Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Iraq as ruled by a Hybrid Authoritarian regime.
Iraq’s transition to a federal parliamentary democracy began with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s 24-year-long authoritarian regime in 2003. Since then, the country has made notable strides towards establishing democratic institutions, including the drafting of a new constitution, holding routine elections, and the formation of a representative government. Iraq’s political landscape is marked by constitutional guarantees for a multi-party system, competitive elections, and a framework for the peaceful transition of power. However, constraints on freedom of dissent and institutional accountability persist. From October 2022 to November 2025, the Iraqi governing authority was led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who assumed his position following a prolonged political deadlock of nearly a year, which occurred after the October 2021 parliamentary elections. In November 2025, his political party won the general elections. However, given Iraq’s consociational governance system, dictated by a multi-stage negotiation process, requiring the nominee to achieve cross-segment legitimacy rather than just a parliamentary plurality, by December 2025, it remained unclear whether his victory would be sufficient to guarantee the incumbent’s reappointment.
National elections are largely free and fair. Regular parliamentary elections have taken place since 2005, with the 2021 parliamentary elections representing the largest infusion of independent candidates in Iraq’s modern history. The post-2003 political system, though often criticized for its ethno-sectarian power-sharing mechanisms (known as Muhasasa), ensures that the country’s diverse partisan, religious, and ethnic groups are generally represented in the Council of Representatives (CoR). The freedom to form political parties is robust, resulting in hundreds of registered parties and shifting alliances, reflecting an open, albeit fragmented, political environment.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. While individuals are afforded some space to criticize the regime, vaguely worded provisions in the penal code are often instrumentalized by the political elite to target and prosecute journalists, activists, and protesters, directly contradicting the fundamental right to free speech enshrined in the new constitution.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Iraq’s institutions exist in a precarious and frequently constrained state, where constitutional powers are consistently undermined by the interests of the dominant political elite and sectarian political blocs. The Federal Supreme Court (FSC) acts as a critical, yet selective, check, often intervening decisively to safeguard electoral integrity and limit executive overreach. However, the FSC has consistently avoided issuing broad rulings that would dismantle the ethno-sectarian power-sharing system, the perceived root of institutional corruption. Moreover, the legislature’s oversight function is often selective and partisan, and junior courts and anti-corruption bodies are frequently subject to political interference and coercion.
National elections are largely free and fair. Iraq holds regular, competitive elections in a political landscape marked by constitutional guarantees for a multi-party system and a framework for the peaceful transition of power. However, formal electoral frameworks coexist with underlying systemic flaws that undermine genuine political competition and accountability. While elections are frequently characterized by procedural legitimacy—regular, competitive, and allowing citizens to participate—they are marred by structural design flaws, elite manipulation, and entrenched power-sharing arrangements that distort outcomes. These dynamics lead to a superficial veneer of democracy, where electoral results do not translate into substantive change, and political elites maintain control through mechanisms that restrict meaningful opposition, perpetuate sectarian or partisan dominance, and undermine public confidence. The principal challenge lies in the proportional representation system and an entrenched, unwritten ethno-sectarian power-sharing quota system, known as Muhasasa. Together, these systems ensure that elections do not pick leaders but merely determine the relative strength of established parties. This necessitates months of closed-door, elite negotiations to form a government, requiring a supermajority coalition that dilutes the individual vote.
Iraq’s electoral system, which uses proportional representation to allocate seats based on party lists and requires a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority (220 out of 329 seats) to approve a government, fundamentally undermines the individual vote. Since no single party ever wins a majority, elections serve only to determine the relative strength of political blocs, forcing them into prolonged, closed-door negotiations to form broad, multi-sectarian coalitions. This process has institutionalized the Muhasasa quota system, which allocates top state posts by ethno-sectarian identity, with the prime minister a Shia Muslim, the president being Kurdish, and the speaker of the house a Sunni Muslim. It prioritizes elite power-sharing over popular mandates, leading to a profound lack of voter confidence and high abstention rates. Nonetheless, Iraq’s fragmented system and constant need for coalition-building have prevented authoritarian consolidation. The 2019 Tishreen (October) protests, which initially erupted over failing infrastructure and mass water poisoning but quickly evolved to demand an end to corruption, increased jobs, and political reform targeting the Muhasasa system that dominated Iraqi politics, led to early elections and a shift to the Single Non-Transferable Vote system, weakening dominant parties and enabling a record number of independents to enter parliament, demonstrating that political change remains possible outside the entrenched Muhasasa system.
The regime in Iraq has been widely accused of engaging in significant electoral law manipulation. Since 2003, Iraqi politicians have repeatedly altered the electoral system in the run-up to elections, often under popular pressure, but with results that favor the dominant parties. For example, the system has swung between various forms of proportional representation (PR), sometimes adopting the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system under massive public demand in 2020. This constant shifting of rules creates confusion and makes it difficult for new, independent parties to organize effectively. While the regime fully shifted to new biometric voter cards during the 2021 elections to address the issue of voting irregularities, during the initial rollout of the biometric cards in 2018, which were characterized by manual and electronic voting, allegations of fraud were so pervasive that the Iraqi Supreme Court mandated a manual recount of the nearly 11 million electronic votes. This recount resulted in some seat changes, confirming that manipulation had occurred.
