Hybrid Authoritarian
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Population
HRF classifies India as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
After independence in 1947, the Indian National Congress (Congress) emerged as the dominant party and governed for most of the next six decades, shaping the country’s postcolonial institutions under the leadership of the Nehru–Gandhi dynasty. In 2014, Narendra Modi, then Chief Minister of Gujarat, led the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to a decisive victory, ending Congress’ long electoral dominance and inaugurating an era of right-wing Hindu nationalist rule. Modi has since secured three consecutive terms – the first Indian prime minister to do so since Jawaharlal Nehru – cementing both his personal authority and the BJP’s central role in national politics. His government remains deeply polarizing, with supporters celebrating him for economic growth and assertive nationalism, and critics pointing out the systematic dismantling of democratic freedoms, weakening institutional independence, and targeting Muslim and other minority communities.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of BJP to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely although realistic chance to win. While the 2024 election denied the BJP an absolute majority for the first time in a decade, forcing it into coalition, the party still commands the largest bloc in parliament and benefits from structural advantages. These stem from years of politically motivated investigations and arrests of opposition leaders, an entrenched campaign finance imbalance fueled by the electoral bonds scheme, which was annulled in 2024, and weakened electoral oversight.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their capacity to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The BJP has ordered the shutdown of several international NGOs, expanded censorship powers through sedition and anti-terrorism laws, and relied on raids and financial scrutiny to intimidate media outlets. Non-state actors such as paramilitary right-wing Hindu organizations, including the Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh, further amplify repression through online harassment and attacks on journalists, activists, and protesters. Muslims and other marginalized groups have been disproportionately targeted through police violence, punitive demolitions, and cow-vigilante attacks, narrowing their ability to dissent.
Despite progress in certain aspects, courts and other independent institutions still frequently and unfairly side with the regime when reviewing challenges to regime policies or interests, with courts often showing excessive delays in election-related cases and reluctance to curb the misuse of laws against critics. Legislative institutions have been weakened by the BJP curtailing time for debate in the upper and lower house and mass suspensions of opposition lawmakers. Oversight bodies such as the Election Commission, Enforcement Directorate, and Information Commissions have also seen their autonomy eroded through statutory reforms that concentrate appointment and tenure powers in the hands and main interests of the regime.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the BJP, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely although realistic chance to win. Since coming to power in 2014, Prime Minister Modi and the BJP have skewed the electoral playing field through politically motivated and selective investigations of political opponents, a near-monopoly on campaign finance, and a systematic weakening of election management authorities. Additionally, controversial voter roll revisions in 2025 that may risk mass disenfranchisement have further undermined electoral integrity.
The regime has somewhat unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s campaign. This is done through politically motivated investigations, arrests, and harassment. Federal agencies such as the Enforcement Directorate and the Central Bureau of Investigation have disproportionately targeted opposition leaders, particularly during election periods. In the runup to the 2024 general election, for example, Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal was arrested, marking the first time a sitting chief minister was jailed in India’s history. Kejriwal’s case followed the arrest of more than a dozen officials belonging to his party, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), a well-known opposition party that has controlled Delhi since 2015. Congress also claimed that its campaign funds were frozen weeks before voting. Opposition figures have asserted that nearly 95% of federal investigations since 2019 have targeted them. In August 2025, the regime introduced a draft bill that would automatically disqualify sitting lawmakers who have been jailed for more than 30 days, even if they have not been formally convicted. This bill raises further concerns that it could be abused to unfairly deprive elected opposition figures of their seats.
