Fully Authoritarian
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Population
HRF classifies Iran as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution that ended the monarchy’s rule, Iran adopted a constitution with a complex theocratic political system that ensures the uncontested control of the Supreme Leader, who holds a life tenure position with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches functioning under his uncontested supervision. The unelected Guardian Council, consisting of 12 Islamic jurists who are appointed by the Supreme Leader, regulates and vets the country’s presidential and legislative elections, the 290-seat parliament, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis-e Shura-ye Eslami), and the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan), a deliberative body composed of 88 members who are experts in interpreting Islamic law. Elected every eight years, the Assembly of Experts has the mandate to elect and remove the Supreme Leader.
Elections in Iran are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime unfairly bars presidential and parliamentary candidates from competing in elections, which are marred by the lack of independent electoral supervision, ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, and other irregularities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime monopolizes domestic and radio television services, closes independent media outlets, and intimidates dissidents and journalists who criticize the regime’s policies. The regime has responded to protests violently and suppressed dissent through a number of tactics, including executions, arbitrary detention, and judicial harassment, contributing to an environment where critical expression is virtually impossible. The regime has also aimed to delegitimize and incapacitate civil society organizations that promote human rights and political reform. This pressure results in a significant chilling effect, where potential dissenters weigh personal safety against civic engagement, often leading to a retreat from public life.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Iranian regime has systematically co-opted the judiciary, legislature, and executive institutions to consolidate and maintain its authoritarian rule. The Supreme Leader appoints and can dismiss the Chief Justice of Iran, who is the highest judge of the Supreme Court and administers and supervises the judiciary branch. Judicial proceedings are often marked by a lack of transparency, arbitrary detentions, inadequate legal representation, and confessions under torture. The practice of holding secret trials, in particular by the specialized Revolutionary Courts, serves to further diminish any semblance of judicial fairness, ensuring that dissenting voices are silenced swiftly and without due process. The Islamic Consultative Assembly is elected through a process that is tightly controlled by the regime, with many opposition candidates disqualified by the Guardian Council, which is dominated by regime loyalists. The Guardian Council, appointed by the Supreme Leader and the judiciary, vets candidates and can veto legislation, effectively ensuring that laws align with the regime’s ideological framework. The Guardian Council is empowered to supervise elections and to approve or disqualify candidates seeking to run in local, parliamentary, or presidential elections – this ensures candidates are fully aligned with the regime, and institutions are fully coopted, as a result.
Elections in Iran are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The Iranian regime’s control over elections undermines independent electoral oversight, effectively turning them into a ratification process for pre-selected candidates. By narrowing the list of approved candidates, the Guardian Council’s primary function is to guarantee the regime’s full dominance over the political process by ensuring that all candidates running for public elections align with the regime’s practices and policies.
Iran holds presidential elections every four years, and members of Parliament, also known as the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis-e Shura-ye Eslami), are also elected for four-year terms in multi- and single-seat constituencies. The Assembly of Experts of the Leadership, also known as the Council of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan), a deliberative body empowered to appoint the Supreme Leader of Iran, is elected every eight years. Despite these seemingly plural processes, all nominated and elected officials must be approved by the Guardian Council. For instance, in the 2024 parliamentary elections, the Guardian Council received nearly 15,200 candidacy bids but approved only 30 candidates from the reformist camp. Similarly, in the 2021 presidential election, only seven hardliner candidates were permitted to run, while all reformist candidates were disqualified.
The regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. While the regime prohibits political parties, it allows two main political groupings, the Principlists and Reformists, with limited ability to operate within the Islamic Republic. These groups do not represent formal political parties; they only reflect differing views on the role of religion in politics, social freedoms, and foreign policy. The regime favors the Principlists (also known as conservatives or hardliners), confines the Reformists’ ability to engage in political discourse, and blocks opposition parties, the majority of which have either been exiled or gone underground. Opposition groups include but are not limited to the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI/MEK), and the Farashgard (Revival), a pro-democratic group that calls for the non-violent overthrow of the Islamic Republic.
With mainstream opposition groups barred from entering elections, and only those who exhibit practical allegiance to absolute clerical rule allowed to participate, the regime attempts to create the illusion of competition between hardliners and reformists, while ensuring that the latter are not strong enough to deliver meaningful change. In 2009, the reformist Green Movement accused the regime of rigging the presidential elections in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In response, the regime effectively isolated the Green Movement’s leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi, from political life, and by December 2025, the three leaders had spent approximately 5,425 days under house arrest.