The regime does not unfairly bar a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections presented a robust display of pluralism. With 31 political alliances, 38 parties, and 75 independent candidates entering the fray, the sheer volume of options suggests a political system defined by openness. Reflecting this broader political representation, the 2025 elections saw 7,768 candidates vying for seats—a significant increase over the 3,249 who ran in the previous 2021 cycle. However, the election landscape was characterized by systemic absorption. While the freedom to run remained intact, the freedom to remain independent was undermined by the gravity of established political blocs. A poignant example of this phenomenon is the fate of the Imtidad party. Originally born from the grassroots energy of the Tishreen protests, the party’s absence from the 2025 elections marked a significant turning point. Rather than maintaining a distinct opposition front, its former MPs were largely absorbed into established political groups.
It is also worth noting that Iraq bars former Baathists from competing in elections primarily to prevent the return of Saddam Hussein’s repressive regime and to fulfill a core aspect of De-Ba’athification, a policy rooted in addressing historical atrocities. The constitutional mandate for this exclusion is found in Article 7 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which prohibits any entity or program that promotes or glorifies the Baath Party. The practical enforcement is managed by the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC), which scrutinizes the history of individuals to prevent high-ranking former Baathists from holding public office or gaining influence in the post-2003 democratic system. While these laws have significantly marginalized certain groups, they do not constitute an outright ban on political opposition. Instead, the political landscape remains relatively open, allowing various factions to participate in elections and political processes.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, contribute to the regime enjoying significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete, including by engaging in slander or misinformation. Political parties aligned with the ruling elite, such as the Fatah Alliance and parties associated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF or Hashd al-Shaabi, as it’s known in Arabic), which originated from the consolidation of various armed wings of nonstate actors maintained by different political parties following the 2014 fatwa against ISIS, have historically leveraged their access to state institutions and security apparatuses to mobilize support. These groups often benefit from patronage networks that distribute resources and services, giving them an electoral edge over newer or less-connected opposition groups. During election campaigns, parties affiliated with the PMF are more likely to have access to media coverage, funding, and logistical support, which amplifies their visibility and influence.
The regime has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. International observers, including UN monitors, and the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) have routinely noted that the voting and counting processes are technically sound and secure. During all Iraqi elections, the IHEC has collaborated closely with a number of international organizations like the UN Election Assistance Mission in Iraq, the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. In 2025, around 1,200 international observers took part in monitoring the parliamentary elections. In 2021, the parliamentary elections were monitored by 150,000 local observers from hundreds of local non-governmental organizations and over 1,500 international observers. Electoral results are ratified by the Federal Supreme Court, and subsequent government formation, however delayed, is rooted in the outcome of the polls.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime in Iraq manipulates legal frameworks, controls media outlets, and has at times employed repression tactics to suppress dissent and sustain power. Despite constitutional guarantees of free expression, the regime exploits vague laws—such as broad defamation statutes—to criminalize critics, activists, and journalists, fostering an environment of fear and self-censorship. Although Iraq boasts a relatively diverse media landscape with numerous outlets, most are partisan and serve elite or political faction interests, rather than functioning as independent watchdogs. Repression strategies—ranging from harassment and arbitrary detention to violence against protestors and journalists—are systematically used to curtail opposition and control public discourse, as seen during the 2019 Tishreen protests. However, recent shifts under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, emphasizing limited reforms and short-term stability, demonstrate how the regime balances repression with efforts to address popular grievances, maintaining a fragile political equilibrium while delaying fundamental democratic change.
The regime has, at times, taken measures that led to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. While the Iraqi media market is diverse compared to regime-controlled systems in other parts of the Middle East, the regime and powerful non-state groups have at times enforced the temporary or permanent forced closure of media outlets. In July 2025, regime agents shut down the privately owned Iraq AlHadath channel without a clear explanation. In September 2019, Iraq’s Communications and Media Commission (CMC), a regulatory body that oversees the media industry, issued a three-month suspension against the American government-funded Arabic-language satellite television channel, Al Hurra. This action followed Al Hurra’s broadcast of an investigative report on alleged corruption within Iraqi religious institutions, with the CMC justifying the suspension by claiming the channel had defamed those religious bodies.
The regime has somewhat manipulated media coverage in its favor. This has taken shape in the form of a two-pronged strategy focusing on controlling traditional media outlets through a mixture of regulation and co-optation strategies, and policing the digital space. Beyond using specific defamation and libel penal codes to target dissent, official regime bodies, like the CMC, use regulatory power to exert influence over media outlets. The CMC, which grants licenses to broadcast media, is also used to impose heavy financial penalties, temporarily suspend, or permanently revoke the licenses of television and radio stations that produce content deemed hostile or dangerous to the regime’s security or social harmony.