The regime has somewhat enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. In 2017, the regime introduced the electoral bonds scheme, which enables individuals, groups, or corporations to make anonymous political donations by purchasing tax-free, time-limited bonds. While all registered parties are eligible to redeem purchased bonds, observers have criticized the scheme for giving the ruling BJP an unfair advantage, given that the identities of donors are known only to the State Bank of India (SBI), a state-owned bank, and not to the public or the Election Commission. Exposure of donor identities in such a manner risks undermining transparency in political donations and offering the regime unfettered access to donor identities. The Supreme Court granted opposition and civil society petitions to rule the electoral bonds scheme unconstitutional in February 2024, seven years after its introduction. In that time span, the BJP was able to rely on the scheme as its primary funding source and became the main beneficiary of bonds. In March 2024, the Election Commission published data handed by the SBI per the Supreme Court’s order showing that the BJP received nearly 50% of bonds sold between April 2019 and January 2024, amounting to INR60.6 million (approx. USD696,000). In contrast, the main opposition party, Congress, had an 11% share. Additionally, local media reported that in the wake of the regime’s introduction of the electoral bonds scheme, opposition lawmakers in several major states left their parties to join the BJP, citing the latter’s “near-monopoly on political funding.” While the BJP does not have overwhelming ownership of media, it has been able to leverage its financial dominance, fueled by the electoral bonds scheme, to spend exorbitant amounts on political advertising in online and offline media spaces and issue directives on how such advertisements were to be run by outlets falling within the purview of the Indian Broadcasting Foundation. Between 2014 and 2022, the regime spent nearly INR 65 billion (approx. USD 795 million) on electronic and print advertising, a sum unparalleled by any opposition party. Between February and April 2019, the BJP spent ten times more on Google ads than Congress. The party was also estimated to have 18 times more funds in its campaign coffers than its opponents in this period. In the 2024 general election, the BJP was accused of mobilizing the Central Bureau of Communication (CBC), a federal advertising agency, to run pro-BJP videos and slogans online with public funds. In the four months leading up to the 2024 general election, the CBC became the largest spender on Google ads, exhausting nearly INR387 million (approximately USD4.65 million) in such ads, far surpassing the USD3.3 million spent by Congress over the six years from June 2018 to March 2024.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, have contributed to the regime enjoying significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. The BJP has also been able to dominate online channels and fortify its Hindu nationalist platform and identity politics with the aid of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a far-right paramilitary group and ideological parent organization of the BJP. During the 2019 general election, RSS volunteers helped proliferate WhatsApp groups through which BJP propaganda was distributed. These groups were estimated to be in the millions. On mainstream social media platforms, RSS sister organizations, collectively known as the Sangh Parivar, launched a coordinated information operation to amplify the BJP’s campaign messages based on the socio-economic profiles of voters and spread anti-Muslim rhetoric to appeal to the Hindu majority. In April 2019, Facebook took down over 700 of such accounts, with some of them later discovered to have been linked to an IT firm close to the Prime Minister. On average, BJP-linked propaganda pages spent an estimated INR20 million (approximately USD250,000) in promotions. Moreover, the BJP reportedly deployed volunteers offline to approach and influence voters under the guise of increasing voter turnout. These tactics could also be observed in the 2023-2024 election season. Local civil society groups India Hate Lab reported a surge in anti-Muslim hate speech throughout 2023, propagated by BJP politicians and RSS volunteers across the nation, with 75% of recorded cases taking place in BJP strongholds. Many of these cases coincided with local elections ongoing at the time.
The regime has somewhat seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The Election Commission has repeatedly cleared Prime Minister Modi and senior BJP leaders of campaign rule violations while sanctioning opposition figures. The Commission refrained from intervening in high-profile arrests of opposition leaders during election time and failed to act on inflammatory rhetoric by BJP leaders. Reforms passed in December 2023 altered the Commission’s appointment process to give the regime a majority vote.
The regime has somewhat systematically disenfranchised specific groups of voters. The Election Commission has been criticized for overseeing the 2025 Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of voter rolls in Bihar, a state in eastern India, that demanded citizens to re-register to vote, now with extensive citizenship-related documentation, which risked disenfranchising millions of poor and migrant voters. These concerns are heightened by the 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), notified in 2024, which fast-tracks citizenship for non-Muslim migrants, and proposals for a nationwide National Register of Citizens requiring documentary proof of citizenship. Although the Supreme Court intervened to limit aspects of SIR, fears remain of its national rollout, threatening mass voter exclusion.
While allegations of electronic voting machine tampering and “vote theft” have not been conclusively proven, they have fueled widespread public debate and reinforced concerns about the erosion of electoral integrity. Nonetheless, the 2024 general election results – which denied the BJP an absolute majority for the first time since 2014, forcing it into a coalition – demonstrate that electoral competition has not collapsed entirely, and may be improving. The opposition coalition INDIA (Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance) secured 99 seats, signaling renewed space for opposition politics, though its durability remains uncertain given the BJP’s continued popularity.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. Since coming to power in 2014, the Modi government has leveraged restrictive laws, financial controls, and surveillance to weaken critical NGOs and media, while deploying censorship and intimidation to silence journalists, activists, and opposition voices. Protests have been met with violence, internet shutdowns, and punitive demolitions, with Muslims and other marginalized groups disproportionately targeted. Non-state actors linked to the BJP and its ideological parent, the RSS, have further contributed to repression through campus violence, mob attacks, and vigilante killings.
