Democracy
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HRF classifies Israel as a democracy.
The state of Israel operates under a parliamentary system where, in the absence of a formal constitution or a second legislative chamber, the judiciary serves as the primary check on executive power. Benjamin Netanyahu is the longest-serving executive in Israel with a combined 17 years in office non-consecutively. Under his coalition cabinet, sworn in on December 29, 2022, the executive has successfully concentrated unprecedented authority by moving to curtail institutional accountability and expand exclusionary frameworks. These ongoing initiatives seek to curtail the Supreme Court’s authority to review administrative decisions and include proposals to restructure the Judicial Selection Committee in order to grant the political leadership decisive control over judicial appointments. Additionally, members of the governing coalition have frequently criticized civil society organizations engaged in human rights advocacy and legal reform, particularly those receiving foreign government funding, portraying them as politically motivated or aligned with external interests. Legislative initiatives and public rhetoric have also targeted media regulation and public broadcasting structures, prompting concerns among press freedom advocates about potential political influence over the media environment. At the same time, independent media outlets continue to operate and publish critical reporting. The Netanyahu administration also transferred the administrative authority over the West Bank to civilian ministers in Israel, blurring the legal distinction between military operations and civilian governance, raising questions about oversight and legal accountability. At the same time, the judicial reform agenda launched in 2023, whose ultimate goal is to give parliament the ability to override judiciary and Supreme Court decisions by a simple majority, has strained Israel’s institutional balance. While the reform process remains contested and partially implemented, it has intensified debate over the scope of judicial independence and the durability of constitutional constraints.
National elections are largely free and fair, with universal suffrage and a robust multi-party system. At the same time, ongoing debates within Israeli society reflect tensions between democratic procedures and questions of civic equality. The 2018 Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People has been criticized by Arab citizens, Druze, and other minority communities, who have organized public protests arguing that the law emphasizes Jewish national identity while not including an explicit guarantee of equal civic status for all citizens.
Independent media, political figures, civil society organizations, and members of the public continue to operate and express criticism of the government. However, observers and domestic critics argue that the space for dissent has come under increased pressure under the current governing coalition. These concerns center on a combination of proposed legislation, regulatory measures, and political rhetoric that critics say may have a chilling effect on public criticism. Media-related debates have included the passage of legislation in 2024 allowing the government to restrict or suspend the operations of foreign media outlets, including Al Jazeera, on national security grounds, as well as public discussions around proposals to alter funding arrangements for the public broadcaster Kan, which has aired content critical of the government, alongside calls to expand the role of private outlets perceived as closer to Likud.
Civil society organizations, particularly those engaged in human rights advocacy, have also expressed concern regarding proposed fiscal measures and transparency requirements related to foreign funding. Supporters of these initiatives argue they promote accountability and sovereignty, while critics contend they risk stigmatizing legitimate domestic dissent by framing it as external influence.
Formal state institutions remain in place and continue to function. However, the scope and balance of institutional oversight have been the subject of intense internal debate. Legislative initiatives advanced by the current governing coalition—most notably proposals associated with judicial reform—have raised concerns among legal professionals, former officials, and segments of the public about potential erosion of checks and balances. These debates focus on proposals affecting the role of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court of Israel, the authority of the Attorney General of Israel, and the appointment processes within the civil service, which critics argue could reduce the independence of institutions traditionally tasked with overseeing executive power.
Israel’s national elections are generally free and fair in their administration, with universal suffrage, regular electoral turnover, and a robust multi-party system. At the same time, scholars, civil society organizations, and minority representatives have long debated whether the structural design of the electoral system and changes in the legislative environment produce unequal political outcomes for certain segments of the population. These concerns focus not on electoral fraud, but on institutional rules and political practices that shape who is able to compete effectively, gain representation, and participate in governing coalitions.
Certain structural features of the system are cited as having disproportionate effects on minority participation. These include electoral thresholds, candidate disqualification provisions, and the evolving relationship between the legislature and judicial oversight. Arab-Israeli citizens and some minority Jewish communities are among the groups most frequently identified in these debates as facing structural obstacles to full political inclusion, even when formal voting rights are intact.