While Iraq’s media environment appears superficially diverse, hosting over 200 newspapers and 90 broadcast stations, the majority of these outlets are predominantly partisan because they are either owned or financed by political elites. These platforms effectively function as sophisticated propaganda tools to promote narratives favorable to their political patrons and the regime’s initiatives, simultaneously discrediting opposition voices and fueling partisan conflict to distract the public from systemic corruption. Moreover, these outlets frequently advance narratives of ethnic or sectarian threat to solidify loyalty among their supporters, thus enabling their political faction to secure the transactional power and economic resources required to thrive within the country’s consociational system. As a result, Iraqi political media behavior is characterized by a recurring “in-and-out” cycle of patronage and opposition. When a party or coalition loses its ministerial positions, parliamentary seats, or is excluded from the ruling coalition, it often turns to its media outlets to mobilize its supporters and leverage negotiations to regain influence. This process involves shifting from being a regime ally to a temporary opposition, depending on the political circumstances. This cyclical pattern prevents the emergence of a genuine, constructive political opposition committed to legislative oversight and the development of long-term national policy alternatives. Instead, opposition parties predominantly use their media platforms as tools for negotiation over resource distribution, perpetuating a cycle of transactional governance. As a result, Iraq remains trapped in a political dynamic where power is maintained through short-term deals and patronage, rather than through sustained, principled opposition aimed at fostering stability and meaningful reform.
The regime censors dissenting speech. While the physical barriers to expression may be lower than in more authoritarian regimes, the legal and digital mechanisms for censorship are robust and frequently enforced. In recent years, the primary legislative efforts to control media have centered on the digital sphere, reflecting the regime’s concern over the rapid spread of political dissent and information on social media. For instance, censorship of social media content occurs through the use of the “Ballegh” (report) platform, launched in January 2023, which allows citizens to anonymously report social media content deemed indecent or immoral. With over 152,000 complaints filed by August 2024, the platform leverages vague morality laws to institutionalize digital surveillance, allowing the state to selectively prosecute critics and activists under the guise of upholding public morals. By blurring the distinction between moral offense and legitimate political criticism, the regime cultivates a widespread environment of self-censorship online. While rival factions may criticize one another, any critical discourse targeting the entire political system is suppressed, thereby reinforcing the regime’s control over the public narrative.
The regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. Despite allowing the emergence of diverse voices and opinions, the regime has occasionally used vague laws to suppress dissenting voices and curtail freedom of expression. For example, Articles 225-227 of the Penal Code, which were widely used by Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime, have in recent years also been used to prosecute activists criticizing the regime. These articles contain ambiguous and broad language that enables Iraqi authorities to penalize anyone who “insults the government,” “military forces,” or “semi-official agencies,” and condemn them to up to seven years in prison. Other laws governing “morality” or “public order” have authorized the arbitrary and indiscriminate application of some provisions to silence Iraqi journalists and government critics. In March 2024, the regime used these articles against Yasser Aljuboori, an activist and outspoken critic of corruption in Iraq, who was detained for ten days on charges relating to a tweet criticizing regime appointments. However, Prime Minister Al-Sudani intervened to secure his release a few days after his detention.
The regime has at times seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. During the 2019 Tishreen movement, then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi’s regime used lethal force, mass arrests, and internet shutdowns to suppress demonstrations, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. Protesters, journalists, and activists faced violence, arbitrary detention, and harassment. However, under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the strategy has shifted considerably. While repression remains a threat, the focus has been on addressing protesters’ core demands—such as fighting corruption, improving infrastructure, and creating jobs—which has temporarily reduced protest activity and stabilized the political landscape. Nonetheless, this stability relies more on short-term gains and deterrence than on genuine reform or trust-building. Some activists and journalists, like Sherwan Sherwani, who cover protests and denounce cases of political corruption within the Iraqi-Kurdistan regime institutions, have been indefinitely detained on questionable charges since 2020.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Operating within a highly fragmented political environment, institutional checks and balances are inconsistently applied and often undermined by powerful political interests. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court (FSC) operates as a critical, yet selective, check on the regime, exercising significant judicial review that limits the political elite’s power and guarantees electoral integrity. Yet, it also appears to avoid direct, long-term intervention in high-profile constitutional cases, allowing the Muhasasa system to persist. As addressed under electoral competition, the Muhasasa system is the unwritten sectarian quota and political convention system that allocates ministries and state wealth based on ethno-sectarian lines. Under this system, the Prime Minister is not a true executive with a clear mandate but a consensus candidate selected through parliamentary coalition negotiations, inherently limiting his independent authority. Executive cabinet positions are allocated by the Muhasasa system, meaning ministers are often loyal to their party bloc or militia rather than to the prime minister, hindering the prime minister’s ability to enforce cohesive national policy or pursue anti-corruption efforts within ministries controlled by rival factions.