The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Authorities have weaponized the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) to revoke or suspend over 20,000 NGO licenses, forcing groups such as Amnesty India, Greenpeace, and the Centre for Policy Research to scale back or close. The Kashmir Press Club was forcibly shuttered in 2022, while independent outlets like Maktoob Media have been temporarily blocked under IT Act 69A and police raids on outlets such as BBC, NDTV, and NewsClick have continued.
The regime has somewhat manipulated media coverage in its favor. In 2025, the government temporarily blocked 2,355 X (formerly Twitter) accounts under Section 69A of the IT Act, including major international news outlets such as Reuters, TRT News, and Global Times, without proper justification. These accounts were unblocked shortly after. Conglomerates closely tied to the government, such as Adani and Reliance, dominate ownership of major outlets, while Indian independent media platform Newslaundry’s content analysis study of 429 prime-time segments found that just 1.4% questioned the government. The BJP has withdrawn advertising from critical publications and directed vast state resources to pro-government media campaigns. Pro-government troll farms and RSS-affiliated networks amplify intimidation, spreading propaganda and targeting dissenters with coordinated harassment.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Journalists and activists face raids, arbitrary detention, doxxing, and surveillance, including through Pegasus spyware. High-profile cases include the arrest of human rights activist Khurram Parvez and Kashmiri journalist Aasif Sultan under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), as well as the prosecution of famous author Arundhati Roy in June 2024. In Kashmir, draconian laws and blanket restrictions severely constrain expression. Nationwide, dissenting students, comedians, and academics face intimidation. Reporters Without Borders has documented at least 28 journalists killed since 2014, most with little accountability. These include the murder of freelance reporter Mukesh Chandrakar in January 2025 after he exposed corruption by local officials.
The regime has repressed protests and marginalized groups’ ability to dissent. Police crackdowns on the anti-CAA movement (2019–2020) left dozens dead, mostly Muslims, with thousands detained and mass internet shutdowns imposed. Police violence against protesters in 2022 and punitive demolitions of Muslim homes reinforced a climate of fear. Peaceful farmers’ protests in 2024-25 faced pellet fire, drones, and surveillance. In Kashmir, prohibitions on gatherings and routine detentions persist.
Non-state actors, with ties to the governing authority, have contributed to seriously and unfairly repressing dissenting protests. The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), a student organization affiliated with the RSS, as well as right-wing Hindutva mobs, have repeatedly disrupted assemblies on college campuses, attacked minority students, and publicly lynched minorities, often amid police inaction. Muslims remain disproportionately affected, facing targeted killings by cow-vigilante groups that are granted immunity by the regime, punitive demolitions often backed by the police, and selective policing, which narrows their ability to dissent. For example, the Delhi riots of February 2020 over the CAA were the deadliest outbreak of communal violence in the Indian capital in decades, leaving over 50 people dead and hundreds injured, the majority of them Muslims. Mobs armed with stones, rods, and firearms attacked homes, shops, and mosques in northeast Delhi, while police were accused of either standing by or actively colluding in the violence. More generally, there are constant cases of ABVP violence against left-wing groups on college campuses, and between 2015 and 2018, at least 44 people (36 of them Muslims and the rest Dalit or Adivasi) were killed by cow vigilante groups affiliated with the BJP.
Finally, the regime has engaged in or enabled transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Critics have faced cancellation of Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) status and entry bans, including Swedish academic Ashok Swain and UK professor Nitasha Kaul. Investigations in Canada and the United States have implicated Indian officials in assassination plots against Sikh separatists, including the 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada and a foiled plot by a former Indian intelligence officer to assassinate Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in New York in 2024.
Despite these concerning trends, critical independent media remains resilient, and peaceful protests across a range of issues continue. The farmers’ protests were the largest in contemporary history and were successful in overturning the government’s farm laws, while journalists, comedians, artists, and other individuals critical of the BJP continue their work, though in an increasingly intimidating environment.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Courts have often failed to provide timely checks on the BJP while allowing politically motivated investigations to undermine opposition leaders. Legislative scrutiny has been curtailed through mass suspensions, reduced committee review, and fast-tracking of major bills, while oversight bodies such as the Election Commission, the Enforcement Directorate, and Information Commissions have seen their autonomy narrowed through statutory reforms that concentrate power in the executive.
