national elections are generally free and fair. The electoral framework allows mainstream opposition parties and candidates to compete effectively, producing competitive contests and broad parliamentary representation. Legal provisions governing campaign finance and media access are intended to promote a level playing field and enable parties and candidates to campaign freely.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the public are generally able to criticize and challenge the government openly. Civil society remains active and diverse, with organizations operating across a wide range of sectors. At the same time, groups engaged in politically sensitive areas encounter bureaucratic, legal, and financial constraints that can complicate their activities. The media environment is formally protected by law and includes a plurality of independent outlets, but political influence remains a structural concern, especially in relation to the public broadcaster RAI. Public demonstrations also continue to take place and are typically permitted without undue interference.
Institutions are generally independent and continue to function as meaningful checks on governing authorities. The judiciary, in particular, benefits from strong constitutional and institutional safeguards that provide substantial autonomy, enabling courts to effectively scrutinize government action, including in high-profile, politically sensitive cases. Despite persistently elevated corruption risks, Italian enforcement bodies retain the capacity to investigate and prosecute public officials. However, structural weaknesses continue to constrain overall effectiveness. Lengthy judicial proceedings, the frequent imposition of suspended sentences, and other procedural bottlenecks reduce both the efficiency of enforcement and its deterrent impact.
In Italy, national elections are largely free and fair. The electoral system enables mainstream opposition parties and candidates to compete effectively, resulting in competitive contests with broad parliamentary representation. Legal safeguards on campaign financing and equal media access further support a level playing field, allowing parties and candidates to campaign freely. There have been no reports of the government using its position to secure undue campaign advantages in recent electoral cycles, although concerns have been raised about state-controlled media potentially favoring incumbents.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The country employs a mixed electoral system, combining majoritarian and proportional elements. Approximately one-third of parliamentary seats are allocated via first-past-the-post races in single-member districts, while the remaining two-thirds are distributed proportionally from party lists at the regional level. This system balances the representation of smaller parties with the election of majoritarian candidates in local constituencies. For example, in the September 2022 Italian general election, voters elected 400 members of the Chamber of Deputies and 200 members of the Senate, producing a clear victory for the center-right coalition led by Brothers of Italy (“Fratelli d’Italia”) and Giorgia Meloni. The coalition secured an absolute majority with 237 seats in the Chamber and 115 seats in the Senate, despite winning about 44% of the national vote. Within the coalition, Brothers of Italy emerged as the largest party with roughly 26% of the vote, translating into 119 seats in the Chamber and 65 seats in the Senate, while its partners, Matteo Salvini’s League (“Lega”) and Forza Italia, each won about 8% of the vote and a smaller share of seats. The Democratic Party led the fragmented center-left with about 19% of the vote, winning 69 seats in the Chamber and 39 in the Senate, while the Five Star Movement followed with approximately 15% of the vote and 52 Chamber seats and 28 Senate seats.
The Italian government has not hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Campaigns in Italy are regulated by laws such as the Consolidated Electoral Law, which guarantees transparency in campaign financing and limits undue financial influence. The Authority for Communications Guarantees oversees media coverage, mandating equal airtime for all parties on public broadcasters. These measures help maintain a level playing field and allow for vibrant political competition. As a result, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has consistently found, including with respect to the most recent parliamentary elections in 2022, that political parties and candidates in Italy are able to conduct their campaigns freely and that electoral campaigns are competitive, allowing for a wide range of parties and candidates.
Similarly, the government has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. During recent electoral cycles, there were no reports that the government used its position to gain undue advantages that would place aligned parties ahead of the opposition. However, concerns have been raised about the recent use of state-controlled media, particularly the public broadcaster RAI. These include allowing political rallies, particularly those in government, to be broadcast live and in full, without journalists questioning or contextualizing them, and permitting politicians, including government ministers, to receive airtime during the election period to speak about their work in parliament or in government. Critics argue that this makes it harder for viewers to tell the difference between neutral government information and political campaigning.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the general public in Italy are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country’s civil society remains vibrant, with independent organizations continuing to operate across many sectors, but some, particularly those working on politically sensitive issues, face bureaucratic, legal, and financial obstacles. Italy maintains formally independent media within a protective legal framework, but government influence, particularly under Giorgia Meloni, has intensified at the public broadcaster RAI. Additionally, protests continue to occur freely and generally without undue obstruction, but recent security-oriented legislation, particularly targeting non-violent disruptive tactics such as roadblocks and sit-ins, has raised concerns about disproportionate restrictions on the freedom of dissent.