The regime engaged in overwhelming voting irregularities or large-scale electoral fraud. During the 2024 parliamentary elections, there were multiple reports of voter manipulation, particularly organized buying of votes across impoverished areas. Reportedly, these took place in the form of financial payouts or material incentives, such as food parcels and other forms of aid packages offered by the Basij, a paramilitary volunteer armed group, under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Supreme Leader.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. This usually takes place in the form of judicial harassment for violating broadly worded penal codes, among other vague laws. This reality manifests theoretically as a totalizing architecture of regime control, where the legal apparatus is weaponized to transform fundamental human rights—such as assembly, expression, and association—into high-stakes criminal acts. The regime applies a multi-tiered strategy: the institutional monopolization of information via the shuttering of outlets, judicial harassment, and the dismantling of the civic space through the dissolution of civil society organizations (CSOs). This manifestation of power extends beyond national borders through transnational repression and the targeting of family members, creating a climate of fear among dissidents.
The regime unfairly shuts down major independent and dissenting organizations. The Iranian regime owns and controls the majority of media outlets, including television, radio, and major newspapers, and monitors outlets and reprimands them or shuts them down for non-alignment. In September 2023, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance’s Press Supervision Council suspended the pro-regime news site Entekhab. The site’s online presence was dismantled following the release of a video critique targeting the late President Ebrahim Raisi’s ineffective foreign diplomacy. In February 2023, the reformist publication Sazandegi was forced to close after running a lead story that scrutinized the government’s economic failures during a period of soaring meat costs. This pattern of censorship extends back decades; for example, Zanan (meaning “Women” in Farsi), once the nation’s final independent monthly magazine for women, was banned in January 2008. Regulators justified the move by claiming the magazine damaged the public’s psychological well-being by portraying women’s lives in a “gloomy” light and sharing morally questionable content.
The regime has also shut down or restricted the operations of CSOs that advocate for socio-economic and political rights. For example, in March 2021, the Ministry of Interior dissolved the Imam Ali Charity Association. This NGO, which worked to support vulnerable children, was shuttered after releasing two investigative papers that criticized the government’s failure to address the growing child labor crisis. The Defenders of Human Rights Center (DHRC), founded by Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, was first shuttered in 2008. Authorities justified the move by claiming the DHRC operated as an unlicensed political entity—pointing to standard NGO activities like hosting press briefings and collaborating with international partners as evidence of illegal conduct. It was closed illegally a second time in January 2010. The pressure from the state ultimately forced Ebadi into exile in Europe in 2009.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Dissidents frequently face charges of violating penal codes relating to “national security” (Articles 498, 499, 500, 505, and 610), “spreading propaganda against the system” (Article 500), Insulting the Supreme Leader (Article 514), “assembly and collusion against the regime” (Article 610) and “agitating the public consciousness” (Article 698). The regime also uses penal codes carrying the death sentence to suppress dissent, often against peaceful protesters. These include “Enmity against God” (Moharebeh) and “Corruption on Earth” (ifsad-fil-arz) (Articles 279 and 286). In addition, the regime manipulates morality and religious offences, including “Insulting Islamic sanctities” (Article 513 of the Penal Code) and Article 638, which requires that all women observe hijab in public places, to suppress dissent.
By the end of 2024, the regime had launched over 281 cases of legal and security proceedings against journalists and media workers. In June 2024, the Iranian judiciary handed down prison sentences to two prominent media figures: Yashar Soltani, the head of Memari News, and Saba Azarpeik, a journalist linked to reformist circles. Both were detained on allegations of spreading anti-regime propaganda and disturbing public opinion—charges widely viewed as baseless. The legal consequences were severe, with Soltani receiving a 13-month term and Azarpeik sentenced to two years. The human cost was particularly high for Azarpeik; she was pregnant during her arrest and tragically suffered a miscarriage shortly after enduring a nine-hour court hearing.