Courts have somewhat failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. The Supreme Court’s long delay in striking down the electoral bonds scheme allowed the BJP to benefit from it across two election cycles, entrenching its campaign finance dominance. Courts have also been reluctant to intervene against politically motivated investigations, with opposition leaders such as Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal kept in detention throughout much of the 2024 elections. At the same time, the judiciary has upheld controversial measures, including the revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy, which affects election administration in the territory. Nevertheless, there has been progress in certain aspects, such as the overhaul of the election commissioner appointment process to enhance impartiality in 2023.
Courts have somewhat frequently and unfairly enabled the BJP’s attempts to repress criticism. Lower courts have convicted prominent dissidents on politically motivated charges, such as academic G.N. Saibaba – who spent a decade imprisoned under UAPA before passing away in 2024 after years of denied medical care – and former police officer Sanjiv Bhatt, who remains in prison on charges linked to his criticism of Modi’s role in the 2002 Gujarat riots. Social activist Parvez Parwaz was sentenced to life on trumped-up charges after seeking to hold a BJP chief minister accountable for inciting communal violence. In April 2022, the Supreme Court upheld the FCRA, a law that is often weaponized to impose undue restrictions on NGOs’ foreign funding. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has intermittently intervened to protect dissent – suspending the colonial-era sedition law, striking down Section 66A of the IT Act, and warning against misuse of a new legal code dealing with acts endangering the sovereignty, unity. More recently, it declared the extrajudicial demolitions of Muslim-owned properties by local officials – a practice colloquially known as “bulldozer justice” – illegal, and examined India’s so-called “new sedition law.” BNS §152 law, susceptible to criminalizing critical journalism.
Judicial and executive institutions have somewhat systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold BJP officials accountable. Senior BJP leaders, including Amit Shah, were acquitted in high-profile murder and corruption cases; 32 BJP figures were cleared in the Babri Masjid demolition case; and charges against Prime Minister Modi and others for the 2002 Gujarat riots were dismissed. During the 2024 election, local courts likewise acquitted BJP politicians of violations while opposition leaders faced harsh rulings. The record on accountability by other institutions remains mixed. While institutions like the Enforcement Directorate (ED), an executive body, and the Election Commission, a constitutionally independent body, have had sparse cases of holding the BJP accountable, they have by and large failed to do so in high-profile cases. As of mid-2025, the ED has claimed that it has handled 5,892 money-laundering cases, under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 (PMLA), since 2015, but secured only eight convictions.
The governing authority has repeatedly used reforms to weaken judicial, legislative, and oversight institutions. In Parliament, debate and scrutiny have been reduced through curtailing debate and committee review of proposed laws in the upper and lower houses, sidelining the opposition through mass suspensions while moving major bills, and using fast-track tools like ‘voting without discussion’. In December 2023, 146 opposition MPs were expelled over protests about a security breach, allowing the government to pass sweeping criminal law overhauls virtually without opposition. Data from PRS, an Indian nonprofit, show that in the 17th Lok Sabha (lower house), only 16% of bills were referred to standing committees – the lowest share in recent cycles – and half the bills that passed were debated for under two hours, indicating minimal transparency and bipartisan deliberation in the legislative process. The government also suspended “Question Hour”, a daily slot in which lawmakers can orally question ministers, entirely for the 2020 Monsoon session. Oversight bodies have been weakened by statutory changes: the Right to Information (Amendment) Act 2019 empowered the regime to determine the tenure, salaries, and service conditions of the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners, effectively placing these statutorily independent officials under executive control. Subsequent amendments in 2021 to the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and the Central Vigilance Commission Act allowed the regime to grant annual extensions (up to five years) to the directors of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the ED, a change critics argue compromises their independence by making tenure contingent on executive favor. In 2021, the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act replaced the previous system of appointing election commissions – where a selection committee included the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, and Chief Justice – with one composed solely of the Prime Minister, a Union Minister nominated by him, and the Leader of Opposition, thus removing judicial participation and increasing executive influence over the process. Collectively, these reforms have eroded the autonomy of key oversight and accountability bodies.