The Italian government has not unfairly shut down independent or dissenting organizations. The country’s civil society remains vibrant, and independent organizations continue to operate, with tens of thousands of civil society organizations (CSOs) active nationwide across areas ranging from human rights to culture and education. There have been no major reports of the government directly shutting down dissenting organizations. At the same time, civil society actors occasionally encounter obstacles facing bureaucratic or financial challenges when engaging in politically sensitive issues, particularly those dealing with migration rights, environmental activism. For example, in 2023, Italy intensified efforts to deter migration by restricting nongovernmental search-and-rescue operations. Measures included fines, ship seizures, delayed disembarkation, and criminal investigations against rescue workers for allegedly facilitating irregular migration. A notable case is the seizure of the rescue vessel Iuventa in 2017 and the prosecution of its crew, who faced years of prosecution before being fully acquitted in 2024. Although Italian courts have annulled fines and lifted seizures in several cases, these actions have imposed sustained legal, financial, and operational burdens on CSOs, constraining some rescue activities.
At the same time, the Italian government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. In Italy, independent media and civil society operate within a framework of legal protections but face challenges stemming from media concentration and political influence. The public broadcaster RAI, funded through mandatory license fees and commercial revenue, has frequently been criticized for its lack of editorial independence. Successive governments have long influenced its leadership and editorial decisions, but this interference has increased significantly under Giorgia Meloni’s administration. In the year following Giorgia Meloni’s rise to power in October 2022, a significant number of RAI executives were either replaced or forced out, and pressure for pro-government coverage increased. To illustrate, Carlo Fuortes, the former chief executive of RAI appointed under Mario Draghi’s government, resigned in May 2023, citing mounting political pressure. Fuortes’ refusal to align with government expectations led to allegations of a political conflict that has, in turn, weakened RAI’s role as a public service broadcaster. Fabio Fazio, a prominent left-leaning talk show host, and his co-presenter, comedian Luciana Littizzetto, also left RAI after their contracts were not renewed for Che Tempo Che Fa, a show that frequently criticized incumbents. Fuortes was replaced by Roberto Sergio, a RAI veteran whose political stance has historically shifted based on the party in power. Giampaolo Rossi, a former RAI board member and strong supporter of Brothers of Italy, Giorgia Meloni’s party, was appointed director general.
Additionally, investigative journalists working for the public broadcaster RAI and independent outlets have been subjected to defamation lawsuits and summoned before parliamentary committees following critical reporting. Additionally, the politicians and the government’s senior officials have actively used the Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) against independent journalists. For example, the case against journalist Roberto Saviano, initiated by Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in 2022, garnered significant international attention. Saviano called Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni a “bastard” during a televised program over her hardline views on immigration. In 2023, he was convicted of criminal defamation and fined €1,000 (approximately $1,200), a penalty that was suspended and does not require payment.
Finally, the Italian government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. As of December 2025, protests continue to occur freely and generally without undue obstruction. At the same time, the government has been increasingly criticized for adopting restrictive legislative and policing measures that disproportionately affect certain forms of dissent, particularly under the administration of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. These measures have been most visible in the government’s response to environmental and climate activism. Environmental activists, among others, have faced heightened repression through security-oriented legislation adopted via emergency decree-laws. Most notably, in April 2025, the government enacted Decree-Law No. 48/2025 (“Security Decree”), later approved by Parliament in June 2025, which introduced stricter criminal penalties for protest-related activities, including non-violent roadblocks, sit-ins, and passive resistance. While framed as urgent public-order measures, the Security Decree expanded police powers, increased sanctions for offenses against public officials, and introduced new crimes such as the “unlawful occupation of property,” carrying penalties of up to seven years’ imprisonment. Taken together with similar instruments adopted under Meloni’s administration, these measures have a cumulative effect that disproportionately restricts the right to protest.