Courts frequently check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The FSC has demonstrated a degree of institutional independence by intervening decisively in electoral processes, effectively checking the power of the ruling blocs when the rule of law is directly violated or challenged. The most significant instance was after the disputed 2018 parliamentary elections. Following widespread accusations of fraud that threatened the legitimacy of the entire political structure, the FSC issued a pivotal ruling in 2020 to mandate a partial manual recount of millions of votes. This decision forced the regime to reverse its previous actions and accept judicial oversight, proving the court would not simply rubber-stamp results generated by the political elite. In December 2021, the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) rejected a petition from the Fatah Alliance, led by Hadi al-Ameri, to invalidate the results of the 2021 parliamentary elections based on allegations of widespread fraud. Ameri, an influential regime figure at the time and the former head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), was acting after his bloc suffered a dramatic setback. The Fatah Alliance, which represents various armed factions within the influential PMF—forces that were once loosely organized but have more recently been centralized under government authority (with a few groups existing outside the official structure)—won only 18 seats, a substantial loss compared to the 48 seats it had secured in the previous election. The ruling was critical in convincing groups opposing election results to accept them, cease street protests by their supporters, and join political negotiations in parliament. In late 2022, when the country went over a year without a new government and then Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s administration was operating in a caretaker capacity, the FSC issued a pivotal ruling to explicitly restrict the powers of the caretaker government, ruling that it could not submit new draft laws to the parliament, sign significant new international treaties, or undertake large-scale borrowing or appointments that were not strictly essential for daily function. This ruling was a direct check on the political vacuum, preventing the incumbent caretaker faction from leveraging its prolonged, unelected status to implement its long-term political agenda or financially tie the hands of the next full government. By delineating the boundaries of interim power, the FSC ensured that the crisis did not become a permanent tool for one faction to consolidate power outside the constitutional process, thus upholding the principles of the separation of powers.
Judicial institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold the regime accountable. With numerous public officials perceived to be actively engaged in grafts, kickbacks, patronage, clientelism, nepotism, and extortion, the judiciary has been unable to rein in corruption and the widespread theft of public funds. For example, in June 2023, following a nine-month investigation by the Washington Post, Prime Minister Sudani sanctioned an investigation that later validated a series of charges of torture and extortion by the anti-corruption committee, otherwise known as Committee 29. The committee, established under the reign of his predecessor, former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, was ultimately invalidated, and its members were prosecuted. However, senior executives in Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi were not questioned or charged, despite the majority of committee members testifying that they had investigated names handed down to them by senior officials as a means of settling political scores.
The FSC has generally avoided issuing broad constitutional reviews or rulings that would eliminate the basis for the Muhasasa system, often seen as the root cause of institutional corruption and democratic stagnation in Iraq. For instance, this system dictates that the Prime Minister must be Shia, the President Kurdish, and the Speaker Sunni, despite no such constitutional prerequisites. By repeatedly avoiding a broad ruling that mandates appointments based purely on competence or electoral mandate rather than on ethno-sectarian affiliation, the FSC allows the foundational mechanism of Muhasasa and institutional corruption to persist.
The regime has subjected some independent oversight institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their operational independence. This has taken place in the form of political interference, legislative changes, and resource constraints that undermine the independence and operational effectiveness of oversight institutions. While Iraq has demonstrated a degree of institutional awareness, such as passing a Code of Judicial Conduct in 2023, establishing Integrity Investigation Courts at the governorate level, and forming a Judicial Oversight Authority to monitor judges and impose disciplinary measures against those proven to have committed legal violations, other critical institutions like the Federal Commission of Integrity (the main anti-corruption body) and its counterpart in the Kurdistan Region are reported to lack the necessary independence and are often subject to political influence, with key roles left vacant or filled based on party affiliation rather than merit. Coupled with weak judicial cooperation, this has hindered their ability to effectively carry out their mandate and recover stolen public assets, particularly while pursuing high-profile corruption cases that could upset the established political order.
The Council of Representatives (CoR) is highly competitive, yet party discipline is extremely rigid. MPs are often bound by the decisions of their political bloc’s leaders, limiting their ability to vote independently or respond directly to their constituents’ demands. This means that while the legislature can, in theory, debate and pass bills (like the 2024 Iraqi Legal Aid Law, the 2019 Law on Combating Violence against Women), the success of any legislation depends on backroom political deals between the dominant blocs, not organic debate. While the CoR retains the power to question and even remove ministers, this power is typically exercised only when a political bloc wants to target a rival minister whose portfolio is held by an opposing faction, demonstrating that oversight is often a tool of inter-elite conflict rather than genuine accountability. The CoR, while representative, often struggles to perform its oversight function effectively. The deeply fragmented, factional nature of Iraqi politics means that the primary concern of parliamentary blocs is power-sharing and patronage, rather than rigorous scrutiny of the executive or the enforcement of oversight measures. The typically slow and arduous process of forming a government in Iraq, often taking several months, underscores the paralysis in the legislative branch, preventing it from acting as a cohesive check on the other branches of government.