The Iranian regime has seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. This is primarily achieved by responding with excessive force and carrying out targeted and widespread arbitrary arrests to stifle opposition. For example, by the end of the Woman Life Freedom protests of 2022—sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody—the regime had reportedly killed 537 protesters and arrested more than 19,400 Iranians, including at least 79 journalists. This systemic crackdown is further exemplified by the case of 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi, who is currently held in Evin Prison. Mohammadi was arrested in November 2021 while attending a memorial for a victim of the Aban protests of November 2019. Those protests, initially triggered by a sudden rise in fuel prices, evolved into a nationwide uprising against the ruling establishment, to which the regime responded with a near-total internet blackout and lethal force that resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,500 protesters. Since her arrest, Mohammadi has faced new sentences—including an additional year added in June 2024— for her ongoing advocacy against the mandatory hijab and the death penalty. Her situation mirrors the historical violence seen during the 2009 Green Movement, where at least 100 protesters were killed, and over 4,000 were detained on vague charges. In the eight weeks between that election and the inauguration of the president, the judiciary executed 115 people in a calculated effort to instill fear and stifle future dissent, a tactic that continues to define the regime’s approach to organized opposition today.
The Iranian regime employs transnational repression against dissidents living abroad, using tactics such as surveillance, intimidation, and targeted assassinations. The Center for Human Rights in Iran has documented various instances where family members of Iranian political activists and journalists are targeted while the activists live outside the country. For example, Behrouz Ghobadi was detained in 2012 after his brother, Bahman Ghobadi, created a film highlighting the struggles of underground musicians in Iran. This incident underscores the regime’s method of threatening families to deter dissent. A similar case involved Massi Kamari, who received threats from an Iranian agent when she called her mother in Iran in April 2024, warning her to stop opposing the regime or risk her parents’ safety. Additionally, Massoud Molavi Vardanjani, a former intelligence operative who spoke out against corruption, was assassinated in Istanbul in November 2019 after his defection from Iran, illustrating the regime’s willingness to eliminate critics abroad.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The political system is characterized by a complex interplay between governing bodies—such as the President and the Islamic Consultative Assembly—and unelected institutions like the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, which wield outsized influence over legislation and governance. This structure often results in legislation and executive actions that prioritize regime stability and security over democratic principles and human rights. The hierarchical structure of the judicial systems renders all judges answerable to the Chief Justice of Iran, a figurehead appointed by the Supreme Leader. Consequently, the courts routinely validate the Guardian Council’s electoral manipulations and dismiss evidence of fraud. This culture of impunity is most visible in the Revolutionary Courts, which handle the majority of capital cases. By directing politically sensitive cases to these specialized tribunals and using the Guardian Council to veto any legislative attempts at reform, the regime has created a closed-loop system in which the law is used exclusively to criminalize opposition and insulate state officials from accountability.
With no elected judicial officials, Iran’s judiciary is not subject to any independent or representative oversight. Within this system, the head of the judicial system, the Chief Justice, is appointed by and accountable only to the Supreme Leader, and takes all major judicial and administrative decisions pertaining to the judiciary. The Chief Justice, frequently picked based on his alignment with and loyalty to the regime, has a seat on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the Supreme Economic Coordination Council. He also nominates jurists who serve on the Guardian Council. The Iranian regime has consistently selected former regime officials to head the judicial branch, with individuals demonstrating strong ties to the clerical establishment. For example, in 2021, the Supreme Leader picked Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei, a former minister of intelligence and prosecutor-general, to head the judicial system. Ejei, among several other regime officials, was sanctioned in 2011 by the United States Department of State and the European Union for his role in suppressing the 2009 Iranian presidential election protests.
Iranian courts frequently uphold decisions made by other repressive regime bodies, like the Guardian Council, failing to protect candidates’ and voters’ rights or challenge the regime’s electoral manipulations. Furthermore, allegations of electoral fraud, such as vote tampering and ballot stuffing, have been reported in various elections. However, judicial mechanisms to investigate these claims are often absent or ineffective. Notably, the 2009 presidential elections were marred by the discovery of at least 3 million fraudulent ballots, raising allegations of blatant electoral manipulation. Despite this, the Guardian Council’s ability to unilaterally validate electoral results limited the judiciary’s role in addressing any claims of misconduct. Instead, the judiciary focused on persecuting and handing out severe sentences against dissidents, protesters, and other activists associated with the 2009 Green Movement, which the judiciary falsely labeled as an act of sedition.