Electoral thresholds have also been central to debates about representation. Israel’s current threshold of 3.25 percent has encouraged party consolidation but has also increased the risk of vote loss among smaller or fragmented parties. This dynamic has been particularly consequential for Arab-Israeli parties, which represent ideologically diverse constituencies. In the 2022 elections, for example, the Balad party failed to cross the threshold despite receiving approximately 138,000 votes, which is around 2.9 percent, resulting in a substantial number of unrepresented votes. As a result of party fragmentation and threshold effects, Arab-Israeli citizens— who comprise roughly 20 percent of Israel’s population—currently hold 10 seats in the 120-member Knesset, their lowest level of representation in approximately two decades.
Candidate Eligibility and Oversight
Israel’s electoral framework permits the disqualification of candidates or lists that deny the Jewish and democratic character of the state or support racism or armed struggle. The Central Elections Committee (CEC), composed primarily of representatives from Knesset factions, regularly adjudicates such cases. Critics argue that the CEC’s composition allows political considerations to influence disqualification attempts, particularly against minority candidates. The Supreme Court has frequently overturned CEC disqualifications, reinforcing judicial oversight as a key check on exclusionary practices.
The absence of a formal constitution allows the Knesset to amend Basic Laws by simple majority, contributing to constitutional instability surrounding candidate eligibility and electoral rules. While most mainstream Jewish opposition parties operate freely, minority candidates—particularly Arab-Israeli politicians—have faced repeated disqualification attempts, investigations, and public delegitimization campaigns. Even when such decisions are overturned by the courts, these proceedings can impose reputational and political costs that constrain coalition participation and legislative effectiveness.
West Bank Governance and Electoral Asymmetries: Contextual Impact
Since 2023, the transfer of certain administrative powers over the West Bank from military authorities to civilian officials within Israel’s Ministry of Defense has raised concerns over governance and accountability in the territories. Human rights organizations and former officials have described these changes as deepening civilian control without extending political rights to the Palestinian population.
These developments highlight a broader asymmetry in political representation beyond Israel’s recognized borders. Jewish-Israeli settlers in the West Bank—approximately 10 percent of Israel’s population—participate fully in national elections and are represented in the Knesset, despite residing outside Israel’s sovereign territory. By contrast, Palestinians in East Jerusalem who hold permanent residency status—around 40 percent of the city’s population—face significant barriers to citizenship and are generally unable to vote in national elections, despite being subject to Israeli law in areas such as taxation, planning, and residency rights.
While these arrangements are formally grounded in distinctions between citizenship, residency, and territorial jurisdiction, critics argue that they produce a tiered political reality in which populations governed by the same authorities do not enjoy equal political agency. Supporters counter that these distinctions reflect unresolved questions of sovereignty and conflict rather than institutional design. Nonetheless, the resulting disparities are frequently cited in assessments of democratic inclusion and representation.
Freedom of Expression, Media, and Civic Space
Independent media outlets, civil society organizations, political leaders, and members of the public continue to operate in Israel and openly criticize government policy. At the same time, domestic and international observers have raised concerns that the space for dissent has narrowed in recent years due to a combination of security legislation, regulatory initiatives, and heightened political pressure. These developments are debated within Israeli society and are frequently justified by the government on national security grounds, particularly during periods of active conflict.
Media-related concerns have focused in part on legislation adopted in April 2024 permitting the temporary suspension of foreign news outlets deemed to pose a security risk. This authority was exercised against Al Jazeera, whose operations were suspended and equipment seized in East Jerusalem. In the same period, Israeli authorities briefly seized broadcasting equipment belonging to the Associated Press in Sderot, citing concerns that live footage was being relayed to Al Jazeera. The equipment was later returned following public criticism.
The government has advanced plans to restructure broadcast oversight by replacing existing regulatory bodies with a centralized authority appointed by political leadership. Supporters argue these changes are intended to modernize the media landscape and reduce inefficiencies, while critics warn they risk politicizing licensing, advertising distribution, and regulatory enforcement. Disputes have also arisen over state advertising policy, including directives limiting government engagement with certain critical outlets while granting regulatory advantages to others perceived as ideologically aligned with the governing coalition.