HRF classifies India as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
After independence in 1947, the Indian National Congress (Congress) emerged as the dominant party and governed for most of the next six decades, shaping the country’s postcolonial institutions under the leadership of the Nehru–Gandhi dynasty. In 2014, Narendra Modi, then Chief Minister of Gujarat, led the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to a decisive victory, ending Congress’ long electoral dominance and inaugurating an era of right-wing Hindu nationalist rule. Modi has since secured three consecutive terms – the first Indian prime minister to do so since Jawaharlal Nehru – cementing both his personal authority and the BJP’s central role in national politics. His government remains deeply polarizing, with supporters celebrating him for economic growth and assertive nationalism, and critics pointing out the systematic dismantling of democratic freedoms, weakening institutional independence, and targeting Muslim and other minority communities.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of BJP to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely although realistic chance to win. While the 2024 election denied the BJP an absolute majority for the first time in a decade, forcing it into coalition, the party still commands the largest bloc in parliament and benefits from structural advantages. These stem from years of politically motivated investigations and arrests of opposition leaders, an entrenched campaign finance imbalance fueled by the electoral bonds scheme, which was annulled in 2024, and weakened electoral oversight.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their capacity to openly criticize or challenge the regime. The BJP has ordered the shutdown of several international NGOs, expanded censorship powers through sedition and anti-terrorism laws, and relied on raids and financial scrutiny to intimidate media outlets. Non-state actors such as paramilitary right-wing Hindu organizations, including the Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh, further amplify repression through online harassment and attacks on journalists, activists, and protesters. Muslims and other marginalized groups have been disproportionately targeted through police violence, punitive demolitions, and cow-vigilante attacks, narrowing their ability to dissent.
Despite progress in certain aspects, courts and other independent institutions still frequently and unfairly side with the regime when reviewing challenges to regime policies or interests, with courts often showing excessive delays in election-related cases and reluctance to curb the misuse of laws against critics. Legislative institutions have been weakened by the BJP curtailing time for debate in the upper and lower house and mass suspensions of opposition lawmakers. Oversight bodies such as the Election Commission, Enforcement Directorate, and Information Commissions have also seen their autonomy eroded through statutory reforms that concentrate appointment and tenure powers in the hands and main interests of the regime.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the BJP, to the point where the real, mainstream opposition has a highly unlikely although realistic chance to win. Since coming to power in 2014, Prime Minister Modi and the BJP have skewed the electoral playing field through politically motivated and selective investigations of political opponents, a near-monopoly on campaign finance, and a systematic weakening of election management authorities. Additionally, controversial voter roll revisions in 2025 that may risk mass disenfranchisement have further undermined electoral integrity.
The regime has somewhat unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s campaign. This is done through politically motivated investigations, arrests, and harassment. Federal agencies such as the Enforcement Directorate and the Central Bureau of Investigation have disproportionately targeted opposition leaders, particularly during election periods. In the runup to the 2024 general election, for example, Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal was arrested, marking the first time a sitting chief minister was jailed in India’s history. Kejriwal’s case followed the arrest of more than a dozen officials belonging to his party, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), a well-known opposition party that has controlled Delhi since 2015. Congress also claimed that its campaign funds were frozen weeks before voting. Opposition figures have asserted that nearly 95% of federal investigations since 2019 have targeted them. In August 2025, the regime introduced a draft bill that would automatically disqualify sitting lawmakers who have been jailed for more than 30 days, even if they have not been formally convicted. This bill raises further concerns that it could be abused to unfairly deprive elected opposition figures of their seats.