Because judges are fully controlled by the regime and consistently uphold regime decisions, there is little to no information on members of the judicial branch facing any regime retaliation for acting contrary to regime interests. The regime uses an extensive investigation process to vet public service personnel, known as the Gozinesh process. In the judicial system, the process is designed to ensure conformity with the regime’s practices and policies by examining the beliefs and prior political leanings of judges and judicial personnel rather than their professional competence and legal qualifications. When appointed, judges do not enjoy security of tenure and remain employed at the discretion of the Chief Justice. This provides little incentive for judges to act contrary to the wishes of the head of the judiciary and diminishes their independence and impartiality. Those who deviate from this expectation, especially in cases that involve sensitive topics such as women’s rights, political dissent, or religious freedoms, can face various forms of retaliation.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judicial system has regularly failed to uphold the rule of law or to protect individuals’ rights against retaliation for dissenting views, reinforcing the atmosphere of fear and control within Iranian society. When complaints are raised, the courts generally do not act to investigate or rectify such grievances in a manner that upholds electoral integrity. Instead, Iranian courts are more likely to punish protesters, dissidents, whistleblowers, or journalists who expose electoral manipulation or corruption rather than the officials involved in the corrupt act. For instance, during the first seven weeks of the 2022 Woman Life Freedom protests, the judiciary announced that it had indicted over 1,000 protesters, all charged under false pretenses, including for alleged crimes like committing corruption on earth. In 2016, Yashar Soltani was arrested due to his reporting on corruption within the Iranian regime. Following his investigative reporting on an exploitation scheme enabling public officials to siphon public funds for personal gains, the judiciary sentenced Soltani to 24 months in prison on the false charges of promoting “propaganda against the state” and “collusion against national security.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable, particularly for actions that seriously undermine electoral competition or freedom of dissent. Following the 2022 Woman Life Freedom protests, the judiciary failed to hold any security agents accountable for hundreds of deaths, arbitrary detentions, and countless injuries among protesters – reinforcing the judiciary’s deeply entrenched culture of impunity for regime-led atrocities. This pattern is often driven by political motivations, especially in sensitive cases where dissent is targeted. For example, legal maneuvers in January 2018 significantly restricted the right to counsel for those facing national security charges—crimes that often carry the death penalty in Iran. Under a directive issued by the Chief Justice at the time, only a select roster of regime-sanctioned public defenders was permitted to manage such cases, effectively stripping defendants of the ability to retain independent legal aid during the critical early stages of an investigation. Anecdotal reports suggest that of the 2,000 lawyers authorized by the judiciary, a mere 20 were affiliated with the Tehran Bar Association. By restricting legal representation to a pre-approved pool of attorneys, the regime effectively eliminates the possibility of challenging or scrutinising the regime’s actions. This system promotes impunity among regime officials by creating an environment where abuses of power, such as arbitrary detentions, torture, and unfair trials, go unchallenged.
The Iranian regime directs politically sensitive cases, including those involving dissent or opposition to the regime, to separate courts that are under its control. This practice includes the use of Revolutionary Courts and other specialized tribunals designed to deal with cases that the regime considers a threat to its stability. Revolutionary Courts issued 520, approximately 61 percent, of all death sentences carried out in 2023. While integrated into the country’s judiciary, the Revolutionary Courts ofen operate in defiance of both domestic statutes and global legal standards. These tribunals are characterized by a persistent disregard for due process, frequently conducting expedited trials where defendants are stripped of their right to a defense. In many instances, the judiciary actively obstructs legal counsel by concealing vital case documents, evidence, and investigative findings. Over the last four decades, these specialized courts have established a reputation for extreme sentencing. They are responsible for a staggering death toll, with records indicating that at least 25,000 individuals—among them thousands of political dissidents—have been executed following verdicts handed down by these panels.
The Iranian regime’s executive and legislative institutions lack genuine independence and are extensively controlled by oversight mechanisms that ensure their actions and decisions consistently serve regime interests. For instance, in addition to its electoral duties, the Guardian Council, composed of non-elected clerics and jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader, also vets all legislation passed by the Parliament to ensure conformity with Islamic law and the regime’s ideological framework. This vetting process often leads to the rejection of laws that might challenge regime interests, effectively shaping legislation in favor of regime continuity. The Iranian parliament (Majlis-e Shura-ye Eslami) has passed numerous laws that enhance state security and suppress dissent. For example, legislation that criminalizes protests, restricts freedom of expression, or expands surveillance powers serves to entrench the regime’s grip on power. An illustrative case is the 2018 amendments to the Law on Cybercrime, which increased government control over digital spaces, targeting activists and opposition voices. The Assembly of Experts’ (Majles-e Khobregan) power to influence or affect legislation is limited. Although it theoretically holds the constitutional authority to oversee the Supreme Leader and influence his decisions, it does not have a formal role in the legislative process or in drafting or passing laws. As a result, it serves more as a body that safeguards the ideological integrity of the regime rather than as an active legislative or policy-making institution.