Israel continues to operate a military censorship regime, a practice in place since the state’s founding, which requires prior review of security-related reporting. According to data released by Israeli media watchdog organizations, the number of censorship orders increased significantly in 2024, including both full publication bans and partial redactions. While authorities maintain that such measures are essential for national security, journalists contend that the expanded scope and frequency of enforcement have encouraged self-censorship, particularly during periods of regional escalation. In 2025, these requirements were applied more systematically to foreign journalists operating within Israel during the Israel–Iran war, narrowing what had previously been a comparatively broader space for editorial discretion.
Civil society organizations, particularly those engaged in human rights and humanitarian work related to the Palestinian territories, have also reported increased administrative scrutiny. Government officials have defended new registration requirements, licensing reviews, and funding regulations as necessary to ensure transparency and prevent abuse. Critics contend that these measures disproportionately affect organizations critical of Israeli military policy and have warned of a chilling effect on humanitarian monitoring and advocacy. Legislative proposals to impose additional taxes on foreign-funded CSOs or limit their access to judicial review remain under debate as of 2025.
Journalists and political figures critical of government policy have reported harassment, threats, and legal pressure. While Israeli journalists retain substantial legal protections, high-profile cases—including public attacks on reporters following investigative coverage and repeated disciplinary or impeachment motions against opposition lawmakers—have fueled concern about the use of institutional mechanisms to delegitimize dissent. International press freedom organizations have also documented the detention of Palestinian journalists, particularly in the context of security operations, raising concerns about due process and proportionality.
Public demonstrations remain legal, but policing practices have drawn scrutiny. During mass protests in 2023–2025—including judicial reform demonstrations and later anti-war or hostage-related protests—police employed crowd-control measures such as water cannons, mounted units, and mass arrests. Civil rights groups argue that administrative detentions and frequent arrests have been used to deter sustained mobilization, while authorities maintain that such measures are necessary to maintain public order amid heightened security risks.
Finally, Israeli officials have adopted an increasingly assertive posture toward international advocacy efforts perceived as hostile, particularly campaigns aimed at boycotting, divesting from, or sanctioning the state. Investigative reporting has documented coordination between the Israeli government and allied organizations to monitor diaspora activist networks to counter perceived delegitimization campaigns, though the government has neither fully confirmed nor publicly detailed these activities. Government statements and allied commentators frame these efforts as defensive responses to what they characterize as coordinated efforts to undermine Israel’s international standing, while CSOs and some human rights organizations describe them as extending domestic security logic into the international arena in ways that risk undermining freedom of expression beyond Israel’s borders.
Israel’s institutional framework encompasses independent courts, professional oversight bodies, and a civil service designed to constrain executive authority. At the same time, the operation of these institutions has become increasingly contested, particularly where questions of national identity, security, and minority political participation intersect. Critics contend that although these institutions remain formally strong, their capacity to function as effective checks on political power has been diminished through legislative initiatives, political pressure, and patterns of structural deference.
The judiciary has historically played a central role in mediating tensions between Israel’s democratic character and its definition as a Jewish state. In politically sensitive cases, however, the Supreme Court has often exercised restraint, prioritizing institutional stability and the preservation of the constitutional status quo. This approach was evident in 2018, when the Knesset Presidium barred a proposed “State of All Its Citizens” bill from legislative debate. Petitioners challenged the decision before the Supreme Court, which declined to intervene, treating the matter as an internal parliamentary issue. While the Court did not criminalize the proposal, then–President Esther Hayut characterized it as crossing a constitutional “red line,” reinforcing the view that certain challenges to Israel’s foundational identity fall outside the scope of judicial protection. Critics argue that this deference has had the effect of narrowing the bounds of permissible political discourse for Arab-Israeli representatives.
In 2021, the Supreme Court upheld Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, emphasizing that the statute does not derogate from individual civil rights and must be interpreted in conjunction with other Basic Laws protecting equality and human dignity. At the same time, critics argue that the decision left certain constitutional questions unresolved, particularly regarding the relationship between the state’s national character and principles of equality, and that it relied on judicial interpretation rather than incorporating an explicit equality provision within the Basic Law itself.
Relations between the judiciary and the political branches have grown increasingly strained. Since 2019, senior political figures have publicly questioned the legitimacy of judicial and law-enforcement institutions, particularly in the context of corruption proceedings against elected officials. This rhetoric intensified during the 2023–2024 judicial reform debate, which included proposals to limit judicial review and alter the balance of power between branches. Although the Supreme Court invalidated the “reasonableness” amendment in early 2024, the governing coalition continued to pursue alternative reforms.