The regime has somewhat enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. In 2017, the regime introduced the electoral bonds scheme, which enables individuals, groups, or corporations to make anonymous political donations by purchasing tax-free, time-limited bonds. While all registered parties are eligible to redeem purchased bonds, observers have criticized the scheme for giving the ruling BJP an unfair advantage, given that the identities of donors are known only to the State Bank of India (SBI), a state-owned bank, and not to the public or the Election Commission. Exposure of donor identities in such a manner risks undermining transparency in political donations and offering the regime unfettered access to donor identities. The Supreme Court granted opposition and civil society petitions to rule the electoral bonds scheme unconstitutional in February 2024, seven years after its introduction. In that time span, the BJP was able to rely on the scheme as its primary funding source and became the main beneficiary of bonds. In March 2024, the Election Commission published data handed by the SBI per the Supreme Court’s order showing that the BJP received nearly 50% of bonds sold between April 2019 and January 2024, amounting to INR60.6 million (approx. USD696,000). In contrast, the main opposition party, Congress, had an 11% share. Additionally, local media reported that in the wake of the regime’s introduction of the electoral bonds scheme, opposition lawmakers in several major states left their parties to join the BJP, citing the latter’s “near-monopoly on political funding.” While the BJP does not have overwhelming ownership of media, it has been able to leverage its financial dominance, fueled by the electoral bonds scheme, to spend exorbitant amounts on political advertising in online and offline media spaces and issue directives on how such advertisements were to be run by outlets falling within the purview of the Indian Broadcasting Foundation. Between 2014 and 2022, the regime spent nearly INR 65 billion (approx. USD 795 million) on electronic and print advertising, a sum unparalleled by any opposition party. Between February and April 2019, the BJP spent ten times more on Google ads than Congress. The party was also estimated to have 18 times more funds in its campaign coffers than its opponents in this period. In the 2024 general election, the BJP was accused of mobilizing the Central Bureau of Communication (CBC), a federal advertising agency, to run pro-BJP videos and slogans online with public funds. In the four months leading up to the 2024 general election, the CBC became the largest spender on Google ads, exhausting nearly INR387 million (approximately USD4.65 million) in such ads, far surpassing the USD3.3 million spent by Congress over the six years from June 2018 to March 2024.
Non-state actors, with ties to the regime, have contributed to the regime enjoying significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the real, mainstream opposition’s ability to compete. The BJP has also been able to dominate online channels and fortify its Hindu nationalist platform and identity politics with the aid of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a far-right paramilitary group and ideological parent organization of the BJP. During the 2019 general election, RSS volunteers helped proliferate WhatsApp groups through which BJP propaganda was distributed. These groups were estimated to be in the millions. On mainstream social media platforms, RSS sister organizations, collectively known as the Sangh Parivar, launched a coordinated information operation to amplify the BJP’s campaign messages based on the socio-economic profiles of voters and spread anti-Muslim rhetoric to appeal to the Hindu majority. In April 2019, Facebook took down over 700 of such accounts, with some of them later discovered to have been linked to an IT firm close to the Prime Minister. On average, BJP-linked propaganda pages spent an estimated INR20 million (approximately USD250,000) in promotions. Moreover, the BJP reportedly deployed volunteers offline to approach and influence voters under the guise of increasing voter turnout. These tactics could also be observed in the 2023-2024 election season. Local civil society groups India Hate Lab reported a surge in anti-Muslim hate speech throughout 2023, propagated by BJP politicians and RSS volunteers across the nation, with 75% of recorded cases taking place in BJP strongholds. Many of these cases coincided with local elections ongoing at the time.
The regime has somewhat seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The Election Commission has repeatedly cleared Prime Minister Modi and senior BJP leaders of campaign rule violations while sanctioning opposition figures. The Commission refrained from intervening in high-profile arrests of opposition leaders during election time and failed to act on inflammatory rhetoric by BJP leaders. Reforms passed in December 2023 altered the Commission’s appointment process to give the regime a majority vote.
The regime has somewhat systematically disenfranchised specific groups of voters. The Election Commission has been criticized for overseeing the 2025 Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of voter rolls in Bihar, a state in eastern India, that demanded citizens to re-register to vote, now with extensive citizenship-related documentation, which risked disenfranchising millions of poor and migrant voters. These concerns are heightened by the 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), notified in 2024, which fast-tracks citizenship for non-Muslim migrants, and proposals for a nationwide National Register of Citizens requiring documentary proof of citizenship. Although the Supreme Court intervened to limit aspects of SIR, fears remain of its national rollout, threatening mass voter exclusion.
While allegations of electronic voting machine tampering and “vote theft” have not been conclusively proven, they have fueled widespread public debate and reinforced concerns about the erosion of electoral integrity. Nonetheless, the 2024 general election results – which denied the BJP an absolute majority for the first time since 2014, forcing it into a coalition – demonstrate that electoral competition has not collapsed entirely, and may be improving. The opposition coalition INDIA (Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance) secured 99 seats, signaling renewed space for opposition politics, though its durability remains uncertain given the BJP’s continued popularity.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. Since coming to power in 2014, the Modi government has leveraged restrictive laws, financial controls, and surveillance to weaken critical NGOs and media, while deploying censorship and intimidation to silence journalists, activists, and opposition voices. Protests have been met with violence, internet shutdowns, and punitive demolitions, with Muslims and other marginalized groups disproportionately targeted. Non-state actors linked to the BJP and its ideological parent, the RSS, have further contributed to repression through campus violence, mob attacks, and vigilante killings.