HRF classifies Iran as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution that ended the monarchy’s rule, Iran adopted a constitution with a complex theocratic political system that ensures the uncontested control of the Supreme Leader, who holds a life tenure position with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches functioning under his uncontested supervision. The unelected Guardian Council, consisting of 12 Islamic jurists who are appointed by the Supreme Leader, regulates and vets the country’s presidential and legislative elections, the 290-seat parliament, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis-e Shura-ye Eslami), and the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan), a deliberative body composed of 88 members who are experts in interpreting Islamic law. Elected every eight years, the Assembly of Experts has the mandate to elect and remove the Supreme Leader.
Elections in Iran are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime unfairly bars presidential and parliamentary candidates from competing in elections, which are marred by the lack of independent electoral supervision, ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, and other irregularities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime monopolizes domestic and radio television services, closes independent media outlets, and intimidates dissidents and journalists who criticize the regime’s policies. The regime has responded to protests violently and suppressed dissent through a number of tactics, including executions, arbitrary detention, and judicial harassment, contributing to an environment where critical expression is virtually impossible. The regime has also aimed to delegitimize and incapacitate civil society organizations that promote human rights and political reform. This pressure results in a significant chilling effect, where potential dissenters weigh personal safety against civic engagement, often leading to a retreat from public life.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Iranian regime has systematically co-opted the judiciary, legislature, and executive institutions to consolidate and maintain its authoritarian rule. The Supreme Leader appoints and can dismiss the Chief Justice of Iran, who is the highest judge of the Supreme Court and administers and supervises the judiciary branch. Judicial proceedings are often marked by a lack of transparency, arbitrary detentions, inadequate legal representation, and confessions under torture. The practice of holding secret trials, in particular by the specialized Revolutionary Courts, serves to further diminish any semblance of judicial fairness, ensuring that dissenting voices are silenced swiftly and without due process. The Islamic Consultative Assembly is elected through a process that is tightly controlled by the regime, with many opposition candidates disqualified by the Guardian Council, which is dominated by regime loyalists. The Guardian Council, appointed by the Supreme Leader and the judiciary, vets candidates and can veto legislation, effectively ensuring that laws align with the regime’s ideological framework. The Guardian Council is empowered to supervise elections and to approve or disqualify candidates seeking to run in local, parliamentary, or presidential elections – this ensures candidates are fully aligned with the regime, and institutions are fully coopted, as a result.
Elections in Iran are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The Iranian regime’s control over elections undermines independent electoral oversight, effectively turning them into a ratification process for pre-selected candidates. By narrowing the list of approved candidates, the Guardian Council’s primary function is to guarantee the regime’s full dominance over the political process by ensuring that all candidates running for public elections align with the regime’s practices and policies.
Iran holds presidential elections every four years, and members of Parliament, also known as the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis-e Shura-ye Eslami), are also elected for four-year terms in multi- and single-seat constituencies. The Assembly of Experts of the Leadership, also known as the Council of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan), a deliberative body empowered to appoint the Supreme Leader of Iran, is elected every eight years. Despite these seemingly plural processes, all nominated and elected officials must be approved by the Guardian Council. For instance, in the 2024 parliamentary elections, the Guardian Council received nearly 15,200 candidacy bids but approved only 30 candidates from the reformist camp. Similarly, in the 2021 presidential election, only seven hardliner candidates were permitted to run, while all reformist candidates were disqualified.
The regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. While the regime prohibits political parties, it allows two main political groupings, the Principlists and Reformists, with limited ability to operate within the Islamic Republic. These groups do not represent formal political parties; they only reflect differing views on the role of religion in politics, social freedoms, and foreign policy. The regime favors the Principlists (also known as conservatives or hardliners), confines the Reformists’ ability to engage in political discourse, and blocks opposition parties, the majority of which have either been exiled or gone underground. Opposition groups include but are not limited to the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI/MEK), and the Farashgard (Revival), a pro-democratic group that calls for the non-violent overthrow of the Islamic Republic.
With mainstream opposition groups barred from entering elections, and only those who exhibit practical allegiance to absolute clerical rule allowed to participate, the regime attempts to create the illusion of competition between hardliners and reformists, while ensuring that the latter are not strong enough to deliver meaningful change. In 2009, the reformist Green Movement accused the regime of rigging the presidential elections in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In response, the regime effectively isolated the Green Movement’s leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi, from political life, and by December 2025, the three leaders had spent approximately 5,425 days under house arrest.