In March 2025, the Knesset passed Amendment No. 4 to the Basic Law: The Judiciary, restructuring the Judicial Selection Committee by replacing representatives of the Israel Bar Association with political appointees. While the amendment’s implementation is deferred until after the 2026 elections, legal scholars and former officials argue that it increases political influence over judicial appointments and may weaken perceptions of judicial independence.
Oversight institutions beyond the courts have faced similar pressures. The Office of the Attorney General (AG), which traditionally serves as a binding legal authority over executive action, has been the subject of repeated reform proposals. These include efforts to redefine the AG’s opinions as advisory rather than binding, allow ministers to retain private counsel, and divide the office’s responsibilities among separate positions. Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara has opposed several government initiatives on legal grounds, prompting public criticism from coalition figures and calls for her dismissal.
Accountability mechanisms related to security forces remain formally in place but are frequently criticized for limited effectiveness. While Israeli courts and military prosecutors have, at times, investigated alleged misconduct, human rights organizations report consistently low indictment rates in cases involving abuse complaints against soldiers. Courts have often accepted security-based justifications, including reliance on classified evidence, which critics argue restricts meaningful judicial scrutiny. In a state facing persistent security threats and recurrent armed conflict, courts and prosecutors operate within a legal framework that affords significant weight to national security considerations. That deference, though grounded in national security considerations, has been associated with low indictment and conviction rates in cases involving alleged misconduct by security personnel.
Taken together, these developments reflect an ongoing internal struggle over the scope of institutional independence in Israel. While democratic structures continue to function, critics argue that cumulative legislative changes, political pressure, and judicial restraint have reduced the capacity of oversight bodies to challenge executive authority in politically sensitive domains. Supporters of the current approach maintain that these adjustments are necessary to restore democratic balance and ensure governance reflects electoral outcomes. The result is a system characterized less by institutional collapse than by contested authority and narrowing margins for independent oversight.
HRF classifies Israel as a democracy.
The state of Israel operates under a parliamentary system where, in the absence of a formal constitution or a second legislative chamber, the judiciary serves as the primary check on executive power. Benjamin Netanyahu is the longest-serving executive in Israel with a combined 17 years in office non-consecutively. Under his coalition cabinet, sworn in on December 29, 2022, the executive has successfully concentrated unprecedented authority by moving to curtail institutional accountability and expand exclusionary frameworks. These ongoing initiatives seek to curtail the Supreme Court’s authority to review administrative decisions and include proposals to restructure the Judicial Selection Committee in order to grant the political leadership decisive control over judicial appointments. Additionally, members of the governing coalition have frequently criticized civil society organizations engaged in human rights advocacy and legal reform, particularly those receiving foreign government funding, portraying them as politically motivated or aligned with external interests. Legislative initiatives and public rhetoric have also targeted media regulation and public broadcasting structures, prompting concerns among press freedom advocates about potential political influence over the media environment. At the same time, independent media outlets continue to operate and publish critical reporting. The Netanyahu administration also transferred the administrative authority over the West Bank to civilian ministers in Israel, blurring the legal distinction between military operations and civilian governance, raising questions about oversight and legal accountability. At the same time, the judicial reform agenda launched in 2023, whose ultimate goal is to give parliament the ability to override judiciary and Supreme Court decisions by a simple majority, has strained Israel’s institutional balance. While the reform process remains contested and partially implemented, it has intensified debate over the scope of judicial independence and the durability of constitutional constraints.
National elections are largely free and fair, with universal suffrage and a robust multi-party system. At the same time, ongoing debates within Israeli society reflect tensions between democratic procedures and questions of civic equality. The 2018 Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People has been criticized by Arab citizens, Druze, and other minority communities, who have organized public protests arguing that the law emphasizes Jewish national identity while not including an explicit guarantee of equal civic status for all citizens.