HRF classifies Iraq as ruled by a Hybrid Authoritarian regime.
Iraq’s transition to a federal parliamentary democracy began with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s 24-year-long authoritarian regime in 2003. Since then, the country has made notable strides towards establishing democratic institutions, including the drafting of a new constitution, holding routine elections, and the formation of a representative government. Iraq’s political landscape is marked by constitutional guarantees for a multi-party system, competitive elections, and a framework for the peaceful transition of power. However, constraints on freedom of dissent and institutional accountability persist. From October 2022 to November 2025, the Iraqi governing authority was led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who assumed his position following a prolonged political deadlock of nearly a year, which occurred after the October 2021 parliamentary elections. In November 2025, his political party won the general elections. However, given Iraq’s consociational governance system, dictated by a multi-stage negotiation process, requiring the nominee to achieve cross-segment legitimacy rather than just a parliamentary plurality, by December 2025, it remained unclear whether his victory would be sufficient to guarantee the incumbent’s reappointment.
National elections are largely free and fair. Regular parliamentary elections have taken place since 2005, with the 2021 parliamentary elections representing the largest infusion of independent candidates in Iraq’s modern history. The post-2003 political system, though often criticized for its ethno-sectarian power-sharing mechanisms (known as Muhasasa), ensures that the country’s diverse partisan, religious, and ethnic groups are generally represented in the Council of Representatives (CoR). The freedom to form political parties is robust, resulting in hundreds of registered parties and shifting alliances, reflecting an open, albeit fragmented, political environment.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. While individuals are afforded some space to criticize the regime, vaguely worded provisions in the penal code are often instrumentalized by the political elite to target and prosecute journalists, activists, and protesters, directly contradicting the fundamental right to free speech enshrined in the new constitution.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Iraq’s institutions exist in a precarious and frequently constrained state, where constitutional powers are consistently undermined by the interests of the dominant political elite and sectarian political blocs. The Federal Supreme Court (FSC) acts as a critical, yet selective, check, often intervening decisively to safeguard electoral integrity and limit executive overreach. However, the FSC has consistently avoided issuing broad rulings that would dismantle the ethno-sectarian power-sharing system, the perceived root of institutional corruption. Moreover, the legislature’s oversight function is often selective and partisan, and junior courts and anti-corruption bodies are frequently subject to political interference and coercion.
National elections are largely free and fair. Iraq holds regular, competitive elections in a political landscape marked by constitutional guarantees for a multi-party system and a framework for the peaceful transition of power. However, formal electoral frameworks coexist with underlying systemic flaws that undermine genuine political competition and accountability. While elections are frequently characterized by procedural legitimacy—regular, competitive, and allowing citizens to participate—they are marred by structural design flaws, elite manipulation, and entrenched power-sharing arrangements that distort outcomes. These dynamics lead to a superficial veneer of democracy, where electoral results do not translate into substantive change, and political elites maintain control through mechanisms that restrict meaningful opposition, perpetuate sectarian or partisan dominance, and undermine public confidence. The principal challenge lies in the proportional representation system and an entrenched, unwritten ethno-sectarian power-sharing quota system, known as Muhasasa. Together, these systems ensure that elections do not pick leaders but merely determine the relative strength of established parties. This necessitates months of closed-door, elite negotiations to form a government, requiring a supermajority coalition that dilutes the individual vote.
Iraq’s electoral system, which uses proportional representation to allocate seats based on party lists and requires a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority (220 out of 329 seats) to approve a government, fundamentally undermines the individual vote. Since no single party ever wins a majority, elections serve only to determine the relative strength of political blocs, forcing them into prolonged, closed-door negotiations to form broad, multi-sectarian coalitions. This process has institutionalized the Muhasasa quota system, which allocates top state posts by ethno-sectarian identity, with the prime minister a Shia Muslim, the president being Kurdish, and the speaker of the house a Sunni Muslim. It prioritizes elite power-sharing over popular mandates, leading to a profound lack of voter confidence and high abstention rates. Nonetheless, Iraq’s fragmented system and constant need for coalition-building have prevented authoritarian consolidation. The 2019 Tishreen (October) protests, which initially erupted over failing infrastructure and mass water poisoning but quickly evolved to demand an end to corruption, increased jobs, and political reform targeting the Muhasasa system that dominated Iraqi politics, led to early elections and a shift to the Single Non-Transferable Vote system, weakening dominant parties and enabling a record number of independents to enter parliament, demonstrating that political change remains possible outside the entrenched Muhasasa system.
The regime in Iraq has been widely accused of engaging in significant electoral law manipulation. Since 2003, Iraqi politicians have repeatedly altered the electoral system in the run-up to elections, often under popular pressure, but with results that favor the dominant parties. For example, the system has swung between various forms of proportional representation (PR), sometimes adopting the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system under massive public demand in 2020. This constant shifting of rules creates confusion and makes it difficult for new, independent parties to organize effectively. While the regime fully shifted to new biometric voter cards during the 2021 elections to address the issue of voting irregularities, during the initial rollout of the biometric cards in 2018, which were characterized by manual and electronic voting, allegations of fraud were so pervasive that the Iraqi Supreme Court mandated a manual recount of the nearly 11 million electronic votes. This recount resulted in some seat changes, confirming that manipulation had occurred.