The regime engaged in overwhelming voting irregularities or large-scale electoral fraud. During the 2024 parliamentary elections, there were multiple reports of voter manipulation, particularly organized buying of votes across impoverished areas. Reportedly, these took place in the form of financial payouts or material incentives, such as food parcels and other forms of aid packages offered by the Basij, a paramilitary volunteer armed group, under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Supreme Leader.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. This usually takes place in the form of judicial harassment for violating broadly worded penal codes, among other vague laws. This reality manifests theoretically as a totalizing architecture of regime control, where the legal apparatus is weaponized to transform fundamental human rights—such as assembly, expression, and association—into high-stakes criminal acts. The regime applies a multi-tiered strategy: the institutional monopolization of information via the shuttering of outlets, judicial harassment, and the dismantling of the civic space through the dissolution of civil society organizations (CSOs). This manifestation of power extends beyond national borders through transnational repression and the targeting of family members, creating a climate of fear among dissidents.
The regime unfairly shuts down major independent and dissenting organizations. The Iranian regime owns and controls the majority of media outlets, including television, radio, and major newspapers, and monitors outlets and reprimands them or shuts them down for non-alignment. In September 2023, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance’s Press Supervision Council suspended the pro-regime news site Entekhab. The site’s online presence was dismantled following the release of a video critique targeting the late President Ebrahim Raisi’s ineffective foreign diplomacy. In February 2023, the reformist publication Sazandegi was forced to close after running a lead story that scrutinized the government’s economic failures during a period of soaring meat costs. This pattern of censorship extends back decades; for example, Zanan (meaning “Women” in Farsi), once the nation’s final independent monthly magazine for women, was banned in January 2008. Regulators justified the move by claiming the magazine damaged the public’s psychological well-being by portraying women’s lives in a “gloomy” light and sharing morally questionable content.
The regime has also shut down or restricted the operations of CSOs that advocate for socio-economic and political rights. For example, in March 2021, the Ministry of Interior dissolved the Imam Ali Charity Association. This NGO, which worked to support vulnerable children, was shuttered after releasing two investigative papers that criticized the government’s failure to address the growing child labor crisis. The Defenders of Human Rights Center (DHRC), founded by Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, was first shuttered in 2008. Authorities justified the move by claiming the DHRC operated as an unlicensed political entity—pointing to standard NGO activities like hosting press briefings and collaborating with international partners as evidence of illegal conduct. It was closed illegally a second time in January 2010. The pressure from the state ultimately forced Ebadi into exile in Europe in 2009.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Dissidents frequently face charges of violating penal codes relating to “national security” (Articles 498, 499, 500, 505, and 610), “spreading propaganda against the system” (Article 500), Insulting the Supreme Leader (Article 514), “assembly and collusion against the regime” (Article 610) and “agitating the public consciousness” (Article 698). The regime also uses penal codes carrying the death sentence to suppress dissent, often against peaceful protesters. These include “Enmity against God” (Moharebeh) and “Corruption on Earth” (ifsad-fil-arz) (Articles 279 and 286). In addition, the regime manipulates morality and religious offences, including “Insulting Islamic sanctities” (Article 513 of the Penal Code) and Article 638, which requires that all women observe hijab in public places, to suppress dissent.
By the end of 2024, the regime had launched over 281 cases of legal and security proceedings against journalists and media workers. In June 2024, the Iranian judiciary handed down prison sentences to two prominent media figures: Yashar Soltani, the head of Memari News, and Saba Azarpeik, a journalist linked to reformist circles. Both were detained on allegations of spreading anti-regime propaganda and disturbing public opinion—charges widely viewed as baseless. The legal consequences were severe, with Soltani receiving a 13-month term and Azarpeik sentenced to two years. The human cost was particularly high for Azarpeik; she was pregnant during her arrest and tragically suffered a miscarriage shortly after enduring a nine-hour court hearing.