Independent media, political figures, civil society organizations, and members of the public continue to operate and express criticism of the government. However, observers and domestic critics argue that the space for dissent has come under increased pressure under the current governing coalition. These concerns center on a combination of proposed legislation, regulatory measures, and political rhetoric that critics say may have a chilling effect on public criticism. Media-related debates have included the passage of legislation in 2024 allowing the government to restrict or suspend the operations of foreign media outlets, including Al Jazeera, on national security grounds, as well as public discussions around proposals to alter funding arrangements for the public broadcaster Kan, which has aired content critical of the government, alongside calls to expand the role of private outlets perceived as closer to Likud.
Civil society organizations, particularly those engaged in human rights advocacy, have also expressed concern regarding proposed fiscal measures and transparency requirements related to foreign funding. Supporters of these initiatives argue they promote accountability and sovereignty, while critics contend they risk stigmatizing legitimate domestic dissent by framing it as external influence.
Formal state institutions remain in place and continue to function. However, the scope and balance of institutional oversight have been the subject of intense internal debate. Legislative initiatives advanced by the current governing coalition—most notably proposals associated with judicial reform—have raised concerns among legal professionals, former officials, and segments of the public about potential erosion of checks and balances. These debates focus on proposals affecting the role of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court of Israel, the authority of the Attorney General of Israel, and the appointment processes within the civil service, which critics argue could reduce the independence of institutions traditionally tasked with overseeing executive power.
Israel’s national elections are generally free and fair in their administration, with universal suffrage, regular electoral turnover, and a robust multi-party system. At the same time, scholars, civil society organizations, and minority representatives have long debated whether the structural design of the electoral system and changes in the legislative environment produce unequal political outcomes for certain segments of the population. These concerns focus not on electoral fraud, but on institutional rules and political practices that shape who is able to compete effectively, gain representation, and participate in governing coalitions.
Certain structural features of the system are cited as having disproportionate effects on minority participation. These include electoral thresholds, candidate disqualification provisions, and the evolving relationship between the legislature and judicial oversight. Arab-Israeli citizens and some minority Jewish communities are among the groups most frequently identified in these debates as facing structural obstacles to full political inclusion, even when formal voting rights are intact.
Electoral thresholds have also been central to debates about representation. Israel’s current threshold of 3.25 percent has encouraged party consolidation but has also increased the risk of vote loss among smaller or fragmented parties. This dynamic has been particularly consequential for Arab-Israeli parties, which represent ideologically diverse constituencies. In the 2022 elections, for example, the Balad party failed to cross the threshold despite receiving approximately 138,000 votes, which is around 2.9 percent, resulting in a substantial number of unrepresented votes. As a result of party fragmentation and threshold effects, Arab-Israeli citizens— who comprise roughly 20 percent of Israel’s population—currently hold 10 seats in the 120-member Knesset, their lowest level of representation in approximately two decades.
Candidate Eligibility and Oversight
Israel’s electoral framework permits the disqualification of candidates or lists that deny the Jewish and democratic character of the state or support racism or armed struggle. The Central Elections Committee (CEC), composed primarily of representatives from Knesset factions, regularly adjudicates such cases. Critics argue that the CEC’s composition allows political considerations to influence disqualification attempts, particularly against minority candidates. The Supreme Court has frequently overturned CEC disqualifications, reinforcing judicial oversight as a key check on exclusionary practices.
The absence of a formal constitution allows the Knesset to amend Basic Laws by simple majority, contributing to constitutional instability surrounding candidate eligibility and electoral rules. While most mainstream Jewish opposition parties operate freely, minority candidates—particularly Arab-Israeli politicians—have faced repeated disqualification attempts, investigations, and public delegitimization campaigns. Even when such decisions are overturned by the courts, these proceedings can impose reputational and political costs that constrain coalition participation and legislative effectiveness.
West Bank Governance and Electoral Asymmetries: Contextual Impact
Since 2023, the transfer of certain administrative powers over the West Bank from military authorities to civilian officials within Israel’s Ministry of Defense has raised concerns over governance and accountability in the territories. Human rights organizations and former officials have described these changes as deepening civilian control without extending political rights to the Palestinian population.