The regime does not unfairly bar a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections presented a robust display of pluralism. With 31 political alliances, 38 parties, and 75 independent candidates entering the fray, the sheer volume of options suggests a political system defined by openness. Reflecting this broader political representation, the 2025 elections saw 7,768 candidates vying for seats—a significant increase over the 3,249 who ran in the previous 2021 cycle. However, the election landscape was characterized by systemic absorption. While the freedom to run remained intact, the freedom to remain independent was undermined by the gravity of established political blocs. A poignant example of this phenomenon is the fate of the Imtidad party. Originally born from the grassroots energy of the Tishreen protests, the party’s absence from the 2025 elections marked a significant turning point. Rather than maintaining a distinct opposition front, its former MPs were largely absorbed into established political groups.
It is also worth noting that Iraq bars former Baathists from competing in elections primarily to prevent the return of Saddam Hussein’s repressive regime and to fulfill a core aspect of De-Ba’athification, a policy rooted in addressing historical atrocities. The constitutional mandate for this exclusion is found in Article 7 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which prohibits any entity or program that promotes or glorifies the Baath Party. The practical enforcement is managed by the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC), which scrutinizes the history of individuals to prevent high-ranking former Baathists from holding public office or gaining influence in the post-2003 democratic system. While these laws have significantly marginalized certain groups, they do not constitute an outright ban on political opposition. Instead, the political landscape remains relatively open, allowing various factions to participate in elections and political processes.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, contribute to the regime enjoying significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete, including by engaging in slander or misinformation. Political parties aligned with the ruling elite, such as the Fatah Alliance and parties associated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF or Hashd al-Shaabi, as it’s known in Arabic), which originated from the consolidation of various armed wings of nonstate actors maintained by different political parties following the 2014 fatwa against ISIS, have historically leveraged their access to state institutions and security apparatuses to mobilize support. These groups often benefit from patronage networks that distribute resources and services, giving them an electoral edge over newer or less-connected opposition groups. During election campaigns, parties affiliated with the PMF are more likely to have access to media coverage, funding, and logistical support, which amplifies their visibility and influence.
The regime has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. International observers, including UN monitors, and the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) have routinely noted that the voting and counting processes are technically sound and secure. During all Iraqi elections, the IHEC has collaborated closely with a number of international organizations like the UN Election Assistance Mission in Iraq, the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. In 2025, around 1,200 international observers took part in monitoring the parliamentary elections. In 2021, the parliamentary elections were monitored by 150,000 local observers from hundreds of local non-governmental organizations and over 1,500 international observers. Electoral results are ratified by the Federal Supreme Court, and subsequent government formation, however delayed, is rooted in the outcome of the polls.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime in Iraq manipulates legal frameworks, controls media outlets, and has at times employed repression tactics to suppress dissent and sustain power. Despite constitutional guarantees of free expression, the regime exploits vague laws—such as broad defamation statutes—to criminalize critics, activists, and journalists, fostering an environment of fear and self-censorship. Although Iraq boasts a relatively diverse media landscape with numerous outlets, most are partisan and serve elite or political faction interests, rather than functioning as independent watchdogs. Repression strategies—ranging from harassment and arbitrary detention to violence against protestors and journalists—are systematically used to curtail opposition and control public discourse, as seen during the 2019 Tishreen protests. However, recent shifts under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, emphasizing limited reforms and short-term stability, demonstrate how the regime balances repression with efforts to address popular grievances, maintaining a fragile political equilibrium while delaying fundamental democratic change.
The regime has, at times, taken measures that led to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. While the Iraqi media market is diverse compared to regime-controlled systems in other parts of the Middle East, the regime and powerful non-state groups have at times enforced the temporary or permanent forced closure of media outlets. In July 2025, regime agents shut down the privately owned Iraq AlHadath channel without a clear explanation. In September 2019, Iraq’s Communications and Media Commission (CMC), a regulatory body that oversees the media industry, issued a three-month suspension against the American government-funded Arabic-language satellite television channel, Al Hurra. This action followed Al Hurra’s broadcast of an investigative report on alleged corruption within Iraqi religious institutions, with the CMC justifying the suspension by claiming the channel had defamed those religious bodies.
The regime has somewhat manipulated media coverage in its favor. This has taken shape in the form of a two-pronged strategy focusing on controlling traditional media outlets through a mixture of regulation and co-optation strategies, and policing the digital space. Beyond using specific defamation and libel penal codes to target dissent, official regime bodies, like the CMC, use regulatory power to exert influence over media outlets. The CMC, which grants licenses to broadcast media, is also used to impose heavy financial penalties, temporarily suspend, or permanently revoke the licenses of television and radio stations that produce content deemed hostile or dangerous to the regime’s security or social harmony.