The Iranian regime has seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. This is primarily achieved by responding with excessive force and carrying out targeted and widespread arbitrary arrests to stifle opposition. For example, by the end of the Woman Life Freedom protests of 2022—sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody—the regime had reportedly killed 537 protesters and arrested more than 19,400 Iranians, including at least 79 journalists. This systemic crackdown is further exemplified by the case of 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi, who is currently held in Evin Prison. Mohammadi was arrested in November 2021 while attending a memorial for a victim of the Aban protests of November 2019. Those protests, initially triggered by a sudden rise in fuel prices, evolved into a nationwide uprising against the ruling establishment, to which the regime responded with a near-total internet blackout and lethal force that resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,500 protesters. Since her arrest, Mohammadi has faced new sentences—including an additional year added in June 2024— for her ongoing advocacy against the mandatory hijab and the death penalty. Her situation mirrors the historical violence seen during the 2009 Green Movement, where at least 100 protesters were killed, and over 4,000 were detained on vague charges. In the eight weeks between that election and the inauguration of the president, the judiciary executed 115 people in a calculated effort to instill fear and stifle future dissent, a tactic that continues to define the regime’s approach to organized opposition today.
The Iranian regime employs transnational repression against dissidents living abroad, using tactics such as surveillance, intimidation, and targeted assassinations. The Center for Human Rights in Iran has documented various instances where family members of Iranian political activists and journalists are targeted while the activists live outside the country. For example, Behrouz Ghobadi was detained in 2012 after his brother, Bahman Ghobadi, created a film highlighting the struggles of underground musicians in Iran. This incident underscores the regime’s method of threatening families to deter dissent. A similar case involved Massi Kamari, who received threats from an Iranian agent when she called her mother in Iran in April 2024, warning her to stop opposing the regime or risk her parents’ safety. Additionally, Massoud Molavi Vardanjani, a former intelligence operative who spoke out against corruption, was assassinated in Istanbul in November 2019 after his defection from Iran, illustrating the regime’s willingness to eliminate critics abroad.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The political system is characterized by a complex interplay between governing bodies—such as the President and the Islamic Consultative Assembly—and unelected institutions like the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, which wield outsized influence over legislation and governance. This structure often results in legislation and executive actions that prioritize regime stability and security over democratic principles and human rights. The hierarchical structure of the judicial systems renders all judges answerable to the Chief Justice of Iran, a figurehead appointed by the Supreme Leader. Consequently, the courts routinely validate the Guardian Council’s electoral manipulations and dismiss evidence of fraud. This culture of impunity is most visible in the Revolutionary Courts, which handle the majority of capital cases. By directing politically sensitive cases to these specialized tribunals and using the Guardian Council to veto any legislative attempts at reform, the regime has created a closed-loop system in which the law is used exclusively to criminalize opposition and insulate state officials from accountability.
With no elected judicial officials, Iran’s judiciary is not subject to any independent or representative oversight. Within this system, the head of the judicial system, the Chief Justice, is appointed by and accountable only to the Supreme Leader, and takes all major judicial and administrative decisions pertaining to the judiciary. The Chief Justice, frequently picked based on his alignment with and loyalty to the regime, has a seat on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the Supreme Economic Coordination Council. He also nominates jurists who serve on the Guardian Council. The Iranian regime has consistently selected former regime officials to head the judicial branch, with individuals demonstrating strong ties to the clerical establishment. For example, in 2021, the Supreme Leader picked Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei, a former minister of intelligence and prosecutor-general, to head the judicial system. Ejei, among several other regime officials, was sanctioned in 2011 by the United States Department of State and the European Union for his role in suppressing the 2009 Iranian presidential election protests.
Iranian courts frequently uphold decisions made by other repressive regime bodies, like the Guardian Council, failing to protect candidates’ and voters’ rights or challenge the regime’s electoral manipulations. Furthermore, allegations of electoral fraud, such as vote tampering and ballot stuffing, have been reported in various elections. However, judicial mechanisms to investigate these claims are often absent or ineffective. Notably, the 2009 presidential elections were marred by the discovery of at least 3 million fraudulent ballots, raising allegations of blatant electoral manipulation. Despite this, the Guardian Council’s ability to unilaterally validate electoral results limited the judiciary’s role in addressing any claims of misconduct. Instead, the judiciary focused on persecuting and handing out severe sentences against dissidents, protesters, and other activists associated with the 2009 Green Movement, which the judiciary falsely labeled as an act of sedition.