These developments highlight a broader asymmetry in political representation beyond Israel’s recognized borders. Jewish-Israeli settlers in the West Bank—approximately 10 percent of Israel’s population—participate fully in national elections and are represented in the Knesset, despite residing outside Israel’s sovereign territory. By contrast, Palestinians in East Jerusalem who hold permanent residency status—around 40 percent of the city’s population—face significant barriers to citizenship and are generally unable to vote in national elections, despite being subject to Israeli law in areas such as taxation, planning, and residency rights.
While these arrangements are formally grounded in distinctions between citizenship, residency, and territorial jurisdiction, critics argue that they produce a tiered political reality in which populations governed by the same authorities do not enjoy equal political agency. Supporters counter that these distinctions reflect unresolved questions of sovereignty and conflict rather than institutional design. Nonetheless, the resulting disparities are frequently cited in assessments of democratic inclusion and representation.
Freedom of Expression, Media, and Civic Space
Independent media outlets, civil society organizations, political leaders, and members of the public continue to operate in Israel and openly criticize government policy. At the same time, domestic and international observers have raised concerns that the space for dissent has narrowed in recent years due to a combination of security legislation, regulatory initiatives, and heightened political pressure. These developments are debated within Israeli society and are frequently justified by the government on national security grounds, particularly during periods of active conflict.
Media-related concerns have focused in part on legislation adopted in April 2024 permitting the temporary suspension of foreign news outlets deemed to pose a security risk. This authority was exercised against Al Jazeera, whose operations were suspended and equipment seized in East Jerusalem. In the same period, Israeli authorities briefly seized broadcasting equipment belonging to the Associated Press in Sderot, citing concerns that live footage was being relayed to Al Jazeera. The equipment was later returned following public criticism.
The government has advanced plans to restructure broadcast oversight by replacing existing regulatory bodies with a centralized authority appointed by political leadership. Supporters argue these changes are intended to modernize the media landscape and reduce inefficiencies, while critics warn they risk politicizing licensing, advertising distribution, and regulatory enforcement. Disputes have also arisen over state advertising policy, including directives limiting government engagement with certain critical outlets while granting regulatory advantages to others perceived as ideologically aligned with the governing coalition.
Israel continues to operate a military censorship regime, a practice in place since the state’s founding, which requires prior review of security-related reporting. According to data released by Israeli media watchdog organizations, the number of censorship orders increased significantly in 2024, including both full publication bans and partial redactions. While authorities maintain that such measures are essential for national security, journalists contend that the expanded scope and frequency of enforcement have encouraged self-censorship, particularly during periods of regional escalation. In 2025, these requirements were applied more systematically to foreign journalists operating within Israel during the Israel–Iran war, narrowing what had previously been a comparatively broader space for editorial discretion.
Civil society organizations, particularly those engaged in human rights and humanitarian work related to the Palestinian territories, have also reported increased administrative scrutiny. Government officials have defended new registration requirements, licensing reviews, and funding regulations as necessary to ensure transparency and prevent abuse. Critics contend that these measures disproportionately affect organizations critical of Israeli military policy and have warned of a chilling effect on humanitarian monitoring and advocacy. Legislative proposals to impose additional taxes on foreign-funded CSOs or limit their access to judicial review remain under debate as of 2025.
Journalists and political figures critical of government policy have reported harassment, threats, and legal pressure. While Israeli journalists retain substantial legal protections, high-profile cases—including public attacks on reporters following investigative coverage and repeated disciplinary or impeachment motions against opposition lawmakers—have fueled concern about the use of institutional mechanisms to delegitimize dissent. International press freedom organizations have also documented the detention of Palestinian journalists, particularly in the context of security operations, raising concerns about due process and proportionality.
Public demonstrations remain legal, but policing practices have drawn scrutiny. During mass protests in 2023–2025—including judicial reform demonstrations and later anti-war or hostage-related protests—police employed crowd-control measures such as water cannons, mounted units, and mass arrests. Civil rights groups argue that administrative detentions and frequent arrests have been used to deter sustained mobilization, while authorities maintain that such measures are necessary to maintain public order amid heightened security risks.
Finally, Israeli officials have adopted an increasingly assertive posture toward international advocacy efforts perceived as hostile, particularly campaigns aimed at boycotting, divesting from, or sanctioning the state. Investigative reporting has documented coordination between the Israeli government and allied organizations to monitor diaspora activist networks to counter perceived delegitimization campaigns, though the government has neither fully confirmed nor publicly detailed these activities. Government statements and allied commentators frame these efforts as defensive responses to what they characterize as coordinated efforts to undermine Israel’s international standing, while CSOs and some human rights organizations describe them as extending domestic security logic into the international arena in ways that risk undermining freedom of expression beyond Israel’s borders.