The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Authorities have weaponized the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) to revoke or suspend over 20,000 NGO licenses, forcing groups such as Amnesty India, Greenpeace, and the Centre for Policy Research to scale back or close. The Kashmir Press Club was forcibly shuttered in 2022, while independent outlets like Maktoob Media have been temporarily blocked under IT Act 69A and police raids on outlets such as BBC, NDTV, and NewsClick have continued.
The regime has somewhat manipulated media coverage in its favor. In 2025, the government temporarily blocked 2,355 X (formerly Twitter) accounts under Section 69A of the IT Act, including major international news outlets such as Reuters, TRT News, and Global Times, without proper justification. These accounts were unblocked shortly after. Conglomerates closely tied to the government, such as Adani and Reliance, dominate ownership of major outlets, while Indian independent media platform Newslaundry’s content analysis study of 429 prime-time segments found that just 1.4% questioned the government. The BJP has withdrawn advertising from critical publications and directed vast state resources to pro-government media campaigns. Pro-government troll farms and RSS-affiliated networks amplify intimidation, spreading propaganda and targeting dissenters with coordinated harassment.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Journalists and activists face raids, arbitrary detention, doxxing, and surveillance, including through Pegasus spyware. High-profile cases include the arrest of human rights activist Khurram Parvez and Kashmiri journalist Aasif Sultan under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), as well as the prosecution of famous author Arundhati Roy in June 2024. In Kashmir, draconian laws and blanket restrictions severely constrain expression. Nationwide, dissenting students, comedians, and academics face intimidation. Reporters Without Borders has documented at least 28 journalists killed since 2014, most with little accountability. These include the murder of freelance reporter Mukesh Chandrakar in January 2025 after he exposed corruption by local officials.
The regime has repressed protests and marginalized groups’ ability to dissent. Police crackdowns on the anti-CAA movement (2019–2020) left dozens dead, mostly Muslims, with thousands detained and mass internet shutdowns imposed. Police violence against protesters in 2022 and punitive demolitions of Muslim homes reinforced a climate of fear. Peaceful farmers’ protests in 2024-25 faced pellet fire, drones, and surveillance. In Kashmir, prohibitions on gatherings and routine detentions persist.
Non-state actors, with ties to the governing authority, have contributed to seriously and unfairly repressing dissenting protests. The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), a student organization affiliated with the RSS, as well as right-wing Hindutva mobs, have repeatedly disrupted assemblies on college campuses, attacked minority students, and publicly lynched minorities, often amid police inaction. Muslims remain disproportionately affected, facing targeted killings by cow-vigilante groups that are granted immunity by the regime, punitive demolitions often backed by the police, and selective policing, which narrows their ability to dissent. For example, the Delhi riots of February 2020 over the CAA were the deadliest outbreak of communal violence in the Indian capital in decades, leaving over 50 people dead and hundreds injured, the majority of them Muslims. Mobs armed with stones, rods, and firearms attacked homes, shops, and mosques in northeast Delhi, while police were accused of either standing by or actively colluding in the violence. More generally, there are constant cases of ABVP violence against left-wing groups on college campuses, and between 2015 and 2018, at least 44 people (36 of them Muslims and the rest Dalit or Adivasi) were killed by cow vigilante groups affiliated with the BJP.
Finally, the regime has engaged in or enabled transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Critics have faced cancellation of Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) status and entry bans, including Swedish academic Ashok Swain and UK professor Nitasha Kaul. Investigations in Canada and the United States have implicated Indian officials in assassination plots against Sikh separatists, including the 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada and a foiled plot by a former Indian intelligence officer to assassinate Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in New York in 2024.
Despite these concerning trends, critical independent media remains resilient, and peaceful protests across a range of issues continue. The farmers’ protests were the largest in contemporary history and were successful in overturning the government’s farm laws, while journalists, comedians, artists, and other individuals critical of the BJP continue their work, though in an increasingly intimidating environment.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Courts have often failed to provide timely checks on the BJP while allowing politically motivated investigations to undermine opposition leaders. Legislative scrutiny has been curtailed through mass suspensions, reduced committee review, and fast-tracking of major bills, while oversight bodies such as the Election Commission, the Enforcement Directorate, and Information Commissions have seen their autonomy narrowed through statutory reforms that concentrate power in the executive.