In Italy, institutions are independent and largely function as effective checks on the governing authorities. The judiciary remains largely independent due to strong institutional and constitutional safeguards. As a result, courts are generally able to effectively scrutinize government action, including in high-profile cases. Despite persistently high levels of corruption, Italian institutions, often working in cooperation with European bodies, are able to investigate and prosecute public officials. However, lengthy proceedings, the frequent use of suspended sentences, and other structural limitations continue to reduce the overall effectiveness and deterrent impact of enforcement.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Judicial independence is enshrined in the constitution under Article 104, which proclaims that “[t]he Judiciary is a branch that is autonomous and independent of all other powers” and establishes the High Council for the Judiciary (CSM). The CSM is an independent and autonomous institution, with thirds of its members elected by magistrates themselves, while the remaining one third are elected by Parliament from among senior legal professionals. The CSM exercises exclusive authority over the appointment, assignment, promotion, transfer, and discipline of ordinary judges and prosecutors. Although the Minister of Justice may submit observations or propose disciplinary action, final decisions rest with the CSM.
As a result, the government has not undermined institutional independence to the point that cases challenging the governing authorities are no longer brought or are routinely dismissed. Members of the judiciary who rule against the government have not faced retaliation. On the contrary, Italian courts have repeatedly ruled against the government in high-profile cases without judges suffering adverse consequences. For example, in March 2025, Italy’s Court of Cassation, the country’s highest appeals court, ruled that an Eritrean migrant was entitled to compensation for having been unlawfully detained aboard an Italian coast guard vessel in 2018, after the then-government refused to allow rescued migrants to disembark. In its decision, the court emphasized that government actions are never exempt from judicial review when they exceed constitutional and legal limits, particularly where fundamental rights are concerned. While the ruling was met with strong criticism from senior members of the governing coalition, the judges did not face retaliation. In another case, in January 2025, a Rome appeals court blocked the fast-track expulsion of 43 migrants transferred to Albania under the Meloni government’s plan to process asylum applications outside EU territory. The judges declined to validate the migrants’ detention and return, holding that the designation of certain countries as “safe” must first be assessed by the European Court of Justice. In neither case did judges face clear retaliation from the government.
Italy’s legal and institutional framework has not been systematically weakened in a manner that would effectively prevent accountability of government or public officials. Italian courts, prosecutors, the High Council for the Judiciary, the independent National Anti-Corruption Authority, the Court of Auditors, as well as the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), continue to operate and bring cases against public officials. For example, in April 2023, an officer of Italy’s Financial Police was convicted in EPPO proceedings for corruption linked to a major VAT fraud investigation and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with confiscation exceeding €500,000 (approximately $545,000). Additionally, in 2024, the Court of Auditors issued 177 convictions for financial damage to the public administration, prosecutors filed 271 new indictments, and Italian prosecutors investigated 51 corruption cases under EPPO competence. However, persistent delays, a high rate of suspended sentences, and pending legislation on conflicts of interest, lobbying, and party financing limit the system’s deterrent effect.
At the same time, some structural and procedural safeguards applicable to senior political officials continue to create significant gaps in accountability. In particular, criminal prosecution against members of government can only continue if Parliament gives its authorization. When this authorization is denied, cases can be closed without judicial review on the merits. For example, in 2025, an investigation into senior government officials, including the Undersecretary to the Prime Minister, related to the release and expulsion of a foreign official wanted by the International Criminal Court was dropped after Parliament refused to allow the prosecution to proceed. Although these safeguards are part of the constitutional system, their use in politically sensitive cases has raised concerns that high-level officials can avoid effective accountability.