While Iraq’s media environment appears superficially diverse, hosting over 200 newspapers and 90 broadcast stations, the majority of these outlets are predominantly partisan because they are either owned or financed by political elites. These platforms effectively function as sophisticated propaganda tools to promote narratives favorable to their political patrons and the regime’s initiatives, simultaneously discrediting opposition voices and fueling partisan conflict to distract the public from systemic corruption. Moreover, these outlets frequently advance narratives of ethnic or sectarian threat to solidify loyalty among their supporters, thus enabling their political faction to secure the transactional power and economic resources required to thrive within the country’s consociational system. As a result, Iraqi political media behavior is characterized by a recurring “in-and-out” cycle of patronage and opposition. When a party or coalition loses its ministerial positions, parliamentary seats, or is excluded from the ruling coalition, it often turns to its media outlets to mobilize its supporters and leverage negotiations to regain influence. This process involves shifting from being a regime ally to a temporary opposition, depending on the political circumstances. This cyclical pattern prevents the emergence of a genuine, constructive political opposition committed to legislative oversight and the development of long-term national policy alternatives. Instead, opposition parties predominantly use their media platforms as tools for negotiation over resource distribution, perpetuating a cycle of transactional governance. As a result, Iraq remains trapped in a political dynamic where power is maintained through short-term deals and patronage, rather than through sustained, principled opposition aimed at fostering stability and meaningful reform.
The regime censors dissenting speech. While the physical barriers to expression may be lower than in more authoritarian regimes, the legal and digital mechanisms for censorship are robust and frequently enforced. In recent years, the primary legislative efforts to control media have centered on the digital sphere, reflecting the regime’s concern over the rapid spread of political dissent and information on social media. For instance, censorship of social media content occurs through the use of the “Ballegh” (report) platform, launched in January 2023, which allows citizens to anonymously report social media content deemed indecent or immoral. With over 152,000 complaints filed by August 2024, the platform leverages vague morality laws to institutionalize digital surveillance, allowing the state to selectively prosecute critics and activists under the guise of upholding public morals. By blurring the distinction between moral offense and legitimate political criticism, the regime cultivates a widespread environment of self-censorship online. While rival factions may criticize one another, any critical discourse targeting the entire political system is suppressed, thereby reinforcing the regime’s control over the public narrative.
The regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. Despite allowing the emergence of diverse voices and opinions, the regime has occasionally used vague laws to suppress dissenting voices and curtail freedom of expression. For example, Articles 225-227 of the Penal Code, which were widely used by Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime, have in recent years also been used to prosecute activists criticizing the regime. These articles contain ambiguous and broad language that enables Iraqi authorities to penalize anyone who “insults the government,” “military forces,” or “semi-official agencies,” and condemn them to up to seven years in prison. Other laws governing “morality” or “public order” have authorized the arbitrary and indiscriminate application of some provisions to silence Iraqi journalists and government critics. In March 2024, the regime used these articles against Yasser Aljuboori, an activist and outspoken critic of corruption in Iraq, who was detained for ten days on charges relating to a tweet criticizing regime appointments. However, Prime Minister Al-Sudani intervened to secure his release a few days after his detention.
The regime has at times seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. During the 2019 Tishreen movement, then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi’s regime used lethal force, mass arrests, and internet shutdowns to suppress demonstrations, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. Protesters, journalists, and activists faced violence, arbitrary detention, and harassment. However, under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the strategy has shifted considerably. While repression remains a threat, the focus has been on addressing protesters’ core demands—such as fighting corruption, improving infrastructure, and creating jobs—which has temporarily reduced protest activity and stabilized the political landscape. Nonetheless, this stability relies more on short-term gains and deterrence than on genuine reform or trust-building. Some activists and journalists, like Sherwan Sherwani, who cover protests and denounce cases of political corruption within the Iraqi-Kurdistan regime institutions, have been indefinitely detained on questionable charges since 2020.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Operating within a highly fragmented political environment, institutional checks and balances are inconsistently applied and often undermined by powerful political interests. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court (FSC) operates as a critical, yet selective, check on the regime, exercising significant judicial review that limits the political elite’s power and guarantees electoral integrity. Yet, it also appears to avoid direct, long-term intervention in high-profile constitutional cases, allowing the Muhasasa system to persist. As addressed under electoral competition, the Muhasasa system is the unwritten sectarian quota and political convention system that allocates ministries and state wealth based on ethno-sectarian lines. Under this system, the Prime Minister is not a true executive with a clear mandate but a consensus candidate selected through parliamentary coalition negotiations, inherently limiting his independent authority. Executive cabinet positions are allocated by the Muhasasa system, meaning ministers are often loyal to their party bloc or militia rather than to the prime minister, hindering the prime minister’s ability to enforce cohesive national policy or pursue anti-corruption efforts within ministries controlled by rival factions.