Courts have somewhat failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. The Supreme Court’s long delay in striking down the electoral bonds scheme allowed the BJP to benefit from it across two election cycles, entrenching its campaign finance dominance. Courts have also been reluctant to intervene against politically motivated investigations, with opposition leaders such as Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal kept in detention throughout much of the 2024 elections. At the same time, the judiciary has upheld controversial measures, including the revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy, which affects election administration in the territory. Nevertheless, there has been progress in certain aspects, such as the overhaul of the election commissioner appointment process to enhance impartiality in 2023.
Courts have somewhat frequently and unfairly enabled the BJP’s attempts to repress criticism. Lower courts have convicted prominent dissidents on politically motivated charges, such as academic G.N. Saibaba – who spent a decade imprisoned under UAPA before passing away in 2024 after years of denied medical care – and former police officer Sanjiv Bhatt, who remains in prison on charges linked to his criticism of Modi’s role in the 2002 Gujarat riots. Social activist Parvez Parwaz was sentenced to life on trumped-up charges after seeking to hold a BJP chief minister accountable for inciting communal violence. In April 2022, the Supreme Court upheld the FCRA, a law that is often weaponized to impose undue restrictions on NGOs’ foreign funding. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has intermittently intervened to protect dissent – suspending the colonial-era sedition law, striking down Section 66A of the IT Act, and warning against misuse of a new legal code dealing with acts endangering the sovereignty, unity. More recently, it declared the extrajudicial demolitions of Muslim-owned properties by local officials – a practice colloquially known as “bulldozer justice” – illegal, and examined India’s so-called “new sedition law.” BNS §152 law, susceptible to criminalizing critical journalism.
Judicial and executive institutions have somewhat systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold BJP officials accountable. Senior BJP leaders, including Amit Shah, were acquitted in high-profile murder and corruption cases; 32 BJP figures were cleared in the Babri Masjid demolition case; and charges against Prime Minister Modi and others for the 2002 Gujarat riots were dismissed. During the 2024 election, local courts likewise acquitted BJP politicians of violations while opposition leaders faced harsh rulings. The record on accountability by other institutions remains mixed. While institutions like the Enforcement Directorate (ED), an executive body, and the Election Commission, a constitutionally independent body, have had sparse cases of holding the BJP accountable, they have by and large failed to do so in high-profile cases. As of mid-2025, the ED has claimed that it has handled 5,892 money-laundering cases, under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 (PMLA), since 2015, but secured only eight convictions.
The governing authority has repeatedly used reforms to weaken judicial, legislative, and oversight institutions. In Parliament, debate and scrutiny have been reduced through curtailing debate and committee review of proposed laws in the upper and lower houses, sidelining the opposition through mass suspensions while moving major bills, and using fast-track tools like ‘voting without discussion’. In December 2023, 146 opposition MPs were expelled over protests about a security breach, allowing the government to pass sweeping criminal law overhauls virtually without opposition. Data from PRS, an Indian nonprofit, show that in the 17th Lok Sabha (lower house), only 16% of bills were referred to standing committees – the lowest share in recent cycles – and half the bills that passed were debated for under two hours, indicating minimal transparency and bipartisan deliberation in the legislative process. The government also suspended “Question Hour”, a daily slot in which lawmakers can orally question ministers, entirely for the 2020 Monsoon session. Oversight bodies have been weakened by statutory changes: the Right to Information (Amendment) Act 2019 empowered the regime to determine the tenure, salaries, and service conditions of the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners, effectively placing these statutorily independent officials under executive control. Subsequent amendments in 2021 to the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and the Central Vigilance Commission Act allowed the regime to grant annual extensions (up to five years) to the directors of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the ED, a change critics argue compromises their independence by making tenure contingent on executive favor. In 2021, the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act replaced the previous system of appointing election commissions – where a selection committee included the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, and Chief Justice – with one composed solely of the Prime Minister, a Union Minister nominated by him, and the Leader of Opposition, thus removing judicial participation and increasing executive influence over the process. Collectively, these reforms have eroded the autonomy of key oversight and accountability bodies.