Israel’s institutional framework encompasses independent courts, professional oversight bodies, and a civil service designed to constrain executive authority. At the same time, the operation of these institutions has become increasingly contested, particularly where questions of national identity, security, and minority political participation intersect. Critics contend that although these institutions remain formally strong, their capacity to function as effective checks on political power has been diminished through legislative initiatives, political pressure, and patterns of structural deference.
The judiciary has historically played a central role in mediating tensions between Israel’s democratic character and its definition as a Jewish state. In politically sensitive cases, however, the Supreme Court has often exercised restraint, prioritizing institutional stability and the preservation of the constitutional status quo. This approach was evident in 2018, when the Knesset Presidium barred a proposed “State of All Its Citizens” bill from legislative debate. Petitioners challenged the decision before the Supreme Court, which declined to intervene, treating the matter as an internal parliamentary issue. While the Court did not criminalize the proposal, then–President Esther Hayut characterized it as crossing a constitutional “red line,” reinforcing the view that certain challenges to Israel’s foundational identity fall outside the scope of judicial protection. Critics argue that this deference has had the effect of narrowing the bounds of permissible political discourse for Arab-Israeli representatives.
In 2021, the Supreme Court upheld Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, emphasizing that the statute does not derogate from individual civil rights and must be interpreted in conjunction with other Basic Laws protecting equality and human dignity. At the same time, critics argue that the decision left certain constitutional questions unresolved, particularly regarding the relationship between the state’s national character and principles of equality, and that it relied on judicial interpretation rather than incorporating an explicit equality provision within the Basic Law itself.
Relations between the judiciary and the political branches have grown increasingly strained. Since 2019, senior political figures have publicly questioned the legitimacy of judicial and law-enforcement institutions, particularly in the context of corruption proceedings against elected officials. This rhetoric intensified during the 2023–2024 judicial reform debate, which included proposals to limit judicial review and alter the balance of power between branches. Although the Supreme Court invalidated the “reasonableness” amendment in early 2024, the governing coalition continued to pursue alternative reforms.
In March 2025, the Knesset passed Amendment No. 4 to the Basic Law: The Judiciary, restructuring the Judicial Selection Committee by replacing representatives of the Israel Bar Association with political appointees. While the amendment’s implementation is deferred until after the 2026 elections, legal scholars and former officials argue that it increases political influence over judicial appointments and may weaken perceptions of judicial independence.
Oversight institutions beyond the courts have faced similar pressures. The Office of the Attorney General (AG), which traditionally serves as a binding legal authority over executive action, has been the subject of repeated reform proposals. These include efforts to redefine the AG’s opinions as advisory rather than binding, allow ministers to retain private counsel, and divide the office’s responsibilities among separate positions. Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara has opposed several government initiatives on legal grounds, prompting public criticism from coalition figures and calls for her dismissal.
Accountability mechanisms related to security forces remain formally in place but are frequently criticized for limited effectiveness. While Israeli courts and military prosecutors have, at times, investigated alleged misconduct, human rights organizations report consistently low indictment rates in cases involving abuse complaints against soldiers. Courts have often accepted security-based justifications, including reliance on classified evidence, which critics argue restricts meaningful judicial scrutiny. In a state facing persistent security threats and recurrent armed conflict, courts and prosecutors operate within a legal framework that affords significant weight to national security considerations. That deference, though grounded in national security considerations, has been associated with low indictment and conviction rates in cases involving alleged misconduct by security personnel.
Taken together, these developments reflect an ongoing internal struggle over the scope of institutional independence in Israel. While democratic structures continue to function, critics argue that cumulative legislative changes, political pressure, and judicial restraint have reduced the capacity of oversight bodies to challenge executive authority in politically sensitive domains. Supporters of the current approach maintain that these adjustments are necessary to restore democratic balance and ensure governance reflects electoral outcomes. The result is a system characterized less by institutional collapse than by contested authority and narrowing margins for independent oversight.