Courts frequently check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The FSC has demonstrated a degree of institutional independence by intervening decisively in electoral processes, effectively checking the power of the ruling blocs when the rule of law is directly violated or challenged. The most significant instance was after the disputed 2018 parliamentary elections. Following widespread accusations of fraud that threatened the legitimacy of the entire political structure, the FSC issued a pivotal ruling in 2020 to mandate a partial manual recount of millions of votes. This decision forced the regime to reverse its previous actions and accept judicial oversight, proving the court would not simply rubber-stamp results generated by the political elite. In December 2021, the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) rejected a petition from the Fatah Alliance, led by Hadi al-Ameri, to invalidate the results of the 2021 parliamentary elections based on allegations of widespread fraud. Ameri, an influential regime figure at the time and the former head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), was acting after his bloc suffered a dramatic setback. The Fatah Alliance, which represents various armed factions within the influential PMF—forces that were once loosely organized but have more recently been centralized under government authority (with a few groups existing outside the official structure)—won only 18 seats, a substantial loss compared to the 48 seats it had secured in the previous election. The ruling was critical in convincing groups opposing election results to accept them, cease street protests by their supporters, and join political negotiations in parliament. In late 2022, when the country went over a year without a new government and then Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s administration was operating in a caretaker capacity, the FSC issued a pivotal ruling to explicitly restrict the powers of the caretaker government, ruling that it could not submit new draft laws to the parliament, sign significant new international treaties, or undertake large-scale borrowing or appointments that were not strictly essential for daily function. This ruling was a direct check on the political vacuum, preventing the incumbent caretaker faction from leveraging its prolonged, unelected status to implement its long-term political agenda or financially tie the hands of the next full government. By delineating the boundaries of interim power, the FSC ensured that the crisis did not become a permanent tool for one faction to consolidate power outside the constitutional process, thus upholding the principles of the separation of powers.
Judicial institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold the regime accountable. With numerous public officials perceived to be actively engaged in grafts, kickbacks, patronage, clientelism, nepotism, and extortion, the judiciary has been unable to rein in corruption and the widespread theft of public funds. For example, in June 2023, following a nine-month investigation by the Washington Post, Prime Minister Sudani sanctioned an investigation that later validated a series of charges of torture and extortion by the anti-corruption committee, otherwise known as Committee 29. The committee, established under the reign of his predecessor, former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, was ultimately invalidated, and its members were prosecuted. However, senior executives in Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi were not questioned or charged, despite the majority of committee members testifying that they had investigated names handed down to them by senior officials as a means of settling political scores.
The FSC has generally avoided issuing broad constitutional reviews or rulings that would eliminate the basis for the Muhasasa system, often seen as the root cause of institutional corruption and democratic stagnation in Iraq. For instance, this system dictates that the Prime Minister must be Shia, the President Kurdish, and the Speaker Sunni, despite no such constitutional prerequisites. By repeatedly avoiding a broad ruling that mandates appointments based purely on competence or electoral mandate rather than on ethno-sectarian affiliation, the FSC allows the foundational mechanism of Muhasasa and institutional corruption to persist.
The regime has subjected some independent oversight institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their operational independence. This has taken place in the form of political interference, legislative changes, and resource constraints that undermine the independence and operational effectiveness of oversight institutions. While Iraq has demonstrated a degree of institutional awareness, such as passing a Code of Judicial Conduct in 2023, establishing Integrity Investigation Courts at the governorate level, and forming a Judicial Oversight Authority to monitor judges and impose disciplinary measures against those proven to have committed legal violations, other critical institutions like the Federal Commission of Integrity (the main anti-corruption body) and its counterpart in the Kurdistan Region are reported to lack the necessary independence and are often subject to political influence, with key roles left vacant or filled based on party affiliation rather than merit. Coupled with weak judicial cooperation, this has hindered their ability to effectively carry out their mandate and recover stolen public assets, particularly while pursuing high-profile corruption cases that could upset the established political order.
The Council of Representatives (CoR) is highly competitive, yet party discipline is extremely rigid. MPs are often bound by the decisions of their political bloc’s leaders, limiting their ability to vote independently or respond directly to their constituents’ demands. This means that while the legislature can, in theory, debate and pass bills (like the 2024 Iraqi Legal Aid Law, the 2019 Law on Combating Violence against Women), the success of any legislation depends on backroom political deals between the dominant blocs, not organic debate. While the CoR retains the power to question and even remove ministers, this power is typically exercised only when a political bloc wants to target a rival minister whose portfolio is held by an opposing faction, demonstrating that oversight is often a tool of inter-elite conflict rather than genuine accountability. The CoR, while representative, often struggles to perform its oversight function effectively. The deeply fragmented, factional nature of Iraqi politics means that the primary concern of parliamentary blocs is power-sharing and patronage, rather than rigorous scrutiny of the executive or the enforcement of oversight measures. The typically slow and arduous process of forming a government in Iraq, often taking several months, underscores the paralysis in the legislative branch, preventing it from acting as a cohesive check on the other branches of government.