Because judges are fully controlled by the regime and consistently uphold regime decisions, there is little to no information on members of the judicial branch facing any regime retaliation for acting contrary to regime interests. The regime uses an extensive investigation process to vet public service personnel, known as the Gozinesh process. In the judicial system, the process is designed to ensure conformity with the regime’s practices and policies by examining the beliefs and prior political leanings of judges and judicial personnel rather than their professional competence and legal qualifications. When appointed, judges do not enjoy security of tenure and remain employed at the discretion of the Chief Justice. This provides little incentive for judges to act contrary to the wishes of the head of the judiciary and diminishes their independence and impartiality. Those who deviate from this expectation, especially in cases that involve sensitive topics such as women’s rights, political dissent, or religious freedoms, can face various forms of retaliation.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judicial system has regularly failed to uphold the rule of law or to protect individuals’ rights against retaliation for dissenting views, reinforcing the atmosphere of fear and control within Iranian society. When complaints are raised, the courts generally do not act to investigate or rectify such grievances in a manner that upholds electoral integrity. Instead, Iranian courts are more likely to punish protesters, dissidents, whistleblowers, or journalists who expose electoral manipulation or corruption rather than the officials involved in the corrupt act. For instance, during the first seven weeks of the 2022 Woman Life Freedom protests, the judiciary announced that it had indicted over 1,000 protesters, all charged under false pretenses, including for alleged crimes like committing corruption on earth. In 2016, Yashar Soltani was arrested due to his reporting on corruption within the Iranian regime. Following his investigative reporting on an exploitation scheme enabling public officials to siphon public funds for personal gains, the judiciary sentenced Soltani to 24 months in prison on the false charges of promoting “propaganda against the state” and “collusion against national security.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable, particularly for actions that seriously undermine electoral competition or freedom of dissent. Following the 2022 Woman Life Freedom protests, the judiciary failed to hold any security agents accountable for hundreds of deaths, arbitrary detentions, and countless injuries among protesters – reinforcing the judiciary’s deeply entrenched culture of impunity for regime-led atrocities. This pattern is often driven by political motivations, especially in sensitive cases where dissent is targeted. For example, legal maneuvers in January 2018 significantly restricted the right to counsel for those facing national security charges—crimes that often carry the death penalty in Iran. Under a directive issued by the Chief Justice at the time, only a select roster of regime-sanctioned public defenders was permitted to manage such cases, effectively stripping defendants of the ability to retain independent legal aid during the critical early stages of an investigation. Anecdotal reports suggest that of the 2,000 lawyers authorized by the judiciary, a mere 20 were affiliated with the Tehran Bar Association. By restricting legal representation to a pre-approved pool of attorneys, the regime effectively eliminates the possibility of challenging or scrutinising the regime’s actions. This system promotes impunity among regime officials by creating an environment where abuses of power, such as arbitrary detentions, torture, and unfair trials, go unchallenged.
The Iranian regime directs politically sensitive cases, including those involving dissent or opposition to the regime, to separate courts that are under its control. This practice includes the use of Revolutionary Courts and other specialized tribunals designed to deal with cases that the regime considers a threat to its stability. Revolutionary Courts issued 520, approximately 61 percent, of all death sentences carried out in 2023. While integrated into the country’s judiciary, the Revolutionary Courts ofen operate in defiance of both domestic statutes and global legal standards. These tribunals are characterized by a persistent disregard for due process, frequently conducting expedited trials where defendants are stripped of their right to a defense. In many instances, the judiciary actively obstructs legal counsel by concealing vital case documents, evidence, and investigative findings. Over the last four decades, these specialized courts have established a reputation for extreme sentencing. They are responsible for a staggering death toll, with records indicating that at least 25,000 individuals—among them thousands of political dissidents—have been executed following verdicts handed down by these panels.
The Iranian regime’s executive and legislative institutions lack genuine independence and are extensively controlled by oversight mechanisms that ensure their actions and decisions consistently serve regime interests. For instance, in addition to its electoral duties, the Guardian Council, composed of non-elected clerics and jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader, also vets all legislation passed by the Parliament to ensure conformity with Islamic law and the regime’s ideological framework. This vetting process often leads to the rejection of laws that might challenge regime interests, effectively shaping legislation in favor of regime continuity. The Iranian parliament (Majlis-e Shura-ye Eslami) has passed numerous laws that enhance state security and suppress dissent. For example, legislation that criminalizes protests, restricts freedom of expression, or expands surveillance powers serves to entrench the regime’s grip on power. An illustrative case is the 2018 amendments to the Law on Cybercrime, which increased government control over digital spaces, targeting activists and opposition voices. The Assembly of Experts’ (Majles-e Khobregan) power to influence or affect legislation is limited. Although it theoretically holds the constitutional authority to oversee the Supreme Leader and influence his decisions, it does not have a formal role in the legislative process or in drafting or passing laws. As a result, it serves more as a body that safeguards the ideological integrity of the regime rather than as an active legislative or policy-making institution.
